Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is negative. St. Thomas proves it by three reasons. First, for God is the first immovable mover: but no body moves unless it is moved, therefore, etc. Second, for God is the first being existing altogether in act; but a body has something of potentiality, since it is continuous and consequently divisible — therefore. Third, because God is the noblest of all beings: but it is repugnant to a body to be the noblest, which is manifest in a body that is not alive. Of a living body it is also proved: for that by which it lives is nobler than the living body itself — therefore, etc.

COMMENTARY.

For the understanding of this article, notice with Cajetan that since 'body' is taken in a threefold way — first, for the body in the category of quantity, which implies a threefold dimension; second, for the other part of the natural composite placed on the side of the category of substance; third, for that which is placed in the direct line of the category of substance: St. Thomas's question in this article is not about body in the first and second way. For it is clear that God is not an accident pertaining to the first meaning of 'body'; likewise, it cannot enter anyone's mind that God is a part of substance: the conclusion is therefore to be understood of body in the third meaning. And it is certain according to the faith, so much so that its contrary is manifest heresy. It is proved, first, by the testimonies of Holy Scripture: John 4, 'God is a spirit.' Which passage all the holy Fathers understand literally of spirit, insofar as it excludes every portion of body. And the truth of this understanding is gathered from the context itself: for Christ in that passage intended to teach the Samaritan woman that the worship of God was not bound to any special bodily place; and he urges this from the fact that God is a spirit — that is, incorporeal. Likewise 1 Tim. 1, 'To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, etc.'; Rom. 1, 'For the invisible things of him, etc.' By this is signified that to be invisible is for God to be imperceptible to every bodily sense, as being truly incorporeal. This truth is also defined in the Lateran Council and is held in the chapter Firmiter on the Highest Trinity. Moreover it is proved by the authority of the Saints, who all receive this conclusion as the most true dogma of the faith. See St. Augustine, De haeresibus, ad Quodvultdeum, c. 86, vol. 6, and lib. 3 Confess. c. 7, where he says that the opposite view was the heresy of the Manichees. See also lib. 10 Super Genes. ad litteram, c. 25; and lib. 1 De Doct. Christ., c. 7 and 8; and lib. 6 De Trinit. c. 6 and 8; and lib. 11 Confess. c. 10 — from which passage St. Thomas took the reasons that he brings forth here.

But there is an argument. For St. Augustine, in the cited passage De haeresibus, relating that Tertullian affirmed that 'God is a body',

excuses him from heresy: therefore, to say that God is a body is not manifest heresy.

This is confirmed: for if the opinion contrary to St. Thomas's conclusion is condemned as heresy, it is because in Sacred Scripture God is called 'Spirit'; but angels are also called spirits in Holy Scripture very often, and yet the gravest certain Catholic Doctors taught, without any note of heresy, that angels are corporeal, as will be said below, q. 51 a. 1: therefore, etc.

To this argument it is answered that the blessed Augustine in that passage asserts our conclusion as a dogma of faith: yet he wished to excuse Tertullian from heresy, because perhaps Tertullian did not hold that God is truly a body, but in order to explain that God is not something empty, but something solid, firm, and substantial, he therefore called God 'body.' That this was Tertullian's mind is gathered from that very passage of St. Augustine, and also from Tertullian himself, De Resurrectione carnis, where, speaking of the soul, he says: 'But we confess that the soul is here also corporeal, having its own kind of solidity of substance.' And he says almost the same when he speaks of God.

To the confirmation it is answered that the Divine Scriptures attribute to-be Spirit to God and to angels in diverse ways. For to God as one altogether devoid of body, so as to include no portion of body — as is clear from the cited passage Ioan. 4. But Scripture does not say this so openly of angels and the rational soul. Finally the conclusion is proved: no body can be everywhere according to its whole self, so that the whole be in the whole and the whole in any part; but God is whole in the whole universe and whole in any part, as is clear from that Ierem. 23: «I fill heaven and earth»; therefore etc.

It is confirmed: for it is impious to think of God that one part of Him correspond to one part of the universe and another part to another — which one would necessarily have to say if He were a body.

It is confirmed, second: for if God is a body, then either finite or infinite; if finite, then He does not fill the whole nor is He everywhere, but will be confined to a certain place; if infinite, then He admits no other body together with Himself, as Aristotle well demonstrates, 3. lib. Physicorum. But there is an argument against the first reason of St. Thomas, in which he says that no body moves unmoved. It is argued thus: a magnet, when it draws iron to itself, moves it remaining itself unmoved. Likewise color presented to sight, remaining unmoved, moves the visual potency, and snow chills the surrounding air, remaining unmoved; therefore that proposition of St. Thomas, on which the first reason of the article is founded, is not universally true.

For the solution, note that that proposition — every moving body is moved — is from Aristotle, 8. Physic., ca. 5, text 40, and is to be understood, that it be universal, of purely local motion, by which one body moves another not through the impression of some form or quality from which that motion proceeds, but through impulse alone — as when someone throws a stone upward. And in this sense that proposition is most certain.

And it is proved: for mover and moved must be simultaneous; but it is impossible for them to be simultaneous if, while the mobile changes place, the mover is not moved either in itself or in its part, therefore etc.

Second, that proposition — every body while it moves is moved — is explained not of act but of potency: so that the sense is, every moving body is by nature apt to be moved; in which sense the proposition is most true, and sufficiently proves St. Thomas's intent, namely that God is not a body, since He is altogether immovable. See St. Thomas, 7. Physic., texts 10 and 11. And Master Cajetan rather applauds this explanation. To the objections to the contrary, it is answered.

To the first, concerning the magnet, see St. Thomas, 7. Physic., lect. 3, where he teaches that the magnet draws iron to itself by impressing a certain quality upon it; hence that is not purely local motion by impulse, of which we spoke in explaining the proposition. And the same will be said to the argument that could be made concerning heavy and light bodies, which are moved by the generator while it remains unmoved. For it is said that they are not moved with purely local motion by impulse alone, but with local motion which follows by a simple resulting toward the substantial form which they received from the generator.

Or, second, it is answered, as pleases Master Cajetan here, that the magnet does not move the iron, but rather the iron is moved toward it on account of the impressed quality.

To the other objections, concerning color and snow, it is answered likewise that the motion they effect is not purely local. But speaking of motion other than local, it is manifest that a body which moves need not be moved with the same motion, nor be movable: for the heaven alters these lower things, and yet is unalterable. IT IS DOUBTED concerning what St. Thomas says in the third reason, that a living body is nobler than a non-living body: whether this proposition is universally true.

And on the negative side it is argued first. For it seems absurd to say that ants and gnats are nobler than the heavenly bodies. For Aristotle, lib. 1 De partibus animal., ca. 5, says: «It is better to know few things concerning the heavenly bodies on account of their nobility, than many concerning these lower things». And 1. Caeli, c. 2: «The heavenly body (he says) is something divine and more excellent than things composed of elements». Hence when we wish to praise some body, we call it heavenly; whence the common consensus of all assigns heaven to God for a place, as the best body, as Aristotle says, 2. Caeli, c. 1; and it is more manifestly established from Divine Scripture, Isaiah, c. 66: Heaven is my throne, and Daniel, 2: There is a God in heaven revealing mysteries. Certainly, lib. 3 De natura Deorum, Cicero ridicules those who assert that ants and worms are more excellent than the heavenly bodies.

Second, it is argued: The dispositions for the form of heaven are nobler than those required for the form of living things other than man; therefore the form of heaven is more excellent than the forms of other living things. The antecedent seems known: for those dispositions are incorruptibility, transparency, brightness, etc. The consequence is proved, since dispositions are ordered by nature to the substantial form; therefore where they are nobler, the form too will be nobler. It is confirmed: for between natural dispositions and the form there must be proportion in the account of perfection.

Third, it is argued. Heaven is the equivocal cause of all living things: therefore it is nobler than the living things themselves. The consequence is proved: for the effect is in the equivocal cause in a more perfect mode than in itself; and it seems absurd to say that any effect in the whole of its latitude exceeds its cause in perfection. The antecedent is proved: for when heaven produces living things, it does not produce an effect of the same account, assimilated to heaven in species; therefore it is not the univocal cause of living things, but equivocal.

It is confirmed: for often the heavenly bodies without a particular agent produce certain imperfect living things in these lower regions, as worms, mice, etc.; therefore at least such living things are not more perfect than heaven; otherwise heaven could not produce them by itself alone.

It is confirmed, second: living things depend in becoming and in being conserved upon the heavenly bodies; therefore they are not of as great perfection as the heavens themselves, for otherwise they would certainly not so depend upon them, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 104, art. 1.

Fourth, it is argued: Sacred Scripture much more extols divine Wisdom in the heavenly bodies than in lower things, as is patent in Psal. 18: «The heavens declare the glory of God»; and Psal. 8: «I shall see thy heavens, the works of thy fingers.» And many similar passages are found in divine Scripture which especially commend divine Wisdom and Power in the fabric of the heavens.

Fifth, it is argued: for from the fact that living things, speaking absolutely and according to their proper account, are nobler than non-living things, it does not follow that every living thing is more excellent than any non-living thing; therefore the heavenly bodies could be more perfect than many living things. The antecedent is proved and explained: for although justice is a more excellent virtue than fortitude, nevertheless some act of fortitude is simply and absolutely more perfect than many acts of justice — namely martyrdom; therefore the same must be said of the perfection of heaven in relation to many living things.

Last, it is argued: for St. Thomas, 4. Cont. Gent., c. ulti.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-quartus:liber.4/capitulum.97, seems to hold this sentence proved by the foregoing arguments: for he says that the end of the motion of heaven is man, therefore man alone excels heaven. And De Potentia, q. 5, art. 5, he says that the end of the motion of heaven is the determinate number of the elect: and he adds that it can happen that the term of the operation of a nobler thing be viler: and he speaks of the operation of heaven with respect to living things other than man; therefore he holds heaven to be nobler than all living things besides man.

Concerning this difficulty there are various opinions. The first is of those who say that a living body is more perfect, according to its genus, than a non-living body. That is, within the genus of living body some living body is found which excels any non-living body whatever; in the way theologians commonly explain that the virtue of justice is more excellent than the virtue of fortitude: because the most excellent act of justice exceeds the noblest act of fortitude. This opinion pleases Marfil. in 1., q. 1., art. 2., conclusi. 6 et 7.

The second opinion says that every living body, even the most imperfect, is nobler than any non-living body whatever even heavenly, speaking simply and absolutely; but secundum quid the heavenly body is judged more perfect: since it has certain accidental conditions by which it exceeds many living things — for it is incorruptible, and a universal cause exerting influx upon these lower things, etc. Of this opinion is Master Cajetan on this article, where he says that the ant, in that it is living, is simply a nobler being than heaven: although heaven is a nobler body and more perfect secundum quid.

The third opinion says that living things are nobler than non-living things as to the grade of being, for they have a nobler grade of being, namely life. For the rest, heaven exceeds living things as to mode, for it has a nobler mode of being.

FOR the decision of this difficulty let the first conclusion be: It is probable that heaven is more perfect than all living things besides man. After Marsilius, ubi supra, this conclusion was taught from our own ranks by the most wise M. Victoria and Cano on this article, and it is proved by the arguments made from the beginning.

In exposition of this conclusion, note from St. Thomas, below, q. 5, art. 1, ad 1, that although being and good are the same, yet the account of being is taken from one source, and the account of good or perfect from another: for the account of being is taken simply from substantial to-be, while the account of good and perfect is taken from superadded accidents. So although the substantial to-be of any living thing whatever is nobler than heaven, yet since heaven vindicates to itself more perfect accidents than all living things besides man, it can be called simply more perfect.

The second conclusion: It is much more probable that any living thing whatever is simply more perfect than heaven or any non-living thing whatever. This sentence is taught here by Cajetan and Ferr., 1. Cont. Gentes, cap. 20|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.20, with St. Thomas, ibidem in the sixth reason, where St. Thomas says that in any body, the living is nobler than the non-living: and in this Part below, q. 70, art. 3, ad secundum, he says that nothing prevents something from being nobler simply and baser in a certain respect. The form of the heavenly body, therefore, although it is not simply more perfect than the soul of a living thing, will yet be nobler in the account of form, because it totally completes its matter. St. Thomas holds, therefore, that the form of a living thing is simply nobler than the form of heaven. He teaches the same, quaest. 6 De Potentia, art. 6, ad 13. The conclusion is also proved by reason. The form of any living thing whatever gives a more perfect grade of being than the form of heaven; therefore it is simply more perfect. The antecedent is proved: for the form of a living thing gives the grade of life, which the form of heaven does not give. The consequence is proved: for that is the more perfect form which gives a more perfect to-be, contracting to-be itself in a more abstract mode.

For the fuller explanation of this, note here with Cajetan that the grade of life in the universe is higher than the grade of nature, according as nature is distinguished against soul. For as, among the elements, fire holds the higher place on account of its perfection, so among grades the grade of life is higher than the grade of corporeity; and so corporeity in its whole latitude is under the order of life, as something more imperfect. Hence not secundum quid but simply, the whole latitude of body is below the latitude of life.

Second, the conclusion is proved: any living thing whatever has a more excellent operation than the operation of any non-living body whatever; therefore it has a more perfect to-be. The consequence is proved: for operation follows upon the to-be of a thing, for each thing operates inasmuch as it is in act. The antecedent is proved: for the operation of a living thing, by which the living thing is perfected, is from an intrinsic principle; but the operation or motion of a non-living thing is from without. Also, vital operation is more abstract from matter than any operation whatever of a non-living thing.

Third, it is proved and confirmed: for Aristotle in the Prologue of the Metaphysicae for this reason said that sight is more excellent than the act of hearing: because it abstracts more from matter, and does not so depend upon extrinsic matter: but the actions of a living thing depend less upon matter than the actions of a non-living thing; therefore etc.

And it is confirmed from the sentence of St. Augustine, lib. De vera Religione, where he seems to assert this conclusion, saying that every living substance whatever is preferred in the order of nature to the non-living. And in the first book De Doct. Christ., cap. 8, and book 11 De Civit. Dei, cap. 16, he distinguishes four grades of things: first, of those which have natural to-be not conjoined with life; second, of living things without senses, as are plants; and so by degrees up to the Angels — and he says that living things are set before non-living things.

Let the third conclusion be: It seems most probable that living things are more perfect than non-living things as to the grade of being, but not as to the mode of being. This conclusion does not contradict the preceding one, but can be held together with it. For the exposition of this, note that one thing can be more perfect than another in substance and not as to mode. E.g. Theology in us wayfarers is a more perfect science than Mathematics, since it has a more perfect object; for the rest, as to mode, the mathematical sciences excel, since they proceed through evident means, while Theology in this life proceeds obscurely. So in the proposal, the to-be conjoined with life is higher and more perfect than corporeal to-be. For the rest, some corporeal non-living to-be, such as is found in heaven, has a certain more perfect mode of being: because heaven has to-be un-losably and incorruptibly, while corporeal living things participate to-be defectibly and corruptibly.

Note, second, that since the grade of being is to-be, to-live, to-sense, to-understand, while the modes of being are possible, necessary, corruptible, incorruptible, act, potency, effect, cause, etc., heaven and living things stand as exceeding and exceeded in the account of the perfect: for the living surpasses the heavenly bodies in grade of being, but is surpassed by them in mode of being, since heaven has incorruptible to-be and is the cause of these lower things. This conclusion so explained seems to be expressly St. Thomas's, below, q. 70, art. 3, ad secundum.

AD ARGUMENTA IN CONTRARIUM. — To the arguments to the contrary, it is answered.

To the first it is said that it is not only not absurd that ants and other most ignoble animate things be called more perfect than the heavenly bodies, but it is very consonant with reason and the rules of the best Philosophy, as is established from what we have said in the second and third conclusions.

To Aristotle it is answered that in those passages he intends to teach nothing else except that the heavenly bodies have a more perfect mode of being, as we explained in the third conclusion.

To the second it is answered by denying the antecedent: for since the grade of life is more perfect, so also the consequent or concomitant dispositions of that grade are more perfect. Also the forms of living things have vital potencies as dispositions, which potencies are more perfect than other qualities of bodies. And finally it is answered that this argument, if it proved anything, would also prove that heaven is more perfect than man — which the followers of the opposite opinion, whom we reported in the first conclusion, do not admit. And in the same way it is answered to the confirmation.

To the third it is answered from the doctrine of St. Thomas below, q. 70, art. 3, ad 3, that the heavenly bodies, if considered in themselves and not as including the moving intelligences, are not the principal cause of the living things generated in these lower regions, but only an instrumental cause operating in virtue of the principal agent, namely the intelligence which, since it is a living substance, can cause life in these lower regions. St. Thomas says the same, De potentia, q. 3, art. 11, ad 13 and 14, where he says that the heavenly body, although it is not living, yet acts in virtue of a living substance. But the power of the moving spiritual substance is received in the heavenly body after the manner of a certain intention, and not as a form having complete to-be in nature: as the power of art is said to be in the craftsman's instrument after the manner of a transient. And hereby it is answered to the first and second confirmations.

But for fuller satisfaction of the second confirmation and the objection which could be formed from St. Thomas below, q. 115, art. 3, ad 3, where he teaches that the heavenly bodies contain in their universal power whatever is generated in these lower regions, note that heaven is sometimes considered as not including the moving intelligence: and in this way we take it when it is said to concur instrumentally in the generation of living things; but sometimes it is considered together with the moving intelligence, in which sense must be taken what the philosophers say when they call the heavenly bodies the universal causes of what comes to be in these lower regions: for then heaven and the intelligence are not considered as two distinct causes, but both together as one total and integral and universal cause which, according to this consideration, as the equivocal cause of these lower things, contains in a higher mode the perfections found in them.

To the fourth it is answered that Divine Scripture commends God's wisdom in the heavenly bodies more than in these lower things because, according to an incorruptible and perpetual mode of being, they approach nearer to God.

To the fifth it is answered that living things are not called nobler than the heavenly bodies only in the way justice is called simply more perfect than fortitude, but because the grade of the living in its whole latitude is more perfect than the grade of nature found in the heavens.

To the last argument it is said, first, that St. Thomas, IV. Contra Gent., does not say that the motion of heaven is ordered to man alone as to an end, but only says that motion is especially on account of the generation of men: for other generable and corruptible things are ordered to man. Also, even if St. Thomas sometimes insinuates something concerning the perfection of the motion of heaven above living things, he must be understood according to the tenor of the third conclusion. To the second passage of St. Thomas it is answered in the same way; and we deliberately do not wish at present to examine what is the end of the motion of heaven (for furnishing the occasion of that disputation was what that passage of St. Thomas did), for that belongs to another place. Only note, for the fuller understanding of that passage and the knowledge of the truth, that the more perfect can be ordered to the more imperfect, not indeed as means to end, but as cause to its effect: as the disciples of St. Thomas teach, in 3 p., q. 1, art. 3, that the Incarnation of Christ is ordered to the salvation of men as cause to effect. Indeed, since the effect is the end of the operation of the efficient cause, it can very well be granted that the more perfect is ordered to the more imperfect as to a proximate end. Hence although the ultimate end must be more perfect than the thing ordered to that end, this is yet not required in a proximate end. I say therefore in the proposal that if the motion of heaven is considered as it proceeds from the intelligence, it is ordered to all corruptible living things, and especially to man, as cause to effect, and also as to a proximate end: but the ultimate and principal end of that motion so considered is that heaven itself be reduced to act, wherein it attains most of all the likeness of God in causing — and so St. Thomas says that heaven, as moved by the intelligence in the generation of corruptible things, attains its perfection. And since man is the most perfect effect of all corruptible things, in the production of man heaven attains its greatest perfection. And all this is true considering the motion of heaven as it proceeds from the intelligence; for according to this consideration, since it is the effect of a living thing nobler than all other living things in these lower regions, it is more perfect than they. But if that motion is considered as it proceeds from heaven itself, the intelligence set aside, since it is something more imperfect than living things, it is ordered to them as means to end. And this doctrine is to be noted.

Concerning the solution of St. Thomas's arguments, especially concerning the solution to the first, see St. Thomas, 1. Cont. Gent., ca. 89 and 90|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.89, and St. Augustine, lib. 1 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 8 and 17, and Epist. 111, and the lib. De Essentia Divinitatis, to. 4.

Concerning the solution to the second, note that Origen expounds that Let us make man to our image and likeness thus: what is said to the image is understood in this life, because we do not know God perfectly; but what is said to the likeness is referred to the perfection we shall have in our homeland — because when He shall appear, we shall be like Him.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is negative. St. Thomas proves it by three arguments.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article, see Soncinas on 12 Metaphysics, q. 29; and Cajetan here, especially on the third argument. On which it must be noted that although to heat or to cool per se first is not the same as to be such according to its whole self (for fire is per se first heating, and yet not according to its whole self, but according to a part, namely the form), nevertheless to be an agent per se first and to be an agent according to its whole self are convertible. The reason for this is: because an action of a determinate species, e.g. heating, if it belongs to some agent through its proper form, even if it does not belong to it according to its whole self, can belong to it per se first: so that it is not necessary that it be reduced to another prior principle to which that species of action belongs according to its whole self. There is an example in heating, which belongs to fire according to one part, namely according to the form, and nevertheless it is that to which this action first belongs. And if you still seek the reason for this, it is this: because actions of this sort, of a determinate species, cannot belong to an agent otherwise than by reason of the form; but since the form is the principle from which the determination of the species is taken, both as regards substance and also as regards the accidents which follow upon it, for such an action to belong to an agent per se first, it is not required that it belong to it according to its whole self, but it will suffice that it belong according to the form. But as for action as it is signified by this word action, abstracting from every species and mode of action: for it to belong to something per se first, it is necessary that it belong to it according to its whole self: since action as such, from the fact that it imports no limitation, must necessarily be reduced to an agent to which it belongs to act first and per se and without any limitation; and consequently not by reason of some determinate part, and thus according to its whole self.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning the solution to the third, where St. Thomas says that forms which are receivable in matter are individuated by matter, whether matter is the principle of individuation. It has pleased us to dispute this question, for the sake of the philosophers.

And it is argued first for the negative side; and I prove that the form is the principle of individuation. This form is by nature prior to this matter, and this matter is by nature prior to this quantity; therefore the principle of individuation of this substance will be this form. The consequence is proved: for that is the first principle of individuation to which it first belongs to be this and an individual. And the antecedent is proved: for the form gives to-be to matter; therefore it is prior.

It is confirmed: this matter is this one on account of this form; therefore by nature the form is this one prior. Likewise the accidents are these singular ones, because they are received in singular matter; therefore matter is this one prior to this quantity.

It is confirmed second: the form determines matter which of itself is indifferent to many forms differing in species and number; therefore matter itself is determined and becomes this singular one through this form rather than the converse.

It is argued second: the rational soul is by nature prior to being and to being received in signate matter; therefore it is not individuated through it. The antecedent is proved: for the rational soul has to-be by nature prior to the whole composite, and prior to matter itself: whence it is not educed from the potency of matter. And it is commonly said that among natural forms there is this difference between rational souls and others: that the composite from the others has to-be prior to the form itself; but the rational soul has to-be prior to the composite from it. Indeed, it itself communicates to-be to the whole composite; and when it is separated from the body, it draws its to-be back to itself. See St. Thomas below, q. 90, art. 2, and Master Soto, book 1 of the Physics, q. 7.

It is argued third: any substantial form is united by nature to matter prior to the union of the accidents; therefore in that priority the substantial composite is understood to be this and singular, before these accidents are understood to be these. The consequence seems clear, and the antecedent is proved: for the substantial form is united to bare matter; otherwise substantial generation would not be generation simply, as Aristotle teaches, 5 Physics, text 7.

