Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion. It is not demonstrable by a demonstration propter quid, namely from the cause. The reason is: the middle term of a demonstration propter quid is the what-it-is; but concerning God we cannot know that he is, therefore we cannot demonstrate that he is. *SECOND conclusion. That God is is demonstrable by a demonstration quia, that is, from the effects. This he proves first in the argument On the contrary, by the authority of St. Paul to the Romans 1: «The invisible things of God through those things which are made, etc.». Second, in the body: From any effect we can demonstrate that its proper cause is, provided the effect be better known than the cause; therefore from the effects of God it is demonstrable that he is.

THIRD, to the first. That God is, and propositions of this sort, which can be demonstrated by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but preambles to faith.

FOURTH, to the third. From effects we cannot know God perfectly according to his essence. The reason is: because from effects not proportioned to the cause a perfect cognition of the cause cannot be had; but whatever effects of God there are are disproportionate to God, therefore.*

COMMENTARY.

THERE IS A DOUBT, whether that God is is demonstrable? And it seems that it is not.

It is argued for the negative side. First. This proposition, God is, pertains to faith, and is had through divine revelation; therefore it cannot be demonstrated. The consequence seems good, for faith is about supernatural things, which pertain to the supernatural order, since it is a supernatural habit and of the divine order. Likewise, because this object, that God is, is entirely supernatural in itself; indeed it is God's very essence, therefore it is not attainable by the natural intellect. But if you say that that proposition does not pertain per se to faith,

but per accidens, as St. Thomas says, 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, against this it is replied: habits which differ in genus by reason of a diverse mode of proceeding cannot be terminated at the same thing, either per se or per accidens; but faith and natural science differ in genus, therefore.

Second. It cannot be understood that God is three and one unless we understand that God is; but that God is three and one is not demonstrable, but is had only through faith. The consequence is proved: for otherwise the cognition of faith would depend on natural cognition, which seems to be false. But the antecedent is manifest, since that God is three intrinsically presupposes that God is.

Third. If that God is is demonstrable, it follows that that which is most perfect in God is demonstrable; but the consequent is false, therefore etc. The consequence is proved: for the most perfect thing which is in God is to-be, as we shall say below. But the falsity of the consequent is proved: for we know God through effects and creatures; but no effect or creature can represent the most perfect thing which is in God, nay from creatures alone can we arrive at an imperfect cognition of God, therefore.

It is confirmed. To-be in God is the same as his Essence; but the Essence of God is not demonstrable through effects, because it consists in the Trinity of Persons and the unity of Essence: but the Trinity of Persons is indemonstrable, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 32, art. 1, therefore.

