Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is negative. St. Thomas proves it by three arguments.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article, see Soncinas on 12 Metaphysics, q. 29; and Cajetan here, especially on the third argument. On which it must be noted that although to heat or to cool per se first is not the same as to be such according to its whole self (for fire is per se first heating, and yet not according to its whole self, but according to a part, namely the form), nevertheless to be an agent per se first and to be an agent according to its whole self are convertible. The reason for this is: because an action of a determinate species, e.g. heating, if it belongs to some agent through its proper form, even if it does not belong to it according to its whole self, can belong to it per se first: so that it is not necessary that it be reduced to another prior principle to which that species of action belongs according to its whole self. There is an example in heating, which belongs to fire according to one part, namely according to the form, and nevertheless it is that to which this action first belongs. And if you still seek the reason for this, it is this: because actions of this sort, of a determinate species, cannot belong to an agent otherwise than by reason of the form; but since the form is the principle from which the determination of the species is taken, both as regards substance and also as regards the accidents which follow upon it, for such an action to belong to an agent per se first, it is not required that it belong to it according to its whole self, but it will suffice that it belong according to the form. But as for action as it is signified by this word action, abstracting from every species and mode of action: for it to belong to something per se first, it is necessary that it belong to it according to its whole self: since action as such, from the fact that it imports no limitation, must necessarily be reduced to an agent to which it belongs to act first and per se and without any limitation; and consequently not by reason of some determinate part, and thus according to its whole self.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning the solution to the third, where St. Thomas says that forms which are receivable in matter are individuated by matter, whether matter is the principle of individuation. It has pleased us to dispute this question, for the sake of the philosophers.

And it is argued first for the negative side; and I prove that the form is the principle of individuation. This form is by nature prior to this matter, and this matter is by nature prior to this quantity; therefore the principle of individuation of this substance will be this form. The consequence is proved: for that is the first principle of individuation to which it first belongs to be this and an individual. And the antecedent is proved: for the form gives to-be to matter; therefore it is prior.

It is confirmed: this matter is this one on account of this form; therefore by nature the form is this one prior. Likewise the accidents are these singular ones, because they are received in singular matter; therefore matter is this one prior to this quantity.

It is confirmed second: the form determines matter which of itself is indifferent to many forms differing in species and number; therefore matter itself is determined and becomes this singular one through this form rather than the converse.

It is argued second: the rational soul is by nature prior to being and to being received in signate matter; therefore it is not individuated through it. The antecedent is proved: for the rational soul has to-be by nature prior to the whole composite, and prior to matter itself: whence it is not educed from the potency of matter. And it is commonly said that among natural forms there is this difference between rational souls and others: that the composite from the others has to-be prior to the form itself; but the rational soul has to-be prior to the composite from it. Indeed, it itself communicates to-be to the whole composite; and when it is separated from the body, it draws its to-be back to itself. See St. Thomas below, q. 90, art. 2, and Master Soto, book 1 of the Physics, q. 7.

It is argued third: any substantial form is united by nature to matter prior to the union of the accidents; therefore in that priority the substantial composite is understood to be this and singular, before these accidents are understood to be these. The consequence seems clear, and the antecedent is proved: for the substantial form is united to bare matter; otherwise substantial generation would not be generation simply, as Aristotle teaches, 5 Physics, text 7.

It is argued fourth, proving that matter, which is the other part of the composite, is the principle of individuation without respect to the accidents; for matter, by reason of the material cause, is by nature this one prior to the form and prior to the accidents; therefore it does not have from them that it be this one: and consequently, it itself will be for the composite the principle of individuation. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent is proved: for a cause is by nature prior to its effect; but matter is the material cause of the form and of the composite. It is confirmed first: matter in that priority of nature, namely in the genus of material cause, is understood as this one before the form and the composite and the accidents are understood; therefore it is this one through itself, and hence the principle of individuation of the composite. It is confirmed second: the form of itself is unlimited and infinite; therefore it is limited and individuated through matter.

It is argued fifth. For if individuation were through matter signate by this quantity, it would follow that in that priority of nature in which matter regards the form prior to quantity, neither matter nor form would be this singular one; but both would be something common, which nevertheless is impossible, since common matter and form are found only in the intellect. And the sequel is proved: for before we understand the order to quantity, there will be no principle of individuation; therefore all things are universal and common. It is confirmed first: for, as we said above from the mind of Aristotle, and as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 76, art. 6, the form is united immediately to matter as regards the first grade which it confers upon it, which is substantial to-be, so that no disposition precedes the form in matter, even in the genus of material cause, insofar as the form gives that grade of being substantially to matter; therefore then matter and form, insofar as they are united in that grade, are something common, since no quantity is understood there.

