Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE. First conclusion: In things composed of matter and form, it is necessary that nature and supposit differ. The reason is that nature comprehends only those things which fall within the definition of the species; but the supposit includes individual matter, and this flesh, and these bones, together with the accidents designating this matter. Second conclusion: In substances separated from matter, supposit and nature do not differ. The reason is that forms subsisting through themselves are individuated. Third conclusion, the principal one: God is the same as his essence or nature. The reason is that God is not composed of matter and form; therefore he is his Godhead, and his life, etc.

COMMENTARY. IN this article there are three difficulties, chiefly according to the number and the order of these three conclusions. The first: Whether in material substances the supposit is really distinguished from the nature?

Argument is made first, on the negative side, from Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 21, where he says that in all substances the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is. And in text 20, teaching the same, he excepts from this universal only those things which are one per accidens. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas in the article proves only from this that supposit and nature differ really in material things, because the supposit includes individuating, or material, conditions which the nature does not include. Then the argument is made thus: material conditions are not of the account of the supposit, but are accidents of it, and come to the supposit already constituted; therefore from these no real distinction of it from the nature is gathered. The antecedent is proved: for the supposit is the primary substance, which according to Aristotle's sentence in the predicament of substance is most properly and supremely substance; therefore it is not constituted in the to-be of a supposit through accidental conditions designating this matter, as St. Thomas says in the article. And this reasoning we brought forward in the preceding article as a demonstration, by which we proved that designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, does not import matter with actual quantity. It is confirmed secondly: for if the supposit included material accidents, it would be a being per accidens; for from substance and accident there does not arise one per se, as Aristotle often teaches. And also because if God by a miracle separated from Peter all his accidents, he would still remain the same in number.

Secondly it is argued principally: individual material conditions per se first pertain to the singular nature, in such a way that this humanity includes by priority of nature all those conditions before this man does; therefore supposit and nature do not differ really. The consequence is evident, standing within St. Thomas's reasoning; and the antecedent is proved. By priority of nature this humanity is singular before this man is constituted in the singular to-be of this man: it is proved, for this individual, namely Peter, is this man for the reason that he has this singular and essential nature, namely this humanity; therefore it is understood prior that the nature is singular. And it is confirmed: for the divine Word assumed this singular humanity, and did not assume a supposit; therefore the human nature is understood as singular before it be understood in a supposit, otherwise a singular nature could not be assumed without a supposit being assumed.

Thirdly it is argued: the account of the individual is presupposed to the account of the supposit; therefore it belongs to the nature prior to the supposit, and consequently the account on which St. Thomas relies in the article is null. The consequence is proved: for every condition which precedes the account of the supposit holds on the side of the nature. And the antecedent is proved: the account of the supposit is that it be subsisting through itself, independent of any other supposit through which it subsists; but the account of the individual is that it be undivided in itself, that is, one thing simply, and that it cannot be divided into several inferior things. But this second account is presupposed to the first: for it is prior that some thing be one in itself and undivided, than that it subsist independently of every other; therefore the account of singularity belongs to the nature prior. You will say perhaps that St. Thomas in this article does not say that the material individual really differs from the singular nature, but only says that it really differs from the specific nature: for he speaks of the definable nature, saying that nature comprehends only those things which fall within the definition of the species, such as humanity. Against this is the argument: it follows that St. Thomas spoke defectively; since he does not sufficiently distinguish the material supposit from the divine supposit. For this is peculiar to the divine supposit, that it be the same as its most singular nature. Likewise also he speaks defectively in that, in distinguishing the singular supposit from the specific nature, he does not compare it to the singular nature.

Fourthly it is argued: there follows from this sentence of St. Thomas that this proposition is false, man is humanity; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved. For of those things which are really distinguished, one is not predicated of the other. And the minor is proved. For this proposition is true in divine things, God is Godhead; and in created things this is true, a created being is entity; therefore this too will be true, man is humanity.

Fifth. The supposit does not include anything real which the nature does not include; therefore they do not differ really. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved: for otherwise this would be false, man is the thing which is humanity, which nevertheless all Metaphysicians concede. It is proved: because this is false, man is the thing which is prime matter, man is the thing which is the soul; because man includes, besides matter, the form itself, and besides the soul, the body; therefore if the supposit adds something real above the nature, that proposition will likewise be false.

