Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is negative. St. Thomas proves it by three reasons. First, for God is the first immovable mover: but no body moves unless it is moved, therefore, etc. Second, for God is the first being existing altogether in act; but a body has something of potentiality, since it is continuous and consequently divisible — therefore. Third, because God is the noblest of all beings: but it is repugnant to a body to be the noblest, which is manifest in a body that is not alive. Of a living body it is also proved: for that by which it lives is nobler than the living body itself — therefore, etc.

COMMENTARY.

For the understanding of this article, notice with Cajetan that since 'body' is taken in a threefold way — first, for the body in the category of quantity, which implies a threefold dimension; second, for the other part of the natural composite placed on the side of the category of substance; third, for that which is placed in the direct line of the category of substance: St. Thomas's question in this article is not about body in the first and second way. For it is clear that God is not an accident pertaining to the first meaning of 'body'; likewise, it cannot enter anyone's mind that God is a part of substance: the conclusion is therefore to be understood of body in the third meaning. And it is certain according to the faith, so much so that its contrary is manifest heresy. It is proved, first, by the testimonies of Holy Scripture: John 4, 'God is a spirit.' Which passage all the holy Fathers understand literally of spirit, insofar as it excludes every portion of body. And the truth of this understanding is gathered from the context itself: for Christ in that passage intended to teach the Samaritan woman that the worship of God was not bound to any special bodily place; and he urges this from the fact that God is a spirit — that is, incorporeal. Likewise 1 Tim. 1, 'To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, etc.'; Rom. 1, 'For the invisible things of him, etc.' By this is signified that to be invisible is for God to be imperceptible to every bodily sense, as being truly incorporeal. This truth is also defined in the Lateran Council and is held in the chapter Firmiter on the Highest Trinity. Moreover it is proved by the authority of the Saints, who all receive this conclusion as the most true dogma of the faith. See St. Augustine, De haeresibus, ad Quodvultdeum, c. 86, vol. 6, and lib. 3 Confess. c. 7, where he says that the opposite view was the heresy of the Manichees. See also lib. 10 Super Genes. ad litteram, c. 25; and lib. 1 De Doct. Christ., c. 7 and 8; and lib. 6 De Trinit. c. 6 and 8; and lib. 11 Confess. c. 10 — from which passage St. Thomas took the reasons that he brings forth here.

But there is an argument. For St. Augustine, in the cited passage De haeresibus, relating that Tertullian affirmed that 'God is a body',

excuses him from heresy: therefore, to say that God is a body is not manifest heresy.

This is confirmed: for if the opinion contrary to St. Thomas's conclusion is condemned as heresy, it is because in Sacred Scripture God is called 'Spirit'; but angels are also called spirits in Holy Scripture very often, and yet the gravest certain Catholic Doctors taught, without any note of heresy, that angels are corporeal, as will be said below, q. 51 a. 1: therefore, etc.

To this argument it is answered that the blessed Augustine in that passage asserts our conclusion as a dogma of faith: yet he wished to excuse Tertullian from heresy, because perhaps Tertullian did not hold that God is truly a body, but in order to explain that God is not something empty, but something solid, firm, and substantial, he therefore called God 'body.' That this was Tertullian's mind is gathered from that very passage of St. Augustine, and also from Tertullian himself, De Resurrectione carnis, where, speaking of the soul, he says: 'But we confess that the soul is here also corporeal, having its own kind of solidity of substance.' And he says almost the same when he speaks of God.

To the confirmation it is answered that the Divine Scriptures attribute to-be Spirit to God and to angels in diverse ways. For to God as one altogether devoid of body, so as to include no portion of body — as is clear from the cited passage Ioan. 4. But Scripture does not say this so openly of angels and the rational soul. Finally the conclusion is proved: no body can be everywhere according to its whole self, so that the whole be in the whole and the whole in any part; but God is whole in the whole universe and whole in any part, as is clear from that Ierem. 23: «I fill heaven and earth»; therefore etc.

It is confirmed: for it is impious to think of God that one part of Him correspond to one part of the universe and another part to another — which one would necessarily have to say if He were a body.