It is confirmed second: matter by nature regards the substantial form, which is its primary term, prior to quantity itself, which is a secondary term; therefore it has from the substantial form that it be this one prior to having it from quantity itself, which afterwards follows upon the form in matter. The antecedent is proved: for each thing regards prior that which is of its own genus.

It is argued sixth: although matter had from quantity that it be this one in the genus of material cause, nevertheless in the genus of formal cause it has by nature from the substantial form that it be this one prior to having it from quantity: therefore by whatever reason quantity is said to be the first root and principle of individuation, by the same reason, and much more, it can be granted of the substantial form: for of the former in the genus of material cause, of the latter in the genus of formal cause, which is more excellent, can it be verified. It is confirmed: quantity proceeds from the form, and not from matter; therefore it should rather be said that the form, by reason of the quantity which it causes, is the principle of individuation. The antecedent is proved from the doctrine of Aristotle, 1 Physics, ch. 4, and is adduced by St. Thomas below, q. 7, art. 3. For every natural form determines for itself certain accidents, one of which is quantity. It is confirmed second: act and potency mutually determine each other; therefore just as it is granted that matter determines the form in the genus of material cause, so it must be granted that the form determines matter in the genus of formal cause; and thus just as matter is the principle of individuation, so too is the form.

It is argued seventh: the unity of the predicament of substance is one thing, and the unity of the predicament of quantity, which is the principle of number, another; therefore, just as a thing is one with quantitative unity through quantity, so too will it be one with substantial unity through its substance; therefore to be an individual, which belongs to this unity, must be reduced, as to its principle in material substances, to its own proper substance, so that to one asking why Peter is this singular man, the answer must be: because he has this singular substance. It is confirmed: Peter is essentially this singular substance placed directly in the predicament of substance; therefore he is not constituted in that to-be by something of another predicament, since the constitutive principle of any substance must necessarily be a substance; therefore he is not constituted through quantity, and thus matter signate by quantity will not be the principle of individuation. It is confirmed second: if God through his omnipotence took away from Peter all accidents, Peter would still remain individual and singular; therefore no accident is such as to be the principle of the individuation of Peter. The antecedent is proved: for Peter would then remain a substance, not a common one, therefore a singular one. But whoever wishes to see more arguments for this side, let him see Cajetan, On Being and Essence, ch. 2, q. 5; and Javelli, 5 Metaphysics, q. 15; and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, from q. 31 up to and including 34.

IN this question we shall not dwell much, for it is philosophical, and is to be treated by us most abundantly on book 1 of Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, which commentary we are now preparing to bring to light.

For the solution, therefore, note most briefly that on this matter there have been various opinions. The first was that of Scotus in 1, d. 3, q. 6: that the principle of individuation is the account of singularity, through which a material thing has that it is thus this and singular, which he calls thisness. This opinion nevertheless falls short, since although it acknowledges a mode or account by which a nature is in reality formally individual — in which it does not differ from the opinion of St. Thomas — it nevertheless does not explain the principle and root from which this account of singularity is taken, which is what we are inquiring into.

Another opinion was that of Durandus, ibid., q. 2, where he says two things. First, that each thing is individuated from a twofold principle, namely an intrinsic and an extrinsic one. He says secondly that the intrinsic principle of individuation is the essence of the singular thing itself, while the extrinsic one is the efficient cause from which it is produced. Whence if someone should ask Durandus why Peter is this man, he will answer: because he has this essence in number, namely this matter and this form; and also because he was begotten from these parents, and not from others. But this opinion, although it appears most clear, nevertheless does not touch the point of the difficulty. For as regards the efficient cause, it is entirely something extrinsic, about which we are not inquiring here. For if the discussion were about this, Durandus says truly that the agent is the principle of individuation. But we are inquiring about the intrinsic principle; whence it is not sufficiently answered that it is this essence in number. For this is what is at issue in the dispute: whence does this essence have that it be this one in number.