It is argued fourth, proving that matter, which is the other part of the composite, is the principle of individuation without respect to the accidents; for matter, by reason of the material cause, is by nature this one prior to the form and prior to the accidents; therefore it does not have from them that it be this one: and consequently, it itself will be for the composite the principle of individuation. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent is proved: for a cause is by nature prior to its effect; but matter is the material cause of the form and of the composite. It is confirmed first: matter in that priority of nature, namely in the genus of material cause, is understood as this one before the form and the composite and the accidents are understood; therefore it is this one through itself, and hence the principle of individuation of the composite. It is confirmed second: the form of itself is unlimited and infinite; therefore it is limited and individuated through matter.

It is argued fifth. For if individuation were through matter signate by this quantity, it would follow that in that priority of nature in which matter regards the form prior to quantity, neither matter nor form would be this singular one; but both would be something common, which nevertheless is impossible, since common matter and form are found only in the intellect. And the sequel is proved: for before we understand the order to quantity, there will be no principle of individuation; therefore all things are universal and common. It is confirmed first: for, as we said above from the mind of Aristotle, and as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 76, art. 6, the form is united immediately to matter as regards the first grade which it confers upon it, which is substantial to-be, so that no disposition precedes the form in matter, even in the genus of material cause, insofar as the form gives that grade of being substantially to matter; therefore then matter and form, insofar as they are united in that grade, are something common, since no quantity is understood there.

It is confirmed second: matter by nature regards the substantial form, which is its primary term, prior to quantity itself, which is a secondary term; therefore it has from the substantial form that it be this one prior to having it from quantity itself, which afterwards follows upon the form in matter. The antecedent is proved: for each thing regards prior that which is of its own genus.

It is argued sixth: although matter had from quantity that it be this one in the genus of material cause, nevertheless in the genus of formal cause it has by nature from the substantial form that it be this one prior to having it from quantity: therefore by whatever reason quantity is said to be the first root and principle of individuation, by the same reason, and much more, it can be granted of the substantial form: for of the former in the genus of material cause, of the latter in the genus of formal cause, which is more excellent, can it be verified. It is confirmed: quantity proceeds from the form, and not from matter; therefore it should rather be said that the form, by reason of the quantity which it causes, is the principle of individuation. The antecedent is proved from the doctrine of Aristotle, 1 Physics, ch. 4, and is adduced by St. Thomas below, q. 7, art. 3. For every natural form determines for itself certain accidents, one of which is quantity. It is confirmed second: act and potency mutually determine each other; therefore just as it is granted that matter determines the form in the genus of material cause, so it must be granted that the form determines matter in the genus of formal cause; and thus just as matter is the principle of individuation, so too is the form.

It is argued seventh: the unity of the predicament of substance is one thing, and the unity of the predicament of quantity, which is the principle of number, another; therefore, just as a thing is one with quantitative unity through quantity, so too will it be one with substantial unity through its substance; therefore to be an individual, which belongs to this unity, must be reduced, as to its principle in material substances, to its own proper substance, so that to one asking why Peter is this singular man, the answer must be: because he has this singular substance. It is confirmed: Peter is essentially this singular substance placed directly in the predicament of substance; therefore he is not constituted in that to-be by something of another predicament, since the constitutive principle of any substance must necessarily be a substance; therefore he is not constituted through quantity, and thus matter signate by quantity will not be the principle of individuation. It is confirmed second: if God through his omnipotence took away from Peter all accidents, Peter would still remain individual and singular; therefore no accident is such as to be the principle of the individuation of Peter. The antecedent is proved: for Peter would then remain a substance, not a common one, therefore a singular one. But whoever wishes to see more arguments for this side, let him see Cajetan, On Being and Essence, ch. 2, q. 5; and Javelli, 5 Metaphysics, q. 15; and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, from q. 31 up to and including 34.

IN this question we shall not dwell much, for it is philosophical, and is to be treated by us most abundantly on book 1 of Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, which commentary we are now preparing to bring to light.

For the solution, therefore, note most briefly that on this matter there have been various opinions. The first was that of Scotus in 1, d. 3, q. 6: that the principle of individuation is the account of singularity, through which a material thing has that it is thus this and singular, which he calls thisness. This opinion nevertheless falls short, since although it acknowledges a mode or account by which a nature is in reality formally individual — in which it does not differ from the opinion of St. Thomas — it nevertheless does not explain the principle and root from which this account of singularity is taken, which is what we are inquiring into.

Another opinion was that of Durandus, ibid., q. 2, where he says two things. First, that each thing is individuated from a twofold principle, namely an intrinsic and an extrinsic one. He says secondly that the intrinsic principle of individuation is the essence of the singular thing itself, while the extrinsic one is the efficient cause from which it is produced. Whence if someone should ask Durandus why Peter is this man, he will answer: because he has this essence in number, namely this matter and this form; and also because he was begotten from these parents, and not from others. But this opinion, although it appears most clear, nevertheless does not touch the point of the difficulty. For as regards the efficient cause, it is entirely something extrinsic, about which we are not inquiring here. For if the discussion were about this, Durandus says truly that the agent is the principle of individuation. But we are inquiring about the intrinsic principle; whence it is not sufficiently answered that it is this essence in number. For this is what is at issue in the dispute: whence does this essence have that it be this one in number.

The third opinion is that of certain most learned disciples of St. Thomas of our time, who, convinced by the arguments made, say that the principle of individuation is neither quantity nor matter signate by quantity; but that, as regards us, the singular distinction of one individual from another is more easily explained through matter signate by quantity: namely because Peter has other matter with other quantity than Paul. Yet they say that there are two essential principles of individuation, namely this matter and this form. But if you ask whence this form is this one, they answer: from this matter. And if you ask again whence this matter has that it be this one, they answer: from this form; nor do they reckon this circle vicious, because it proceeds in diverse genera of causes. For matter is individuated through the form in the genus of formal cause, and the form is individuated through matter in the genus of material cause. Cajetan below, q. 29, art. 1, seems to some to conform to this opinion. But certainly this opinion seems contrary to St. Thomas and Aristotle: for the Philosopher teaches universally that the principle of individuation is not to be reduced to the form, but to matter signate by quantity, as is clear in 3 Metaphysics, text 11, and more clearly in book 5, text 12, and book 12, texts 5 and 49.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be certain according to the mind of St. Thomas. The first principle of individuation is signate matter: so St. Thomas teaches wherever he speaks of this matter; here, to the third. And in the opuscule On Being and Essence, ch. 2, and opuscule 29, and opuscule 70, q. 4, art. 2; and 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21; and it is briefly proved. Numerical distinction is not taken from the form, nor from the whole composite: therefore from matter. The minor is clear. The major is proved: for numerical distinction is material; therefore it is not from the form. Likewise also, for the form is the principle of specific distinction, therefore not of numerical. Moreover, for that is the intrinsic principle of individuation to which it first repugns to be communicated to many, as a universal is communicated to particulars: but it is signate matter to which this first repugns; therefore etc. The major is clear; the minor is proved. That belongs first to signate matter which, with any other thing excluded, belongs to it, and with it excluded, belongs to no other, as is clear from 1 Posterior Analytics, text 14. But not to be communicated to many, as a universal to a particular, with any other thing existing in a sensible substance excluded, belongs to signate matter: for it cannot be understood as communicable. Again, with it excluded, Peter does not remain this man, nor does the form of Peter remain this singular form; therefore the principle of singularity is signate matter.

The point of the difficulty among the Thomists, therefore, stands in this: what is to be understood by signate matter. For on this there are among the Thomists as many opinions as heads: some saying that signate matter is matter with actual quantity; others, that it is matter capable of this quantity; others again asserting that signate matter is neither the one nor the other, but is matter as the principle, root and cause of this quantity.

Let there be, therefore, a second conclusion: that opinion is probable which asserts that signate matter is prime matter according as it is the foundation and root of this quantity, and not of another. This opinion Cajetan holds in the place cited above; but before it is proved, it must be explained in what this opinion differs from the other opinion of Cajetan, in which the whole difficulty lies.

For the exposition of which, note first that just as a subject with respect to its proper passions has a twofold account — one account is that of a receptive potency, for it receives its proper passions in itself and is their subject; the other account is that of cause and root, for the essence is the principle and root of the passions — so matter, which is the other part of the composite, has a twofold account, as Soncinas teaches, 8 Metaphysics, q. 7, in the body, and to the first and second. For matter is the ground of receiving quantity, and is as it were the root and principle of it: just as the form is that by reason of which certain accidents follow upon the subject.

Note secondly that in the first instant of generation, when fire, e.g., generates fire, it first disposes the matter, by the power of which disposition it appropriates it to this quantity, so as to make it capable of this quantity, and not of another; likewise it also determines it to be the root and principle from which this quantity, and not another, follows in the composite.

Cajetan, therefore, and this our conclusion, teaches that prime matter according to this last consideration — namely insofar as it is the root and principle of this quantity — and not according to the prior consideration, namely insofar as it is capable of, or in potency to, this quantity, is signate matter. The chief reason for this conclusion is the one which Cajetan adduces in the present place, and Soncinas teaches in the place above. For matter, according as it is capable of and in potency to receive this quantity, pertains to the genus of quantity; for act and potency are in the same genus: therefore it cannot be the intrinsic principle constitutive of this singular substance. Likewise also, for the numerical distinction by which Peter is substantially distinguished from Paul is not a quantitative distinction, but the foundation of a quantitative distinction, since the principle constitutive of this man and distinguishing him from another is the root and foundation of this quantity; therefore the intrinsic principle of individuation is matter as the root and foundation of quantity.

Third conclusion. The opinion which Cajetan held in On Being and Essence, above, is more probable for us and more according to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas: that signate matter is prime matter, not actually having quantity, but capable of this quantity, and not of another. For the understanding of this conclusion and truth, note that according to this doctrine the whole individuation is reduced to matter, not as it is a cause pre-containing quantity in its own power, but as it is the receptive potency of quantity; and since the account of a passive potency is ultimately reduced to its proper act, it follows that individuation and numerical distinction are reduced and resolved into quantity, as it is the act of that potency: and especially according to our mode of understanding, who can scarcely distinguish matter otherwise than by a certain quantity. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 77, art. 2, where he says that quantity is the principle of individuation: because, namely, it is that by which one matter is divided from another. See below, q. 76, art. 2, to the second; and Cajetan in the same place, and 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 73, reason 4. And so just as the sciences are distinguished by their objects — not that the objects themselves are extrinsic differentiae of the sciences, but they are distinguished by the order and relation to those objects — so too the principle of individuation is matter with an order and relation to this quantity. And quantity of itself is undivided in itself, and divided from any other whatever. Whence just as the principle by which two natures are distinguished in species is the essential difference, while the difference itself is distinguished of itself from another, so too the principle of numerical distinction is matter signate by quantity, while quantity is of itself distinct from another quantity.

TO the arguments it must be answered. To the first: let the antecedent pass, and the consequence is denied. For just as the form is prior to matter in the genus of formal cause, so too matter is prior to the form in the genus of material cause, since causes are causes of one another: yet in that priority of nature in which the form is understood, matter is pre-understood in another genus of cause, namely the material, not indeed with actual quantity, but with the order and capacity of this quantity, to which it has been disposed by the action of the natural agent. Whence I say that in that priority in which the form is understood as this one, matter is pre-understood in the genus of material cause as capable of this quantity. But these priorities are not priorities of times, but of causality: and therefore the arguments which rely on them, both here and in other places, are for the most part sophistical. To the confirmation it is answered that although the form determines matter formally, nevertheless matter signate by quantity determines the form materially; and since we are here speaking of material distinction, it must be reduced to matter as to its principle.

To the second argument it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I deny the consequence. For in that priority the rational soul is understood with an order to matter signate by quantity, and so it is understood as this one on account of that order. There is an example in separated souls, which are understood as individual on account of the transcendental order which they bear to their own bodies.

To the third it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I distinguish the consequent: this substantial composite is understood before these accidents actually exist, I grant; before the order and capacity of this accident, which is quantity, I deny. For that implicit and virtual order of matter to this quantity is the principle by which this composite is this one.

To the fourth it is answered that matter in that priority in which it precedes the form has that it be this and singular through the transcendental order which it bears by virtue of the preceding dispositions to this quantity. In the same way it is answered to the first confirmation. To the second it is answered that the form, which of itself is unlimited, is limited and individuated through matter, not in any way whatever, but signate by quantity.

To the fifth it is answered: the sequel is denied, for as we said, causes are causes of one another; and so the form, insofar as it formally gives to-be to matter, presupposes the same matter with the capacity of this quantity. For since quantity is a disposition necessary to the form, there is pre-understood at least the capacity of it on the part of matter in the genus of material cause. To the first confirmation it is answered that although with respect to that first grade of being substantially, which matter receives from the substantial form, no intrinsic disposition is understood in matter, there is nevertheless necessarily presupposed a certain extrinsic disposition of alteration, or of this sort, through which matter was determined by the natural agent to this quantity in number, and not to another. To the second confirmation it is answered: I distinguish the antecedent; for in the genus of material cause matter regards quantity prior to this substantial form, in that quantity is the proper disposition to this singular form.

To the sixth it is answered: I deny the consequence; the reason for which is manifold. First, for the constitution and distinction of which we speak here is numerical and material; whence it must be reduced to matter and quantity as to its principle. The second reason is that although quantity were an effect of the form and not of matter, nevertheless it regards matter first as its primary subject, one part of which is distinguished from another by quantity itself; and by this it is answered to the first confirmation. The third reason is that quantity, insofar as it is the principle of individuation, is not considered as an effect of the form; for in that way it is something posterior. But when quantity is asserted to be the first root of individuation, it is considered as a cause holding itself on the part of matter, as disposing to the form. Absolutely, however, it is no inconvenience to grant that so great a quantity is an effect of the form. According to which is understood the saying of Aristotle and St. Thomas adduced in the first confirmation. To the second confirmation it is answered that although act and potency mutually determine each other, they do so not in the same way: for act determines potency as to species, but potency determines act as to the individual.

To the seventh it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and to the consequence it is said that a singular substance is one individually through something substantial. Nor do we say that the intrinsic principle constitutive of the individual is quantity — for that is chimerical — but it is matter itself capable of this quantity, as has often been said. But that individuation is not to be reduced to this singular substance, as Durandus said, has been proved above, when we reported his opinion. To the first confirmation it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and the first consequence. But to the other consequences it is said that matter signate by quantity, in the way it has been explained, is not something of the predicament of accident, but of the genus of substance. And to the argument which is customarily formed against this from Cajetan, namely that act and potency are in the same genus, therefore matter as capable of or able to receive quantity, and quantity, which it regards as act, are in the same genus, namely that of quantity: it is answered, omitting many explanations of that maxim, that the first act, to which the potency is ordered, and the potency itself must be in the same predicament; but this is not required with respect to a secondary act: but the primary act of matter is the substantial form, and quantity is secondary. To the second confirmation it is answered that, that miracle admitted, there would still remain in the matter of Peter an order to such a quantity, by which order signate matter is constituted. Nor can that order be taken away unless the individual be destroyed. There is an example in the essence of man: although God took away from it the power of laughter, there nevertheless remains in the essence itself that it is the root and also capable of risibility. And let these things suffice concerning this question.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE. First conclusion: In things composed of matter and form, it is necessary that nature and supposit differ. The reason is that nature comprehends only those things which fall within the definition of the species; but the supposit includes individual matter, and this flesh, and these bones, together with the accidents designating this matter. Second conclusion: In substances separated from matter, supposit and nature do not differ. The reason is that forms subsisting through themselves are individuated. Third conclusion, the principal one: God is the same as his essence or nature. The reason is that God is not composed of matter and form; therefore he is his Godhead, and his life, etc.

COMMENTARY. IN this article there are three difficulties, chiefly according to the number and the order of these three conclusions. The first: Whether in material substances the supposit is really distinguished from the nature?

Argument is made first, on the negative side, from Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 21, where he says that in all substances the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is. And in text 20, teaching the same, he excepts from this universal only those things which are one per accidens. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas in the article proves only from this that supposit and nature differ really in material things, because the supposit includes individuating, or material, conditions which the nature does not include. Then the argument is made thus: material conditions are not of the account of the supposit, but are accidents of it, and come to the supposit already constituted; therefore from these no real distinction of it from the nature is gathered. The antecedent is proved: for the supposit is the primary substance, which according to Aristotle's sentence in the predicament of substance is most properly and supremely substance; therefore it is not constituted in the to-be of a supposit through accidental conditions designating this matter, as St. Thomas says in the article. And this reasoning we brought forward in the preceding article as a demonstration, by which we proved that designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, does not import matter with actual quantity. It is confirmed secondly: for if the supposit included material accidents, it would be a being per accidens; for from substance and accident there does not arise one per se, as Aristotle often teaches. And also because if God by a miracle separated from Peter all his accidents, he would still remain the same in number.

Secondly it is argued principally: individual material conditions per se first pertain to the singular nature, in such a way that this humanity includes by priority of nature all those conditions before this man does; therefore supposit and nature do not differ really. The consequence is evident, standing within St. Thomas's reasoning; and the antecedent is proved. By priority of nature this humanity is singular before this man is constituted in the singular to-be of this man: it is proved, for this individual, namely Peter, is this man for the reason that he has this singular and essential nature, namely this humanity; therefore it is understood prior that the nature is singular. And it is confirmed: for the divine Word assumed this singular humanity, and did not assume a supposit; therefore the human nature is understood as singular before it be understood in a supposit, otherwise a singular nature could not be assumed without a supposit being assumed.

Thirdly it is argued: the account of the individual is presupposed to the account of the supposit; therefore it belongs to the nature prior to the supposit, and consequently the account on which St. Thomas relies in the article is null. The consequence is proved: for every condition which precedes the account of the supposit holds on the side of the nature. And the antecedent is proved: the account of the supposit is that it be subsisting through itself, independent of any other supposit through which it subsists; but the account of the individual is that it be undivided in itself, that is, one thing simply, and that it cannot be divided into several inferior things. But this second account is presupposed to the first: for it is prior that some thing be one in itself and undivided, than that it subsist independently of every other; therefore the account of singularity belongs to the nature prior. You will say perhaps that St. Thomas in this article does not say that the material individual really differs from the singular nature, but only says that it really differs from the specific nature: for he speaks of the definable nature, saying that nature comprehends only those things which fall within the definition of the species, such as humanity. Against this is the argument: it follows that St. Thomas spoke defectively; since he does not sufficiently distinguish the material supposit from the divine supposit. For this is peculiar to the divine supposit, that it be the same as its most singular nature. Likewise also he speaks defectively in that, in distinguishing the singular supposit from the specific nature, he does not compare it to the singular nature.

Fourthly it is argued: there follows from this sentence of St. Thomas that this proposition is false, man is humanity; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved. For of those things which are really distinguished, one is not predicated of the other. And the minor is proved. For this proposition is true in divine things, God is Godhead; and in created things this is true, a created being is entity; therefore this too will be true, man is humanity.

Fifth. The supposit does not include anything real which the nature does not include; therefore they do not differ really. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved: for otherwise this would be false, man is the thing which is humanity, which nevertheless all Metaphysicians concede. It is proved: because this is false, man is the thing which is prime matter, man is the thing which is the soul; because man includes, besides matter, the form itself, and besides the soul, the body; therefore if the supposit adds something real above the nature, that proposition will likewise be false.

Lastly it is argued. If the supposit differs from the nature really, then also personality is really distinguished from the nature, and existence. And then again it follows that in material things there is a threefold composition, namely of matter and form, of to-be and essence, and of nature and personality: which nevertheless no Metaphysician has yet said. On the contrary, however, is the sentence of St. Thomas in this article, which he took from Aristotle, 3 De Anima, text 9, and 7 Metaphysics, text 41, where he says: «And what it was to be for each thing is in some cases the same, as in primary substances». But all things which are as matter, or as things gathered together from matter, are not the same. Concerning this difficulty there are very many opinions, which see in Master Cajetan, in the 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, where this matter is also disputed. FOR the resolution, it must be noted first that a supposit properly taken is a complete individual substance subsisting incommunicably. It is called substance to exclude accidents; complete excludes parts of a substance, such as head, arms, etc.; individual excludes the specific nature, not only as signified in the abstract, as humanity, but also in the concrete, as man: for we are speaking here of the singular supposit. It is called subsisting in contrast to a substantial nature taken in the abstract, which does not subsist, but is that by which the supposit subsists. We say incommunicably, to exclude God from the account of supposit: for this God, as communicable to the three Divine Persons, is not a supposit. It is true that at present the substantial supposit is not only taken for the singular supposit, but also for what is signified by a common term, e.g. man. For I consider that, since man imports the human nature in a supposit, although it imports the nature prior thereto, nevertheless it truly signifies the supposit confusedly and in common. And this is proved both from the definition of a common term handed down by the Dialecticians. And it is confirmed: for when man is taken personally, it is predicated of and supposits properly for supposits, therefore it signifies them. Secondly it is proved: for if man signifies the nature alone, and not the supposit, it follows that this should be granted, the Son of God assumed man, which nevertheless all Theologians reject as heretical, if it be taken in rigor, as is clear: 3rd part, q. 4, art. 3. And the sequel is proved: for the Son of God assumed the human nature; therefore if man adds nothing above the human nature, it follows well that he assumed man. Note secondly from St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ch. 3, that nature can be signified in two ways, both by way of a part, as by this word humanity, and by way of a whole, as it is signified by this word man. But they differ in that what is signified in the first way excludes from its account singular supposits, as for example humanity excludes Peter and Paul: for it signifies the form by which man is man, which cannot belong to Peter. But signified in the second way, it includes implicitly the singular supposits of that nature, as man. For it signifies one having humanity, which belongs to any supposit whatever. For to any supposit of the human nature it belongs that it be one having humanity, but not that it be that by which man is man. Hence it comes about that, since all that Peter explicitly imports, man imports implicitly and confusedly, by the same kind of distinction by which Peter differs from the human nature, man also differs. It is true that the Philosophers commonly are accustomed to understand by the name supposit only the singular supposit: where it must also be noted that, although St. Thomas in these distinctions for the sake of explanation is accustomed to attend to the mode of signifying of terms, whether the nature is signified by way of a part, or by way of a whole, etc., nevertheless our question proceeds most of all physically and metaphysically, attending to the natures of things, in which the mode of signifying is also wont to be founded. Note thirdly that the distinction by which something is distinguished from another is manifold: one is real distinction, and another of reason. And again the real distinction: one is between two things wholly or materially distinct, as between Peter and John, which is wont to be called the distinction of thing from thing; another is formal, such as that between action and passion. Again, that which is between two things is sometimes such as obtains between two of which one includes the other and adds something real. And this is still in a twofold difference: for sometimes something real is intrinsically enclosed in one which is not in the other, in the way that the whole is distinguished from any part taken separately, as Peter from his matter, inasmuch as he includes the form, and from his form, inasmuch as he includes the matter. But sometimes that which adds something real above another does not include it intrinsically, but extrinsically as a term which it looks to. Just as the capable-of-discipline or the risible is really distinguished from man, because it adds the act of discipline, or of risibility, which is something extrinsic to man himself.