Lastly it is argued. If the supposit differs from the nature really, then also personality is really distinguished from the nature, and existence. And then again it follows that in material things there is a threefold composition, namely of matter and form, of to-be and essence, and of nature and personality: which nevertheless no Metaphysician has yet said. On the contrary, however, is the sentence of St. Thomas in this article, which he took from Aristotle, 3 De Anima, text 9, and 7 Metaphysics, text 41, where he says: «And what it was to be for each thing is in some cases the same, as in primary substances». But all things which are as matter, or as things gathered together from matter, are not the same. Concerning this difficulty there are very many opinions, which see in Master Cajetan, in the 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, where this matter is also disputed. FOR the resolution, it must be noted first that a supposit properly taken is a complete individual substance subsisting incommunicably. It is called substance to exclude accidents; complete excludes parts of a substance, such as head, arms, etc.; individual excludes the specific nature, not only as signified in the abstract, as humanity, but also in the concrete, as man: for we are speaking here of the singular supposit. It is called subsisting in contrast to a substantial nature taken in the abstract, which does not subsist, but is that by which the supposit subsists. We say incommunicably, to exclude God from the account of supposit: for this God, as communicable to the three Divine Persons, is not a supposit. It is true that at present the substantial supposit is not only taken for the singular supposit, but also for what is signified by a common term, e.g. man. For I consider that, since man imports the human nature in a supposit, although it imports the nature prior thereto, nevertheless it truly signifies the supposit confusedly and in common. And this is proved both from the definition of a common term handed down by the Dialecticians. And it is confirmed: for when man is taken personally, it is predicated of and supposits properly for supposits, therefore it signifies them. Secondly it is proved: for if man signifies the nature alone, and not the supposit, it follows that this should be granted, the Son of God assumed man, which nevertheless all Theologians reject as heretical, if it be taken in rigor, as is clear: 3rd part, q. 4, art. 3. And the sequel is proved: for the Son of God assumed the human nature; therefore if man adds nothing above the human nature, it follows well that he assumed man. Note secondly from St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ch. 3, that nature can be signified in two ways, both by way of a part, as by this word humanity, and by way of a whole, as it is signified by this word man. But they differ in that what is signified in the first way excludes from its account singular supposits, as for example humanity excludes Peter and Paul: for it signifies the form by which man is man, which cannot belong to Peter. But signified in the second way, it includes implicitly the singular supposits of that nature, as man. For it signifies one having humanity, which belongs to any supposit whatever. For to any supposit of the human nature it belongs that it be one having humanity, but not that it be that by which man is man. Hence it comes about that, since all that Peter explicitly imports, man imports implicitly and confusedly, by the same kind of distinction by which Peter differs from the human nature, man also differs. It is true that the Philosophers commonly are accustomed to understand by the name supposit only the singular supposit: where it must also be noted that, although St. Thomas in these distinctions for the sake of explanation is accustomed to attend to the mode of signifying of terms, whether the nature is signified by way of a part, or by way of a whole, etc., nevertheless our question proceeds most of all physically and metaphysically, attending to the natures of things, in which the mode of signifying is also wont to be founded. Note thirdly that the distinction by which something is distinguished from another is manifold: one is real distinction, and another of reason. And again the real distinction: one is between two things wholly or materially distinct, as between Peter and John, which is wont to be called the distinction of thing from thing; another is formal, such as that between action and passion. Again, that which is between two things is sometimes such as obtains between two of which one includes the other and adds something real. And this is still in a twofold difference: for sometimes something real is intrinsically enclosed in one which is not in the other, in the way that the whole is distinguished from any part taken separately, as Peter from his matter, inasmuch as he includes the form, and from his form, inasmuch as he includes the matter. But sometimes that which adds something real above another does not include it intrinsically, but extrinsically as a term which it looks to. Just as the capable-of-discipline or the risible is really distinguished from man, because it adds the act of discipline, or of risibility, which is something extrinsic to man himself.

THESE things noted, so that we may separate the certain from the uncertain, let the first conclusion be Although it is not an error in faith nor rash to say that supposit and nature are distinguished by reason alone, it is nevertheless much more conformable to faith and truth that in things composed of matter and form they be distinguished really. The first part of the conclusion is proved: for the truth of faith, that God assumed a singular nature, and not a supposit, is best saved with a distinction of reason alone between nature and supposit. I prove it: for that the union was made in a person and not in a nature, and that the term of the assumption is a person, is sufficiently saved by that distinction of reason; therefore also that truth, the Son of God assumed a nature, not a supposit. Secondly it is proved: for just as in this position, the divine Person immediately assumed, and not the divine nature, the truth is saved by a distinction of reason alone between person and divine nature, so also in this one, the human nature is assumed and not a person. But the second part of our conclusion is proved: for in this sentence nearly all the holy Doctors agree, saying that it is proper to God that in him nature and supposit, Godhead and God, not be distinguished. Those authorities are to be seen in the Master of the Sentences, in 1, d. 8, in the last part of the distinction, and d. 34. See also Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 11, and book 15 of On the Trinity, ch. 17; and Bernard on the Canticle, sermon 80. Likewise it is proved by reason. The supposit includes something real which the nature does not include; therefore they differ really. The consequence is clear from those things which we have noted here. The antecedent is proved. Many predicates are said of the supposit which are not truly said of the nature, whether taken in particular or in common, namely to subsist, to receive accidents, to act and to be acted upon. Therefore the supposit includes something real on account of which all these predicates belong to it, which the nature does not include. Secondly it is proved. This is false, Peter is this humanity, as is evident; therefore between subject and predicate there is a real distinction. The consequence is proved: for a distinction of reason alone is not sufficient to falsify a proposition, except on account of some appellation intervening; but in this proposition there is no appellation; therefore etc. Thirdly, according to the doctrine of faith the Son of God assumed the human nature, and did not assume a man, or a supposit; therefore they are really distinguished: for otherwise, if they are the same, why is one assumed and not the other? It is confirmed: for in order that the dogmas of the Theologians in the matter of the Incarnation be better asserted and verified, it is necessary to confess this distinction between nature and supposit. For the Theologians assert that the humanity in Christ lacks a personality of its own, and that it is inclined toward it, and that if the divine Person assumed a humanity in some person, it would corrupt the personality. All of which things require a real distinction between nature and supposit.