Fourth. If we could know that God is through demonstration, most of all through a demonstration a posteriori and from an effect, as St. Thomas teaches in the article. But this is not so: first, because otherwise through such a demonstration we would know God perfectly: for since an effect has a likeness to its cause, it leads us into a perfect cognition of its cause. Second. This demonstration a posteriori, that God is, can be had neither by angels nor by men; therefore it is in no way possible. That it cannot be had by angels is proved: for St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, art. 3, holds that angels do not have a demonstration a posteriori that God is, and he proves it: for this demonstration begins from the cognition of creatures and is terminated at God; but angels descend from the cognition of God to the cognition of creatures, therefore. That it cannot be had by men is proved: for as St. Thomas teaches, 1, q. 94, art. 1, ad 3, the first man in the state of nature did not know by a demonstration taken from an effect, therefore. For the explanation of this matter it must be known that there were anciently certain Philosophers who opined that God cannot be demonstrated, not even by a demonstration from an effect and a posteriori: but is known only by divine revelation and believed with certitude by faith alone. This opinion St. Thomas reports in bk. I Against the Gentiles, ch. 12, and it is commonly wont to be ascribed to Rabbi Moses, bk. 3, ch. 6. Among the more recent Theologians there is one, Peter of Ailly, who in I Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, follows this opinion and strives to solve all the reasons of Aristotle in 7 and 8 of the Physics and 11 and 12 of the Metaphysics. But this opinion is rash, and as it seems to some, erroneous. But nevertheless it seems to me that a distinction must be drawn. For if anyone denies that it can be naturally known, as much as suffices to oblige men to the worship of God, that God is can be demonstrated, it is heresy: but if anyone says that it is not demonstrated according to the Aristotelian art, it is not an error in faith, but in Physics or Metaphysics, and rash in faith. WHEREFORE let this be our certain conclusion: the opinion of St. Thomas in his second conclusion is most certain, and the opposite of it is rash.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: for in Rom 1 it is said: «For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable». Note the word are seen, for he does not say are believed by opinion. Note so that they are inexcusable, and yet if they had not known with certitude, they would have an excuse. Likewise Wis 13: «For from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the creator of them could be seen, being known». In which place those words must be weighed: being known, which is the same as evidently, and to be seen, which signifies evidence. These two testimonies are most manifest for proving the conclusion of St. Thomas. Nevertheless Ailly, in the place above, strives to solve them, saying that certain properties of God are demonstrated from creatures, but not that he is; for example, it is demonstrated that he is one, that he is immutable, etc. But this solution is worthless, since the reasons of Aristotle evidently prove that there is one first mover: and in bk. 12 of the Metaphysics, ch. 7, he concludes: «It is clear therefore that there is one first and immortal substance»; and in Wis 13 the Holy Spirit accuses those who from these things which are seen as good could not know him who is. Very many other passages of Sacred Scripture also hint at the same thing, as is that of Ps 18: «The heavens declare the glory of God, etc.», and that of Ps 88: «The heavens shall confess thy wonders», where see Cajetan; and that of Ps 103: «Stretching out the heaven like a skin». By which it is signified that heaven is like an open book, which was formerly made from the skins of animals, so that from the knowledge of it, as from a book, we might be taught about God, whence in Acts 14 it is said: «We are mortal men, announcing to you that you should be converted to God, who made heaven and earth. And indeed he did not leave himself without testimony, doing good to us from heaven, giving rains, etc.» On which passage Ambrose, bk. 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 1, says: «Even before the Sacred Letters the world served as a testimony to the Lord, and the ineffable beauty of the heavens, through which certain tablets were offered to men, so that as in the pages of the elements and of the heavens the doctrine of the divine institution might be read». And in Wis 1 it is said: «The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things has knowledge of the voice», that is, the Holy Spirit has filled by his works, and that which contains all things. The sense of which seems to be that it is a periphrasis of the world, when it is said that which contains all things, that the world be understood, which, as Pliny says, bk. 2, ch. 1, all things dwell within its circuit; or, as Pomponius Mela says, bk. 1, ch. 1, because in one circuit it has encompassed itself and all things; this, I say, has knowledge of the voice, that is, like our teacher, from whose sight, as from the voice of an instructor, we are instructed that we may know him: on which see Basil, homily 1 of the Hexaemeron; similarly Ps 128: «Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me», that is, from the creation of man the wonderful knowledge of God became known to the world. So Basil, hom. 10 of the Hexaemeron. Further the conclusion is proved by the authority of all the Saints, because everywhere the sacred Doctors affirm our conclusion. Origen, homily 2 [on various passages]; Basil, homilies 1, 2, 6, 10 and 11 of the Hexaemeron; Hilary on Ps 12; St. Augustine, bk. 10 of the Confessions, ch. 6; On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 12, and bk. 8 of The City of God, ch. 6, and Sermon 55 On the Words of the Lord; St. Gregory, bk. 27 of the Moralia, ch. 2, on ch. 36 of Job; Jerome, bk. 11 on Isaiah at the end, and on Romans 1, and there Ambrose, and in the place above, and Chrysostom there and homilies 9 and 10 To the People; Theodoret, the book On the Gods and Angels, and the book On Providence; St. Dionysius, ch. 7 On the Divine Names; Damascene, bk. 1 On the Faith, ch. 1; Theophilus, bk. 1 to Autolycus; St. Cyril, bk. 3 on John, chs. 3 and 13; St. Gregory Nazianzen, bk. 2 of the Theology; Lactantius Firmianus, bk. 1 of the Divine Institutes. And all the scholastic Doctors in 1 Sent., d. 2 and 3. Likewise from profane authors: Philo the Jew, bk. 2 of the Allegories of the Sacred Letters, before the middle; Ammonius in the preface to the Categories; Cicero, 1 of the Tusculans and 2 On the Nature of the Gods; Lucretius, bk. 5.

It is proved then by natural and theological reasons. The cognition of God is the first foundation of all religion, nay even of the whole rational life rightly ordered; therefore if it could not be demonstrated by natural reason that God is, it would be all over with religion, with the natural and the moral virtues, if we kept ourselves within the limits of nature.

