Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

WE have a single affirmative conclusion, which St. Thomas confirms by five demonstrations, taken from the Philosopher. The first is taken from 7 Physics, and 8 and 12 Metaphysics, ch. 7. The second is taken from 2 Metaphysics, text 4. The third and fourth are taken from 2 Metaphysics, text 5, and from 4 Metaphysics. The fifth argument is taken from St. John Damascene, book 1 of the Orthodox Faith, ch. 3, and from the Commentary on book 2 of the Physics, comment 7.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning this article whether the aforesaid arguments are good?

It is argued first against all the arguments in common: for all those taken together do not prove the intended point, namely that God is; therefore. The antecedent is proved: for the first argument convinces only that there is found in the nature of things a first immovable mover; the second proves that there is one first cause productive of all things; the third proves that there is some necessary being not begging its necessity from another; the fourth, some supreme good; the fifth, that there is one supreme governor: but in these it is supposed that God is; therefore they do not demonstrate that God is.

It is argued second against the first argument. For in it it is said that everything that is moved is moved by another: but this principle is neither demonstrated nor known per se; therefore the first demonstration is null. The minor is proved. For the reasoning by which it is proved that everything that is moved is moved by another reaches only this, that in physical bodily motion one must arrive at something which is not moved per se; but it does not prove that it is not moved per accidens: e.g., in the motion of a man we arrive at showing that the soul moving the body is not moved per se, although it moves the body per se; therefore by that way it is only shown that there is one first mover, such as the soul, which is the act of the body. It is confirmed first: granted that we arrive at showing that there is one first mover, it is enough if it be the mover of the first heaven, which nevertheless is not God, but an intelligence separate from corporeal matter and subsisting per se. This argument is explained more evidently. For that maxim, everything that is moved etc., is understood either of physical motion or of metaphysical motion. If the first, it concludes nothing: for even if it be understood of the first mover altogether immovable with physical motion, both per se and per accidens, as Soto understands it in 8 Physics, q. 4, it convinces only that one must arrive at a motive intelligence, on which all physical motion depends; which intelligence nevertheless is moved with neither per se nor per accidens physical motion. Likewise from this it is only gathered that in the same living thing a part moving per se is distinguished from a part moved per se. But it cannot be understood of metaphysical motion: for in metaphysical motion, such as understanding, the same thing can be both mover and moved according to diverse accounts, as Cajetan teaches below, q. 79, art. 2; for the intellect is the same thing that acts the intellection and is acted upon, that is, producing and receiving it; therefore if it be understood of all motion, it is not true that everything that is moved is moved by another.

It is confirmed second: for that other proposition from which this argument proceeds, namely, nothing is at the same time in act and in potency, although it is true of act and potency according to the same account, as Aristotle and St. Thomas speak, nevertheless it is not true in the case of formal potency and virtual act, as Scotus says — namely when something is in act through a principle more eminent for producing some effect of another account: for the intellect through the likenesses is in virtual act and formal potency with respect to the intellection; but here someone could say that the argument for the most part proves that one must arrive at one first mover of the others, which can move itself through this virtual act, which nevertheless does not suffice for St. Thomas's intended point.

It is argued third against the second argument, in which it is presupposed that there is no process to infinity in efficient causes. For someone could solve that argument by saying that the ultimate and middle causes do not have a necessary dependence on one first cause, but on prior ones. And when it is inferred, therefore motion will never begin, if one first cause is not given, he will reply: I deny the consequence, because the prior causes, which are infinite in number, flow in at the same time; and therefore no time will be awaited for the first cause to move; just as in fact the multitude of finite universal causes always flows into these lower things, and yet all the higher ones flow in by nature prior to the lower ones; nevertheless the particular motions of lower things begin and cease according as they are applied in diverse ways to the universal causes; therefore it matters little whether the causes be finite or infinite, if they flow in at the same time.

It is confirmed, because it will be said that the motion of the higher causes, even infinite ones, is spiritual, and does not depend on time, so that there no delay is found between being moved and moving. We could use this argument against what is presupposed in the first argument, that there is no process to infinity in movers; and against what is presupposed in the third, which assumes this foundation, that in necessary things there is no process to infinity: for it will be said that it is not unfitting, just as it is not unfitting in efficient causes — e.g. if Peter had infinite efficient causes, namely father, grandfather, great-grandfather, etc.