The point of difficulty of this question, then, the truth of the first conclusion being supposed, consists in this: that it be explained what the supposit adds above the nature, by which it is constituted in the to-be of a supposit and is distinguished from the nature. On which Cajetan in the 3rd part, above, having related seven opinions, which all agree in this, that the supposit adds nothing intrinsically positive above the singular nature, himself laid down his own sentence, that the supposit adds above the singular nature a certain positive reality, really distinct from the singular nature itself, which is a certain term or complement of the nature: and by this the individual is constituted in the to-be of a supposit. And by this complement (he says) the nature is made capable of existence, and is made able to act and to be acted upon. Hence just as the point (he says) is related to the line, because it terminates it: so this mode or complement is related to the nature, because it renders it terminated and complete.

The second sentence is that the supposit adds nothing real above the nature except the act of existence. Which opinion can be explained in a twofold sense: the first, that the supposit include the act of existence intrinsically, as the white thing includes whiteness; and this sense is most false. And it is refuted, because existence is essential to God alone, but to any created thing it is accidental, as will be said in the following article; therefore it is not intrinsically enclosed in the supposit of Peter. And it is confirmed. For otherwise this proposition would be of perpetual truth, Peter exists: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, which nevertheless is absurd. Furthermore, because St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2, says that to-be pertains to the person as to that which has to-be; therefore the to-be of existence presupposes the supposit which has to-be. Likewise, because that manner of speaking, that the to-be of existence is received in the supposit, is frequent in St. Thomas; therefore existence presupposes the supposit already constituted. In the other way this second opinion can be understood, that the supposit include the to-be of existence extrinsically, as the capable-of-discipline includes extrinsically the act of discipline. And in this sense this second opinion is Capreolus's, in 3, d. 5, q. 3, but it seems manifestly false. First, for if existence pertains only extrinsically to the supposit, then by priority of nature the supposit is understood as constituted in the to-be of a supposit before it be understood to have existence. Therefore there is already another intrinsic constitutive principle of the supposit. The first consequence is proved: for existence to be an extrinsic act of the supposit can be nothing other than that the account of the supposit be constituted through an order to existence; not, however, that it formally inhering constitute it, just as we said in the preceding article that designated matter is constituted through an order to quantity, yet not that quantity formally inhering makes it designated; therefore before existence is understood in the supposit, by priority of nature the supposit is fore-understood as intrinsically constituted in the to-be of a supposit. Secondly: for from this sentence it follows that the supposit adds nothing real intrinsically above the nature; therefore it is really the same as the nature: and then the arguments made in proof of the first conclusion return.

The third sentence is a middle one, which Master Vitoria taught, and which Master Soto often defends in the Logic and the Physics: that nature and supposit are indeed distinguished really, not as thing from thing, but as thing and mode of thing. Whence they seem to confess that the supposit adds a certain mode above the nature, but adds the act of existence extrinsically.

Let the second conclusion, however, be: the supposit in material things adds above the singular nature something real, positive, intrinsic to the supposit itself, and constitutive of it. It is proved first, from Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 15, where he divides substance into essence and supposit. And proportionally, in the predicament of substance it is divided into primary and secondary, where the primary substance is called supremely substance: but it is necessary to constitute something positive and intrinsic, constitutive of the essence and of the secondary substance; therefore likewise there must also be assigned something real, positive, intrinsic, constituting the supposit, which is to be per se separated from all others. It is confirmed: these names, I, you, this man, by common consent signify something real intrinsic to primary substances, and truly signify the supposit or person; therefore etc. Secondly it is proved: the divine Person is constituted in the to-be of a person through something real and positive; therefore also the created person. The consequence is proved: for person is said of the created and the uncreated person with one concept, although analogous. Thirdly it is proved, in the mystery of the Incarnation, according to the Catholic faith, the personality of the Word supplies the personality of the human nature; therefore the human personality is something real, because a negation is not supplied. It is confirmed: if Christ laid aside the humanity, in that laid-aside humanity there would be another person in number from the Person of the Word proper to that humanity; therefore without doubt that personality would be a substance: otherwise it would not be another. In this sentence St. Thomas is constant, in the 3rd part, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, where he says that if the divine Person assumed the nature of an existing angel, its personality would be destroyed. And in the second article he says that if the Person were fore-understood to the assumption, either it would be necessary that it be corrupted, and so the assumption would be in vain, or that it remain after the union, and so there would be two persons. See there at the second, and q. 17, art. 2, and especially at the first, where it is said that to-be follows upon the nature not as having to-be, but because it is something; but the person, or hypostasis, as having to-be. See there, q. 35, art. 5, and in the solution to the 5th. And in this conclusion we chiefly impugn Scotus, in 3, d. 1, q. 1, asserting that the supposit adds above the nature an intrinsic negation, namely that it cannot be terminated by another, nor exist in another.