It is confirmed: for if man had been constituted in pure nature without any supernatural cognition, he could attain his end; therefore he could have a most certain cognition that God is: but this cannot be had except through demonstration, therefore. Other natural demonstrations for this conclusion St. Thomas sets out in the following article, which we shall examine there.

TO THE arguments set down at the beginning it is answered.

To the first it must be noted that the seven articles of faith which pertain to the Divinity are distinguished and proposed to be believed by the whole Church and by individual faithful, among whom there are very many ignorant of these demonstrations. For few are they who grasp them, and therefore the seven articles are distinguished: and therefore, formally speaking, that which is demonstrated — whether a priori or a posteriori — cannot be the object of faith, because faith is about things not seen and obscure. Nevertheless, because the habit of faith and the supernatural light render the intellect more certain concerning this, God is, than the natural light does through discourse, it is not to be denied that through faith we in some way assent to this, God is, even we who have demonstrations. And I say that we assent through faith in some way, as regards certitude. For two habits concur in the Christian philosopher to the assent of this, God is: otherwise the peasant would assent to it more firmly than the Theologian, because the former does so through supernatural faith, the latter through natural discourse; on which matter I say more in 2-2, q. 1, art. 5. Yet it must be guarded against that in the vulgar speech of sermons it be said that God is one is not an article of faith. But we can say that it is not obscure to the wise that God is one God, but open by natural reason, although even they, on account of the faith which they have, are more certain of that truth than are the natural philosophers. To the argument, therefore, it is answered that the solution there assigned is good. To the reply, that habits which differ in genus are not terminated at the same formal object under the same formal account: yet they are terminated at the same material object: for faith is terminated at that truth strengthening the intellect as regards supernatural certitude; but the light of science under a certain natural and evident account.

To the second it is answered: I deny the consequence. Because, as St. Thomas says here, at the second, it is no inconvenience that something natural be presupposed to the supernatural cognition of faith, not as that on which that assent rests, but as something presupposed and material

To the third, that that which is most perfect in God is demonstrated imperfectly, and according to an imperfect account: for it is only demonstrated that it is in the nature of things. For the confirmation see St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 12, and Ferrariensis there. Nevertheless it is answered that even concerning the Essence it is demonstrated that it is and that it is not distinguished from to-be.

To the fourth it is answered that all created effects in respect of God are disproportionate and inadequate effects; and for that reason only an imperfect cognition of God is had through these effects. To the second proof of the minor it is answered that every natural cognition which both angels and men have naturally begins from creatures and is terminated at God, and so is a posteriori. And to that of St. Thomas concerning the angel it is answered either that he was speaking according to their beatific cognition, for this begins from God and is terminated at creatures; or he only excludes the necessity of cognition through exterior created effects, because they know God through their essences. And to that concerning Adam, St. Thomas there teaches the excellence of the cognition of God which Adam had in that state. For it was not necessary for him to arrive at the cognition of God through sensible effects, as we arrive: but through intelligible effects, and in these he understood God better than we do from sensible things.

Concerning the fourth conclusion note that it is of St. Dionysius, bk. On the Divine Names, chs. 1 and 2, where he says that God according to his substance is unknown: and the reason is the one we assigned in the conclusion.

But against this there is the argument from that of Rom 1: «For the invisible things of him, etc., his eternal power also and divinity»; therefore not only is a power for working shown, but also the divine Essence itself.

It is answered, and note, from St. Thomas on this passage, that from creatures man can know God in three ways. First through causality, because movable things are reduced to one immovable, and thus it is shown that God is. Second through the way of excellence, insofar as from the perfections of creatures we gather that those excellences are in God. Third through the way of negation, insofar as we deny of God everything that is imperfect in creatures. Since therefore the Apostle says that the philosophers knew these three things — the invisible things, the eternal power, the Divinity — the invisible things pertains to the what-it-is of God; the eternal power to the efficient cause; the Divinity to the final cause: for the supreme good must be the end of all other things. But that they knew these things not in the same way, must be said. The invisible things through the way of negation, because these pertain to the essence in itself; but he speaks in the plural, the invisible things, because through many negations we know the divine essence to be pure act. The second, namely the eternal power, is known through the way of causality. The third, namely the Divinity, through the way of excellence; for by the name of Divinity a good is conveyed, which is participated by all in their own way, but in God it is in a most excellent way. It is clear therefore from this that St. Thomas held in the aforesaid conclusion when he says that we cannot know God perfectly through his Essence. For he does not deny that in some way it is known through the way of negation, as has been said.