The third opinion is that of certain most learned disciples of St. Thomas of our time, who, convinced by the arguments made, say that the principle of individuation is neither quantity nor matter signate by quantity; but that, as regards us, the singular distinction of one individual from another is more easily explained through matter signate by quantity: namely because Peter has other matter with other quantity than Paul. Yet they say that there are two essential principles of individuation, namely this matter and this form. But if you ask whence this form is this one, they answer: from this matter. And if you ask again whence this matter has that it be this one, they answer: from this form; nor do they reckon this circle vicious, because it proceeds in diverse genera of causes. For matter is individuated through the form in the genus of formal cause, and the form is individuated through matter in the genus of material cause. Cajetan below, q. 29, art. 1, seems to some to conform to this opinion. But certainly this opinion seems contrary to St. Thomas and Aristotle: for the Philosopher teaches universally that the principle of individuation is not to be reduced to the form, but to matter signate by quantity, as is clear in 3 Metaphysics, text 11, and more clearly in book 5, text 12, and book 12, texts 5 and 49.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be certain according to the mind of St. Thomas. The first principle of individuation is signate matter: so St. Thomas teaches wherever he speaks of this matter; here, to the third. And in the opuscule On Being and Essence, ch. 2, and opuscule 29, and opuscule 70, q. 4, art. 2; and 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21; and it is briefly proved. Numerical distinction is not taken from the form, nor from the whole composite: therefore from matter. The minor is clear. The major is proved: for numerical distinction is material; therefore it is not from the form. Likewise also, for the form is the principle of specific distinction, therefore not of numerical. Moreover, for that is the intrinsic principle of individuation to which it first repugns to be communicated to many, as a universal is communicated to particulars: but it is signate matter to which this first repugns; therefore etc. The major is clear; the minor is proved. That belongs first to signate matter which, with any other thing excluded, belongs to it, and with it excluded, belongs to no other, as is clear from 1 Posterior Analytics, text 14. But not to be communicated to many, as a universal to a particular, with any other thing existing in a sensible substance excluded, belongs to signate matter: for it cannot be understood as communicable. Again, with it excluded, Peter does not remain this man, nor does the form of Peter remain this singular form; therefore the principle of singularity is signate matter.

The point of the difficulty among the Thomists, therefore, stands in this: what is to be understood by signate matter. For on this there are among the Thomists as many opinions as heads: some saying that signate matter is matter with actual quantity; others, that it is matter capable of this quantity; others again asserting that signate matter is neither the one nor the other, but is matter as the principle, root and cause of this quantity.

Let there be, therefore, a second conclusion: that opinion is probable which asserts that signate matter is prime matter according as it is the foundation and root of this quantity, and not of another. This opinion Cajetan holds in the place cited above; but before it is proved, it must be explained in what this opinion differs from the other opinion of Cajetan, in which the whole difficulty lies.

For the exposition of which, note first that just as a subject with respect to its proper passions has a twofold account — one account is that of a receptive potency, for it receives its proper passions in itself and is their subject; the other account is that of cause and root, for the essence is the principle and root of the passions — so matter, which is the other part of the composite, has a twofold account, as Soncinas teaches, 8 Metaphysics, q. 7, in the body, and to the first and second. For matter is the ground of receiving quantity, and is as it were the root and principle of it: just as the form is that by reason of which certain accidents follow upon the subject.

Note secondly that in the first instant of generation, when fire, e.g., generates fire, it first disposes the matter, by the power of which disposition it appropriates it to this quantity, so as to make it capable of this quantity, and not of another; likewise it also determines it to be the root and principle from which this quantity, and not another, follows in the composite.

Cajetan, therefore, and this our conclusion, teaches that prime matter according to this last consideration — namely insofar as it is the root and principle of this quantity — and not according to the prior consideration, namely insofar as it is capable of, or in potency to, this quantity, is signate matter. The chief reason for this conclusion is the one which Cajetan adduces in the present place, and Soncinas teaches in the place above. For matter, according as it is capable of and in potency to receive this quantity, pertains to the genus of quantity; for act and potency are in the same genus: therefore it cannot be the intrinsic principle constitutive of this singular substance. Likewise also, for the numerical distinction by which Peter is substantially distinguished from Paul is not a quantitative distinction, but the foundation of a quantitative distinction, since the principle constitutive of this man and distinguishing him from another is the root and foundation of this quantity; therefore the intrinsic principle of individuation is matter as the root and foundation of quantity.

Third conclusion. The opinion which Cajetan held in On Being and Essence, above, is more probable for us and more according to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas: that signate matter is prime matter, not actually having quantity, but capable of this quantity, and not of another. For the understanding of this conclusion and truth, note that according to this doctrine the whole individuation is reduced to matter, not as it is a cause pre-containing quantity in its own power, but as it is the receptive potency of quantity; and since the account of a passive potency is ultimately reduced to its proper act, it follows that individuation and numerical distinction are reduced and resolved into quantity, as it is the act of that potency: and especially according to our mode of understanding, who can scarcely distinguish matter otherwise than by a certain quantity. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 77, art. 2, where he says that quantity is the principle of individuation: because, namely, it is that by which one matter is divided from another. See below, q. 76, art. 2, to the second; and Cajetan in the same place, and 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 73, reason 4. And so just as the sciences are distinguished by their objects — not that the objects themselves are extrinsic differentiae of the sciences, but they are distinguished by the order and relation to those objects — so too the principle of individuation is matter with an order and relation to this quantity. And quantity of itself is undivided in itself, and divided from any other whatever. Whence just as the principle by which two natures are distinguished in species is the essential difference, while the difference itself is distinguished of itself from another, so too the principle of numerical distinction is matter signate by quantity, while quantity is of itself distinct from another quantity.