THESE things noted, so that we may separate the certain from the uncertain, let the first conclusion be Although it is not an error in faith nor rash to say that supposit and nature are distinguished by reason alone, it is nevertheless much more conformable to faith and truth that in things composed of matter and form they be distinguished really. The first part of the conclusion is proved: for the truth of faith, that God assumed a singular nature, and not a supposit, is best saved with a distinction of reason alone between nature and supposit. I prove it: for that the union was made in a person and not in a nature, and that the term of the assumption is a person, is sufficiently saved by that distinction of reason; therefore also that truth, the Son of God assumed a nature, not a supposit. Secondly it is proved: for just as in this position, the divine Person immediately assumed, and not the divine nature, the truth is saved by a distinction of reason alone between person and divine nature, so also in this one, the human nature is assumed and not a person. But the second part of our conclusion is proved: for in this sentence nearly all the holy Doctors agree, saying that it is proper to God that in him nature and supposit, Godhead and God, not be distinguished. Those authorities are to be seen in the Master of the Sentences, in 1, d. 8, in the last part of the distinction, and d. 34. See also Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 11, and book 15 of On the Trinity, ch. 17; and Bernard on the Canticle, sermon 80. Likewise it is proved by reason. The supposit includes something real which the nature does not include; therefore they differ really. The consequence is clear from those things which we have noted here. The antecedent is proved. Many predicates are said of the supposit which are not truly said of the nature, whether taken in particular or in common, namely to subsist, to receive accidents, to act and to be acted upon. Therefore the supposit includes something real on account of which all these predicates belong to it, which the nature does not include. Secondly it is proved. This is false, Peter is this humanity, as is evident; therefore between subject and predicate there is a real distinction. The consequence is proved: for a distinction of reason alone is not sufficient to falsify a proposition, except on account of some appellation intervening; but in this proposition there is no appellation; therefore etc. Thirdly, according to the doctrine of faith the Son of God assumed the human nature, and did not assume a man, or a supposit; therefore they are really distinguished: for otherwise, if they are the same, why is one assumed and not the other? It is confirmed: for in order that the dogmas of the Theologians in the matter of the Incarnation be better asserted and verified, it is necessary to confess this distinction between nature and supposit. For the Theologians assert that the humanity in Christ lacks a personality of its own, and that it is inclined toward it, and that if the divine Person assumed a humanity in some person, it would corrupt the personality. All of which things require a real distinction between nature and supposit.

The point of difficulty of this question, then, the truth of the first conclusion being supposed, consists in this: that it be explained what the supposit adds above the nature, by which it is constituted in the to-be of a supposit and is distinguished from the nature. On which Cajetan in the 3rd part, above, having related seven opinions, which all agree in this, that the supposit adds nothing intrinsically positive above the singular nature, himself laid down his own sentence, that the supposit adds above the singular nature a certain positive reality, really distinct from the singular nature itself, which is a certain term or complement of the nature: and by this the individual is constituted in the to-be of a supposit. And by this complement (he says) the nature is made capable of existence, and is made able to act and to be acted upon. Hence just as the point (he says) is related to the line, because it terminates it: so this mode or complement is related to the nature, because it renders it terminated and complete.

The second sentence is that the supposit adds nothing real above the nature except the act of existence. Which opinion can be explained in a twofold sense: the first, that the supposit include the act of existence intrinsically, as the white thing includes whiteness; and this sense is most false. And it is refuted, because existence is essential to God alone, but to any created thing it is accidental, as will be said in the following article; therefore it is not intrinsically enclosed in the supposit of Peter. And it is confirmed. For otherwise this proposition would be of perpetual truth, Peter exists: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, which nevertheless is absurd. Furthermore, because St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2, says that to-be pertains to the person as to that which has to-be; therefore the to-be of existence presupposes the supposit which has to-be. Likewise, because that manner of speaking, that the to-be of existence is received in the supposit, is frequent in St. Thomas; therefore existence presupposes the supposit already constituted. In the other way this second opinion can be understood, that the supposit include the to-be of existence extrinsically, as the capable-of-discipline includes extrinsically the act of discipline. And in this sense this second opinion is Capreolus's, in 3, d. 5, q. 3, but it seems manifestly false. First, for if existence pertains only extrinsically to the supposit, then by priority of nature the supposit is understood as constituted in the to-be of a supposit before it be understood to have existence. Therefore there is already another intrinsic constitutive principle of the supposit. The first consequence is proved: for existence to be an extrinsic act of the supposit can be nothing other than that the account of the supposit be constituted through an order to existence; not, however, that it formally inhering constitute it, just as we said in the preceding article that designated matter is constituted through an order to quantity, yet not that quantity formally inhering makes it designated; therefore before existence is understood in the supposit, by priority of nature the supposit is fore-understood as intrinsically constituted in the to-be of a supposit. Secondly: for from this sentence it follows that the supposit adds nothing real intrinsically above the nature; therefore it is really the same as the nature: and then the arguments made in proof of the first conclusion return.

The third sentence is a middle one, which Master Vitoria taught, and which Master Soto often defends in the Logic and the Physics: that nature and supposit are indeed distinguished really, not as thing from thing, but as thing and mode of thing. Whence they seem to confess that the supposit adds a certain mode above the nature, but adds the act of existence extrinsically.

Let the second conclusion, however, be: the supposit in material things adds above the singular nature something real, positive, intrinsic to the supposit itself, and constitutive of it. It is proved first, from Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 15, where he divides substance into essence and supposit. And proportionally, in the predicament of substance it is divided into primary and secondary, where the primary substance is called supremely substance: but it is necessary to constitute something positive and intrinsic, constitutive of the essence and of the secondary substance; therefore likewise there must also be assigned something real, positive, intrinsic, constituting the supposit, which is to be per se separated from all others. It is confirmed: these names, I, you, this man, by common consent signify something real intrinsic to primary substances, and truly signify the supposit or person; therefore etc. Secondly it is proved: the divine Person is constituted in the to-be of a person through something real and positive; therefore also the created person. The consequence is proved: for person is said of the created and the uncreated person with one concept, although analogous. Thirdly it is proved, in the mystery of the Incarnation, according to the Catholic faith, the personality of the Word supplies the personality of the human nature; therefore the human personality is something real, because a negation is not supplied. It is confirmed: if Christ laid aside the humanity, in that laid-aside humanity there would be another person in number from the Person of the Word proper to that humanity; therefore without doubt that personality would be a substance: otherwise it would not be another. In this sentence St. Thomas is constant, in the 3rd part, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, where he says that if the divine Person assumed the nature of an existing angel, its personality would be destroyed. And in the second article he says that if the Person were fore-understood to the assumption, either it would be necessary that it be corrupted, and so the assumption would be in vain, or that it remain after the union, and so there would be two persons. See there at the second, and q. 17, art. 2, and especially at the first, where it is said that to-be follows upon the nature not as having to-be, but because it is something; but the person, or hypostasis, as having to-be. See there, q. 35, art. 5, and in the solution to the 5th. And in this conclusion we chiefly impugn Scotus, in 3, d. 1, q. 1, asserting that the supposit adds above the nature an intrinsic negation, namely that it cannot be terminated by another, nor exist in another.

Third conclusion: This constitutive principle of the supposit, namely to be per se separated from the rest, belongs reductively to the predicament of substance. And so the supposit is directly placed in the predicament of substance; but this reality constitutive of the supposit belongs there indirectly and reductively: just as the difference of man does not belong directly to the direct line of the predicament of substance, but reductively. It is proved: for the constitutive principle of substance, since it is of its account, cannot be an accident; therefore it is a substance. Again, it is not a substance placed in the direct line; therefore it belongs there reductively in that predicament. It is confirmed: for the difference constituting man, and the mode per se constituting substance, are reductively in the genus of substance; therefore also that real constitutive principle of the supposit. But if you say that Aristotle, 2 De Anima, text 2, in the division of substance makes no mention of this mode constituting the supposit, but only of matter, and form, and the composite: it is answered that by the name of composite he understood the nature with its term and complement constituting the supposit. Secondly the conclusion is proved: the supposit, according to the sentence of Aristotle and St. Thomas, adds something above the nature; but that is not the act of existence; therefore it is this mode which we posit. The consequence is proved, because nothing else substantial can be imagined which the supposit could add above the nature. It is confirmed: before the nature is understood as constituted in a supposit, it is understood as indeterminate and dependent on another; but constituted in a supposit, it is understood as determinate and altogether independent; therefore the supposit adds above the nature a certain real mode by which it is terminated and completed. Hence it follows that this mode, or complement, constitutive of the supposit is the pure and ultimate term of the substantial nature. The individual parts of this corollary are explained: it is called term, since the substantial nature, however much it be understood as perfect and singular, yet if it be not in a supposit or person, is still terminable, as is clear in the humanity of Christ, which indeed is most perfect in its species, and again singular, yet is still actually terminated by the personality of the Word. In the same way, in created supposits, natures according to themselves are perfect in their species, and singular through individuating principles, yet are terminated by the proper accounts of the supposits. Then it is called pure, to exclude all causality whatsoever, not only the extrinsic causality of the efficient cause, but also the intrinsic causality of the formal cause. And so to be a pure term is to terminate without including causality, just as the point in a line is called its pure term, so that it is not its cause. It is true, however, that this account of terminating can be reduced to the genus of formal cause, and, the imperfections removed, can belong to the divine Person. See Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 4, art. 3, at the end. For personality is not present to the nature as a proper property, but as a perfection and complement of the effect; it follows naturally upon the effect whose complement it is. For the nature, as prior by causality, is incomplete as regards its ultimate complement: but when it is personated, it attains the ultimate complement. Whence it comes about that the action by which this man is produced, if it be considered as begun, namely drawn out as far as this nature, abstracting from personation, is unaccomplished and imperfect, since it does not reach its term inclusively. But then it is perfect and accomplished, when the personated nature comes to be, which Peter signifies: for then it is drawn out as far as the term inclusively. The mode, therefore, by which personality follows upon the nature or the principles of the nature is that by which the term of the action and of the thing made is naturally present to the thing produced at the end of the action. It is called ultimate, since if the substantial nature has once been terminated by such an account of supposit, it is no longer terminable, at least as far as is on the part of the nature itself, since it now has its ultimate complement, by which it is most perfectly terminated. I said deliberately, as far as is on the part of its nature, since if we attend to the power of the terminating person, it can happen that a nature once terminated by one personality be then and successively terminated by another.

Fourth conclusion. This account constituting the supposit is really distinguished in created things, as a thing other than the act of being or of existence. And it is called by Master Cajetan subsistence. This conclusion is against Capreolus, in 3, d. 5, q. 3, who asserts that the act of being is extrinsic and outside the account of the supposit. In which Cajetan agrees with him. But it is said that that act of being is the same as personality. It is also against certain disciples of St. Thomas, who although they agree with Cajetan in this, that personality is of the intrinsic account of the person, nevertheless say that that personality is the act of being. It is also against some authors who hold that even if these two are really distinguished, they are nevertheless distinguished as thing and mode of thing, not as two entities. It is proved, then, first from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2, at the first, where he says that to-be follows upon the nature not as having to-be, but the person or hypostasis as having to-be. Where St. Thomas means that the account of the supposit precedes the act of being, and is prior to it; therefore the act of being is not personality. Secondly. Personality, or the account of the supposit, is altogether intrinsic to the person or supposit, and is placed in its definition, whereas existence is not of the account and definition of any created thing, but is the first act of every substance, as we shall explain at length in the following article; therefore. Thirdly. The act of being is not the same as the constitutive account of the secondary substance, species, or genus, but comes to it as actuating the quiddity constituted through its intrinsic and formal principles, all of which are related as potency with respect to the act of existence; therefore formally it is not the same as the account constituting the quiddity of the person. It is true, however (as we shall say at once), that this act of being is the act of the nature and of the supposit: but it is the first and immediate act of the supposit, and a mediated act of the nature. Lastly, this conclusion is proved by all the arguments by which we proved the first sentence to be false.

Fifth conclusion. It is most probable that the supposit intrinsically adds above the nature that real mode which we have spoken of, by which it is intrinsically constituted in the to-be of a supposit; but it also adds the act of existence, extrinsically, however. I mean in this second part that the supposit is constituted in the account of supposit through an order to existence as to the proper act of the supposit itself, yet it does not intrinsically include existence. This conclusion is proved first: because according to this conclusion the sentences of the most weighty doctors are reconciled; therefore. Secondly it is proved as regards the second part, for the first has already been proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion. The supposit is defined as being a subsisting individual substance, etc.; therefore in the account of the supposit there is included substance and an order to existence. And so the supposit is called existing and subsisting, because although it does not include subsistence in act, it nevertheless intrinsically includes an order to it. Thirdly, the supposit is nothing other than the immediate and proper recipient of substantial existence, according to the sentence of St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 17, art. 2; therefore just as a potency in its account encloses an order to its proper act, so the supposit says an intrinsic order to existence as to an act proportioned to itself. This sentence seems to be St. Thomas's, Quodlibet 2, art. 4, in the solutions of the arguments; and this is the reason why St. Thomas and other most weighty Philosophers very often explain the supposit through the act of existing: not that the supposit intrinsically encloses such an act, but because the whole account of it is taken through an order to it.

But since we have not so far explained whether that real mode which the supposit adds above the nature is distinguished from it as thing from thing, or only formally.

let the last conclusion be. It is probable that that mode is distinguished from the nature by a formal account alone, as the mode of a thing from the thing itself, as sitting from one sitting; but it is more probable that that mode is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing. This conclusion has two parts. The first part is proved; for it seems to be gathered from the sentence of Aristotle and St. Thomas when they say that in immaterial things the supposit is not really distinguished from the nature. From which an argument is gathered: the supposit in immaterial things without doubt adds that real mode above the nature, but if that mode is distinguished from the nature more than formally, it cannot be saved in any sense that the supposit is not really distinguished from the nature. If, however, we say that that mode is distinguished from the nature only formally, that sentence of St. Thomas can be saved, namely that it be understood of a real distinction as thing from thing, so that he means to say that the supposit in material things is not distinguished from the nature by something that is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing; therefore. Secondly, because the most wise Masters, among whom is Soto, say that the supposit is not distinguished from the nature as thing from thing; and so they admit this proposition, man is the thing which is humanity: but if the supposit includes a mode which is distinguished from the nature as thing from thing, that proposition is false, just as this one, the composite is that thing which is the form, since in these propositions it is denoted that the thing which is the predicate is intrinsically and really altogether the same as the thing signified by the subject. Lastly: a plurality of things is not to be admitted without a most grave cause; therefore etc. The second part of this conclusion is Master Cajetan's, in the place cited, although he seems to teach the opposite in this article. And it is proved: for it can scarcely be understood how the divine Word would assume the human nature, and not a supposit, if the supposit does not add something real above the nature distinct as thing from thing; for if the human nature in Christ includes all that intrinsic entity which the human nature has in Peter, it is difficult to explain how it has the account of supposit in Peter and not in Christ; therefore. From this second part it follows that all those propositions in which the nature is predicated of the supposit are false not only in the formal sense, but also in the identical sense, if we speak rigorously, on account of the reason assigned. And so this predication, man is the thing which is humanity, is in rigor false. In every sentence, however, this is false, Christ is the thing which is humanity, since the mode by which the supposit of Christ is constituted is, in every sentence, distinct as thing from thing from the humanity itself. For the personal complement by which the human nature in Christ is terminated is the personal complement of the Word: which indeed is distinguished as thing from thing from the humanity itself.

TO the arguments: to the first it is answered with St. Thomas, 7 Metaphysics, text 21, that Aristotle there speaks of the quiddity of a thing as it is signified in the concrete, as the quiddity of man is signified by its difference, namely rational animal: and indeed the quiddity signified in the concrete includes implicitly and confusedly all singular supposits, and to that extent is predicated of them. But at present we are speaking of the quiddity of a thing according to itself, as Aristotle himself speaks of it, 7 Metaphysics, text 41, according to which account it ought rather to be signified by an abstract than a concrete term; and if it be taken thus, it is really distinguished from the supposit. Hence this proposition, man is humanity, is false, in that nature and supposit are really distinguished, as including and included: for the supposit includes a real mode which the nature rather excludes than includes, as it is signified by an abstract name: on which propositions see Soto, q. 3 of the Universals.

TO the confirmation it is answered that it proves the intended point beyond doubt, namely that material accidents truly do not intrinsically pertain to the account of the material supposit. Wherefore, speaking metaphysically, the supposit is not distinguished from the nature by these accidents, but differs in the mode already explained in the conclusions. But when Aristotle and St. Thomas teach that the material supposit adds those accidents above the nature, they speak physically. For which it must be noted that, although these accidents pertain to the nature prior to the supposit, in that the nature is singular and individual through an order to these accidents (as was said in the preceding article), nevertheless, physically and really, they inhere in the supposit prior by nature to the nature itself: since the supposit is the proper and immediate subject of accidents, and the nature does not receive them except through the supposit. Wherefore, physically speaking, the supposit adds these accidents above the nature: since these accidents affect the supposit before the nature, although they are looked to by the nature prior as something extrinsic, from which the individuation of the nature is taken. But here it must be noted that, although it is probable, as certain Theologians teach, that the nature is individuated through an order to a singular supposit, in such a way that the humanity of Peter is this and singular because it says an order to this singular supposit, nevertheless it is altogether improbable to assert that the individuation of the nature depends on an actual conjunction with a singular supposit. It is proved: the humanity which Christ the Lord assumed was never conjoined with any human supposit, as the Catholic faith confesses; and yet it is this humanity and singular; therefore its individuation does not intrinsically depend on any singular human supposit. Nay, I would believe that the singularity and individuation of the nature does not intrinsically depend on any order to a singular supposit, but depends only on the essential parts of the nature itself, namely on this matter and this form; and this is far more probable than that sentence just stated. It is proved by reason: the singular humanity which is in Christ, and as it is in Christ, does not have an inclination to a singular human supposit proportioned to it; therefore the singularity of that nature is not taken through an order to that singular supposit. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: for the human nature in Christ is most sufficiently terminated by the divine supposit, because the divine supposit affords it every perfection and determination which a created supposit could afford it; nay, even an infinitely greater and more excellent one; therefore it does not retain an inclination, at least a proximate one, to its own suppositality. And by this it is clear as to the second confirmation.

TO the second argument with its confirmation, it is answered from the same doctrine: nor is it necessary to repeat what has been said. And in the same way it is answered to the third.

TO the fourth it is answered by conceding the sequel and denying the minor. To whose proof it is answered that, as often as a diverse mode of signifying is the cause why something real is intrinsically included in one extreme which is not included in the other, explicitly or implicitly, confusedly or distinctly, then the proposition in which an abstract term is predicated of a concrete one is false: and such is that one, man is humanity. But if nothing is intrinsically included in one extreme which is not intrinsically included in the other, the proposition is true, and such is that one, God is Godhead; since the divine nature includes subsistence: and that one, a being is entity: for entity intrinsically includes every mode of being.

TO the fifth it is answered that, as has been said in the last conclusion, it is more probable that that mode which the supposit includes is really distinguished, as thing from thing, from the nature itself. And according to this way of speaking we concede that this is false, man is the thing which is humanity. But following the probable sentence explained in the same conclusion, that that mode is only formally distinguished from the nature, that proposition is true, man is the thing which is humanity. Hence there is not the same account of it as of this one, man is the thing which is prime matter. For man adds nothing above the nature except a mode distinct formally, and not as thing from thing: but above prime matter it adds a certain distinct thing, namely the form.

TO the last it is answered by conceding the first consequence, and to the sequel which is inferred it is answered that, although personality is really distinguished from the nature, it nevertheless does not make a composition with it, but only completes and terminates the nature, as a point a line.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly, concerning the second conclusion of St. Thomas. Whether in immaterial things the supposit is distinguished from the nature, as in material substances composed of matter and form?

For the negative side it is argued first. St. Thomas, in the body of the article, disputing whether the nature is distinguished from the supposit, says that in those things which are not composed of matter and form, in which individuation is not through individual matter, but the forms themselves are individuated through themselves, it is necessary that the forms themselves be subsisting supposits, and so in them the supposit does not differ from the nature; therefore. And it is confirmed: for St. Thomas proves that God is not composed of matter and form, as has already been said, therefore God is his Godhead; therefore it holds similarly, an angel is not composed of matter and form, therefore an angel is his nature.

Secondly, by a reason gathered from St. Thomas. In angels there is no individuating accident pertaining to individuation which is not also a proper property of the specific nature itself; therefore the angelic supposit is not distinguished from the angelic nature itself, at least according to the thing. The consequence is proved: since the supposit adds above the angelic nature no accident pertaining to individuation; nay, it adds nothing that is outside the account of the species; therefore.

Thirdly. In angels, and in those things which are not composed of matter and form, the form is individuated by itself; therefore the supposit adds nothing real above the nature or form itself.

Fourthly. If in things separated from matter supposit and nature are distinguished, it is chiefly because the supposit includes to-be, which the nature does not include. For this is St. Thomas's reason, Quodlibet 2, art. 4, in the body and at the first. But this reason is null; therefore they are not distinguished. The minor is proved: for to-be, as we proved in the preceding doubt, cannot be a mode constitutive of the supposit, since it is accidental to every creature; therefore nature and supposit in angels are not really distinguished.

On the contrary, however, is that in spiritual things the supposit adds above the nature that intrinsic real mode which we have explained above: for the reason brought forward to assert that real mode proceeds not only concerning individuals and supposits in material things, but also in spiritual ones; therefore etc. Likewise also, because God can assume an angelic nature without assuming a supposit, as is said in the 3rd part, question 4, article 2.

For the explanation of this doubt it must be noted from St. Thomas here that things are of a twofold difference. Some are composed of matter and form; others do not have such a composition; e.g. man is composed of matter and form, but God and the angels are not. But angels are composed of to-be and essence, and so hold a middle place between material things and God: because God is pure act having nothing of composition, nor has he a personal complement distinct from his Essence, nor is he individuated through anything distinct; but material things have a composition of matter and form, and so have accidents individuating the specific nature, and the supposit adds a personal complement, not only above the specific nature, but also above the individual nature. But angels hold a middle place, and so the difficulty of this doubt consists in this: whether namely in angels the supposit adds a personal complement above the nature. Secondly it must be noted that the supposit and the individual nature are distinguished: because the human nature, from the very fact that it has this matter and this form, is individual through an order to these accidents; but for it to be a supposit this does not suffice, but it is required that it have a personal complement, by which it is constituted in the to-be of a supposit; e.g. the human nature which is fore-understood to the assumption is this and individual, because it has this matter and this form: yet it is not a supposit, because the personal complement is lacking to it. This doctrine is had in Master Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, around the middle.

THESE things presupposed, let the first conclusion be. In angels the nature is not really distinguished from this individual nature. This conclusion is manifest in the doctrine of St. Thomas, and is had below, question 50, article 2. The reason for this conclusion is manifest. For an angel is a certain form which is individuated by itself, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited; therefore the individual nature in angels is not distinguished from the angelic nature. This conclusion is also proved by the arguments made at the beginning.

Second conclusion. It must necessarily be said that the supposit in angels is really distinguished from the nature. This conclusion the arguments made in the second place evidently prove. St. Thomas holds it expressly below, q. 50 in the place cited; and q. 75, art. 5, ad 4, and 2 Contra Gentes, ch. 52 and 53.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52 All the saints also hold it, who attribute this as peculiar to God: whose testimonies are to be seen in the Master, in 1, d. 8. See also St. Jerome on ch. 3 of Ephesians, on those words: «From whom all Paternity etc.»; and in the Epistle to Damasus. This conclusion is also proved by the arguments made in the preceding doubt to prove that supposit and nature in material things are really distinguished; because in material and immaterial things there is the same account as regards this. And besides it is proved by a manifest reason: because the supposit in angels says the angelic nature, and subsistence, and the personal complement: but the nature of an angel says only the form by which an angel is an angel; therefore etc. From this conclusion we briefly gather that this proposition is false, An angel is his essence: because something real is included in the subject which in no way, neither formally nor virtually, is contained in the predicate.