Third conclusion: This constitutive principle of the supposit, namely to be per se separated from the rest, belongs reductively to the predicament of substance. And so the supposit is directly placed in the predicament of substance; but this reality constitutive of the supposit belongs there indirectly and reductively: just as the difference of man does not belong directly to the direct line of the predicament of substance, but reductively. It is proved: for the constitutive principle of substance, since it is of its account, cannot be an accident; therefore it is a substance. Again, it is not a substance placed in the direct line; therefore it belongs there reductively in that predicament. It is confirmed: for the difference constituting man, and the mode per se constituting substance, are reductively in the genus of substance; therefore also that real constitutive principle of the supposit. But if you say that Aristotle, 2 De Anima, text 2, in the division of substance makes no mention of this mode constituting the supposit, but only of matter, and form, and the composite: it is answered that by the name of composite he understood the nature with its term and complement constituting the supposit. Secondly the conclusion is proved: the supposit, according to the sentence of Aristotle and St. Thomas, adds something above the nature; but that is not the act of existence; therefore it is this mode which we posit. The consequence is proved, because nothing else substantial can be imagined which the supposit could add above the nature. It is confirmed: before the nature is understood as constituted in a supposit, it is understood as indeterminate and dependent on another; but constituted in a supposit, it is understood as determinate and altogether independent; therefore the supposit adds above the nature a certain real mode by which it is terminated and completed. Hence it follows that this mode, or complement, constitutive of the supposit is the pure and ultimate term of the substantial nature. The individual parts of this corollary are explained: it is called term, since the substantial nature, however much it be understood as perfect and singular, yet if it be not in a supposit or person, is still terminable, as is clear in the humanity of Christ, which indeed is most perfect in its species, and again singular, yet is still actually terminated by the personality of the Word. In the same way, in created supposits, natures according to themselves are perfect in their species, and singular through individuating principles, yet are terminated by the proper accounts of the supposits. Then it is called pure, to exclude all causality whatsoever, not only the extrinsic causality of the efficient cause, but also the intrinsic causality of the formal cause. And so to be a pure term is to terminate without including causality, just as the point in a line is called its pure term, so that it is not its cause. It is true, however, that this account of terminating can be reduced to the genus of formal cause, and, the imperfections removed, can belong to the divine Person. See Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 4, art. 3, at the end. For personality is not present to the nature as a proper property, but as a perfection and complement of the effect; it follows naturally upon the effect whose complement it is. For the nature, as prior by causality, is incomplete as regards its ultimate complement: but when it is personated, it attains the ultimate complement. Whence it comes about that the action by which this man is produced, if it be considered as begun, namely drawn out as far as this nature, abstracting from personation, is unaccomplished and imperfect, since it does not reach its term inclusively. But then it is perfect and accomplished, when the personated nature comes to be, which Peter signifies: for then it is drawn out as far as the term inclusively. The mode, therefore, by which personality follows upon the nature or the principles of the nature is that by which the term of the action and of the thing made is naturally present to the thing produced at the end of the action. It is called ultimate, since if the substantial nature has once been terminated by such an account of supposit, it is no longer terminable, at least as far as is on the part of the nature itself, since it now has its ultimate complement, by which it is most perfectly terminated. I said deliberately, as far as is on the part of its nature, since if we attend to the power of the terminating person, it can happen that a nature once terminated by one personality be then and successively terminated by another.

Fourth conclusion. This account constituting the supposit is really distinguished in created things, as a thing other than the act of being or of existence. And it is called by Master Cajetan subsistence. This conclusion is against Capreolus, in 3, d. 5, q. 3, who asserts that the act of being is extrinsic and outside the account of the supposit. In which Cajetan agrees with him. But it is said that that act of being is the same as personality. It is also against certain disciples of St. Thomas, who although they agree with Cajetan in this, that personality is of the intrinsic account of the person, nevertheless say that that personality is the act of being. It is also against some authors who hold that even if these two are really distinguished, they are nevertheless distinguished as thing and mode of thing, not as two entities. It is proved, then, first from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2, at the first, where he says that to-be follows upon the nature not as having to-be, but the person or hypostasis as having to-be. Where St. Thomas means that the account of the supposit precedes the act of being, and is prior to it; therefore the act of being is not personality. Secondly. Personality, or the account of the supposit, is altogether intrinsic to the person or supposit, and is placed in its definition, whereas existence is not of the account and definition of any created thing, but is the first act of every substance, as we shall explain at length in the following article; therefore. Thirdly. The act of being is not the same as the constitutive account of the secondary substance, species, or genus, but comes to it as actuating the quiddity constituted through its intrinsic and formal principles, all of which are related as potency with respect to the act of existence; therefore formally it is not the same as the account constituting the quiddity of the person. It is true, however (as we shall say at once), that this act of being is the act of the nature and of the supposit: but it is the first and immediate act of the supposit, and a mediated act of the nature. Lastly, this conclusion is proved by all the arguments by which we proved the first sentence to be false.