It is confirmed last. A middle cause does not depend on the first cause in that it is a cause: for a cause as cause regards only the effect: nor in that it is a middle cause, because as such it only demands that it mediate in causing; therefore a middle cause as such only demands that it depend on a prior cause, not on the first. Likewise, this conditional is true: if the causes proceeded to infinity, all causes would be middle causes; therefore for the account of a middle cause it is not required that it depend on the first. The third argument is impugned by this same argument.

It is argued fourth against the third argument. For there it is presupposed that it is impossible that contingent things have always been: yet below, in q. 46, he teaches that the world, with the exception of man, could have been from eternity; therefore.

Fifth, against the fourth argument. And first against that: that which is most such is the cause of all things that are in that genus. It is argued thus: whiteness is most perfect in the genus of colors, and yet is not the cause of the other colors; and likewise man is the most perfect of all animals, yet is not the cause of the other animals; therefore.

It is argued sixth against that process: that in each and every degree of perfection one must arrive at one first. This seems not sufficiently to prove that there is a single supreme good: for in the genus of hot things one does not arrive at one hot thing in number, which is the cause of the others, but at one according to species, namely fire; therefore the argument concludes no more than that there is a good according to species, not in one singular thing which is the cause of the other goods.

It is argued last against the last argument: for someone can say that there are several governors of equal power, namely infinite, so that one is superior to another to infinity; whence it does not follow that there is a supreme governor.

FOR the solution of these arguments, note first what learned and modest men often admonish, from Aristotle, 1 Ethics, ch. 3, that it is not the part of a well-disciplined man to demand equal evidence in every matter; but the certainty of the mathematician is one thing, of the physicist another, of the metaphysician another. Hence, since these demonstrations which St. Thomas adduces are some of them physical, some metaphysical, and partly even moral, as the last, which proceeds from governance and can be adapted to morals, they are not equally evident.

Second, it must be noted that, as we said in the preceding article, we arrive at the contemplation of God from the knowledge of creatures in three ways: for we know invisible things by the way of negation; eternal power by the way of causality; Divinity by the way of excellence. And we arrive at these three modes from three things which are found in creatures. For a creature is a being, and from another, and from nothing. A being bespeaks perfection, and as regards this we know God by the way of excellence; from another bespeaks causality, and through it we know God by the way of excellence; from another bespeaks causality, and through it we know God by the way of efficiency; from nothing bespeaks imperfection, and through its removal we know God by the way of negation. But these three are what St. Thomas here demonstrates of God: his Essence in the fourth argument, showing what it is like by removing from it every limit of perfection that is found in creatures, namely that it is being in the highest degree; the force of his efficiency and his power, in the first and second arguments; his eternity, in the third; in the fifth, his Divinity by the way of excellence. And the order of these arguments is as follows: for since God is known through the things that are made, and a thing that is made as such immediately regards the power of the maker, whose part it is to reduce something from potency to act, therefore it is demonstrated that there is something in nature altogether immovable and moving the rest. And because the first mover must be the first efficient cause — otherwise it would be moved by the first efficient cause — therefore secondly he demonstrates that there must be one first efficient cause; and because this must be eternal and from itself — otherwise it would be produced by another — it must pre-contain in itself the perfections which it produces, in a more eminent mode; therefore thirdly he demonstrates that there is one necessary being and from itself; and fourthly, that it is the noblest and most such of all beings; finally, because, as Aristotle teaches, 12 Metaphysics, text 52, the whole ordering of the universe must proceed from the first mover, therefore in the last place he proves that he is the orderer of all things, in which it is also implicitly proved that he is the last end of all things: for the first efficient cause and the first orderer is the last end, as is said in 12 Metaphysics.