TO the arguments proposed at the beginning of this doubt, insofar as they impugn our second conclusion, it is answered.

To the first Cajetan says here that this is the difference between material and immaterial supposits: that the former are distinguished from the nature by something intrinsic to them, namely designated matter, which nevertheless is extrinsic to the nature. But in things separated from matter the supposit is not distinguished from the nature except by something extrinsic, namely to subsist: because subsistence is included in the immaterial supposit, but the nature in no way includes it, but abstracts from it. And this St. Thomas seems to say in the places cited above. For he always says that the immaterial supposit encloses a composition of to-be and essence. This solution has no place unless we say that the supposit adds nothing above the nature besides existence. But the same Cajetan, in 3rd part, q. 4, art. 2, says the opposite: he adds also that St. Thomas in this place spoke rather indistinctly. Wherefore, that a legitimate explanation of St. Thomas may stand, note that two things can be considered in the singular angelic nature: one is the singularity itself by which the nature is this; the other is the personality by which it subsists in the account of a complete subsisting substance. The first belongs to the angelic nature from its own specific principles, and constitutes the individual and singular; but the second is the term of the nature, and constitutes the supposit, and in all created things is really distinguished from the nature itself. When, therefore, St. Thomas says here in the article that in angels nature and supposit do not differ, he takes supposit for the individual and singular, and not for the same nature terminated by personality. Otherwise it seems to be said, as regards this place of St. Thomas and Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 41, from which St. Thomas took his sentence, that in angels all that real content which the supposit includes is taken only from the form, and regards it as the proper subject in which it is received: but in material things, physically speaking, the supposit includes many accidents which do not immediately regard the form itself as the immediate subject in which they are received, although they arise from it; but have as their immediate subject the supposit itself, which indeed has, not from the form but rather from matter (which is the first subject of material accidents), that it be the proximate subject of the same accidents. To the confirmation, it is clear from what has been said. For whether the supposit in divine things be taken for the individual singular or for the subsisting, nature and supposit are the same, on account of the supreme simplicity, which does not happen in the same way in angels.

TO the second and third it is answered, according to the second solution, which we chose as better when we solved the first argument: for it only convicts that the individual in things separated from matter adds nothing above the nature; but they do not prove that the supposit adds nothing. It is answered secondly, according to the last way of speaking on that first argument, that by those arguments it is well proved that the supposit does not add material accidents above the angelic form: but from this it is not gathered that the constitutive principle of the supposit does not add something above the angelic nature. See Capreolus, in 3, d. 5, q. 3.

TO the fourth it is answered by distinguishing the antecedent. For the supposit in angels is intrinsically distinguished from the nature, because it includes a certain mode intrinsically constitutive of the supposit. It is also distinguished extrinsically through the to-be itself to which the supposit says an order. And from this extrinsic term St. Thomas gathers the distinction of the nature from the supposit.

IT IS DOUBTED thirdly, concerning the third conclusion, whether the divine supposit and the divine nature are the same?

And on the negative side it is argued first. Something real belongs to God which does not belong to the Godhead; therefore they are really distinguished. The consequence seems evident; the antecedent is proved. For it belongs to God to generate, and to be generated, which does not belong to the Godhead: for this is true, God generates, and this, God is generated: but those are false, the Godhead generates, the Godhead is generated: but to generate and to be generated is something real; therefore etc. It is confirmed. The Father includes something real which the Godhead does not include, namely the relation of Paternity, by which he is distinguished from the Son, which nevertheless is not included in the Godhead; otherwise just as the Godhead is predicated of the Son, so the Father also would be predicated of him, or neither; therefore they are really distinguished. It is confirmed secondly. For that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son is either included in the Godhead or not: if it is included, then when we say, the Son is the Godhead, something is predicated of the Son by which the Father is distinguished from the Son, and so this proposition will be false: if it is not included, then the Father includes something which the Godhead does not include.

It is argued secondly. According to the Catholic faith, in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of the humanity was made immediately in the divine supposit, and not in the divine nature, as St. Thomas says, 3rd part, q. 2, art. 1; therefore the divine supposit is really distinguished from the divine nature. The consequence is proved: for by this reasoning we prove that man and humanity are really distinguished, because the Son of God assumed the humanity and did not assume a man.

On the contrary, however, is the Catholic truth, which we asserted in the third conclusion of the article.

FOR a brief resolution, the definition of the supposit which we explained in doubt 1 of this article being supposed, note that this term, God, can be taken in three ways, as Master Cajetan teaches here: first, for one having the Godhead in common, abstracting from this and that God: in which way it is a common term, and in this way those took it who thought there were several Gods. In the second way it can be taken for the true God having this Godhead in number, abstracting from the divine persons; which indeed can be done in two ways, namely negatively and precisely: in which way the Hebrews took it, and the natural Philosophers, who, ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity of the divine persons, asserted one God; and also those who assert not only the unity of nature in divine things, but the unity of an incommunicable supposit. In the third way God is taken for an incommunicable divine Person, namely for the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit.

let the conclusion, therefore, be: If God be taken either in the second or in the third way, he does not differ according to the thing from the Godhead. This conclusion is to be held as of faith, in which we make no mention of the first acceptation, because it is chimerical. The conclusion is therefore proved by the authorities of Divine Scripture and of the holy Fathers: John 1, it is said of God that he is light and life; and John 14, Christ says of himself: «I am the way, the truth and the life»; 1 John 5, This is the true God and eternal life: in which places the abstract is predicated of the concrete; therefore life and living, light and shining etc. do not really differ in God; otherwise all those propositions would be false. Likewise it is also proved from the definition of the Council of Reims, gathered against Gilbert Porretanus, Bishop of Poitiers; for he denied that God was truth, and that he was the Godhead properly speaking, but interpreted God is truth as meaning he is true, and for this he was condemned in that Council. For those propositions in the propriety of speech are to be conceded: nay, these, God is true, God is living, are to be interpreted in a more proper sense, God is truth, God is life. See the acts of this Council in Bernard, sermon 80 on the Canticle, where he intends to define this truth as of faith. There are also very many testimonies of the Saints for confirming this truth, which are to be seen in the Master of the Sentences, in 1, d. 8 and 34; and Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 11, and book 15 of On the Trinity, ch. 17. It is proved by reason: for God is pure act, and whatever is in God is infinite; therefore he is his goodness and his Godhead, etc. It is confirmed from the reason of St. Thomas, 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 22: for if God were not his Godhead, it would follow that in God there would be some composition, which it is impious to say. It is proved: for if God is not his Godhead, then the Godhead is denied of God for the reason that something is included in the one which is not in the other; therefore God is not altogether simple, and consequently he will be composite. See many things in St. Thomas, there. Moreover it is proved by the reason of St. Bernard in the place above: if the Godhead is not God, then it is either something or nothing; it cannot be said to be nothing, since it is the divine nature itself; if therefore it is something, then either greater than God, or less, or equal: if greater, then something is the supreme good and is not God: likewise something would be greater than God, which is impossible, for God is that than which nothing greater can be thought: if less, then something by which God is God is less than God, which is impossible, for that by which God is God is simply infinite; therefore it is not something less than God: if equal, then there will be two supreme goods, and not one. Likewise also something which is the supreme good would not be God, which manifestly implies a contradiction.

TO the arguments on the contrary side it is briefly answered. To the first with its confirmation we shall speak at greater length in the matter of the Trinity; for now it is answered: I grant the antecedent, and I deny the consequence. For Peter is incommunicable, but man is communicable: and yet they are distinguished by reason alone. Likewise man really generates man, and not Peter, and Peter really generates Peter, and not man: yet Peter and man are distinguished by reason alone. Hence the distinction of reason alone by which God and the Godhead are distinguished suffices for generating to be attributed to God and not to the Godhead. To the first confirmation it is answered that the same Godhead in number is in the Father and the Son: but it is no inconvenience that it be found conjoined to a different relation in the Father than in the Son. For if a relation, as such, does not import a perfection, it is no inconvenience that some relation be in the Father which is not in the Son: but if it imports a perfection, the consequence must be denied: some relation is in the Father which is not in the Son, or in the Godhead; therefore something real is in the Father which is not in the Son: for the sense is varied from the relative to the absolute. And in the same way it is answered to the second confirmation, nor is there need to linger longer here: because these things belong to the matter of the Trinity.

TO the second it is answered by denying the consequence: to whose proof it is said that that proposition, the union was not made in a nature, can be understood in two ways: first, that from the two natures in Christ a third did not result, and this sense is Catholic; secondly, that the divine Nature, at least mediately, did not assume the humanity, but only the Son of God, and this sense is false. For from the fact that God is man, it is also convincingly shown that the Godhead is man. Whence again it follows that supposit and nature in divine things are not really distinguished. But from the fact that God assumed the human nature, it does not follow that he assumed a man. Whence there is not the same account.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is affirmative. The reason is formed thus: God is His essence, as was said in the third article; but God is His to-be; therefore the to-be of God is His essence: the consequence seems manifest. The minor is proved by a threefold demonstration, as is clear.

COMMENTARY.

The CONCLUSION of this article is asserted by the Theologians as certain according to faith. And they prove it from that Exo. 3: I am who am; and He who is sent me to you — where God signifies His substance by this, that He says He is: for otherwise, the other creatures also are, and God would assert nothing singular and proper to Himself when He says I am. In comparison with whom the other creatures are said not to be; e.g. Isa. 40: «All nations are before Him as if they were not.» This conclusion is unanimously affirmed by the holy Fathers, whose testimonies the Master of the Sentences reports in the cited place, in the preceding article. And finally, if the conclusion were not true, it would follow that the Divine Essence is not infinite simply. The consequence is proved: for the Divine Essence would not intrinsically include to-be itself, which is the greatest perfection. See several other demonstrations in St. Thomas, 1. Cont. Gent., ca. 22, 23. But someone will say: If the conclusion is of faith, how is it demonstrated? It is answered that the same question can be asked concerning all the conclusions of the preceding and following articles, and therefore the solution will be the same. For we do not understand that these conclusions pertain to faith immediately; but as God exists is said to pertain to faith although it is demonstrated — because from its denial there evidently follows the denial of some truth that pertains to faith immediately — so such conclusions are said to be of faith. For from their denial it follows that the authority of Scripture is not infallible, or even that some article of faith is not true: for he who denied that God exists would deny all the articles of faith. And the same we say of the other divine attributes demonstrated by natural reason: if they are denied, consequently it is denied that God exists, which is the foundation of the whole faith.

This article contains a subtle metaphysical doctrine — and (as Cajetan says) one quite foreign to the little moderns, who opine that not only in God but in everything, essence is identified with its existence. Hence I have undertaken to examine and define this question diligently. Before all, concerning the understanding of St. Thomas's reasons and of the doctrine of this article, certain things are briefly to be noted.

Note first, concerning the first reason, how, he says, proper accidents are caused by the principles of the species. For you rightly ask: in what genus of cause are they said to be caused by such principles? It is answered that he speaks here of a genus of cause in a certain way efficient — not through a new change distinct from that by which the substance is produced, but through a certain simple emanation; as light, which is in the sun, is caused by the essential principles of the sun's substance; and as coldness flows from the substance of water — which although it can be impeded, yet, the impediment removed, it immediately follows again, which return to coldness is said to be from the generator. In which way also a stone is said to have a cause in a certain way efficient of its natural motion, inasmuch as through a certain simple emanation downward motion immediately follows, the impediment removed. So therefore the proper passion and the potencies of the soul flow from the soul itself.

Note second, concerning that proposition assumed by St. Thomas in the first reason — that no thing suffices to be to itself the cause of being, if it has caused to-be. For you immediately ask: what is the reason why no thing suffices to be to itself the cause of being, if it has caused to-be? And the reason for doubting is that man has caused risibility, and yet is to himself a sufficient cause of being risible — since the definition of man is a sufficient principle for demonstrating that he is risible; therefore it is no obstacle that a thing have an efficient cause of its to-be, and yet itself be to itself a sufficient cause of being from its own essential principles. Behold, by this argument is already touched the mystery of the difficulty to be examined by us concerning the to-be and essence of creatures. Meanwhile, however, it is answered that there is a great difference between a proper passion in respect of the essential principles of the species, and to-be of existence itself in respect of the same principles. For a proper passion, e.g. the risible, already presupposes the essence in act, and so flows as an accident, which is the being of a being; but to-be itself, since it is that by which formally the essence is, cannot presuppose that the essence itself is the cause from which it flows — for that would presuppose that the essence already is, which implies

a contradiction: as if whiteness, by which something is formally white, presupposed that already, before itself, the subject were white. Therefore it is in no way intelligible that anything having caused to-be be to itself a sufficient cause of being. But perhaps you will say that from our reason it follows that in no way is a thing having caused to-be a cause of being to itself — while St. Thomas yet insinuates in the article that in some way to-be itself is caused from its own essential principles. It is answered that the essential principles are a cause of being materially: because of themselves they are receptive of to-be itself, by which they are first actuated. Indeed they are understood only insofar as they have an order to to-be — as the diaphanous is a cause of light because it is an aptitude for receiving light. And although to-be itself, received in an essence composed of essential principles, is specified by them, yet in that wherein it is specified it receives no perfection, but is rather depressed, and descends to to-be secundum quid — in that for a man to be man, for an angel to be itself, is not a perfection simply. And this is what St. Thomas most often cries out, and the Thomists will not hear: that to-be is the actuality of every form or nature, as in this article he says in the second reason, and that in no thing is it found as receiving and perfectible, but as received and perfecting that in which it is received — yet itself, by the very fact that it is received, is depressed and, so to speak, imperfected. But of these things we shall say more in what follows.

Concerning the second reason of the article there is also a difficulty: how is what St. Thomas says to be understood — that goodness or humanity is not signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be? For this seems false: when I know a rose and name it, I signify it in act, and yet I do not signify it to be — as if, e.g., I said, a rose is a most beautiful flower; therefore etc. To this difficulty one could answer from the doctrine of Cajetan on St. Thomas's second reason, where he says: Note here that this reason is founded upon this, that whatever quiddity or nature, however actual according to its quidditative account, yet referred to to-be has the account of potency — for wisdom and goodness are actuated by this, that I say it is, and likewise humanity and equinity. And therefore it is said both that to-be is the actuality of every form, and that no nature is signified in ultimate act except insofar as to-be is signified in exercised act. Thus far Cajetan. Whose solution does not seem to satisfy fully. For as we understand a thing through its proper concept, so also we signify it: but we perfectly understand the account of a triangle even if it does not actually exist; therefore we also perfectly signify the perfect account of a triangle. Then, what Cajetan says — that St. Thomas must be understood of ultimate act when he says that goodness or humanity is not signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be — does not seem properly said: for to-be is rather the first act of anything than the last. Which is clear, for being is the first thing understood, in which to-be itself is included, or the intrinsic order to to-be as to a first act. Hence St. Thomas seems to me to be explained thus, when he says that no form is signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be — that is, through respect to to-be, as we understand it, whether that thing actually and really exists or in potency. And this doctrine is founded upon this, that being is the object of the intellect. I confess, however, that when a thing is understood to actually exist, it has greater perfection than when it is understood to be in potency. For the rest, the quiddity of things other than God abstracts from being in act or not being in act. Hence it can be perfectly defined according to this abstraction.

Concerning the solution to the second literal argument, Cajetan moves a doubt. For the answer seems (he says) to imply two contradictories. For if we know that this proposition is true, God exists, through the demonstrations made, then we know it to be so in reality that God exists — and this is to know the to-be which is in God Himself; therefore we know not only that the proposition God exists is true, but also that the act of being belongs to God Himself — especially since from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is called true or false. On this difficulty see Cajetan, 2. Post., c. 1. But in his commentary on this article he answers excellently and briefly. And he notes that this is the difference between the to-be of God and the to-be of other things: that the to-be of God is the what it is of God Himself — for this proposition, God exists, is in the first mode of per se predication — while the to-be of other things is not so, but is distinguished from their quiddities. And from this is born another difference: that the to-be of God, speaking simply, is the proper term of the question what is it, and secundum quid is the term of the question whether is it — namely as it founds the truth of the proposition; while the to-be of other things in no way pertains to the question what is it, but simply and in reality to the question whether is it. And therefore when concerning other things we know whether it is, we know not only to-be, which signifies the truth of the proposition, but the to-be of the thing itself, in that it is known according to the proper mode in which it is knowable. But when concerning God we know whether He is, we are said to know the to-be that signifies the truth of the proposition — but we do not know absolutely the to-be of God as it is knowable, namely as pertaining to the what it is; rather we know secundum quid, namely insofar as suffices to found the truth of this proposition, God exists. And in this way, not only the truth of the proposition God exists is the term of our knowledge, but the to-be of God Himself as it answers to the truth of the proposition. But there is still a reply: for through demonstrations we attain not only to the to-be of God as it founds the truth of this proposition, God exists, but we also know what belongs to the quiddity of God, and that God is to-be itself subsisting; therefore the aforesaid solution is false. It is answered that although through natural demonstrations we arrive at knowing this truth — that to-be pertains to the quiddity of God, and that He is to-be itself subsisting and infinite, immutable and eternal, and many other attributes pertaining to His quiddity — yet we know all these things confusedly, and through a certain negation or likeness to creatures, and not through a proper concept expressing the quiddity as it is. And this is what St. Thomas intends to teach in the solution to the second argument. For concerning other things we can know the what it is itself even if we do not know actual existence — since this is extrinsic to quiddity; but concerning God we cannot have distinct knowledge of His quiddity unless we distinctly and openly know the subsisting to-be of God Himself, which is impossible to have from knowledge of creatures, however distinct. Thus far let it have been said concerning to-be and essence as it pertains to God Himself. Yet that we may understand how proper it is to God that His to-be be His essence, and how every creature in respect of the act of being stands as something potential, it has seemed to me worth the labor diligently to examine what existence itself in creatures is, and to what things and how it belongs, and what cause it has. For all these things often come into theological consideration, and are distinctly treated by few.

IT IS DOUBTED, therefore, first: what is existence? For the understanding of which, what the name of existence means must be supposed. For existence is that by which formally a thing is understood actually to be outside its causes. And perhaps existence is so called as standing-outside, that is, actuality outside potentiality. Now therefore we ask not about this or that existence in particular, but in common concerning the existence of creatures, what its account is — on which matter there are various opinions.

The first opinion is that existence is nothing else than a certain accident received in creatures, through which they stand outside nothing. This opinion is proved first. For existence is neither the matter nor the form of a natural thing, nor the whole composite; therefore it is an accident. The antecedent seems manifest, especially in the way of St. Thomas. The consequence is proved: for a substance is nothing else than matter or form, or the composite of both; therefore if existence is none of these, it will not be substance. Second, it is proved: existence informs and actuates the whole essence of the substance whose existence it is said to be; therefore it is totally distinguished from substance, as act is distinguished from potency; and consequently, if it is not substance or something of substance, it will be an accident. It is confirmed: for whatever is understood to come to a thing constituted through form and matter is an accident. But if it be said that it is an act of substance not received in substance, this indeed does not seem intelligible. For how could a substance exist through an existence that is not in it? Besides, no reason could be assigned why Peter exists through this existence rather than through another, through which Paul exists, if neither is received in Peter. Third, it is proved: existence is not distinguished from the duration of a thing, as motion is not distinguished from time, which is the measure of motion; but the duration of a thing is an accident pertaining to the category of quantity or to the category when; therefore existence too is an accident. It is confirmed: for duration seems to be nothing else than the continuation of to-be itself; but the continuation of a thing is not distinguished from it, therefore. It is confirmed, second: for the durations of things are distinguished according to the diverse modes of existence — e.g. aevum is the duration of an existence invariable from within, yet mutable from without, while time is the duration of the existence of a thing mutable within, with succession and continuity; but eternity is called the measure of a wholly immutable thing, whose existence is its essence; therefore the existence of a thing and its duration are the same and pertain to the same category.

The other opinion is that of Capreolus, in 1., dist. 8, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3, and in the same question, art. 3, ad 3 — of Gerard, against the first conclusion — who holds that existence is the actuality and as it were the form of every created thing, by which it is formally said to exist. And he says that existence in itself is neither substance nor accident, but yet the existence of a substance is reduced to the category of substance, while the existence of accidents is reduced to the category of accidents. So, according to Capreolus, existence does not pertain directly to any category. Cajetan also, De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 11, ad 8. argum., says that the existence of a substance is the substance, and the existence of an accident is the accident, and that the existence of a substance is reduced to the genus

of substance as the ultimate formal principle of substance itself: because (as he says) through this a thing is placed in the genus of substance, in that it is capable of substantial to-be.

FOR the decision of this difficulty, let the first conclusion be: existence cannot, according to its proper account, be an accident. First, it is proved: for existence according to its proper account is a perfection simply; therefore, as such, it is not an accident. The consequence is clear. For no account of an accident, however perfect, is a perfection simply. It is confirmed: for existence is formally found in God; therefore formally it does not import an accident.

The second conclusion: created existence, or that of a created thing, even as such, does not import an accident. First, it is proved: for the account of an accident presupposes a being in which it inheres, but the existence of a substance, that it actually exist, does not presuppose a being already in act; therefore it is not an accident. The major is manifest, for an accident is the being of a being. The minor is proved: for substance itself cannot be understood to exist before it has existence; therefore existence does not come to an existing substance, but is rather that by which a substance formally exists. Second, it is proved: for created or creatable substance itself is not intelligible without an intrinsic transcendental order to to-be or existence; therefore existence cannot be an accident. The consequence is clear: for in its own understanding, substance has no dependence upon an accident. The antecedent is proved: for substance is understood inasmuch as it is a being — that is, inasmuch as it has, or is apt to have, to-be per se, that is, not in another; therefore it cannot be understood except with an intrinsic order to to-be itself — which, although it is not the quiddity of substance (which is therefore called created), is yet that by reason of which substance is understood as being per se. And finally it is proved: for if to-be itself were an accident, all the categories would be of accidents. The sequel is clear: for the categories are distinguished through diverse modes of being; therefore if to-be itself is an accident, every mode of being is an accident.

The third conclusion: existence is something real, and intrinsic to the existing thing. The first part of this conclusion is proved: for existence is that by which a thing is constituted outside nothing. The other part is explained: for I do not understand existence to be so intrinsic to the existing thing as to be a part of it, or its essence, or something essential — for concerning this we shall dispute in the following doubt; but I say it is something intrinsic to the existing thing, inasmuch as a thing is said to exist not by an extrinsic denomination, as it is said to be in a place, but is said and denominated to exist from something it has within itself. For in this way personality too is intrinsic to substance; indeed even accidents, as whiteness, are called intrinsic to a body. In this sense, therefore, the conclusion is proved: for existence is the first actuality by which a thing is drawn outside nothing; therefore it must be innermost to the thing — otherwise it is unintelligible how a thing is outside nothing through some account that is outside the thing. It is confirmed: for if the first actuality of each thing were extrinsic, no other actuality could be intrinsic. The sequel is proved: for the first actuality is the foundation of the others. And then, for all other actualities determine to-be itself to some mode or species of being; therefore it implies that the other actualities be intrinsic while to-be or existence itself remains outside. And finally, if existence is not intrinsic to a thing, it is not received in anything; and consequently it would be per se subsisting and infinite, as is the divine existence.