It is confirmed, second: for if God is a body, then either finite or infinite; if finite, then He does not fill the whole nor is He everywhere, but will be confined to a certain place; if infinite, then He admits no other body together with Himself, as Aristotle well demonstrates, 3. lib. Physicorum. But there is an argument against the first reason of St. Thomas, in which he says that no body moves unmoved. It is argued thus: a magnet, when it draws iron to itself, moves it remaining itself unmoved. Likewise color presented to sight, remaining unmoved, moves the visual potency, and snow chills the surrounding air, remaining unmoved; therefore that proposition of St. Thomas, on which the first reason of the article is founded, is not universally true.

For the solution, note that that proposition — every moving body is moved — is from Aristotle, 8. Physic., ca. 5, text 40, and is to be understood, that it be universal, of purely local motion, by which one body moves another not through the impression of some form or quality from which that motion proceeds, but through impulse alone — as when someone throws a stone upward. And in this sense that proposition is most certain.

And it is proved: for mover and moved must be simultaneous; but it is impossible for them to be simultaneous if, while the mobile changes place, the mover is not moved either in itself or in its part, therefore etc.

Second, that proposition — every body while it moves is moved — is explained not of act but of potency: so that the sense is, every moving body is by nature apt to be moved; in which sense the proposition is most true, and sufficiently proves St. Thomas's intent, namely that God is not a body, since He is altogether immovable. See St. Thomas, 7. Physic., texts 10 and 11. And Master Cajetan rather applauds this explanation. To the objections to the contrary, it is answered.

To the first, concerning the magnet, see St. Thomas, 7. Physic., lect. 3, where he teaches that the magnet draws iron to itself by impressing a certain quality upon it; hence that is not purely local motion by impulse, of which we spoke in explaining the proposition. And the same will be said to the argument that could be made concerning heavy and light bodies, which are moved by the generator while it remains unmoved. For it is said that they are not moved with purely local motion by impulse alone, but with local motion which follows by a simple resulting toward the substantial form which they received from the generator.

Or, second, it is answered, as pleases Master Cajetan here, that the magnet does not move the iron, but rather the iron is moved toward it on account of the impressed quality.

To the other objections, concerning color and snow, it is answered likewise that the motion they effect is not purely local. But speaking of motion other than local, it is manifest that a body which moves need not be moved with the same motion, nor be movable: for the heaven alters these lower things, and yet is unalterable. IT IS DOUBTED concerning what St. Thomas says in the third reason, that a living body is nobler than a non-living body: whether this proposition is universally true.

And on the negative side it is argued first. For it seems absurd to say that ants and gnats are nobler than the heavenly bodies. For Aristotle, lib. 1 De partibus animal., ca. 5, says: «It is better to know few things concerning the heavenly bodies on account of their nobility, than many concerning these lower things». And 1. Caeli, c. 2: «The heavenly body (he says) is something divine and more excellent than things composed of elements». Hence when we wish to praise some body, we call it heavenly; whence the common consensus of all assigns heaven to God for a place, as the best body, as Aristotle says, 2. Caeli, c. 1; and it is more manifestly established from Divine Scripture, Isaiah, c. 66: Heaven is my throne, and Daniel, 2: There is a God in heaven revealing mysteries. Certainly, lib. 3 De natura Deorum, Cicero ridicules those who assert that ants and worms are more excellent than the heavenly bodies.

Second, it is argued: The dispositions for the form of heaven are nobler than those required for the form of living things other than man; therefore the form of heaven is more excellent than the forms of other living things. The antecedent seems known: for those dispositions are incorruptibility, transparency, brightness, etc. The consequence is proved, since dispositions are ordered by nature to the substantial form; therefore where they are nobler, the form too will be nobler. It is confirmed: for between natural dispositions and the form there must be proportion in the account of perfection.

Third, it is argued. Heaven is the equivocal cause of all living things: therefore it is nobler than the living things themselves. The consequence is proved: for the effect is in the equivocal cause in a more perfect mode than in itself; and it seems absurd to say that any effect in the whole of its latitude exceeds its cause in perfection. The antecedent is proved: for when heaven produces living things, it does not produce an effect of the same account, assimilated to heaven in species; therefore it is not the univocal cause of living things, but equivocal.

It is confirmed: for often the heavenly bodies without a particular agent produce certain imperfect living things in these lower regions, as worms, mice, etc.; therefore at least such living things are not more perfect than heaven; otherwise heaven could not produce them by itself alone.