Third, it must be noted that these arguments can be brought to two ends: first, to prove that there is in the nature of things some infinite, immaterial being, etc., such as we say God is; second, to conclude that there are found in nature certain predicates which in truth are proper to God, without caring how they belong to him: e.g., the first argument can be brought to prove one immovable mover, whether it be the form of the heaven, or a created being, or anything else; or to prove that there is one mover altogether immovable, such as we posit God to be. Cajetan, in this article, says that these arguments conclude almost per accidens that God is, namely that the first mover is found, which is a predicate proper to God in truth. But this sentence is false. And it is proved first: for either the predicates which are here concluded of God are proper to God, or they are common to him and to the celestial body or its mover. If the first, then Cajetan wrongly teaches that by these arguments there is not concluded a mover more immovable than the intellective soul or the form of the heaven. If the second, then they do not conclude any predicates which in truth are proper to God: since common predicates are not proper.

It is confirmed: for if only this common predicate is concluded, it follows that these arguments do not even prove per accidens that God is. For that predicate immovable mover, without caring whether it is in any way, at least per accidens, movable, can belong to another than God, namely to the motive intelligence of the heaven; therefore even if it be proved that there is a mover of this sort, nothing proper to God is proved.

Second: for the predicates which are proved of God in the other arguments cannot belong to another than him, e.g. to be the first efficient cause, a being not from another, the most perfect being of all; therefore by these arguments it is proved directly that God is. So think Capreolus, in 1, dist. 3, q. 1, and Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13, on the second argument of St. Thomas.

TO the first argument, then, it is answered that although all those arguments taken together do not prove immediately and explicitly that God is, and much less that God is that most perfect being than which nothing more perfect can be thought (for this is reserved to be proved in the following questions), nevertheless those arguments most effectively prove that there are found in the nature of things certain perfections and properties which cannot belong to another than God; and consequently they prove virtually and implicitly that God is. For the first argument convinces that there is found in the nature of things a first immovable mover, and so the others effectively prove other properties which can belong to God alone.

To the second it is answered that if by the name of motion only physical motion be understood, Cajetan rightly says that by that argument one arrives only at the first mover, immovable indeed per se, but able to be moved per accidens. But it should not be taken thus, but so as to comprehend also spiritual and metaphysical motions, such as is any operation, and also any application of a spiritual power to its act, and even metaphorical motions, such as the motion of the end. And then that argument should be set out thus: everything that is moved by any motion whatever, whether spiritual, metaphysical or moral, on account of the appetite for some higher end, is moved by another; and in these movers there is no process to infinity; therefore one must arrive at one mover who with respect to these motions is altogether immovable, such as God, who is moved by another neither really and finally, nor in any other way whatever; except only, according to our mode of understanding, by his own goodness.

To the first confirmation it is answered that intermediate powers, such as sense and intellect, are not in act and potency according to the same account, for through the likeness they are in first act, and are actuated from without, namely by the object or by the Author of nature, as the angelic intellect is. Yet they remain in potency to action, to which they cannot be reduced except by a knower who is always in act, such as God. Whence the application of these powers to act, although it be an operation, is nevertheless from some other mover, namely God; on which St. Thomas treats more fully in On Power, q. 3, art. 7, and often elsewhere.

Always, therefore, it is true that the same thing according to the same account cannot be at the same time in act and in potency, nor mover and moved.

To the second confirmation it is answered that although Aristotle set forth that proposition only in univocal agents, namely that according to the same account nothing can be in act and in potency, nevertheless it is verified also in principles and in equivocal agents, that even in them nothing is in act and in potency according to the same account: but in act by reason of the more eminent form, and in potency by reason of the less perfect form. Wherefore in the first argument St. Thomas says only that it is impossible for something to be, according to the same thing and in the same way, both mover and moved, in act and in potency.

To the third, which asks for the explanation of the second argument, it must be noted that, as is said in the book On Causes, lect. 1, essentially subordinated causes have this property, that the first cause flows into the effect prior, and from it the rest in all their operations receive the actual power of flowing into their effects: which reception of power is not to be understood habitually. For middle causes are not called middle for the reason that they have a power which they once received from a higher cause, but because in their actual operation they depend necessarily on the actual power which they receive from the higher cause. For in this consists the essential subordination of causes, namely that in actual operation the lower causes have a dependence on the higher. From which it follows that it is impossible that there be given a process to infinity in such subordinated efficient causes. It is proved first: for the last effect could not be brought about except from the ordered and actual influx of all the higher causes; but this could not be fulfilled if there were a process to infinity, so that one arrived at the last effect, because the infinite cannot be traversed, and it is impossible that infinite causes operate successively at the same time in a single instant; for this an infinite time would be necessary. It is proved second: every lower cause subordinated to another works for the end of that to which it is subordinated: but if there were infinite subordinated causes, no determinate end could be assigned for which all would work; therefore from the removal of the first efficient cause every other cause is taken away. That consequence is proved, because every operation of causes proceeds from the intention of a determinate end.