The fourth conclusion: the proper account of existence considered in common, although it has that it be intrinsic — that is, within the existing thing — yet does not require that it be received as in a subject. This conclusion is clear: for otherwise existence would not belong to God formally, although it is most intrinsic to Him, since it is His quiddity. Just as we also say that wisdom according to its proper formal account does not import that it be received in a subject: for this is an imperfection of wisdom, belonging to created wisdom not because formally it is wisdom, but because it is created and participated.

The fifth conclusion: the account of created existence consists more and principally in this, that it be the term completing the dependence of substance as to its becoming and being outside nothing, than in this, that existence itself be received in substance itself as in a subject and limited by it. This conclusion is proved theologically: for according to the opinion of St. Thomas, the more probable, humanity in Christ the Lord does not have a created existence received as in a subject, but exists outside nothing through the existence of the Divine Word terminating and completing the dependence of the humanity that it be outside nothing. Therefore to the formal account of existence, which belongs to it per se first, we understand only this to pertain: that it be that by which a thing exists outside nothing. But that it further be received and limited in the thing itself rather regards the material and imperfect account of existence: for if this pertained per se first to the formal account by which a creature exists, it could not be supplied through the divine existence that the creature exist — and not through that limited existence. As God could not through Himself supply the place of whiteness that something be white. True therefore is the aforesaid conclusion. It is confirmed by an excellent example: for therefore the Theologians say — and we shall explain at length below, q. 12, art. 2 — that the divine Essence can supply the place of an intelligible likeness, because to the proper and formal account of an intelligible likeness it pertains per se first that it make the union of object with potency. But that in us the other intelligible likenesses are accidents and inhere in the intellect comes from their imperfection. So also now we assert that to the account of existence per se and formally there pertains no dependence upon that which exists through it; but it has this most formally: to terminate intimately the dependence of quiddity or essence that it be outside nothing.

The sixth conclusion: the existence completing the potentiality of substance — not only that it come to be outside nothing, but that it exist per se, that is, not in a subject — such existence (I say) is reduced to the category of substance, not as potentiality, nor as properly a difference, but as the first actuality completing the intrinsic mode of substance, which is to-be per se — that is, by which substance per se first has to-be. Whence it comes about, as I would more properly say, that to-be or existence itself is something more excellent than all the genera: nor is it reduced to any genus as to something more perfect than itself; but its reduction to a genus is rather a limitation of existence, and an imperfection, than an extension to something more perfect. For in this way the parts of a substance are reduced to substance as to something better, and differences are placed at the side of the category. But existence is the completive of genus and difference and of all things in the category. Hence, in my judgment, to-be itself is not properly said to be reduced to a category, but rather to be participated and limited by every category, and by every genus and predicamental difference; while to-be itself participates nothing, but is participated by all — as St. Thomas teaches very often, especially in q. unica De anima, art. 6, ad 2. And this is confirmed: for no one would say that being is reduced to a category; rather we say that finite being is divided into the categories through the diverse modes by which it is limited, as something innermost to every genus and every predicamental difference. Since therefore being imports that which has to-be, as potency has act, how will it be verified that potency itself is not reduced to a category, while act itself is reduced? Let these things have been said for the ingenious and the metaphysical, not for those who consider all things with rude Minerva. From what has been said follows the last conclusion:

The existence of an accident in a proportionate way pertains to the accident, as the existence of a substance to substance. For now we proceed according to the common opinion, which also seems to be St. Thomas's, and which Cajetan explains excellently below, q. 28, art. 2, in the reply to 2 — namely that the inhering of any accidental form whatever is really distinguished from the essence of the accident and from the to-be of the subject; although it does not seem improbable to me that existence itself of the substance, which per se first actuates the substance, secondarily terminate the dependence of the accidental form. The conclusion is therefore proved: for as the to-be of an accidental form stands to the to-be of the accident, so the to-be of a substance to substance; therefore the existence of an accident will pertain to the accident in the way the existence of a substance to substance.

TO THE ARGUMENTS made for the first opinion, it is answered. To the first, the consequence is denied: for an accident presupposes in its own understanding the to-be of substance, that it be truly called the being of a being. And to the proof of the consequence it is granted that existence is neither matter nor substantial form nor substantial composite, but is the first actuality completing and terminating the intrinsic mode of substance. And so, as we have said, it is in a certain way reduced to substance — not as participating substance, but as something first participated by it.

To the second, the antecedent and the principal consequence are granted; but the accessory is denied, when it is said: and consequently, if it is not substance or something of substance, it will be an accident. For this consequence is denied. Existence itself, considered according to its proper account — even in created things — is neither substance nor accident, but is the first actuality and complement of substance or of accident. As for what is commonly said — that there is no medium between substance and accident — it is true if understood as stated: for there will be no being, namely what has to-be, which is not substance or accident. But to-be or existence itself is not a being having to-be; it is that by which, or in order to which, something has to-be. And so it is no wonder if existence itself is neither substance nor part of substance, neither accident nor of the essence of an accident. But by an improper reduction we confess that it is sometimes reduced to substance, sometimes to accident, according as it actuates substance and actuates accident. To the confirmation it is answered that whenever something is understood to come to a thing constituted through form and matter, it is also understood to come to a being in act, either in reality or in reason; and so existence is already presupposed, in reality or in reason. And hence what so supervenes will be an accident. But before existence, either in reality or in reason, there is nothing, or nothing is understood — since being is the object of the intellect. And therefore existence is never understood to supervene upon a composite already of matter and form: for such a composition, with the intrinsic order to existence set aside, is nothing. To the reply, the answer is clear from what was said in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth conclusions.

To the third it is answered first: I deny the minor. For to endure, intrinsically and formally, is to remain in to-be — something absolute importing no relation to anything extrinsic; and although it is explained and known through order to time, yet this order does not pertain to its formal account. For it is prior in the order of nature, as it were fundamentally, that a thing remain in its to-be, than that what so remains be in time — just as it is prior for a thing to have a quantitative mode of being than to be measured by place. Second, it is answered: I deny the major. For duration adds permanence and continuation upon existence. Hence to exist for an hour is not to exist simply — simply (I say) and absolutely; for this is nothing else than to have to-be in act outside causes. But that it have to-be for so much time or so much duration is not included in the absolute account of existence; and therefore existence absolutely is distinguished from the duration of a thing. And hereby the answer to the first confirmation is clear. For although the continuation of a thing and the thing itself are not distinguished as thing from thing, they are yet distinguished as thing and mode of thing. To the last confirmation it is answered that it only proves that duration has some dependence upon the existence of the thing, not that it is formally the same as it. For the rest, concerning the opinion of Capreolus and Cajetan two things must be said. The first is how to understand what Capreolus and Cajetan say: that to-be or existence, as it actuates substance, is reduced to substance. For this reduction, as we have said, is not of the imperfect to the more perfect, but rather of a most perfect actuality to the best potency receptive of to-be per se. The second is that they call to-be or existence itself the ultimate actuality of a thing. This needs explanation. For since to-be or existence is the first actuality — not only in the intention of the generator but also in the account of formality, since nothing is understood except as it has to-be or with an intrinsic order to to-be — it seems false to say that to-be itself is last in the intention of the generator, and that therefore to-be itself is called the ultimate actuality of a thing. And it is confirmed: for in the way of generation, while a man is generated, an embryo cannot be prior to existence. For already in our saying 'it is an embryo', existence is pre-understood. Nor can any form in the way of generation be prior to its own existence. Indeed neither can anything be understood to be in potency prior to understanding that to-be itself possibly actuates potency. And therefore Cajetan's explanation, ubi supra, does not please me — namely that existence is called the ultimate actuality of a thing because it is last in generation. Certainly this way of speaking — that to-be itself is the ultimate actuality of a thing — is rarely found in St. Thomas. You will find it in quaestio unica De anima, art. 6, ad 2, where he says that to-be itself is the ultimate act participable by all. In which place, if you read what follows, you will understand how to-be itself is the ultimate act — namely supreme and most excellent, perfecting all other acts as well. For all other forms are compared to it as potencies to act. Or if it pleases otherwise, say that to-be itself is the first and the ultimate actuality of anything whatever: first in the order of intellectual composition, ultimate in the order of intellectual resolution. As if, e.g., the intellect, from knowledge of being — which is its proper object — descend even to man, it first understands to-be per se, which belongs to substance, then corporeal to-be, living to-be, rational to-be — in all of which to-be itself is considered as first act. And again, if it would ascend resolutively to what is simpler, it will arrive even at to-be itself, and ascend no further. Behold therefore how to-be itself is the first and ultimate actuality, and so simple that no composition at all is found in it — but all things, besides God, are composed of to-be and essence as of act and potency. Thus far let it have been said concerning the quiddity of to-be itself.

IT IS DOUBTED, second, concerning the distinction of to-be itself from essence in created things: whether it is distinguished from essence?

First, it is argued for the negative side. For if it is really distinguished from essence, it follows that God can separate to-be from essence and conserve each. It is proved: for when two things are really distinct, nothing prevents God from conserving one without the other. But the falsity of the consequent at once appears. For if the essence is conserved and exists, then it has to-be; and on the other hand we suppose that God separates to-be from essence; therefore two contradictories will be true: it has to-be and it does not have to-be. By a like reason St. Thomas, in 1. par., quaest. 66, art. 1, says that matter cannot be without form — for otherwise matter would actually exist without act, which is impossible.

Second, it is argued. If to-be is distinguished from essence really, it follows that it is pure act, and consequently would be God. The sequel is proved. For if it is really distinguished from essence, it is an act including nothing of potentiality, therefore pure act. The antecedent is proved. For to-be itself has no source from which potentiality belongs to it, except from being identified with essence; otherwise, if to-be itself were composed of act and potency, there would be a process to infinity.

Third. If to-be is distinguished really from essence, it follows that it exists through itself. The sequel is proved: for since the act of being includes nothing of potentiality, it cannot exist through another act, and consequently will exist through itself — which is proper to God alone.

Fourth. If to-be is distinguished from essence, it follows that immaterial substances are composed of to-be and essence; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is proved: for whatever includes distinct things is composed of them. The minor is proved: for it is impossible that from two components there result one per se, unless one of those components stand as potency in respect of the other standing as act. For from two things existing in act there comes no one per se, as Aristotle teaches, lib. 2 De anima and lib. 7 Metaph., text. 49. But in immaterial substances neither does to-be itself stand as potency, as is clear, nor does essence itself: for it would be potency either simply or secundum quid — not simply, otherwise it would be pure potency, as prime matter; nor secundum quid, for whatever is in potency secundum quid must be simply in act; and so the essence of an angel, with to-be set aside and as distinguished from it, would be simply in act: therefore.

Fifth. If between to-be and essence there is a real distinction, it follows that there is a distinction between two real extremes really existing; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is proved: for a real distinction is a real relation, which must necessarily be between two real extremes really existing. The minor is proved: for essence as distinct from existence is not in act on the side of reality; therefore it cannot be one extreme of a real distinction from the other extreme, which is existence.

Sixth. If to-be is distinguished really from essence, it follows that in material composites there is a twofold real substantial composition, one of matter and form, the other of to-be and essence; and consequently there would be a composite per accidens. But on the contrary, St. Thomas in this article expressly teaches that God alone is His to-be.

On this difficulty there are three principal opinions. The first opinion asserts that essence and to-be are in no way distinguished on the side of reality, but are distinguished only by our concepts — having a foundation in reality, however. This distinction is customarily called that of reasoned reason. This opinion is held by Hervaeus, Quodlib. 7, q. 9; and Gabriel in 3, d. 6, q. 2; Aureolus in Capreolus in 1, d. 8, q. 1; and Durandus in 1. Senten., d. 8, in the first part of the distinction, q. 2; and all the nominalists. For they think essence and to-be differ no otherwise than a course and running.

The second opinion is that of Scotus in 3. Sent., d. 6, q. 1; of Alexander of Hales, 7. Metaphy., tex. 22; and of Augustine Niphus in 4. Metaph., disputation 5 — which Master Soto also follows in 2. Physic., q. 2. The aforesaid doctors say therefore that existence is distinguished from essence not only by a distinction of reason, but formally from the nature of the thing, or really-formally, and not as thing from thing, as Soto says above. The principal reason for this opinion is this: for in this way the authors of this opinion seem to themselves better to satisfy the arguments made against the extreme opinions.

The third opinion holds that essence is distinguished from to-be as thing from thing — so that not only is this proposition false in the formal sense, essence is to-be, but also this: essence is a thing which is to-be. This opinion is held by Capreolus in 1., d. 8, q. 1; Cajetan in the opusculum De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 10; Ferrara, 2. Cont. Gent., c. 52|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52; Soncinas, 4. Metaph., q. 12; Iavellus in the treatise De transcendentalibus, c. 4; and it seems to be the opinion of St. Hilary, lib. 6 De Trinit., the passage cited by St. Thomas in the Sed contra argument.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be ours: Essence and to-be are not distinguished by reason alone. This opinion seems received among the gravest authors, both Philosophers and Theologians, and St. Thomas holds it in the opusculum De ente et essentia, c. 5, and 2. Contra Gent., c. 52 and 53.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52 And this conclusion is proved. Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers, in the passages cited above in this article and the preceding, attribute to God, as something peculiar and proper to God Himself, that His essence and His to-be are distinguished by reason alone; therefore this must not be granted to created things. Second, it is proved. This proposition, essence is to-be, is commonly denied of created things by all Theologians and Philosophers, and does not seem able to be granted. For it is peculiar to the divine Essence that to-be be predicated of it in the formal sense; but if created to-be were distinguished from essence by reason alone, without doubt that proposition would be true — as is this one, The Divine Essence is its to-be — although the divine Essence and the Divine To-Be differ in reason. Third, it is proved: for from the opposite opinion it follows that to-be belongs to creatures per se, so that this proposition, man exists, would be per se; but the consequent is false, therefore. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for this proposition is not of perpetual truth, since before the creation of the world it was false. The sequel is proved: for no instance could be brought of a real act that is really and formally the same as something, and yet is not intrinsic to it and does not belong to it per se. Also it is proved by reason. For if the formal account of one thing is formally the same as the formal account of another, it is impossible that those things not have an intrinsic and per se connexion, therefore etc. Last, it is proved. If essence is really the same as existence, it is hard to understand how the Divine Word assumed humanity without a created existence, communicating to it immediately not only personality but also the Divine existence. Which opinion St. Thomas expressly holds, 3. par., q. 17, art. 2, where he proves that in Christ the Lord there is only one Divine To-Be.

Hence let the second conclusion be. Much more probable, and more accommodated to theological matter, is the opinion that to-be is really distinguished from essence as thing from thing. This conclusion seems to be St. Thomas's in the cited passages. And it is proved. For the constitutive mode of the supposit is really distinguished as thing from thing from the supposit itself, as was said in the preceding article; therefore much more is to-be distinguished from essence. The consequence is proved: both because to-be belongs to essence only through the mediation of suppositality — for to-be itself is the proper act of the supposit, as St. Thomas teaches, 3. p., q. 17, art. 2 — and because the constitutive mode of the supposit is more intrinsic to the supposit than to-be. For it is placed in the supposition of the supposit, while to-be is not placed, but only the order to to-be is intrinsic to everything. Second, it is proved. To-be is received from an efficient cause, and depends upon it in becoming and being conserved; but essence per se first belongs to a creature without dependence upon an efficient cause. For it is of perpetual truth that to be man belongs to Peter. But that Peter exists, he has with precedence from an efficient cause; therefore it cannot be the same thing as essence. Third, it is proved. True potency and true act are really distinguished, as matter and form; but essence is true potency in respect of the act of being; therefore they are really distinguished as thing from thing. Fourth, it is proved. If the to-be of a creature were the same thing as the essence of the creature, it would follow that to-be is not really received in essence — for the same thing is not received in itself. But if in truth it be not in essence, to-be received will be unlimited and simply infinite, as God Himself: for to-be cannot be limited through any other act, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt. Indeed this reason effectively proves, against Durandus in 1. Sent., d. 8, that essence is distinguished from to-be at least really and formally. And it is confirmed: for the divine Essence is infinite precisely because it is its to-be really and formally; therefore if the essence of a creature were its to-be, it would not have limited to-be — nor, indeed, received to-be. And finally the conclusion is proved: for if we say so, we better understand the Mystery of the Incarnation — how humanity is drawn not only to the personality of the Word but also to existence, according to the more probable opinion. For it would be unfitting to say that the humanity of Christ is terminated by the Divine existence, and by another created existence.

Nevertheless, let there be a last conclusion. Yet the opinion of Scotus, placed in the second place, and the opinion of Master Soto — which differs little from it — can probably be sustained; and the arguments made against it by the assertors of the third opinion can be dissolved by this example: namely, that as figure actuates quantity and terminates it, and quantity stands as potency to figure — and yet figure and quantity are not distinguished really as thing from thing, but are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing, or really-formally as others say, or are distinguished as thing and mode of thing — just as, if someone twists a rod into a circle, he does not seem to have produced anything wholly distinct from the quantity of the rod, but to have made quantity be otherwise disposed. We, however, follow the opinion of St. Thomas as Capreolus and Cajetan understand it.

TO THE ARGUMENTS posed in the beginning, it is answered. To the first, the sequel is denied: for by parity of reason it would be proved that prime matter can be without form, or that a vital act can be without a vital principle — which we think involves a contradiction. We say therefore that even if two things are distinguished as thing from thing, if yet one of them has an order of intrinsic dependence from the other as to the account of being, it cannot be conserved without it; and since essence in the account of being depends upon to-be received in it, it implies a contradiction that it exist without existence.

To the second it is answered: I deny the sequel. To the objection it is answered that to-be itself, although it is really distinguished from essence, is yet limited by being received in essence. Hence it is not pure act, but has the imperfection of potentiality — not from its own account of existence, but because it is receivable. And in this it differs from uncreated to-be, which is not distinguished from essence.

To the third, the sequel is likewise denied for the same reason.

To the fourth I grant the sequel, but deny the minor. To the proof I grant the major, but deny the minor. Indeed, essence in immaterial things, besides God, stands as potency in respect of to-be itself; and then to the reply — namely, that either essence stands as potency simply or secundum quid — it is answered that the essence of a substance does not stand as pure potency, as prime matter in respect of substantial form; but nevertheless the very essence of a thing, compared to the act of being, stands simply as potency in respect of it. Nor is it unfitting that at once the essence itself intrinsically have its specific formality. For it has an intrinsic order to to-be as to the first and ultimate actuality. There is the example St. Thomas gives in q. unica De anima, art. 6, ad 3, where he says that nothing prevents one form from being compared to another as potency to act. As diaphaneity is compared to light as potency to act, and yet diaphaneity itself is the form of a diaphanous body. So too the essence of an angel, however much it be a subsisting form, yet in respect of to-be itself stands simply as potency — although in itself it have a formality whereby it determines to-be itself in a more perfect mode than material things.

To the fifth I grant the sequel, and deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that the very essence actually is on the side of reality — actuated, however, through existence really distinct from itself, in the way matter and form are really distinguished, and between them there is a real relation.

To the sixth I grant the sequel. Nor is it unfitting that in material things there be one physical composition of matter and form, and another metaphysical one of to-be and essence. Nor does it follow that the composite itself is one per accidens. For the whole physical composition of matter and form stands as potency in the other metaphysical composition of to-be and essence. For to-be itself actuates the whole substance composed of matter and form. For the rest, there is the greatest difference between these two compositions: that the first composition is of intrinsic and essential parts, while the other composition is of the whole essence and an act supervening from without, as a term filling up the dependence of the whole creatable essence from nothing. And so it is not a part of essence, but is received in essence.

IT IS DOUBTED, third. Whether existence is more perfect than the essence whose existence it is.

First, it is argued for the negative side. Man is more perfect in that wherein he is a rational animal than in that wherein he exists; therefore the essence of man is more perfect than his existence. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved. For for man to be a rational animal is necessary and intrinsic and eternal — but for man to exist is something contingent, therefore.

Second. Stone agrees with man in the univocal account of existing, and does not agree with man in the most perfect account of man, namely in the difference of sensible, living, and rational; therefore to-be itself is not more perfect than the specific essence of man.

Third. To live and to understand are greater perfections than to-be: for they add something upon to-be; therefore in man to-be itself is not the greatest perfection. And it is confirmed: for what is more common and more determinable is more imperfect; but to-be is the most common of all and the most determinable — since it is determined by all other perfections, life, wisdom, etc. — therefore. And it is confirmed, second: for as St. Thomas teaches, De Verit., q. 7, art. 6, ad 7, what is more common in predication is more imperfect; but being is more common in predication, therefore it is most imperfect.

Fourth. To-be is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser perfection of the essence in which it is received — e.g. the to-be received in the essence of man is more perfect than that received in the essence of a horse; therefore essence itself is more perfect than to-be. The consequence is proved from that Aristotelian maxim: that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so.

Fifth. The essence of anything whatever is placed in a category per se and directly; but to-be indirectly and reductively by reason of the essence in which it is received; therefore essence is more perfect.

Sixth. Existence is compared to essence as its term, as point to line: but a point is not more perfect than a line; therefore neither is existence more perfect than essence.

Seventh. The most perfect thing in man is that wherein he was made to the image and likeness of God: but man was made to the image and likeness of God in that wherein he is intellective, or of free will, and capable of beatitude — all of which belong to man by reason of his specific essence; therefore this is the most perfect of all things in man.

Eighth. Christ the Lord assumed a most perfect human nature, and yet did not assume its existence; therefore existence does not belong to the perfection of human nature — so far is it from being more perfect than the essence of man.

Finally, it is argued. The primary effect of the substantial form is the specific essence itself, while the secondary effect is to-be itself; therefore the specific essence is more formal and more perfect.

On this doubt, Scot. in 4. Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, teaches that to-be is the most imperfect of all perfections. His sentence is followed by Soncin., 4. Metaph., q. 13, and Ferrar., 1. Contra Gent., cap. 28.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.28 Other modern Thomists intend to proceed by a middle way, asserting that to-be, speaking simply, is the least of all perfections, but secundum quid exceeds all other perfections — namely in that it is the first actuality of all other perfections, inasmuch as through existence the other perfections are outside nothing. And they contend to prove this in some measure from St. Thomas, 1. Contra Gent., c. 28.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.28

FOR the decision of the truth let the first conclusion be. Speaking simply, to-be is a greater perfection than the essence whose to-be it is. It is proved first from the authority of St. Denis, c. 5 De divin. nomin., asserting that among all the perfections we have received from God, to-be is something greater. Also Arist., 8. Ethic., c. 11, says that the greatest benefit bestowed upon us by God is that we are. And St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, says To-be is the most perfect of all — where he openly speaks of the to-be of the existence of creatures. Second, it is proved. To-be is the actuality of all perfections and of all forms, and is compared to essence as act to potency — a doctrine most frequent in St. Thomas. See in particular, in question 4 of this First Part, art. 1, ad tertium, where he expressly says that to-be itself is the most perfect of all, and that it is compared to all things as act, and that it is not compared to other things as receiver to received, but is rather received to receiver: therefore it receives no perfection from conjunction with essence. See also St. Thomas, De Verit., quaest. 8, art. 4. Third, it is proved. As long as an essence does not have to-be, it is not being simply, but is being in potency; but when it has to-be, it is already being simply; therefore to-be is more perfect than essence. Fourth, it is proved. In God Himself, what we principally understand is not that He is life, wisdom, or power, but that He is to-be itself subsisting, in whom all other perfections are understood — in that it is to-be not received, and consequently not limited; therefore to-be is not perfected by being received in an essence. The consequence is proved: for its greatest formality is depressed and limited by being received in an essence. And finally it is proved: to the most perfect cause there corresponds as proper a most perfect effect; but the proper effect of God is the to-be of creatures, whose terminus a quo is non-being; therefore that effect is most perfect. And it is confirmed: for all things most of all desire to-be; therefore it is the best of all.