It is confirmed, second: living things depend in becoming and in being conserved upon the heavenly bodies; therefore they are not of as great perfection as the heavens themselves, for otherwise they would certainly not so depend upon them, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 104, art. 1.

Fourth, it is argued: Sacred Scripture much more extols divine Wisdom in the heavenly bodies than in lower things, as is patent in Psal. 18: «The heavens declare the glory of God»; and Psal. 8: «I shall see thy heavens, the works of thy fingers.» And many similar passages are found in divine Scripture which especially commend divine Wisdom and Power in the fabric of the heavens.

Fifth, it is argued: for from the fact that living things, speaking absolutely and according to their proper account, are nobler than non-living things, it does not follow that every living thing is more excellent than any non-living thing; therefore the heavenly bodies could be more perfect than many living things. The antecedent is proved and explained: for although justice is a more excellent virtue than fortitude, nevertheless some act of fortitude is simply and absolutely more perfect than many acts of justice — namely martyrdom; therefore the same must be said of the perfection of heaven in relation to many living things.

Last, it is argued: for St. Thomas, 4. Cont. Gent., c. ulti.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-quartus:liber.4/capitulum.97, seems to hold this sentence proved by the foregoing arguments: for he says that the end of the motion of heaven is man, therefore man alone excels heaven. And De Potentia, q. 5, art. 5, he says that the end of the motion of heaven is the determinate number of the elect: and he adds that it can happen that the term of the operation of a nobler thing be viler: and he speaks of the operation of heaven with respect to living things other than man; therefore he holds heaven to be nobler than all living things besides man.

Concerning this difficulty there are various opinions. The first is of those who say that a living body is more perfect, according to its genus, than a non-living body. That is, within the genus of living body some living body is found which excels any non-living body whatever; in the way theologians commonly explain that the virtue of justice is more excellent than the virtue of fortitude: because the most excellent act of justice exceeds the noblest act of fortitude. This opinion pleases Marfil. in 1., q. 1., art. 2., conclusi. 6 et 7.

The second opinion says that every living body, even the most imperfect, is nobler than any non-living body whatever even heavenly, speaking simply and absolutely; but secundum quid the heavenly body is judged more perfect: since it has certain accidental conditions by which it exceeds many living things — for it is incorruptible, and a universal cause exerting influx upon these lower things, etc. Of this opinion is Master Cajetan on this article, where he says that the ant, in that it is living, is simply a nobler being than heaven: although heaven is a nobler body and more perfect secundum quid.

The third opinion says that living things are nobler than non-living things as to the grade of being, for they have a nobler grade of being, namely life. For the rest, heaven exceeds living things as to mode, for it has a nobler mode of being.

FOR the decision of this difficulty let the first conclusion be: It is probable that heaven is more perfect than all living things besides man. After Marsilius, ubi supra, this conclusion was taught from our own ranks by the most wise M. Victoria and Cano on this article, and it is proved by the arguments made from the beginning.

In exposition of this conclusion, note from St. Thomas, below, q. 5, art. 1, ad 1, that although being and good are the same, yet the account of being is taken from one source, and the account of good or perfect from another: for the account of being is taken simply from substantial to-be, while the account of good and perfect is taken from superadded accidents. So although the substantial to-be of any living thing whatever is nobler than heaven, yet since heaven vindicates to itself more perfect accidents than all living things besides man, it can be called simply more perfect.

The second conclusion: It is much more probable that any living thing whatever is simply more perfect than heaven or any non-living thing whatever. This sentence is taught here by Cajetan and Ferr., 1. Cont. Gentes, cap. 20|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.20, with St. Thomas, ibidem in the sixth reason, where St. Thomas says that in any body, the living is nobler than the non-living: and in this Part below, q. 70, art. 3, ad secundum, he says that nothing prevents something from being nobler simply and baser in a certain respect. The form of the heavenly body, therefore, although it is not simply more perfect than the soul of a living thing, will yet be nobler in the account of form, because it totally completes its matter. St. Thomas holds, therefore, that the form of a living thing is simply nobler than the form of heaven. He teaches the same, quaest. 6 De Potentia, art. 6, ad 13. The conclusion is also proved by reason. The form of any living thing whatever gives a more perfect grade of being than the form of heaven; therefore it is simply more perfect. The antecedent is proved: for the form of a living thing gives the grade of life, which the form of heaven does not give. The consequence is proved: for that is the more perfect form which gives a more perfect to-be, contracting to-be itself in a more abstract mode.