Fifth conclusion. It is most probable that the supposit intrinsically adds above the nature that real mode which we have spoken of, by which it is intrinsically constituted in the to-be of a supposit; but it also adds the act of existence, extrinsically, however. I mean in this second part that the supposit is constituted in the account of supposit through an order to existence as to the proper act of the supposit itself, yet it does not intrinsically include existence. This conclusion is proved first: because according to this conclusion the sentences of the most weighty doctors are reconciled; therefore. Secondly it is proved as regards the second part, for the first has already been proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion. The supposit is defined as being a subsisting individual substance, etc.; therefore in the account of the supposit there is included substance and an order to existence. And so the supposit is called existing and subsisting, because although it does not include subsistence in act, it nevertheless intrinsically includes an order to it. Thirdly, the supposit is nothing other than the immediate and proper recipient of substantial existence, according to the sentence of St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2; therefore just as a potency in its account encloses an order to its proper act, so the supposit says an intrinsic order to existence as to an act proportioned to itself. This sentence seems to be St. Thomas's, Quodlibet 2, art. 4, in the solutions of the arguments; and this is the reason why St. Thomas and other most weighty Philosophers very often explain the supposit through the act of existing: not that the supposit intrinsically encloses such an act, but because the whole account of it is taken through an order to it.

But since we have not so far explained whether that real mode which the supposit adds above the nature is distinguished from it as thing from thing, or only formally.

let the last conclusion be. It is probable that that mode is distinguished from the nature by a formal account alone, as the mode of a thing from the thing itself, as sitting from one sitting; but it is more probable that that mode is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing. This conclusion has two parts. The first part is proved; for it seems to be gathered from the sentence of Aristotle and St. Thomas when they say that in immaterial things the supposit is not really distinguished from the nature. From which an argument is gathered: the supposit in immaterial things without doubt adds that real mode above the nature, but if that mode is distinguished from the nature more than formally, it cannot be saved in any sense that the supposit is not really distinguished from the nature. If, however, we say that that mode is distinguished from the nature only formally, that sentence of St. Thomas can be saved, namely that it be understood of a real distinction as thing from thing, so that he means to say that the supposit in material things is not distinguished from the nature by something that is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing; therefore. Secondly, because the most wise Masters, among whom is Soto, say that the supposit is not distinguished from the nature as thing from thing; and so they admit this proposition, man is the thing which is humanity: but if the supposit includes a mode which is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing, that proposition is false, just as this one, the composite is that thing which is the form, since in these propositions it is denoted that the thing which is the predicate is intrinsically and really altogether the same as the thing signified by the subject. Lastly: a plurality of things is not to be admitted without a most grave cause; therefore etc. The second part of this conclusion is Master Cajetan's, in the place cited, although he seems to teach the opposite in this article. And it is proved: for it can scarcely be understood how the divine Word would assume the human nature, and not a supposit, if the supposit does not add something real above the nature distinct as thing from thing; for if the human nature in Christ includes all that intrinsic entity which the human nature has in Peter, it is difficult to explain how it has the account of supposit in Peter and not in Christ; therefore. From this second part it follows that all those propositions in which the nature is predicated of the supposit are false not only in the formal sense, but also in the identical sense, if we speak rigorously, on account of the reason assigned. And so this predication, man is the thing which is humanity, is in rigor false. In every sentence, however, this is false, Christ is the thing which is humanity, since the mode by which the supposit of Christ is constituted is, in every sentence, distinct as thing from thing from the humanity itself. For the personal complement by which the human nature in Christ is terminated is the personal complement of the Word: which indeed is distinguished as thing from thing from the humanity itself.

TO the arguments: to the first it is answered with St. Thomas, 7 Metaphysics, text 21, that Aristotle there speaks of the quiddity of a thing as it is signified in the concrete, as the quiddity of man is signified by its difference, namely rational animal: and indeed the quiddity signified in the concrete includes implicitly and confusedly all singular supposits, and to that extent is predicated of them. But at present we are speaking of the quiddity of a thing according to itself, as Aristotle himself speaks of it, 7 Metaphysics, text 41, according to which account it ought rather to be signified by an abstract than a concrete term; and if it be taken thus, it is really distinguished from the supposit. Hence this proposition, man is humanity, is false, in that nature and supposit are really distinguished, as including and included: for the supposit includes a real mode which the nature rather excludes than includes, as it is signified by an abstract name: on which propositions see Soto, q. 3 of the Universals.

TO the confirmation it is answered that it proves the intended point beyond doubt, namely that material accidents truly do not intrinsically pertain to the account of the material supposit. Wherefore, speaking metaphysically, the supposit is not distinguished from the nature by these accidents, but differs in the mode already explained in the conclusions. But when Aristotle and St. Thomas teach that the material supposit adds those accidents above the nature, they speak physically. For which it must be noted that, although these accidents pertain to the nature prior to the supposit, in that the nature is singular and individual through an order to these accidents (as was said in the preceding article), nevertheless, physically and really, they inhere in the supposit prior by nature to the nature itself: since the supposit is the proper and immediate subject of accidents, and the nature does not receive them except through the supposit. Wherefore, physically speaking, the supposit adds these accidents above the nature: since these accidents affect the supposit before the nature, although they are looked to by the nature prior as something extrinsic, from which the individuation of the nature is taken. But here it must be noted that, although it is probable, as certain Theologians teach, that the nature is individuated through an order to a singular supposit, in such a way that the humanity of Peter is this and singular because it says an order to this singular supposit, nevertheless it is altogether improbable to assert that the individuation of the nature depends on an actual conjunction with a singular supposit. It is proved: the humanity which Christ the Lord assumed was never conjoined with any human supposit, as the Catholic faith confesses; and yet it is this humanity and singular; therefore its individuation does not intrinsically depend on any singular human supposit. Nay, I would believe that the singularity and individuation of the nature does not intrinsically depend on any order to a singular supposit, but depends only on the essential parts of the nature itself, namely on this matter and this form; and this is far more probable than that sentence just stated. It is proved by reason: the singular humanity which is in Christ, and as it is in Christ, does not have an inclination to a singular human supposit proportioned to it; therefore the singularity of that nature is not taken through an order to that singular supposit. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: for the human nature in Christ is most sufficiently terminated by the divine supposit, because the divine supposit affords it every perfection and determination which a created supposit could afford it; nay, even an infinitely greater and more excellent one; therefore it does not retain an inclination, at least a proximate one, to its own suppositality. And by this it is clear as to the second confirmation.