The second conclusion. Secundum quid, an essence receiving to-be can be called more perfect than it, inasmuch as it limits to a determinate species. This conclusion could be proved by the arguments made for the negative side. But yet this conclusion can be verified only very secundum quid. And the reason is that for to-be itself it were better not to be received nor limited — for if it were not received, it would contain every formality of all species. Hence as a form is not perfected simply by being received in matter, so neither does to-be itself acquire perfection by being received in an essence. It is true, however, that on the supposition that to-be itself must be limitable and receivable, it is in some measure perfected by being received in a more perfect essence than in a less perfect one — which we would more properly say thus: it is less depressed and (so to speak) less imperfected by being received in a living thing than in a non-living one, and in an angel than in a man.

AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM. — To the arguments in opposition, it is answered.

To the first it is said that no perfection belongs to man, even that he be a rational animal, unless an intrinsic order to to-be is understood in it, as of potency to act. Hence I deny the antecedent. For in saying that a man exists, we understand that the rational animal is perfected by existence, not that existence is perfected by the rational animal. To the proof of the antecedent it is answered that all that necessity and eternity of truth belongs to man as he is in God, and not as he is something created. But now we compare a created essence with created to-be, and we say that to-be itself is more perfect, since it is the account by which the essence is outside nothing. For before a man exists, he is actually nothing in himself, but is only in his cause as in an efficient and exemplary principle.

To the second it is answered that although, according to the generic account of substance, a stone exists equally with a man, nevertheless the to-be itself of a man is much more perfect than the to-be of a stone: not because it is perfected by the essence of man, but because it is less depressed by the essence of man than by the essence of a stone.

To the third it is answered that if living and understanding did not include to-be, they would not be greater perfections than to-be; but nevertheless, because they include and receive to-be itself, they are greater perfections than the to-be which lacks life and understanding: yet they would not be greater perfections than to-be if to-be were not received in them. To the first confirmation it is answered that what is more common and more determinable is more imperfect when its commonness and indifference stands as matter and as a potency receiving something else; but to-be itself is most common in formality, and is not determinable as receiving something, but as received in all things: and therefore the consequence is worth nothing. It is answered secondly, with St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 20, art. 2, ad 3, and with St. Dionysius, ch. 5 of On the Divine Names, that if living and to-be are considered separately, so that the one does not enter the account of the other, then to-be is a greater perfection than living. But if living includes to-be, it is no wonder that it is a greater perfection than the to-be which is received in a non-living thing. To the second confirmation it is answered that the common by predication, which is determinable as potency by act, is imperfect; but to-be itself, we have already said, is not determined as potency by act.

To the fourth it is answered that to-be is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser perfection of the essence in which it is received, not as on account of a formal cause, but rather on account of a material one, more or less imperfect. As if you were to say that gold is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser admixture of another metal; but it would be most perfect and purest if it had the admixture of no metal. To the Aristotelian maxim, however, it is answered that for its verification it is required that the positive term be verified of both extremes, and again that, because the one is such, the other be such, which has no place in the present case. For this causal proposition is false, to-be is perfect and the essence is perfect, and because the essence is perfect, to-be itself is perfect: nay rather, to-be is not perfected by the essence except in a qualified sense, as we explained in the second conclusion.

To the fifth the answer is clear from what was said in the preceding first doubt, in the sixth conclusion, where we said that the reduction of to-be itself, which actuates substance, to the predicament of substance is not as of the imperfect to the perfect, but as of actuality to potency.

To the sixth it is answered that existence is not compared to essence as a point to a line as regards all things, but as regards this: that the point completes the line and is not a part of the line. Moreover, existence so terminates the essence that in the account of being it is more perfect; but a point in the account of quantity is not more perfect.

To the seventh it is said that the matter stands thus: that the most perfect thing in man is that in which he was made to the image of God. But I ask you, how was he made so, unless by receiving a to-be less limited than the beasts', but received in a rational nature? Otherwise he would be nothing. We therefore deny the consequence of the argument, since the essence of man is not being compared as it is co-distinguished against to-be.

To the eighth the major and the minor are granted. To the consequence, however, when it is inferred, therefore existence does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, I distinguish the consequent. To quidditative perfection, I say, I grant the consequence. But to the completive perfection of human nature, first and per se, by which it is formally brought out of nothing, I deny the consequence. Yet the human nature in Christ the Lord has this perfection from elsewhere than from an existence proper to itself, in that the human nature in Christ the Lord was drawn to the infinite existence of the Word, which supplies the place of a proper existence as regards the account of terminating. Which account we said in the first doubt to be the most formal.

To the last we shall speak in the following doubt. Meanwhile, however, I wholly deny that the to-be of existence is a formal effect, neither primary nor secondary, of the substantial form itself, so that it flow from it into itself; but every form is compared to to-be as transparency is to light. But of all these things more amply in the following doubt.

IT IS DOUBTED fourth, whether the to-be of existence which is in all creatures is caused by God. This question, on account of its very great difficulty and the varied opinions of the learned, it pleases us to dispute on both sides. And first it must be noted that we are at present speaking of the to-be of generable and corruptible things. For that the to-be of ingenerable and incorruptible things, as the to-be of an angel, the to-be of the rational soul, the to-be of the heaven, is produced by God alone, is certain according to faith. Furthermore, in this question we intend to explain the dependence of existence on particular causes and on the form of the supposit whose to-be it is. For the opinion of philosophers is divided: for some concede that particular causes simply produce to-be in the effect, yet do not attribute this to the form of the effect itself. Others, on the contrary, admit that to-be flows from the form as from an efficient and formal cause, but not from second causes. In order, therefore, to explain what is to be held on this point, we shall treat of all the causes on which to-be depends.

It is argued therefore first for the negative side, and it is proved that the to-be of existence is not the effect of God alone. For St. Thomas very often attributes it to creatures: On Power, q. 7, art. 2, in the body, where he says that all causes agree in this, that they cause to-be; and in 1. p., q. 42, art. 1, ad 1, he says, The first effect of the form is to-be; and q. 50, art. 5, and q. 90, art. 2, ad 1; On Truth, q. 21, art. 6. In which places he says that to-be follows the form. There is a notable passage in 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 54, where he says that as light stands to the luminous, and whiteness to the white, so the form stands to to-be. Some are also accustomed to argue from St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 3, art. 4, in the body, where he says that it is impossible that to-be be caused only by the essential principles of a thing. From which passage, in expounding that exclusive particle, St. Thomas seems to suppose that to-be is in some way caused by the form. For it is resolved thus: to-be is caused by intrinsic principles, and by something else.

Secondly it is argued by reason. When a horse produces a horse, it truly generates it; therefore it produces its to-be effectively. The antecedent is clear, and the consequence is proved: for to generate is to give to-be. And thus generation is commonly defined by Aristotle and the Doctors as the change by which the to-be of a thing is acquired in a disposed subject. Nay rather, all admit that the formal term of generation is the to-be of the thing. It is confirmed: the horse effectively gives to the horse generated both living and sensing; therefore it also effectively causes its to-be. The antecedent is known, and the consequence is proved from parity of reason. For he who effectively causes the lower degrees, say living and sensing, will also cause the higher degree, such as being. But if perchance you say that this argument proves only that, just as the generating horse produces this living thing, this sensible thing, so it also produces this being, from which it does not follow that it produces existence, against this it is urged: for being formally says to-be; therefore if it effectively gives the degree of being, it will also effectively produce to-be; just as what effectively causes the living thing effectively causes life.

Third. Creatures conserve the to-be of other creatures together with God; therefore they also effect that very thing. The antecedent is certain; on this see St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 104, art. 1, ad 2. The consequence is proved: for no more is required for production than for conservation. Nay, St. Thomas repeatedly reckons the action by which a thing is conserved and that by which it is created to be the same, and that it belongs to the same cause to conserve and to produce to-be.

Fourth. A particular cause is constituted in the account of agent through existence; therefore through that same existence it produces existence in the effect. The antecedent is proved: for an efficient cause operates according as it is in act, as is clear from Aristotle and the philosophers. But a cause is formally in act through existence; for the essence of a cause is compared to existence as potency to the ultimate act. The consequence is proved: for what is the act and form of a cause is for it a principle of operating. And it is confirmed: for an agent produces something like itself; therefore if it is an agent according as it is in act through existence, it produces the effect according as the effect itself is existing, and consequently it also produces to-be.

Fifth. The degree of being is prior to the others which are found in the produced effect; therefore what a particular cause first attains is to-be. The antecedent is clear: for the degree of being is prior and more common; and what is more universal and more common is prior. The consequence is proved: for a cause cannot attain a lower or later degree except by first attaining a higher degree, especially since these are essentially subordinate.

Sixth, it is argued specially concerning the form, that it is a principle of being. For it is the common saying of almost all the Metaphysicians that existence is a secondary effect of the form. Which the Theologians admit, saying that God can supply the place of the form in causing existence. And they hold that this was done in the mystery of the Incarnation: nay, they assert that if Christ were to abandon the humanity, a proper to-be would immediately flow forth from the natural form; therefore to-be is an effect of the form.

Seventh. Existence is the substantial act of the supposit; therefore it is caused by the form of the same supposit. The consequence is proved: for what is substantial to a thing ought not to come wholly from without, but is either the form or is caused by the intrinsic principles of the thing. It is confirmed: for it would follow that accidents would be more intrinsic and more conjoined to the supposit than substantial existence, which is absurd. The sequel is proved: for accidents are caused by the form, mediately or immediately; but to-be, as these men hold, comes from outside.

Eighth. This proposition, an angel exists, is necessary and per se, and, by hypothesis, demonstrable; therefore existence is compared to a subsistent form such as an angel as an intrinsic property flowing from it. The consequence is proved: for nothing can be intrinsically connected with a form unless it follows upon it. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 54, art. 2, ad 2, says that the essence of an angel is the account of its whole to-be.

Ninth. For it would follow that the existence of accidents also is not caused by the essence of the subject, but is immediately produced by God. The consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is clear: for by the same reasoning by which you hold that God causes substantial existence by himself alone, we shall say that accidental existence is produced by God alone. The minor is proved: for then it would follow that the to-be of accidents would not per se depend on the substance, nor would it express an intrinsic dependence on the essence of the supposit. The sequel is proved: for according to you that existence is produced by God alone just like substantial existence; therefore of its own nature it depends on God alone.

Lastly it is argued and proved that it is not from God alone. For it would follow that existence is created. The consequent is false, therefore. The minor is clear: for it seems unfitting that in every production which now is and will be, God should produce something anew. And the sequel is clear: for those things are created which are produced immediately by God alone.

In this question Scotus, in 4, d. 1, q. 1, holds that particular agents simply produce the existence of things. And he refutes St. Thomas for saying that existence is the effect of God alone. And Scotus is frequently followed by authors, especially the more recent. Among the Thomists, however, Ferrariensis, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, establishes this sole difference between God and second causes in the production of to-be: that God simply and without addition causes the existence of things, whereas creatures do not cause it absolutely, but determinately. And in ch. 54 he says that existence is the formal effect of the form, which he explains more expressly in ch. 55. Capreolus, however, in 1, dist. 8, q. 1, at the third of Henry and at the third of Gerard against the first conclusion, says that existence is only from the form, because it is the form that makes the subject capable of existing. And Gerard follows him.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be: Particular causes simply give to-be to their effects, each in its own way: as fire generating fire makes it to be fire, and what heats makes it to be hot. This conclusion is proved first by the authority of all, both Philosophers and Theologians, who very often presuppose this conclusion as a first principle. Secondly it is proved by reason: for a particular cause leads the effect out from potency to act simply; therefore it gives to-be and actuality to the effect. The antecedent is clear: for this is to cause simply, namely to reduce to the act of being that which was in potency. It is confirmed: for corrupting causes, as when fire corrupts air, are said simply to destroy the singular to-be of a pre-existing supposit insofar as it was the act of the supposit; for example, when an agent corrupts Peter, although the same to-be that was Peter's remains in the soul, nevertheless the corrupting agent causes Peter not to be; therefore generating causes are said simply to give to-be to the things generated. Thirdly it is proved: particular causes, on any view, bring it about that to-be is conjoined to the essence of the supposit; therefore they simply give to-be to the effect. The consequence is proved: for a cause is said simply to make such a thing either when it produces the form by which the thing is, as when a horse generates a horse, or when it conjoins a form to a subject, as if someone were to unite a pre-existing whiteness to a wall and so make it simply white; therefore if particular causes conjoin existence, which is the form of being, to the essences of supposits, they are said simply to give to-be to the things produced. And it is confirmed: for it seems absurd to deny that my father conferred to-be on me. And the argument made at the beginning of the doubt from the second point sufficiently proves this conclusion.

The second conclusion: Nevertheless creatures do not cause existence simply and as principal causes in their effects. This conclusion is proved first: for any creature whatsoever in its operation presupposes to-be; therefore it does not cause it simply. The antecedent is clear, first, because no creature can operate out of non-being. And furthermore, because every creature presupposes a subject which it physically attains. On which see Aristotle and the authors, book 1 On Generation, text. comm. 11, and St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 45, last art., ad ult., and q. 44, ad 1. But if you reply that this argument proves only that a creature does not produce that to-be which it presupposes, which is rather corrupted, yet it does produce the to-be which follows in the effect generated: on the contrary: for production and absolute causality is when something from being non-such becomes such. For the white is not produced from the white, but from the non-white; and when a man generates a man, he produces from a non-man, because it is production simply. On which principle see Aristotle, at the place cited above, and 5 Physics, text. commen. 6 and 7, and the authors there when they treat of the species of motion. Therefore similarly in the present case, for creatures to be called causes of existence simply and absolutely, they would have to produce existence out of non-existence, which is impossible. Which conclusion will also be clear from what we shall say in the last conclusion. But if you argue: for creatures, according to the first conclusion, simply give to-be and produce the to-be of the whole, therefore they simply cause existence: the consequence is denied: for, as is clear from what has been said, for them to be said to give to-be, it is not required that they produce the form of being. For in the production of a man the generator gives to-be to the man generated, although he does not produce his soul.

The third conclusion: Particular causes do not produce existence, properly speaking, as an instrument. This is set down against certain authors who, holding with us in the second conclusion, assert that a certain transient power is impressed on creatures by God so that they produce the existence of their effects: namely, through this, that existence is communicated to them by God. Nevertheless the conclusion is proved: because this power is posited arbitrarily. And furthermore, because it seems absurd that a particular cause in causing, with respect to the same total effect, have both the account of principal cause and the account of instrumental cause, namely since in the effect produced something is caused simply by a second cause, and something is caused by the same cause as assumed by God.

The fourth conclusion: Particular causes effectively cause the determination of existence. But that you may understand this conclusion, note that existence has two things. First, that it be the act of a being absolutely, according to which account it expresses no limitation. Second, that it be the existence of this supposit received in it, according to which it is now made this one and is limited; and this limitation belongs to existence as it is received in a particular essence. For, as St. Thomas often teaches, what is received must be limited by the receiving subject. We say, therefore, in the conclusion, that a particular agent concurs as a particular efficient cause of this limitation. It is proved first: for this limitation is not from God alone; therefore it is from some particular efficient cause; but this efficient cause is not the essence which receives existence, as is manifest; therefore it will be the cause itself producing the supposit. Furthermore, the agent cause disposes the supposit that it become apt to receive existence; therefore it effectively determines the supposit to exist. The antecedent is clear: for whatever particular thing the supposit has in order to existence, it has from the agent cause. And the consequence is proved: for that very thing by which the supposit is receptive of existence is determinative of it; therefore if it is the efficient cause of that, it also effectively determines existence. From this conclusion, thus explained, you will understand many passages of St. Thomas. For he often says that creatures do not cause being, but this being. And although he often asserts this, yet for example's sake see him in Disputations On Power, q. 3, art. 1, in the body, where he says that any thing whatsoever has an act determined to one genus and to one species; and hence it is that none of them is productive of being as it is being, but of this being as it is this being determined in this or that species. And he adds the reason for this: for an agent acts upon its like; and therefore a natural agent does not produce being simply, but being pre-existing and determined to this or that, for instance to the species of fire, or to whiteness, or to something of the kind. He asserts moreover that God produces to-be, but creatures determine it. And elsewhere you will find that he said that creatures produce this to-be in particular. All these things, therefore, are explained and understood of the limitation already stated in the conclusion, through which the effect is this being and has a determined and limited to-be. So much for agents; concerning forms, however, it follows,

The fifth conclusion: No created form is an efficient, formal, or final cause of existence, yet it is well a material cause. This conclusion is proved in detail, and first that it is not effective. An efficient cause operates according as it is in act through existence; therefore if a form does anything, it causes it insofar as it is actuated by to-be. The antecedent is certain, and a principle presupposed in Aristotle. And it is explained: for a cause not actuated through existence is only in potency; therefore it cannot bestow act on the effect unless it be considered as under a like act. And it is confirmed: for otherwise the same thing, according to its whole self, would reduce itself from potency into act, which is against Aristotle, 3 and 8 Physics, and 12 Metaphysics. The sequel is proved: for a form per se, before it is under existence, effectively causes its own act. Furthermore: existence first belongs to the whole composite, and then is communicated to the parts; therefore it does not flow effectively from the form. The antecedent is certain, of which, God willing, we shall speak in 1 On Generation. And the consequence is proved: for if it proceeds effectively and immediately from the form, it would be united to and communicated to it before any other thing. On this reasoning see M. Soto, 1 Physics, q. 7, conclusion 2, at the end; and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 22. Furthermore the conclusion is proved: for it would follow that the form causes itself, which is absurd. The sequel is proved: for if a form effectively causes its own existence, then it makes itself exist and reduces itself from potency into act, and consequently causes itself. See other reasons in St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, t. c. 22; On Being and Essence, ch. 5 at the end. But that it is not a formal cause is proved: for the form is compared to existence as potency to act and as the receiving to the received; therefore not in the account of form. Then, every existence is the actuality of any form whatsoever; therefore it is the form of every form and not conversely. Moreover it is proved: for it is impossible to explain in what and under what account the essence informs or actuates existence. Finally it is argued: for it would follow that the form of a being would not be to-be itself, or an order to to-be, which is false. The sequel is proved: for that is the form of a being which ultimately terminates and constitutes the thing; therefore if the essence is compared to existence as its form, it will be actuating and ultimately terminating it, and in consequence the essence would be the ultimate act of the being. But if you argue: for the form specifies to-be, therefore it is compared to it in the genus of formal cause: the antecedent is clear: for human to-be is distinguished in species from the to-be of a horse by the form of man, which differs in species from the form of a horse. It is answered that to-be formally and intrinsically takes its specification from the transcendental order which it expresses in the account of act to such a form; but extrinsically, as from a term and subject, it is specified by the form. Moreover, according to this reasoning the form rather has the account of matter: just as the form of the heaven is said to be specified by the matter which is filled by it; and artificial things are said to be specified by the subject. The third part of the conclusion, namely that the form is not the final cause of existence, is proved: for existence is simply the term of the form and not conversely; therefore existence is rather the end of the form than the converse. Secondly: because existence is the ultimate perfection of a thing; therefore the form is not compared to it as an end. The antecedent is proved: for each thing is called good and perfect insofar as it exists. Hence Aristotle, 10 Ethics, ch. 7, and 8 Ethics, ch. 11, says that to-be itself is lovable and desirable in all things. And the truth of this reasoning will be clear below in q. 6. But that the form is the material cause of existence is clear from what has been said, since it is receptive and limiting of the very to-be of existence. And so, just as matter with respect to form has the account of material cause, because it receives and determines the form, so both matter and form, and also the supposit, are compared to existence as a material cause. But nevertheless,

Let the sixth conclusion be: The form, in the genus of formal cause, determines matter to receive existence. It is proved: for the form provides the first act to matter; therefore in the account of form it disposes it to receive the act of existence. Secondly it is proved: for this limitation and adaptation of the subject, which is required for existence to be received, must have some intrinsic form from which it is; but there is no other than the form of the supposit; therefore. Note, however, that the form is called a formal cause disposing to existence, not indeed an immediate one, although a principal one. For besides the form we posit suppositality, by which the supposit is proximately and immediately capable of this existence.