For the fuller explanation of this, note here with Cajetan that the grade of life in the universe is higher than the grade of nature, according as nature is distinguished against soul. For as, among the elements, fire holds the higher place on account of its perfection, so among grades the grade of life is higher than the grade of corporeity; and so corporeity in its whole latitude is under the order of life, as something more imperfect. Hence not secundum quid but simply, the whole latitude of body is below the latitude of life.

Second, the conclusion is proved: any living thing whatever has a more excellent operation than the operation of any non-living body whatever; therefore it has a more perfect to-be. The consequence is proved: for operation follows upon the to-be of a thing, for each thing operates inasmuch as it is in act. The antecedent is proved: for the operation of a living thing, by which the living thing is perfected, is from an intrinsic principle; but the operation or motion of a non-living thing is from without. Also, vital operation is more abstract from matter than any operation whatever of a non-living thing.

Third, it is proved and confirmed: for Aristotle in the Prologue of the Metaphysicae for this reason said that sight is more excellent than the act of hearing: because it abstracts more from matter, and does not so depend upon extrinsic matter: but the actions of a living thing depend less upon matter than the actions of a non-living thing; therefore etc.

And it is confirmed from the sentence of St. Augustine, lib. De vera Religione, where he seems to assert this conclusion, saying that every living substance whatever is preferred in the order of nature to the non-living. And in the first book De Doct. Christ., cap. 8, and book 11 De Civit. Dei, cap. 16, he distinguishes four grades of things: first, of those which have natural to-be not conjoined with life; second, of living things without senses, as are plants; and so by degrees up to the Angels — and he says that living things are set before non-living things.

Let the third conclusion be: It seems most probable that living things are more perfect than non-living things as to the grade of being, but not as to the mode of being. This conclusion does not contradict the preceding one, but can be held together with it. For the exposition of this, note that one thing can be more perfect than another in substance and not as to mode. E.g. Theology in us wayfarers is a more perfect science than Mathematics, since it has a more perfect object; for the rest, as to mode, the mathematical sciences excel, since they proceed through evident means, while Theology in this life proceeds obscurely. So in the proposal, the to-be conjoined with life is higher and more perfect than corporeal to-be. For the rest, some corporeal non-living to-be, such as is found in heaven, has a certain more perfect mode of being: because heaven has to-be un-losably and incorruptibly, while corporeal living things participate to-be defectibly and corruptibly.

Note, second, that since the grade of being is to-be, to-live, to-sense, to-understand, while the modes of being are possible, necessary, corruptible, incorruptible, act, potency, effect, cause, etc., heaven and living things stand as exceeding and exceeded in the account of the perfect: for the living surpasses the heavenly bodies in grade of being, but is surpassed by them in mode of being, since heaven has incorruptible to-be and is the cause of these lower things. This conclusion so explained seems to be expressly St. Thomas's, below, q. 70, art. 3, ad secundum.

AD ARGUMENTA IN CONTRARIUM. — To the arguments to the contrary, it is answered.

To the first it is said that it is not only not absurd that ants and other most ignoble animate things be called more perfect than the heavenly bodies, but it is very consonant with reason and the rules of the best Philosophy, as is established from what we have said in the second and third conclusions.

To Aristotle it is answered that in those passages he intends to teach nothing else except that the heavenly bodies have a more perfect mode of being, as we explained in the third conclusion.

To the second it is answered by denying the antecedent: for since the grade of life is more perfect, so also the consequent or concomitant dispositions of that grade are more perfect. Also the forms of living things have vital potencies as dispositions, which potencies are more perfect than other qualities of bodies. And finally it is answered that this argument, if it proved anything, would also prove that heaven is more perfect than man — which the followers of the opposite opinion, whom we reported in the first conclusion, do not admit. And in the same way it is answered to the confirmation.