TO the arguments it must be answered. To the first: let the antecedent pass, and the consequence is denied. For just as the form is prior to matter in the genus of formal cause, so too matter is prior to the form in the genus of material cause, since causes are causes of one another: yet in that priority of nature in which the form is understood, matter is pre-understood in another genus of cause, namely the material, not indeed with actual quantity, but with the order and capacity of this quantity, to which it has been disposed by the action of the natural agent. Whence I say that in that priority in which the form is understood as this one, matter is pre-understood in the genus of material cause as capable of this quantity. But these priorities are not priorities of times, but of causality: and therefore the arguments which rely on them, both here and in other places, are for the most part sophistical. To the confirmation it is answered that although the form determines matter formally, nevertheless matter signate by quantity determines the form materially; and since we are here speaking of material distinction, it must be reduced to matter as to its principle.

To the second argument it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I deny the consequence. For in that priority the rational soul is understood with an order to matter signate by quantity, and so it is understood as this one on account of that order. There is an example in separated souls, which are understood as individual on account of the transcendental order which they bear to their own bodies.

To the third it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I distinguish the consequent: this substantial composite is understood before these accidents actually exist, I grant; before the order and capacity of this accident, which is quantity, I deny. For that implicit and virtual order of matter to this quantity is the principle by which this composite is this one.

To the fourth it is answered that matter in that priority in which it precedes the form has that it be this and singular through the transcendental order which it bears by virtue of the preceding dispositions to this quantity. In the same way it is answered to the first confirmation. To the second it is answered that the form, which of itself is unlimited, is limited and individuated through matter, not in any way whatever, but signate by quantity.

To the fifth it is answered: the sequel is denied, for as we said, causes are causes of one another; and so the form, insofar as it formally gives to-be to matter, presupposes the same matter with the capacity of this quantity. For since quantity is a disposition necessary to the form, there is pre-understood at least the capacity of it on the part of matter in the genus of material cause. To the first confirmation it is answered that although with respect to that first grade of being substantially, which matter receives from the substantial form, no intrinsic disposition is understood in matter, there is nevertheless necessarily presupposed a certain extrinsic disposition of alteration, or of this sort, through which matter was determined by the natural agent to this quantity in number, and not to another. To the second confirmation it is answered: I distinguish the antecedent; for in the genus of material cause matter regards quantity prior to this substantial form, in that quantity is the proper disposition to this singular form.

To the sixth it is answered: I deny the consequence; the reason for which is manifold. First, for the constitution and distinction of which we speak here is numerical and material; whence it must be reduced to matter and quantity as to its principle. The second reason is that although quantity were an effect of the form and not of matter, nevertheless it regards matter first as its primary subject, one part of which is distinguished from another by quantity itself; and by this it is answered to the first confirmation. The third reason is that quantity, insofar as it is the principle of individuation, is not considered as an effect of the form; for in that way it is something posterior. But when quantity is asserted to be the first root of individuation, it is considered as a cause holding itself on the part of matter, as disposing to the form. Absolutely, however, it is no inconvenience to grant that so great a quantity is an effect of the form. According to which is understood the saying of Aristotle and St. Thomas adduced in the first confirmation. To the second confirmation it is answered that although act and potency mutually determine each other, they do so not in the same way: for act determines potency as to species, but potency determines act as to the individual.

To the seventh it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and to the consequence it is said that a singular substance is one individually through something substantial. Nor do we say that the intrinsic principle constitutive of the individual is quantity — for that is chimerical — but it is matter itself capable of this quantity, as has often been said. But that individuation is not to be reduced to this singular substance, as Durandus said, has been proved above, when we reported his opinion. To the first confirmation it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and the first consequence. But to the other consequences it is said that matter signate by quantity, in the way it has been explained, is not something of the predicament of accident, but of the genus of substance. And to the argument which is customarily formed against this from Cajetan, namely that act and potency are in the same genus, therefore matter as capable of or able to receive quantity, and quantity, which it regards as act, are in the same genus, namely that of quantity: it is answered, omitting many explanations of that maxim, that the first act, to which the potency is ordered, and the potency itself must be in the same predicament; but this is not required with respect to a secondary act: but the primary act of matter is the substantial form, and quantity is secondary. To the second confirmation it is answered that, that miracle admitted, there would still remain in the matter of Peter an order to such a quantity, by which order signate matter is constituted. Nor can that order be taken away unless the individual be destroyed. There is an example in the essence of man: although God took away from it the power of laughter, there nevertheless remains in the essence itself that it is the root and also capable of risibility. And let these things suffice concerning this question.