The last conclusion: Existence is the proper effect of God alone. This conclusion is St. Thomas's in this 1. p., q. 8, art. 1, in the body; and q. 45, art. 5; and 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, and book 3, ch. 66, and often elsewhere. Nor is there any Thomist who doubts that this is St. Thomas's conclusion. Moreover, as to his mind, and what the sense of it is, there is doubt among the doctors. Cajetan, in 1. p., at the places cited above, says that this conclusion is set down by St. Thomas only in this sense: that to-be is an effect that per se and primarily depends on God alone; from which it does not follow that creatures do not produce it as second causes. The same manner of speaking is followed by Ferrariensis, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, and book 3, at the place cited above. Others of the Thomists say that the sense of the said conclusion, as set down by St. Thomas, is that existence is the formal and adequate object of God alone, since God alone is the cause of whatever participates in to-be, and of whatever pertains to the to-be of a thing, which belongs to no creature. Others, however, say that the sense of St. Thomas is that God alone produces being insofar as it is being, and to-be without any limitation. But we prefer to understand St. Thomas's conclusion as it lies, rather than to follow the pleasing interpretations of expositors or to comment anew. For the aforesaid three senses do not explain what St. Thomas intends, who among all authors everywhere attributes this peculiarly to God and proves it by the most profound reasons, nor would he need them if he intended any of the aforesaid senses. For all those are conceded by all without controversy, nor do they retain any mystery. We say, therefore, that no cause produces to-be effectively besides God himself. And, using St. Thomas's reasons, this conclusion is proved first: God alone is his own to-be through his essence, whereas other creatures have a participated to-be; therefore God alone is he who produces to-be. That you may understand the force of this reasoning, note that to have something by participation occurs in two ways: first, because it is communicated by another. In this way, whatever belongs to a creature is participated from God: for all that we are, we are the Lord's. And in this acceptance it well stands that something be essential to a thing and yet participated from another. Wherefore St. Thomas's inference does not proceed in this sense. In a second way something is said to be participated, because it is not proper to the subject, but comes wholly from without, from the producer and conserver, as light in a transparent body. Secondly note that the power of causing presupposes the nature and essence of the thing. For something is first in itself such before it is productive of its like. But each thing is said to be of such a nature from its proper form, and from that which belongs to it per se. And consequently it will be called causative of its like because it belongs to it from its proper form and nature; for example, water from its essence has it that it be water. And this, to produce its like, and to cool, belongs to it per se, because it has them from its proper form. Nevertheless, just as it is not per se hot, so it does not per se have the power to heat, but as an instrument of what is per se hot. These things being posited, the force of St. Thomas's reasoning is gathered thus: no creature has to-be of itself and from its own nature, but it is communicated and conserved by God; therefore no creature is per se the cause of existence, either in common or in particular, but it is from God alone. The antecedent is most certain and to be held according to faith, and according to philosophy. And the consequence is proved: for the power causative of existence presupposes to-be itself in the agent cause; therefore if the to-be of the cause itself comes and is communicated from without, it does not have per se an operative power of existence, unless you wish to say that it has it as an instrument, which we refuted above. God alone, therefore, whose existence is of his essence, has the power of making and conserving the same existence in creatures. Secondly the conclusion is proved: every creature in its action presupposes something produced by God alone; therefore it presupposes its to-be. The antecedent is proved: for every creature produces from something; therefore it presupposes that, and in consequence something produced by God alone. And it is confirmed: for otherwise there is no efficacious cause why we should deny that the power of creating can be communicated to creatures. For if they in their operations presuppose nothing depending on God alone, then they will be able to operate with nothing presupposed. Thirdly the same thing is demonstrated, and the preceding reasoning is further explained: for prime matter is incorruptible and ingenerable, and is conserved by God alone; therefore God alone gives the existence which is communicated to prime matter. The antecedent is certain, and the consequence is proved: for it cannot be understood how matter is not generated, or how it is conserved by God alone, if he alone does not give existence. For if particular causes effectively give existence to matter, they would consequently produce it and conserve it. But if you say that this argument proves that even with respect to God prime matter is corrupted and produced anew, inasmuch as one to-be is destroyed and another is produced anew by which matter exists: it is answered by denying the sequel: for the term of the divine action is only to-be, which is never lacking to matter. Particular causes, however, determine this to-be into which it is changed. Hence the reasoning has force with respect to particular causes, if they produce this existence and destroy the past one. It is confirmed: we cannot explain that God is the cause of the whole of being in any other way than because he alone causes the to-be of both form and matter and of the whole; or, if creatures effect this very thing, they will be said also to be causes of the whole of being, which St. Thomas never asserts. And we omit other reasons, which you can gather passim from St. Thomas's doctrine. In sum, therefore, we say that particular causes have only this, to dispose and determine the subject, that it be apt to receive existence, through the form. But God is he who causes it from without. Let there be an example suited enough, which St. Thomas often uses when he speaks of the to-be and essence of creatures. For he compares the essence to a transparent body, and existence to the light which actuates the transparent body, for example the air, from whose essence or transparency the light does not flow, but the transparent body is only in potency, by reason of its transparency, to receive the light. Now therefore, when a natural agent, in the sight of the sun illuminating the air, corrupts the air and from it generates water, which in the same instant of generation is illuminated by the same sun that was illuminating the air, no one will say that that natural agent by its action effected the light, or was per se the cause of the luminous, but rather we shall say that that light, in the genus of efficient cause and as regards its coming-to-be and being conserved, depends on the sun; and nevertheless the singular light which was before in the air ceases to be at the corruption of the singular subject, and another singular light begins to be with the singular water generated. Of which singularity and individuation of the water the natural agent was the efficient cause, and consequently it effects that the light which would be produced by the sun be this light with a dependence on this numbered subject. Behold, then, how existence stands, which begins or ceases with the thing generated or corrupted by a natural agent. For it is certain that the same existence does not remain in the thing generated which was in the thing corrupted. And nevertheless the generator will not be said to generate or to effect existence, just as, in the example, the natural agent is not said to produce light in the water. But nevertheless it will be verified that the generator of this singular substance is consequently an efficient cause of the determination of existence, that it be this one, because it is received in this subject. Moreover, the account of existence itself proceeds from no other source as from an efficient cause than from God, who exists through his essence. I confess that I do not know what the reason is why this doctrine is not understood by very many men, even most learned ones, who profess the doctrine of St. Thomas, since in St. Thomas there are such manifest testimonies of this truth, and the very account of existence demands this. For as in 1. p., q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, St. Thomas teaches, to-be itself is the most perfect of all things; and the same he says more expressly in q. 7 of On Power, art. 2, ad 9, for it is compared to all things as act. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it is; whence to-be itself is the actuality of all things and even of forms. Hence, he says, it is not compared to other things as the receiving to the received, but rather as the received to the receiving. So he. Whence, in my judgment, it is most openly gathered that God himself alone can be the efficient cause from which the to-be of existence flows. For if from some form of a thing to-be itself were understood to flow as from a formal principle, as to be white flows from whiteness, or to be capable of laughter flows from the rational as from a root, it will not be verified that to-be itself is the first actuality of all things, even of forms; since that from which to-be itself flows, whether in the genus of formal or of radical cause, is already pre-understood to have an actuality not depending on existence in the genus of formal cause, since existence itself flows from it as from a formal or radical principle. But what they say, that the to-be of existence is a secondary effect of the substantial form, implies a contradiction with this: that existence is the first actuality of all things and forms. For if another primary and formal effect of the substantial form is pre-understood, then existence, if it is a secondary effect of the substantial form, will not be the first actuality of all things, even of forms. It implies, therefore, that the substantial form be understood to have some formal effect without its being first pre-understood as actuated by the first actuality, which is existence. But if those who think the opposite would attentively consider these things, perhaps they would render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's: who, since he is the first being, whose essence is to-be itself not received nor limited, is himself alone the efficient cause of the whole of to-be received and limited by him in whom it is received in the genus of material cause, even if that which receives to-be itself is otherwise a substantial form with respect to matter or with respect to the composite. Which can appear most of all in the rational soul, unless someone wishes to close his eyes. For when a man is generated, we all understand that there all things are found completely which are necessary for the generation of a singular substance, no less, nay much more perfectly, than in the generation of a horse. We also admit that in the generation of Peter the form is not educed from the potency of matter; for this is required only on account of the imperfection of the term of generation. Hence it is necessary that in the generation of Peter the form itself be from no other efficient cause than from God creating the soul out of nothing: whose existence flows from God alone and is received in the soul as in a subject from which it does not flow, but is its first actuality. From which it is plainly gathered that when John generates Peter, he cannot be called the efficient cause of the existence which is in Peter, even as regards its singularity. For this singular existence of this soul is communicated to the soul through creation out of nothing. Therefore the consequence which adversaries are accustomed to make is not good: fire generates fire, therefore it is the cause of the existence of fire. Nor does this consequence hold: the generator is the efficient cause that Peter exist, therefore it is the cause of his existence. For the antecedent is verified only by this, that the generator efficiently disposes the matter to the union of the soul with the body, whence it arises that Peter exists, by this, that the existence of the soul is communicated both to the matter and to the supposit, for which it is not required that it be the cause of that existence. And by this doctrine it will be easy to answer the arguments to the contrary.

To the first argument, which is taken from the testimonies of St. Thomas, it is answered that to those we oppose other testimonies of St. Thomas, in which he asserts much more openly that to-be itself is the proper effect of God alone. Thus he says in express words in On Power, q. 7, art. 2, saying: «It is necessary, therefore, that there be some cause higher than all things, by whose power all things cause to-be, and that the to-be of it, that is, of that first cause, be its proper effect». And in this 1. p., q. 8, art. 1, showing how God is intimately in all things, he says that created to-be is his proper effect, which he causes in things not only when they first begin to be, but also as long as they are conserved in being, as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the illuminated air remains. And since this to-be, he says, is the most intimate to each thing and what is most deeply present, since it is formal with respect to all things that are in a thing, it is necessary that God be in all things, and intimately. See also q. 45, art. 5, where he expressly affirms the same. And in book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 66, he teaches the same. Moreover, the testimonies that were brought to the contrary all have one solution. For whenever St. Thomas says that it is common to all causes, namely efficient ones, to cause to-be, it is to be understood insofar as they determine to-be itself to a supposit or to a nature. Which assuredly they do in no other way than by effectively disposing the subject in which to-be is received. And this is what he says in book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 66, in the fifth reason: that all things other than God act upon to-be itself as it were particularizing and determining the action of the first agent, that is, the effect of the first agent. And he says that they act as their proper effects the other perfections which determine to-be. To those testimonies in particular, however, in which it is said that to-be follows the form, and that as light stands to the luminous, so the form stands to to-be, it is answered, from the same St. Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 54, cited: where he says that to-be itself is compared even to the form itself as act. From which it is plainly gathered how to-be itself follows the form. For it follows it as act follows the last disposition of the subject. For although the form itself is compared to the essence of the thing as a formal principle, nevertheless with respect to existence it has the account of potency and of the receptive by which the supposit has to-be, as St. Thomas elegantly discusses in the same place where he says: «For by this, in things composed of matter and form, the form is called a principle of being, because it is the complement of the substance, whose act is to-be itself». And he brings an example: as the transparent body is to the air a principle of shining, because it makes it the proper subject of light. From this doctrine what he had said a little earlier is easily understood. For St. Thomas intended in that chapter to show that substance alone has to-be as that which is; and that the composition from matter and form is not the same as that from substance and to-be. Hence in the third reason he shows that the form itself is neither to-be itself, nor has to-be as that which is, but as that by which the substance is. And as to this he says that it stands as light to the luminous, and whiteness to being white: namely, that as whiteness is not white, nor light luminous, so the substantial form is not to-be itself, but that by which something is. Nevertheless there is a very great difference, which he himself immediately explains. For to be luminous, or to be white, is not the act of light itself, that is, actuating light, or of whiteness itself; but to-be itself actuates the substantial form. And this is what he says: «Then, because to-be itself is compared even to the form itself as act. For by this, in things composed of matter and form, it is called a principle of being, because it is the complement of the substance, whose act is to-be itself; as the transparent body is to the air a principle of shining». So he. When, therefore, you read in St. Thomas that the form is that by which something is, read the aforesaid testimony, and you will understand in what way the form is a cause of being: certainly as transparency is the cause of the luminous, because it is that by which a luminous body receives light.

To the second the solution will now be easy from the foregoing. For we grant that when a horse generates a horse it effectively produces the horse in being. And it effectively determines to-be itself to the to-be of a horse. Yet I shall never grant that the efficiency of a particular cause reaches existence absolutely, but only as regards its determination to this species and to this individual, by effectively limiting it, just as the subject itself materially limits it. Moreover, God himself by his efficiency reaches all things, insofar as to-be itself is his proper effect, which actuates and perfects all things. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. And to the proof it is answered that when a higher degree is contained essentially in a lower one, perhaps it will be verified that he who effectively causes the lower degree also effectively causes the higher degree. But nevertheless to-be itself, as we have often said, is not contained quidditatively in any degree of a creature. Moreover, the solution assigned in the same place is good. And to the rejoinder it is answered that being, according as it is predicated essentially, formally imports an order to to-be. Hence it is not necessary that he who produces this being in the singular produce its existence, as is clear. For he who generates Peter, although he effects this being, does not thereby effect its existence.

To the third it is answered that no creature conserves the to-be of another creature, absolutely speaking, but only insofar as it conserves the determination and limitation of that to-be. For in this way the influences of the heavens conserve a man in being and living, by conserving the necessary disposition of the body and of the individual. But to the testimony of St. Thomas brought in the same place, it is answered that we can bring nothing more convenient for our position than what St. Thomas teaches in that article, which, if it were read attentively by the Thomists, they would never think the opposite of our position. Where, among many other things, he teaches that every creature is related to God as the air to the illuminating sun; and because light has no root in the air, the light immediately ceases when the action of the sun ceases: so, he says, every creature is a being by participation, but God alone is a being through essence. And immediately, in the solution to the first, he says in the same place that to-be per se follows the form of the creature, with the influx of God presupposed; as light follows the transparency of the air, with the influx of the sun presupposed. Let those note these things who say that to-be itself flows from the form as from a root; and let them see how alien their doctrine is from St. Thomas.

To the fourth some say that the existence of a particular cause stands only as a condition necessary for acting to the particular cause itself. But in my judgment they are mistaken. For the existence of a particular cause is the first actuality of every agent form and, as it were, the foundation of all the activity of the form. Yet it must be noted that just as existence itself is received in forms and is limited by them, so it concurs to their effect as regards the limitation of the effect's existence, not as regards existence simply. And by this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the fifth the consequence is denied. Nay rather, the opposite follows: for from the fact that the degree of being is first, it must be attributed to the first Cause; with whose influx presupposed, a particular cause concurs to the determination and particularization of the effect of this species.

To the sixth the answer is now clear from what has been said. Nor are those to be reckoned good Metaphysicians who say that the existence of a thing is a formal effect, albeit secondary, of the substantial form. But it must only be asserted that to-be follows the form as light follows transparency, and that its cause is material, as the immediate disposition for receiving light.

To the seventh the answer is clear from what was said in the first doubt. For we deny that existence is the substantial act of the supposit, as something of the essence or the quiddity of the supposit. But it can be called a substantial act, that is, one first actuating the substance in the account of form; as light is the act of the transparent body, by reason of its transparency. To the confirmation the sequel is denied: for accidents are not caused by the form unless the actuality of existence is presupposed, which is immediately received in the form, although it has no root in the form. Nevertheless that existence itself, limited by the form, is the root of such accidents as flow from the existing form. To the eighth it is denied that this proposition, an angel exists, is simply necessary; but it is only physically necessary, from the supposition made that an angel has once been created or produced by God. But it must be observed that the necessity of these things, the heaven exists, an angel exists, does not arise from their intrinsic account per se and primarily, as the risible arises from the intrinsic account of man; otherwise an angel exists would be of eternal truth, like this, man is capable of laughter; but they are called necessary because, after they have once received to-be from God, they are conserved by him alone; nor is there in the whole of nature any extrinsic or intrinsic cause of those things by which they would cease to be. But God alone, who is outside the whole order of the universe, can annihilate such things: because they are freely conserved, as they were freely created. To the confirmation it is answered that below, on the same passage of St. Thomas, it will be explained how it is to be understood that the essence of an angel itself is the account of its whole to-be. See the solution there.

To the ninth the sequel is denied: for the existence of accidents is not existence simply, but existence in another. Hence it is not unfitting that it flow from a substance already existing, especially since there flows the existence of accidents, determined to the species and individuation of the accident.

To the last the sequel is denied: for existence is not that which has to-be, but that by which something is. Hence to be created belongs only to what exists per se, and to that which receives to-be out of nothing. Moreover, when after creation something is produced anew through the corruption of another, that thing cannot be said to be created, because it does not come to be out of nothing. But nevertheless, in every action of a natural agent the action of the Creator is presupposed, not indeed of one creating anew, but of one conserving by the continuation of the action by which he gives to-be to things. And therefore the proper effect of God is to-be itself, absolutely speaking. On this matter see St. Thomas below, in q. 104, art. 1 and 2, and q. 45, art. 5, and in q. 3 of On Power, art. 7, where he says to-be itself is the most common effect, first and more intimate than all other effects; and therefore such an effect belongs to God alone according to proper power. So much for this difficult question. But for the completion of this matter, it has seemed good briefly to dispute another curious question, concerning the distinction of the existence of accidents from the existence of substance.

IT IS DOUBTED fifth and last, whether accidents have their own existence, really distinct from the existence of substance. On this matter there are various opinions. Scotus, in 2, d. 12, q. 1, holds the affirmative side. The same opinion is held by Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 5, conclusion 2; and he proves it by three arguments.

The first is: for no form is in anything without communicating to it its formal effect; since form and formal effect are inseparable. But in Peter there is, for example, whiteness, whose formal effect is to be white; therefore it gives him to be white. But to be white is not to be a man, because the latter can remain without the former; therefore in Peter there is this twofold to-be. And the same argument can be made concerning other accidental forms. It is confirmed: for it is common to every form to give some to-be; therefore it is natural to them to give some to-be, not substantial, therefore accidental, distinct from the substantial.

The second argument is: for no potency can be without its own act. But to-be is the proper act of the essence; therefore no essence can be without its own proper act; but the to-be of a man is not the proper to-be of whiteness or of another accident; therefore, as many as there are accidental essences, so many are the to-bes which correspond to them.

Thirdly it is argued: for in the Eucharist the accidents of bread exist, and not through the existence of the bread, since nothing of the bread remains once the consecration is made; therefore through their own existence, and consequently accidents have their own existence, distinct from the existence of substance. The same opinion is held by Dominic of Flanders, 7 Metaphysics, q. 1, art. 5.

The contrary opinion is held by Master Dominic Soto, book 1 Physics, q. 6, in the definition of matter; yet he does not prove it. But it can be proved.

First, because his is the to-be whose is the becoming: but becoming belongs only to substances subsisting per se; for by one action Peter is produced, and at the same time all the accidents required for his integrity and perfection are co-produced; therefore to-be also belongs to them alone; and consequently accidents do not have their own to-be, but are through the existence of the substance. And it is confirmed: for matter is not said to have its own existence, because it is not created per se by God, but concreated; but similarly all accidents, which begin to be with some substance, are co-produced at its production, and are not produced per se: nay, certain of them, from their nature, demand to be produced in this way, as is clear in proper passions; therefore it must also be said of accidents that they do not have their own existence.

Secondly it is proved. Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, at the beginning, says that an accident is a being in that it is thus of a being, namely of a substance; therefore only insofar as it is something of a substance; and consequently it does not have its own to-be, because by reason of that it would be a being, and not insofar as it is something of a substance. And it is confirmed: for this seems also to be signified by that common saying, the to-be of an accident is to be in another, because it does not have a proper to-be or a proper existence, but the existence of its subject. And so they do not exist except by the participation or communication of their subject, in which they are.

Thirdly, if accidents had their own existence, it would be inherence; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is clear: for every mode of being in act on the part of the thing is either to-be per se or to be in another: but accidents do not have to-be per se; therefore if they have some to-be, it will be to be in another. The minor is proved: for the existence of an accident is either aptitudinal or actual inherence: not the first, because aptitudinal inherence is the essence of the accident, as Cajetan proves in On Being and Essence, ch. 7, 16; therefore it cannot be its existence, because existence in every created thing is distinguished from essence. Nor can the second be said: because the accidents in the Eucharist truly exist; and not through actual inherence, because this cannot be understood without a subject in act. For that does not actually inhere which does not actually have a subject in which to inhere: but those accidents are wholly actually separated from a subject, as St. Thomas teaches, 3. p., q. 77, art. 1; therefore it can in no way be said that inherence is the existence of an accident, at least if we speak of accidents really distinct from substance.

Of these two opinions, the opinion of Master Soto sometimes seemed to me more probable, because I had not adverted that it was contrary to the opinion of St. Thomas. Now, however, with the matter well inspected, the opinion seems to me much more probable which asserts that the existence of accidents, which are really distinguished from substance, is also really distinguished from the existence of substance. This opinion St. Thomas seems to me expressly to hold in 3. p., q. 17, art. 2: where, asking whether in Christ there is only one to-be, and defining that in Christ there is only one to-be which pertains to the hypostasis as to that which has to-be, he consequently defines that nothing prevents a to-be from being multiplied in Christ, or in one hypostasis, which pertains to an accidental form. For the to-be by which Socrates is white is other than that by which Socrates is musical. So he. The same he asserts, ch. 7 of On Being and Essence, at the beginning, and in 1, d. 3, q. 2, art. 3, and d. 20, q. 1, art. 1, and 4 Against the Gentiles, ch. 14. Likewise Cajetan holds the same opinion as proper to St. Thomas, below, q. 28, art. 2, and in his commentaries on On Being and Essence, ch. 7, where he says that from the conjunction of whiteness with snow there arises the to-be by which both the whiteness is and the snow is white. The same opinion is followed by all who defend the identity of essence with existence. For as an accident has an essence distinct from the essence of substance, so it has an existence distinct from the existence of substance. And indeed they speak consequently, although they are founded on a false opinion. Wherefore we, proceeding from true principles, prove that the proper existence of an accident is distinguished from the existence of substance. For we suppose what was said in the first doubt: that existence is the act by which each thing formally exists. But this act is not equal in all things: for in some it is so imperfect that it depends on the existence of the subject; in others, however, it is more perfect and bestows existence on the subject. The former mode of existing belongs to accidents, the latter to substances. And therefore substance is said to have to-be per se, but an accident in another. The ground of this can be assigned from the very essences, which are diverse, with respect to which to-be itself is limited to a determinate genus and a determinate species. Since, therefore, there is the greatest diversity between substance and accident, because substance is intended per se by nature, but accidents for the completion of substance, it is rightly gathered that substance has to-be per se, but an accident in the substance. Hence a ground can be gathered for this opinion. The same act cannot be both dependent and independent of a subject; but the existence of an accident is by its nature an act dependent on a subject, whereas the existence of a substance is an act independent; therefore they are not the same. But you will say that for this a formal or conceptual distinction suffices. But on the contrary: because this dependence belongs to the act according to its own entity, and proceeds from its imperfection; therefore it is necessary that there be a diversity in the very entity where such dependence is affirmed and denied. It is confirmed: for otherwise, by parity of reason it could be said that the same rational soul is really dependent on matter according to one account and independent according to another, and that according to one account it is mortal and according to another immortal. Secondly I argue thus: an accident is said formally to inhere, or to be inexistent, from its own existence; therefore the existence of an accident is formally inexistence. This consequence is clear: for nothing is said to be formally such except from a form that is formally present; moreover, the existence of substance is not formally inexistence, otherwise substance by reason of it would be formally inexistent; therefore the existence of an accident is distinguished from the existence of substance. Lastly: there are many accidents which according to their intrinsic entity are of a supernatural order; therefore it is necessary that they have a to-be of supernatural order; but no substance besides the divine is of a supernatural order; therefore no existence of substance is the existence of these accidents. The consequence is proved: for existence is proportioned to the essence and is of the same order as it. This opinion, therefore, being supposed, the arguments of the second opinion must be answered.

To the first it is answered: I deny the minor. To the proof I say that although in fact many accidents are produced by the same action by which my substance is produced, of which there is no dispute at present, nevertheless they can be produced by other actions which are terminated at it per se, as a quality is produced by alteration and a quantity by augmentation. It is answered secondly that from the fact that something is co-produced at the production of another, it does not follow that it does not have an existence distinct from it, but only that it is something of it; and so accidents are something of the substance, and are produced for its completion and perfection. To the confirmation it is answered that matter does not lack a proper existence from the fact that it is concreated with simple bodies, which were first produced by God out of nothing: but from the fact that it is created, and from the manner of creation, it does not follow that it has a proper existence, because it is not created per se. Hence although, naturally speaking, what is produced per se has a proper existence, nevertheless from the fact that it is not produced per se it does not follow that it lacks one. As if God were to create men out of nothing as regards both soul and body, then the soul would be said to be concreated, because it would be produced as a part of the man; and nevertheless it would have a proper existence, yet the whole man would not have another, but the same one communicated to itself: because the to-be of the soul pertains to personal to-be, and in the same supposit the to-be that pertains to it cannot be multiplied: because it is impossible that there not be one to-be of one thing, as St. Thomas says, 3. p., q. 17, art. 2.

To the second argument it is answered, with Soto in 4, d. 12, q. 1, that it is not well gathered that an accident has it that it be a being formally from the to-be of the substance, from the fact that it is a being in that it is thus of a being, that is, of a substance. Because that particle, in that it is, signifies not only the formal cause or ground, but also the genus of any cause whatsoever, even an extrinsic one. For it is said 'in that it is' in as many ways as a cause is said, as is clear from Aristotle, 5 Metaph., ch. 17. Wherefore when Aristotle said that an accident is a being in that it is of a substance, he signified only that the entity of an accident is caused by the substance. Which indeed is true, because substance is the extrinsic material cause of accidents. To the confirmation it is answered that the sense of that maxim is that an accident has to-be dependently on the substance in the genus of extrinsic material cause, not however that it is formally in act through the to-be of the substance.

To the third it is answered that the existence of an accident is the actuality by which an accident is in act on the part of the thing: and this actuality is deservedly called inherence or inexistence, because on account of its imperfection it naturally depends, in its coming-to-be and being conserved, on the existence of the subject. For as the essence of an accident stands to the essence of substance, so the existence of an accident stands to the existence of substance. But this dependence is not so great that it cannot be supplied by the power of God, since the dependence of the existence of an accident on the existence of substance is not a dependence as on a formal cause. Nevertheless the existence of accidents remains, with an intrinsic order, as far as lies on its part, to the existence of substance as to its foundation and root.