To the third it is answered from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, q. 70, art. 3, ad 3, that the heavenly bodies, if considered in themselves and not as including the moving intelligences, are not the principal cause of the living things generated in these lower regions, but only an instrumental cause operating in virtue of the principal agent, namely the intelligence which, since it is a living substance, can cause life in these lower regions. St. Thomas says the same, De potentia, q. 3, art. 11, ad 13 and 14, where he says that the heavenly body, although it is not living, yet acts in virtue of a living substance. But the power of the moving spiritual substance is received in the heavenly body after the manner of a certain intention, and not as a form having complete to-be in nature: as the power of art is said to be in the craftsman's instrument after the manner of a transient. And hereby it is answered to the first and second confirmations.

But for fuller satisfaction of the second confirmation and the objection which could be formed from St. Thomas below, q. 115, art. 3, ad 3, where he teaches that the heavenly bodies contain in their universal power whatever is generated in these lower regions, note that heaven is sometimes considered as not including the moving intelligence: and in this way we take it when it is said to concur instrumentally in the generation of living things; but sometimes it is considered together with the moving intelligence, in which sense must be taken what the philosophers say when they call the heavenly bodies the universal causes of what comes to be in these lower regions: for then heaven and the intelligence are not considered as two distinct causes, but both together as one total and integral and universal cause which, according to this consideration, as the equivocal cause of these lower things, contains in a higher mode the perfections found in them.

To the fourth it is answered that Divine Scripture commends God's wisdom in the heavenly bodies more than in these lower things because, according to an incorruptible and perpetual mode of being, they approach nearer to God.

To the fifth it is answered that living things are not called nobler than the heavenly bodies only in the way justice is called simply more perfect than fortitude, but because the grade of the living in its whole latitude is more perfect than the grade of nature found in the heavens.

To the last argument it is said, first, that St. Thomas, IV. Contra Gent., does not say that the motion of heaven is ordered to man alone as to an end, but only says that motion is especially on account of the generation of men: for other generable and corruptible things are ordered to man. Also, even if St. Thomas sometimes insinuates something concerning the perfection of the motion of heaven above living things, he must be understood according to the tenor of the third conclusion. To the second passage of St. Thomas it is answered in the same way; and we deliberately do not wish at present to examine what is the end of the motion of heaven (for furnishing the occasion of that disputation was what that passage of St. Thomas did), for that belongs to another place. Only note, for the fuller understanding of that passage and the knowledge of the truth, that the more perfect can be ordered to the more imperfect, not indeed as means to end, but as cause to its effect: as the disciples of St. Thomas teach, in 3 p., q. 1, art. 3, that the Incarnation of Christ is ordered to the salvation of men as cause to effect. Indeed, since the effect is the end of the operation of the efficient cause, it can very well be granted that the more perfect is ordered to the more imperfect as to a proximate end. Hence although the ultimate end must be more perfect than the thing ordered to that end, this is yet not required in a proximate end. I say therefore in the proposal that if the motion of heaven is considered as it proceeds from the intelligence, it is ordered to all corruptible living things, and especially to man, as cause to effect, and also as to a proximate end: but the ultimate and principal end of that motion so considered is that heaven itself be reduced to act, wherein it attains most of all the likeness of God in causing — and so St. Thomas says that heaven, as moved by the intelligence in the generation of corruptible things, attains its perfection. And since man is the most perfect effect of all corruptible things, in the production of man heaven attains its greatest perfection. And all this is true considering the motion of heaven as it proceeds from the intelligence; for according to this consideration, since it is the effect of a living thing nobler than all other living things in these lower regions, it is more perfect than they. But if that motion is considered as it proceeds from heaven itself, the intelligence set aside, since it is something more imperfect than living things, it is ordered to them as means to end. And this doctrine is to be noted.

Concerning the solution of St. Thomas's arguments, especially concerning the solution to the first, see St. Thomas, 1. Cont. Gent., ca. 89 and 90|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.89, and St. Augustine, lib. 1 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 8 and 17, and Epist. 111, and the lib. De Essentia Divinitatis, to. 4.

Concerning the solution to the second, note that Origen expounds that Let us make man to our image and likeness thus: what is said to the image is understood in this life, because we do not know God perfectly; but what is said to the likeness is referred to the perfection we shall have in our homeland — because when He shall appear, we shall be like Him.