TO the second argument with its confirmation, it is answered from the same doctrine: nor is it necessary to repeat what has been said. And in the same way it is answered to the third.

TO the fourth it is answered by conceding the sequel and denying the minor. To whose proof it is answered that, as often as a diverse mode of signifying is the cause why something real is intrinsically included in one extreme which is not included in the other, explicitly or implicitly, confusedly or distinctly, then the proposition in which an abstract term is predicated of a concrete one is false: and such is that one, man is humanity. But if nothing is intrinsically included in one extreme which is not intrinsically included in the other, the proposition is true, and such is that one, God is Godhead; since the divine nature includes subsistence: and that one, a being is entity: for entity intrinsically includes every mode of being.

TO the fifth it is answered that, as has been said in the last conclusion, it is more probable that that mode which the supposit includes is really distinguished, as thing from thing, from the nature itself. And according to this way of speaking we concede that this is false, man is the thing which is humanity. But following the probable sentence explained in the same conclusion, that that mode is only formally distinguished from the nature, that proposition is true, man is the thing which is humanity. Hence there is not the same account of it as of this one, man is the thing which is prime matter. For man adds nothing above the nature except a mode distinct formally, and not as thing from thing: but above prime matter it adds a certain distinct thing, namely the form.

TO the last it is answered by conceding the first consequence, and to the sequel which is inferred it is answered that, although personality is really distinguished from the nature, it nevertheless does not make a composition with it, but only completes and terminates the nature, as a point a line.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly, concerning the second conclusion of St. Thomas. Whether in immaterial things the supposit is distinguished from the nature, as in material substances composed of matter and form?

For the negative side it is argued first. St. Thomas, in the body of the article, disputing whether the nature is distinguished from the supposit, says that in those things which are not composed of matter and form, in which individuation is not through individual matter, but the forms themselves are individuated through themselves, it is necessary that the forms themselves be subsisting supposits, and so in them the supposit does not differ from the nature; therefore. And it is confirmed: for St. Thomas proves that God is not composed of matter and form, as has already been said, therefore God is his Godhead; therefore it holds similarly, an angel is not composed of matter and form, therefore an angel is his nature.

Secondly, by a reason gathered from St. Thomas. In angels there is no individuating accident pertaining to individuation which is not also a proper property of the specific nature itself; therefore the angelic supposit is not distinguished from the angelic nature itself, at least according to the thing. The consequence is proved: since the supposit adds above the angelic nature no accident pertaining to individuation; nay, it adds nothing that is outside the account of the species; therefore.

Thirdly. In angels, and in those things which are not composed of matter and form, the form is individuated by itself; therefore the supposit adds nothing real above the nature or form itself.

Fourthly. If in things separated from matter supposit and nature are distinguished, it is chiefly because the supposit includes to-be, which the nature does not include. For this is St. Thomas's reason, Quodlibet 2, art. 4, in the body and at the first. But this reason is null; therefore they are not distinguished. The minor is proved: for to-be, as we proved in the preceding doubt, cannot be a mode constitutive of the supposit, since it is accidental to every creature; therefore nature and supposit in angels are not really distinguished.

On the contrary, however, is that in spiritual things the supposit adds above the nature that intrinsic real mode which we have explained above: for the reason brought forward to assert that real mode proceeds not only concerning individuals and supposits in material things, but also in spiritual ones; therefore etc. Likewise also, because God can assume an angelic nature without assuming a supposit, as is said in the 3rd part, question 4, article 2.

For the explanation of this doubt it must be noted from St. Thomas here that things are of a twofold difference. Some are composed of matter and form; others do not have such a composition; e.g. man is composed of matter and form, but God and the angels are not. But angels are composed of to-be and essence, and so hold a middle place between material things and God: because God is pure act having nothing of composition, nor has he a personal complement distinct from his Essence, nor is he individuated through anything distinct; but material things have a composition of matter and form, and so have accidents individuating the specific nature, and the supposit adds a personal complement, not only above the specific nature, but also above the individual nature. But angels hold a middle place, and so the difficulty of this doubt consists in this: whether namely in angels the supposit adds a personal complement above the nature. Secondly it must be noted that the supposit and the individual nature are distinguished: because the human nature, from the very fact that it has this matter and this form, is individual through an order to these accidents; but for it to be a supposit this does not suffice, but it is required that it have a personal complement, by which it is constituted in the to-be of a supposit; e.g. the human nature which is fore-understood to the assumption is this and individual, because it has this matter and this form: yet it is not a supposit, because the personal complement is lacking to it. This doctrine is had in Master Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, around the middle.