From this doctrine the third argument, with its first confirmation, is left solved. For it is answered that it is not unfitting that something have infinite non-subordinated efficient causes, as the argument rightly proves.

To the second confirmation it is answered that a middle cause depends on the first cause insofar as a middle cause is at the same time, as is clear from what has been said.

To the fourth, against the third argument, it is answered that for St. Thomas's demonstration it is enough if contingent things by their own nature cannot always be, although they have this from without and per accidens: for of themselves they are indifferent to be and not to be; and therefore, in order that they always be, one must posit a necessary cause which reduces them to act.

To the fifth, against the fourth argument, it is answered that that maxim is verified also of the formal or exemplary cause; and so whiteness is the exemplary cause and measure of the other colors, because it surpasses the others as regards light, which is the formal what with respect to color. And because whiteness has more of light than the other colors, for that reason it is their measure. So St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 2, art. 4, to the fourth; and the same must be said of man with respect to the other animals. This explanation agrees with the argument of St. Thomas, because thus he proves that God is the cause of all things in the threefold genus of cause: efficient, final and exemplary. Cajetan explains it otherwise in this article; read him; and Ferrariensis, book 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13.

To the sixth it is answered that for the present purpose it is only necessary to arrive at one most perfect according to species in that genus. It will be shown later that there cannot be but a single simple substance which is the supreme good.

To the last, against the last argument, it is answered that that fifth argument proves more openly that there is a first governor, and a unique one: for the order of the universe, which is the greatest perfection of the whole world, must be reduced to one will and providence; otherwise the world would be badly governed by two wills. But if someone should say that there are many Gods, equal in power and conformed in will, then he is to be refuted by the arguments which prove the unity of God in q. 11. Finally, concerning all these things, note from St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13, that the most effective way of proving that God is is taken from the newness of the world: for everything that begins to be anew must be produced by something that is in act. But the newness of the world does not stand by the natural light; wherefore this argument will proceed against a man who admits such a newness.

Concerning the solution to the first of St. Thomas it must be noted that in this solution St. Thomas presupposes that God does not act by necessity of nature upon these lower things, but by his free will. For if he worked by natural necessity, since nature acts according to its whole power, the argument would have the greatest force. But supposing that God acts freely, he can permit evils, both of morals and also of nature. And the reason of St. Thomas which he took from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 11, on account of which God is said to permit evils, is sufficiently suitable. See also St. Thomas below, q. 22, art. 2, to the second; and 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 71. This solution as thus set out is that of Scotus in 2, d. 1, to the first, and seems good and legitimate. From it it is inferred that if, per impossibile, the sentence of those were true who asserted that God works by necessity of nature, then consequently it would have to be admitted that no evil is found in things, which is absurd. But this explanation does not please Cajetan at the end of this article; wherefore he solves this difficulty otherwise, and certainly elegantly. For he says that one contrary can expel another in two ways: first, formally, by expelling it from its proper subject; so that two contraries cannot be compatible at the same time in some thing, if one of them is in the highest degree; and hence it is that the supreme good formally excludes from itself every account of evil. In the second way, effectively, by expelling it from a subject which it makes like to itself. Wherefore if God could, per impossibile, make another supreme good, he would certainly expel from it all evil; just as if fire produced infinite heat, it would expel all cold. But because this is not doable, since only a finite and limited good can be produced according to the capacity of the subject, hence it is that even if he acted by necessity of nature, he would not exclude every evil from things, because an infinite good finitely participated does not exclude every account of its contrary; and so the supreme good participated in a limited way in creatures is compatible with some evil. See Cajetan, who speaks excellently. And let these things said concerning this whole second question suffice, in which the scholastics are less accustomed to dwell.