Moreover, the arguments which have been adduced from Paul Soncinas in confirmation of this opinion are not of great moment, although they also defeat Dominic of Flanders, at the place cited above; for all will easily be solved if one holds that the existence of accidents is indeed distinguished really formally from the existence of substance, but not really as a thing from a thing. In which way a figure is also distinguished from quantity; and according to the opinion of others, the existence of substance is not otherwise distinguished from the substance than really formally, as was said in doubt 3. Nay, by this distinction all the testimonies which have been adduced from St. Thomas can be explained. For St. Thomas can be explained of the real formal distinction. And so the second opinion, which M. Soto holds, is probable. And to the argument made concerning the accidents which remain in the sacrament of the Eucharist you will find an answer abundantly sufficient below, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3. So much for the explanation of article 4.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

THE distinction having been supposed, St. Thomas answers by a twofold conclusion. The distinction is: to be in some genus stands in two ways, namely first and simply and properly, in another way reductively.

FIRST conclusion: God is not in any genus directly and per se, as a species is in a genus. This he proves by a threefold reason.

Second conclusion: God is not in any genus, even reductively.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning this article, on the truth of both conclusions. And it is argued first that God simply pertains to a genus and a predicament. Christ is simply placed in a predicament; therefore God also. The antecedent is conceded by all Theologians. The consequence is proved first: because Christ is an infinite substance, like God. Likewise, because on account of the communication of idioms, whatever is said of Christ is said of God.

Secondly it is argued from St. Aug., 5 On the Trinity, ch. 8, where he says that Sacred Scripture speaks of God according to the categories, which the Latins call predicaments: sometimes indeed improperly, as when God is said to have a disposition or a habit, sometimes however properly, as when God is said to be a substance or a spirit. Almost the same he says in sermon 88 On the time; and Damascene, book 3 On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 8; therefore, etc. It is confirmed: for in God the relations which are found of Paternity and Filiation are most proper relations; therefore they pertain absolutely to the predicament 'to something'. It is confirmed secondly: for certain Theologians probably say that relation, according to what is ultimate and proper to relation, is said univocally of real relation and of relation of reason; for St. Thomas, below, q. 28, art. 2, says that those things which are said 'to something' are most properly found in relations of reason; therefore it is also said univocally of the relations which are in creatures and in God; and accordingly, as the former are placed in a predicament, so also the divine relations.

Third. God is properly a substance; therefore he is placed in the genus of substance. The antecedent is proved from Aristotle, 12 Metaphysics, at the beginning, who, distinguishing substance into corruptible and incorruptible, asserts that one of the incorruptible substances is God. The consequence is proved: for if anything excluded this divine substance from a predicament, it would be that it is infinite; but this does not stand in the way: for if there were an infinite line it would pertain to the genus of quantity, and an infinitely intense whiteness to the predicament of quality; therefore, etc. It is confirmed: for if God is not in a genus, it is on account of the reason adduced by St. Thomas, that things placed in a genus consist or are composed of genus and difference, and of potency and act, etc. But this reason is not efficacious. It is proved: for this composition is in the intellect conceiving the same thing in diverse ways, for on the part of the thing animal and rational are the same; but our intellect can conceive of God something after the manner of potency, and something after the manner of act. It is proved: because although God is altogether simple, nevertheless our intellect, on account of its imperfection, conceives simple things in a composite way; therefore, etc. It is confirmed secondly: for the angels, which are abstract forms, in which there is not something from which the account of genus and the account of difference is taken, are nevertheless in a predicament; therefore the same will be the case with God. It is confirmed thirdly: God is conceived by us after the manner of a universal; therefore after the manner of genus and species, and consequently he is placed in a predicament. The antecedent is proved: for God is conceived by us without individuating conditions; therefore.

Fourth it is argued. For from the divine substance we can abstract one limited and contracted account; therefore in it there can be genus and species. The antecedent is proved: for in God we conceive mercy as distinct from justice.

Fifth it is argued: for the third reason which St. Thomas here adduces, and which seems most weighty, has a manifest equivocation; for in the antecedent, when he says that all things which are in one genus communicate in the essence of the genus and differ according to to-be, he seems manifestly to speak of the to-be of essence; but in the consequent, when he says that it is necessary that whatever are in a genus differ in them according to to-be and what it is, he speaks openly of the to-be of existence; therefore this reason has an equivocation. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas in 1 Sentences, d. 8, q. 4, art. 2, ad tertium, says that God, although he is not placed in the predicament of substance directly, since he is the most perfect being and the measure of all substances, is nevertheless placed reductively. And q. 7 On Power, art. 3, ad ultimum, he says that although God does not pertain to the genus of substance as something contained in a genus, like a species and an individual, it can nevertheless be said that he is in the genus of substance reductively, as a principle and a point are in the genus of continuous quantity, and unity in the genus of number; therefore, etc. And finally, because each thing is measured by something of its own genus: but God, since he is the most perfect substance, is the measure of the others; therefore he is in the same genus. To this question certain Theologians hold that God is properly placed in a predicament: so Ockham thinks, in 1, d. 8, q. 5, and Olcot, and Gregory in 1, dist. 8, q. 3; Gabriel, q. 5, and Marsilius in 1, q. 12, art. 2, conclusion 6.

FOR the resolution it must be noted, first, with St. Thomas, ch. 6 of On Being and Essence, that to-be is so much of the essence of God himself that it is of his quidditative concept, so that God includes no potentiality, but is pure to-be without admixture of potentiality. Hence as animal, if it were not determined to some species, would be pure animal, and whiteness, if it were not coarcted to some subject, would be pure whiteness, so the to-be which in God is unlimited is his essence itself. Note secondly, from the same St. Thomas, On Power, q. 8, art. 3, that although matter is not a genus, nor is form a difference, nevertheless the account of genus is taken from matter, as the account of difference from form. As is clear in man, that the sensitive nature, from which the account of animal is taken, is material with respect to the account from which the rational difference is taken: for animal is what has a sensitive nature, but rational what has reason. Hence Cajetan, On Being and Essence, ch. 6, notes that in things composed of matter and form four things are understood: matter, which is a part of the specific composite; form, which is the other part; the whole quiddity as it has the account of perfectible by a further formal perfection; and the whole quiddity itself as it gives the ultimate formal perfection. For in this we can consider the matter in which its form is received, and the form received in it, and man himself insofar as he is a substance, and as a substance he has the account of perfectible through the corporeal and the rational. But the root of potentiality in sensible things is matter; and therefore genus is taken from matter, but difference from form. Note thirdly that in any predicament whatsoever, the higher genera are contracted to lower species through certain differences contracting those genera, which are outside their formal account, and conversely, as Aristotle teaches, 3 Metaphysics, text. 10; and for this reason being is excluded from the account of genus, and accident too according to the common account of accident. From which it follows that the composition of genus and difference, although it is not as a third thing from two things, as St. Thomas teaches in the opuscule On Being and Essence, ch. 3, is nevertheless not from the intellect's conception alone, but has a foundation in reality, and can be called a real metaphysical composition. Which is proved: for genus is compared to difference as the perfectible to its own proper act by which it is perfected; therefore they are distinguished in reality itself, and not only through the operation of the intellect. Likewise, because Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 54, arguing against Plato, says that if the idea were separate and simple it could not be defined, because a definition is a discourse including distinct parts. Therefore Aristotle holds that the parts of the definition, which are genus and difference, are distinct in reality itself and not from the operation of the intellect alone. Furthermore, because otherwise it would follow that if the account of genus and the account of difference were not diverse according to reality, the one could be predicated of the other in the abstract, nay even in the first mode of saying per se, as animality and rationality: which nevertheless is against all the Metaphysicians. It must be noted fourthly, with master Cajetan in On Being and Essence, ch. 6, that in substances separated from matter, genus and difference cannot be taken from matter and form, since they do not have these parts: therefore both genus and difference are taken from the whole essence, yet in diverse ways. For the genus is taken from the essence of an angel insofar as in it he is assimilated to other angels, but the difference from the same, by reason of that in which one angel differs substantially from others; for the angelic essences differ among themselves by a greater nearness to the pure act. Whence Cajetan infers that every individual, really distinct from its own to-be, has several quidditative predicates, by progress through which it approaches more and more to its own to-be. Secondly he infers that among the aforesaid quidditative predicates there is this order: that a thing is the more actual the closer it approaches to to-be, and the more potential the further it is from to-be; for example, Peter, really distinct from his own to-be of existence, has several quidditative predicates, namely substance, body, living, etc.; and it is certain that Peter as substance is very far removed from his existence; for in order that Peter be, there is required not only that he be a substance, but also a body, etc. But when Peter is considered as an animated sensible substance, etc., then he can already receive actual existence: for no other intrinsic formal thing is required for him to be, although extrinsic causes and individual properties are required as a condition of the one existing. And this is proved by reason of Cajetan himself in the same place. And so among the quidditative predicates there is this order: that what is nearer to to-be itself is more actual, but what is further is more potential. From which it is inferred thirdly that genus is taken from that which is potential. Hence it is a most general rule that genus and difference are taken from the whole essence of a thing according to its removal from and nearness to the very to-be of existence.

It is answered therefore to the doubt that the conclusions of St. Thomas are most certain, namely that God is placed in a predicament neither directly nor indirectly. This is proved from St. Aug., book V On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book VII, ch. 5, who teaches so. Very many Theologians agree, even Scholastics, with the Master in 1, d. 8: Albert, Bonaventure, Richard, Scotus, in the same d., q. 2, and Durandus in 1 Sentences, dist. 3, q. 1. The same St. Thomas holds everywhere: here, and 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 25, and On Power, q. 7, art. 3, and his disciples. It is proved by reason. First: for any predicament whatsoever imports a limited perfection of being, since being is divided into ten genera primarily diverse, whose accounts are distinct among themselves: but God has an infinite and unlimited perfection of being; therefore he is not in a genus. It is confirmed: since relation, goodness, etc., which are in God, are the very substance of God. Secondly it is proved: as the account of being is not said univocally of God and creatures, of substance and accident, so the account of substance is not said univocally of God and of us; therefore if we pertain to a predicament, God ought not to pertain. Furthermore, because being is not placed in a predicament because it is intrinsically enclosed in all things of all predicaments: but whatever is in God is intrinsically included in all things which pertain to God; therefore he is not placed in a predicament. The consequence is proved: for whatever difference is added to some genus so that it be contracted to the to-be of God, it intrinsically includes it. It is confirmed: for God does not pertain to the predicament of substance according as substance is said from substanding; since God does not underlie accidents, as will be said in the following article. And in this way St. Aug., VII On the Trinity, ch. 5, says that God is said to be substance improperly and abusively. Nor is he placed in the genus of substance insofar as substance says a per se subsisting predicamental being: since a being of this kind is determined by differences to a certain species; therefore he is placed in no predicament.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, the antecedent is conceded, and the consequence denied. To its proof it is answered that although Christ is an infinite substance, he nevertheless has some finite nature, namely the humanity, by reason of which he can pertain to a predicament. To the other proof, concerning the communication of idioms, it is spoken more amply in the 3rd part. But for now it is answered that in real predicates there is a communication of idioms, but not in intentional ones. Hence Christ is called a first substance, but not God. The universal rule, therefore, is that when a predicate is verified of Christ only with a reduplication, namely insofar as he is man, so that for the truth of the proposition such a condition must be expressed formally or virtually, there is no communication of idioms except with the same reduplication; so that it does not follow, Christ insofar as he is man begins to be, therefore God begins to be; Christ insofar as he is man is a creature, therefore God is a creature, unless that particle 'insofar as he is man' is added: for we would be arguing from what is said in a qualified sense to what is said simply, or from what is formal to what is identical, or, as the moderns say, the appellation is varied: for in the antecedent the appellation is made over the humanity, but in the consequent over the Deity. Sometimes, however, the reduplication or condition is posited implicitly and virtually, when the predicate signifies an interior act of the soul, as when we say, Christ is predestined. Hence the consequence does not hold, therefore God is predestined: because the term 'predestined', in that it signifies an interior act of the soul, appellates over the humanity. And the same must be said of this consequence, Christ is in a predicament, therefore God is in a predicament: for to be in a predicament is a term of second intention belonging to things through an order to the intellect, and hence it appellates.

To the second it is answered that of those things which belong to creatures, some are said properly even of God, yet not univocally, but analogically, as substance, spirit. Hence the consequence is denied, that God pertains to a predicament. But Augustine and Damascene teach nothing other than that these predicates, which in creatures pertain to a predicament, are said properly of God, yet not according to the same predicamental account by which they are said of creatures. To the first confirmation it is answered that although Paternity and Filiation in God are simply relations, they nevertheless do not pertain to a predicament, on account of the reasons already given. For they are an infinite perfection, and so are not coarcted to one predicamental account. To the second confirmation it must be spoken ex professo below, in the matter of the Trinity. But for now it is answered that relation, insofar as it says 'to', is not said univocally of the divine relation and of that which is in creatures, nay not even of a real relation and one of reason.

To the third it is answered by denying the consequence: for substance is said analogically of God and creatures. Yet Aristotle made that division, because God is naturally known from the things which are in creatures. But to the proof of the consequence it is said that that reason is the best by which God is excluded from a predicament, namely because he is an infinite substance. To the disproof of which it is said that the infinite is twofold: one according to essence, the other according to quantity. The infinite according to essence is that which does not have essential terms, which are genus and difference; the infinite according to quantity is that which lacks the terms of quantity. God is infinite in the first way; wherefore he is not placed in a genus, because he does not have essential terms, namely genus and difference. But a line is infinite according to quantity, because it does not have the terms of length; yet it is finite according to essence, because it is enclosed within essential terms, namely genus and difference, which suffices for it to be placed in a genus. To the first confirmation it is answered that the composition of genus and difference, as we noted, is not from the operation of the intellect alone, but has a foundation in reality; but in God, since he is altogether simple, there cannot be such a foundation on the part of God himself, from which a composition of genus and difference might arise. To the second confirmation it is answered that in angels there is something potential, from which the account of genus is taken, and something actual, from which the account of difference is taken. To the third confirmation it is answered that although God is conceived by us after the manner of a universal and after the manner of a species, nevertheless because this conception has no foundation in reality, but only in the imperfection of our intellect, which cannot know God in this state as he is, but only through an order to material things, therefore God is simply not a species or a genus, nor is he even in a genus; but when an angel is conceived by us after the manner of a species, such a conception has a foundation in reality, as we were just saying to the second confirmation, and therefore it is properly a species.

To the fourth it is answered that although, from the imperfection of our intellect, we can conceive God, who is infinite, according to a certain limited account, as he says a respect to things outside, nevertheless in the account of being God is in himself infinite, and whatever account existing in God is infinite simply, and consequently includes all actuality and perfection, and hence is outside every genus.

To the fifth it is answered, from Cajetan, here and On Being and Essence, ch. 6, that in the antecedent of that third reason St. Thomas takes to-be both for specific to-be and for the to-be of existence, for it is verified of both; nay, the truth of the one infers the truth of the other. See Cajetan, in the preceding article, at the end. To the confirmation it is answered that there is no repugnance between the sayings of St. Thomas. For when in those places he says that God is placed reductively in a predicament as a principle, he understands as a principle containing the genus itself, not as something contained in the genus; and in this way God is in a certain way in all genera, and, by a certain appropriation, in the genus of substance, which more closely approaches God. But when he says here that God is not in a genus even reductively, he understands as contained by the genus itself. The explanation is that of Capreolus in 1, dist. 8, q. 2. See Cajetan here. But if you ask whether it must be said absolutely that God is reductively in a predicament, on account of this explanation given, it is answered that rather it must be absolutely denied that God is reductively in a predicament. For that God contains all genera and is their first cause does not suffice for us to say that God is reduced to some genus; nay rather, from this it is gathered that all genera are reduced to God. Hence that manner of speaking of St. Thomas in 1 Sentences is not altogether proper. One must speak, therefore, according to the tenor of the doctrine which he hands down in this article. But to that which is adduced there, that each thing is measured by what is most perfect in its genus, it is answered that when the measure is of the same order, it is placed in the same genus as the thing measured, as rational animal pertains to the predicament in which the other animals are placed. But when the measure is not of the same account, but superexceeding and most eminent, as God, it is not necessary that he be in the same genus.

But it is doubted how the reason of St. Thomas is to be understood, which he assumes in the argument On the contrary, saying that nothing is prior to God, neither according to reality nor according to intellect. For this seems to be false: for the predicates common to God and creatures, as being, substance, etc., seem to be prior to God himself according to the intellect; and this is clear, because the consequence of subsisting is not converted. To this Cajetan answers, saying that on the part of the thing or of the formal accounts, no account is prior to God; but as regards us, something is prior according to our intellect, as wisdom is prior to divine wisdom as regards us, according to the intellect. A second explanation of St. Thomas is that he is speaking of a univocal account, and thus his proposition is universal, both according to reality and as regards us. And the sense is: no univocal account is prior to God, neither according to reality nor as regards us, even when abstracted through the intellect. But that some analogical accounts abstracted through the intellect are prior to God is no unfitting thing. In a third way the proposition of St. Thomas can be explained: that something be prior to another according to the intellect occurs in two ways. First, according to the reason that reasons, and thus it is not unfitting that something be prior to God according to the intellect. In the second way, according to the reason that has been reasoned, or according to the formal concept of the thing, and thus nothing can be understood as prior to God.

Concerning the corollary which St. Thomas infers in the third reason, that there cannot be demonstration of God, it is to be understood of demonstration a priori, which is given through a true and proper cause according to reality: on which see Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 25. But if we speak of demonstration a priori which is given through a formal account, this has place in God: for we demonstrate a priori that God is eternal by this, that he is immutable. For if the eternity of God were causable, immutability would be its cause.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The CONCLUSION is: In God there cannot be an accident; this he proves by a threefold reason, as is clear.

COMMENTARY.

The conclusion of this article is of faith, as is clear from the Lateran Council, where it is defined that God is altogether simple; therefore in him there is no composition of accident and subject. This is also the common opinion of the Saints. See St. Aug., at the places cited in the preceding article; and 5 On the Trinity, ch. 4 and 5; and especially ch. 16, where St. Aug. solves the arguments which could be made against the truth of the conclusion from the denominations which accrue to God from time, namely that he is Creator, that he is Lord, Governor, etc. Since, therefore, the creature is not from eternity, therefore God was not Lord from eternity. Augustine answers that these are certain relative and extrinsic denominations, not positing anything real in God himself, but a certain respect of reason in order to creatures, of which we shall say more below, q. 13, art. 7; see Cajetan there, art. 7. But against this it is argued. God is creating, and apart from the corruption of the subject he can be not-creating; therefore to create is an accident of God. The consequence is proved from the definition of accident. It is answered that a thing which is a substance can be predicated by the predication of the fifth predicable. Hence to create is not an accident as it is distinguished against substance, yet it is an accident, the fifth predicable.

Concerning the second reason, in which St. Thomas says that to-be itself can have nothing else joined to it, as heat does, note from Cajetan's doctrine here that as between the abstract and the concrete made by the intellect there is this difference, that the abstract admits nothing with itself, as whiteness as such excludes all things other than itself (for whiteness is that by which the white is white, and this is nothing other than whiteness), but the concrete also admits to-be, as the white is understood also to be sweet, and sometimes is so: so also, speaking of the things themselves, between the abstract according to reality and the composite according to reality there is this distinction, that what is abstract according to reality is itself alone. Hence if there is given to-be itself according to reality abstracted from everything in which it is receivable, that is, from every nature determined according to genus and difference, it admits nothing else with itself, and consequently no accident is found with it; but the composite according to reality from to-be and nature admits something else besides itself. And this is what St. Thomas most elegantly embraced in the second reason. See St. Aug., book V and VI On the Trinity, where he establishes the truth of the conclusion of the article, saying that whatever is said of God is not a quality, but the essence. Where note how badly Gabriel speaks in 1, d. 32, q. 1, saying that divine wisdom is placed in the predicament of quality.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The CONCLUSION is affirmative, which he proves by five reasons.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING the conclusion of this article, which is defined in the chapter Firmiter de summa Trinit., St. Aug. is to be seen, 6 On the Trinity, ch. 6 and 7.

Concerning the fifth reason of St. Thomas, in which he says that in wholes of heterogeneous parts no part is the whole, as no part of a man is a man, there could be a doubt whether this holds universally. For the nominalists assert the contrary. Yet this difficulty is philosophical. Master Soto is to be seen, 1 Physics, q. 5. The resolving truth is that although not any part of a whole of heterogeneous parts receives the denomination of the whole (as that part in which the form is not conserved when separated, as the hand of a man is not a man), nevertheless any part of a man which can subsist per se in human nature is a man, even when it is in the whole itself, for example the whole man with the hand removed.

Concerning the solution to the first, in which St. Thomas says that it is of the account of the caused that it be composite, it must be noted, against Scotus, in 1, d. 8, q. 1, that this saying of St. Thomas is not to be understood of the caused taken broadly, as it extends to the parts of some whole and to accidents: for these are not caused, but are co-caused and co-produced; but it is to be understood of the caused subsisting per se: and thus the objections of Scotus cease.

Concerning the solution to the second, where St. Thomas says that among us composites are better than simples, because the perfection of the goodness of a creature is not found in one simple thing, but in many, whereas it is found in one most simple thing: note that simplicity is not a perfection simply. For as St. Anselm teaches in the Monologion, ch. 15, a perfection simply is that which in each thing is better than its negation; which description requires two conditions for something to be a perfection simply. The first, that what is attributed import a perfection, for lack of which its negation is not a perfection simply, as is the case with relation as such. The second condition is that that perfection be better than anything incompossible with it, not in the individual of this or that nature, but in the individual of being. For lack of which, risibility, neighing, and the like are not perfections simply: because although they are better for this man and this horse, they are not better for this being insofar as it is this being. Simplicity, therefore, for lack of the first condition, is not a perfection simply, because it does not say a perfection, but the negation of imperfection. Hence it is also called a negative predicate by Cajetan, in On Being and Essence, ch. 2, where he disputes this matter at greater length against Scotus, in 1, dist. 8.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE. THE three errors on this matter having been recounted, St. Thomas answers: It is impossible for God to come in any way into the composition of anything. This conclusion he proves by three reasons.

COMMENTARY. The conclusion of this article is of faith. The first error of those whom St. Thomas here recounts was that of the ancient Philosophers and Poets, who said that God is the soul of the world. On which see Aristotle, 12 Metaphysics, comm. 41, and Augustine, book IV On the City of God, ch. 10, 11, and 12. But the second error, that God, namely, is the formal principle of all things, was that of a certain heretic by name Almeric, who was condemned in the Lateran Council, as is clear from the end of the chapter Firmiter, On the Supreme Trinity, etc. This error was also held by a certain John of Oria in the University of Salamanca, who was compelled to recant publicly. For he affirmed that just as things set on fire participate fire formally, so all creatures participate the Godhead. Yet this opinion is a manifest error, on which see the elegant and most wise man John of Turrecremata in the Summa of the Church, book IV, ch. 55.

Note at the end of this article four conditions, which master Cajetan well notes here to be required for some thing to come into the composition of another thing. First, that the one be really distinguished from the other. Second, that the conjunction be real. Third, that it be a conjunction not only according to position or operation, but according to its own real to-be. Fourth, that the one stand as potency and the other as act, or in an order to some third thing actuated by both, as in composition per accidens: for lack of which Cajetan says Christ is not called composite: yet this, as far as pertains to Christ, whether he is to be called absolutely a composite person, pertains to 3. p., q. 2, art. 4, where quite probably the most wise disciples of St. Thomas of our time defend the affirmative side. And these things on this question.