THESE things presupposed, let the first conclusion be. In angels the nature is not really distinguished from this individual nature. This conclusion is manifest in the doctrine of St. Thomas, and is had below, question 50, article 2. The reason for this conclusion is manifest. For an angel is a certain form which is individuated by itself, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited; therefore the individual nature in angels is not distinguished from the angelic nature. This conclusion is also proved by the arguments made at the beginning.

Second conclusion. It must necessarily be said that the supposit in angels is really distinguished from the nature. This conclusion the arguments made in the second place evidently prove. St. Thomas holds it expressly below, q. 50 in the place cited; and q. 75, art. 5, ad 4, and 2 Contra Gentes, ch. 52 and 53.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52 All the saints also hold it, who attribute this as peculiar to God: whose testimonies are to be seen in the Master, in 1, d. 8. See also St. Jerome on ch. 3 of Ephesians, on those words: «From whom all Paternity etc.»; and in the Epistle to Damasus. This conclusion is also proved by the arguments made in the preceding doubt to prove that supposit and nature in material things are really distinguished; because in material and immaterial things there is the same account as regards this. And besides it is proved by a manifest reason: because the supposit in angels says the angelic nature, and subsistence, and the personal complement: but the nature of an angel says only the form by which an angel is an angel; therefore etc. From this conclusion we briefly gather that this proposition is false, An angel is his essence: because something real is included in the subject which in no way, neither formally nor virtually, is contained in the predicate.

TO the arguments proposed at the beginning of this doubt, insofar as they impugn our second conclusion, it is answered.

To the first Cajetan says here that this is the difference between material and immaterial supposits: that the former are distinguished from the nature by something intrinsic to them, namely designated matter, which nevertheless is extrinsic to the nature. But in things separated from matter the supposit is not distinguished from the nature except by something extrinsic, namely to subsist: because subsistence is included in the immaterial supposit, but the nature in no way includes it, but abstracts from it. And this St. Thomas seems to say in the places cited above. For he always says that the immaterial supposit encloses a composition of to-be and essence. This solution has no place unless we say that the supposit adds nothing above the nature besides existence. But the same Cajetan, in 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, says the opposite: he adds also that St. Thomas in this place spoke rather indistinctly. Wherefore, that a legitimate explanation of St. Thomas may stand, note that two things can be considered in the singular angelic nature: one is the singularity itself by which the nature is this; the other is the personality by which it subsists in the account of a complete subsisting substance. The first belongs to the angelic nature from its own specific principles, and constitutes the individual and singular; but the second is the term of the nature, and constitutes the supposit, and in all created things is really distinguished from the nature itself. When, therefore, St. Thomas says here in the article that in angels nature and supposit do not differ, he takes supposit for the individual and singular, and not for the same nature terminated by personality. Otherwise it seems to be said, as regards this place of St. Thomas and Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 41, from which St. Thomas took his sentence, that in angels all that real content which the supposit includes is taken only from the form, and regards it as the proper subject in which it is received: but in material things, physically speaking, the supposit includes many accidents which do not immediately regard the form itself as the immediate subject in which they are received, although they arise from it; but have as their immediate subject the supposit itself, which indeed has, not from the form but rather from matter (which is the first subject of material accidents), that it be the proximate subject of the same accidents. To the confirmation, it is clear from what has been said. For whether the supposit in divine things be taken for the individual singular or for the subsisting, nature and supposit are the same, on account of the supreme simplicity, which does not happen in the same way in angels.

TO the second and third it is answered, according to the second solution, which we chose as better when we solved the first argument: for it only convicts that the individual in things separated from matter adds nothing above the nature; but they do not prove that the supposit adds nothing. It is answered secondly, according to the last way of speaking on that first argument, that by those arguments it is well proved that the supposit does not add material accidents above the angelic form: but from this it is not gathered that the constitutive principle of the supposit does not add something above the angelic nature. See Capreolus, in 3, d. 5, q. 3.

TO the fourth it is answered by distinguishing the antecedent. For the supposit in angels is intrinsically distinguished from the nature, because it includes a certain mode intrinsically constitutive of the supposit. It is also distinguished extrinsically through the to-be itself to which the supposit says an order. And from this extrinsic term St. Thomas gathers the distinction of the nature from the supposit.

IT IS DOUBTED thirdly, concerning the third conclusion, whether the divine supposit and the divine nature are the same?

And on the negative side it is argued first. Something real belongs to God which does not belong to the Godhead; therefore they are really distinguished. The consequence seems evident; the antecedent is proved. For it belongs to God to generate, and to be generated, which does not belong to the Godhead: for this is true, God generates, and this, God is generated: but those are false, the Godhead generates, the Godhead is generated: but to generate and to be generated is something real; therefore etc. It is confirmed. The Father includes something real which the Godhead does not include, namely the relation of Paternity, by which he is distinguished from the Son, which nevertheless is not included in the Godhead; otherwise just as the Godhead is predicated of the Son, so the Father also would be predicated of him, or neither; therefore they are really distinguished. It is confirmed secondly. For that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son is either included in the Godhead or not: if it is included, then when we say, the Son is the Godhead, something is predicated of the Son by which the Father is distinguished from the Son, and so this proposition will be false: if it is not included, then the Father includes something which the Godhead does not include.

It is argued secondly. According to the Catholic faith, in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of the humanity was made immediately in the divine supposit, and not in the divine nature, as St. Thomas says, 3rd part, q. 2, art. 1; therefore the divine supposit is really distinguished from the divine nature. The consequence is proved: for by this reasoning we prove that man and humanity are really distinguished, because the Son of God assumed the humanity and did not assume a man.

On the contrary, however, is the Catholic truth, which we asserted in the third conclusion of the article.

FOR a brief resolution, the definition of the supposit which we explained in doubt 1 of this article being supposed, note that this term, God, can be taken in three ways, as Master Cajetan teaches here: first, for one having the Godhead in common, abstracting from this and that God: in which way it is a common term, and in this way those took it who thought there were several Gods. In the second way it can be taken for the true God having this Godhead in number, abstracting from the divine persons; which indeed can be done in two ways, namely negatively and precisely: in which way the Hebrews took it, and the natural Philosophers, who, ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity of the divine persons, asserted one God; and also those who assert not only the unity of nature in divine things, but the unity of an incommunicable supposit. In the third way God is taken for an incommunicable divine Person, namely for the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit.

let the conclusion, therefore, be: If God be taken either in the second or in the third way, he does not differ according to the thing from the Godhead. This conclusion is to be held as of faith, in which we make no mention of the first acceptation, because it is chimerical. The conclusion is therefore proved by the authorities of Divine Scripture and of the holy Fathers: John 1, it is said of God that he is light and life; and John 14, Christ says of himself: «I am the way, the truth and the life»; 1 John 5, This is the true God and eternal life: in which places the abstract is predicated of the concrete; therefore life and living, light and shining etc. do not really differ in God; otherwise all those propositions would be false. Likewise it is also proved from the definition of the Council of Reims, gathered against Gilbert Porretanus, Bishop of Poitiers; for he denied that God was truth, and that he was the Godhead properly speaking, but interpreted God is truth as meaning he is true, and for this he was condemned in that Council. For those propositions in the propriety of speech are to be conceded: nay, these, God is true, God is living, are to be interpreted in a more proper sense, God is truth, God is life. See the acts of this Council in Bernard, sermon 80 on the Canticle, where he intends to define this truth as of faith. There are also very many testimonies of the Saints for confirming this truth, which are to be seen in the Master of the Sentences, in 1, d. 8 and 34; and Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 11, and book 15 of On the Trinity, ch. 17. It is proved by reason: for God is pure act, and whatever is in God is infinite; therefore he is his goodness and his Godhead, etc. It is confirmed from the reason of St. Thomas, 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 22: for if God were not his Godhead, it would follow that in God there would be some composition, which it is impious to say. It is proved: for if God is not his Godhead, then the Godhead is denied of God for the reason that something is included in the one which is not in the other; therefore God is not altogether simple, and consequently he will be composite. See many things in St. Thomas, there. Moreover it is proved by the reason of St. Bernard in the place above: if the Godhead is not God, then it is either something or nothing; it cannot be said to be nothing, since it is the divine nature itself; if therefore it is something, then either greater than God, or less, or equal: if greater, then something is the supreme good and is not God: likewise something would be greater than God, which is impossible, for God is that than which nothing greater can be thought: if less, then something by which God is God is less than God, which is impossible, for that by which God is God is simply infinite; therefore it is not something less than God: if equal, then there will be two supreme goods, and not one. Likewise also something which is the supreme good would not be God, which manifestly implies a contradiction.

TO the arguments on the contrary side it is briefly answered. To the first with its confirmation we shall speak at greater length in the matter of the Trinity; for now it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I deny the consequence. For Peter is incommunicable, but man is communicable: and yet they are distinguished by reason alone. Likewise man really generates man, and not Peter, and Peter really generates Peter, and not man: yet Peter and man are distinguished by reason alone. Hence the distinction of reason alone by which God and the Godhead are distinguished suffices for generating to be attributed to God and not to the Godhead. To the first confirmation it is answered that the same Godhead in number is in the Father and the Son: but it is no inconvenience that it be found conjoined to a different relation in the Father than in the Son. For if a relation, as such, does not import a perfection, it is no inconvenience that some relation be in the Father which is not in the Son: but if it imports a perfection, the consequence must be denied: some relation is in the Father which is not in the Son, or in the Godhead; therefore something real is in the Father which is not in the Son: for the sense is varied from the relative to the absolute. And in the same way it is answered to the second confirmation, nor is there need to linger longer here: because these things belong to the matter of the Trinity.

TO the second it is answered by denying the consequence: to whose proof it is said that that proposition, the union was not made in a nature, can be understood in two ways: first, that from the two natures in Christ a third did not result, and this sense is Catholic; secondly, that the divine Nature, at least mediately, did not assume the humanity, but only the Son of God, and this sense is false. For from the fact that God is man, it is also convincingly shown that the Godhead is man. Whence again it follows that supposit and nature in divine things are not really distinguished. But from the fact that God assumed the human nature, it does not follow that he assumed a man. Whence there is not the same account.