Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion. This proposition, God is, is known per se in itself. The reason is: because its predicate is the same as its subject, for God is his own to-be; therefore.

Second conclusion. God is, is not a proposition known per se to us. The reason is: because we do not know of God what he is; but it needs to be demonstrated through those things which are more known to us; therefore.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question some dispute in 8 Physics, explaining the force of Aristotle's arguments for proving the first cause; and in book 12 of the Metaphysics, around text 29 and following. See Plato in the Timaeus; and what Marsilio Ficino adduces concerning Trismegistus. Cicero speaks wonderfully of this matter, especially book 1 On the Nature of the Gods; Augustine Eugubinus, book 6 On the Perennial Philosophy. See the sacred interpreters on Rom. 1, «Who when they had known God»; and the scholastics on 1 Sentences, dist. 2.

CONCERNING this article there is a doubt about the conclusions of St. Thomas: Whether this proposition, God is, is known per se? And it seems that it is.

First. The first practical principles are known per se to us just as the speculative ones, e.g. good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; but one practical principle is that God is to be worshiped, for to this the habit of first principles inclines; therefore that God is is known per se to us. The consequence is proved, because that principle would not be known per se unless it were known per se that God is; therefore.

It is argued second. This proposition, God is, is immediate; therefore it belongs to the habit of first principles. The consequence is good. For the habit of first principles inclines to propositions known without discourse and without a middle term. And the antecedent is proved. For there is no middle term for proving this proposition: for it has neither a cause nor a formal ground, since the very essence of God is his own to-be. Further: this proposition belongs to the habit of first principles; therefore it is known per se to us.

But if someone should say that this proposition, God is, can be proved a posteriori, against this: an a posteriori demonstration does not manifest a proposition in itself. For it does not render the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; therefore if this proposition, God is, is not known per se to us, it will never be known to us.

It is argued third: that is known per se which cannot be thought not to be; but no one can think God not to be; therefore it is known per se. The major is proved: for that proposition is known per se which no one can deny in his mind, and which, once heard, he immediately approves. The minor is proved: because no thing can be understood together with the opposite of that which is of its quiddity; but to-be is of the essence and quiddity of God, as will be said in q. 3; therefore. Again the minor is proved: because no one can deny that God is unless he does not know what is conveyed by the subject.

It is confirmed: for God is that than which a better cannot be thought; but that is better of which we cannot think that it is not; therefore we cannot think of God that he is not.

It is argued fourth. The first intellection, which is the foundation of all discourse, is that God is; therefore it is known per se that God is. The consequence is good, and the antecedent is proved. When a man reaches the use of reason, he is bound to turn himself to God, and otherwise he sins mortally, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 89, art. 6; therefore in the first instant of the use of reason he can know God without discourse. The consequence is clear: for if he needed discourse, he could not turn himself to God. It is confirmed: in the first instant of the use of reason a man knows the law, otherwise he could not sin; therefore he knows God the lawgiver, for the law cannot be without a lawgiver.

It is argued fifth. That proposition is known per se in which the predicate is included in the account of the subject: for then it is impossible to understand the subject without the predicate being understood; but in this proposition God is, the predicate is of the account of the subject; therefore. It is confirmed: God is his very to-be; but it cannot be thought without the same being predicated of itself, as that a man is not a man. Nor does it avail to say that we do not know what is of the subject, and for that reason do not comprehend the connection which it has with that predicate. For against this it is rejoined: for in order that a proposition be known per se, even to us, it is not required that its extremes be known to us by a proper and quidditative concept, but it is enough that we have confused concepts of them; but of the extremes of this proposition, God is, we have concepts of this sort; therefore. The major is proved. St. Thomas teaches in the article that this proposition «immaterial things are not in a place» is known per se to the wise, but no man can form a proper and expressed quidditative concept of immaterial things: because the likenesses by which we understand represent spiritual things imperfectly, and we have only confused concepts; therefore this suffices.

It is argued sixth. All things desire the supreme good, but God alone is the supreme good; therefore all things desire God; but that which is not known cannot be desired: for nothing is willed unless foreknown; therefore it is known per se that God is.

Last, it is argued. All understand by the name God that than which nothing greater is, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 7; but it is known per se that there is something supreme in the nature of things, than which nothing is greater; therefore.

It is confirmed: all nations call God by a name of four letters (as the Platonists noted); for the Greeks it is θεός, for the Hebrews the tetragrammaton name Jehovah was most solemn; the Latins call him God; the Magi, Persians and Syrians call him Orsi; the Egyptians, Teut; the Arabs, Al Ha. In which matter the Platonists say there is signified first excellence in his essence, second in to-be, third in power, fourth in operation.

It is confirmed second: God is understood by us as something most perfect of all; but that which is is more perfect than that which is not; therefore we cannot think of God with assent that he is not. For if we understood God not to be, how would we attribute to him the highest perfection?

ON the contrary, first. For if this proposition, God is, is known per se, and belongs per se to the habit of first principles, because its predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, it follows that this proposition too is known per se, God is three and one. But the consequent is utterly false: for that is had through faith, and can in no way belong to the habit of first principles. The sequel is proved. The predicate in that proposition is of the intrinsic account of the subject; therefore it is a proposition known per se. It is confirmed: for that proposition, God is three and one, lacks a middle term, just as that one, God is; but the latter, God is, is known per se for this reason alone; therefore so too is the former.

Second, it follows that this proposition, God is eternal, and others of this sort are known per se; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, and one who knew the subject would immediately know the predicate to belong to it; therefore. The minor is proved: for these propositions are demonstrated, God is immutable, God is eternal.

Third: those things which are known per se from themselves are known without any deduction from effects to causes; for as soon as the terms are known they are known, as is said in 1 Posterior Analytics; but we do not know that God is except through his effects, as is had in Rom. 1: «From the creation of the world, through the things that are made, being understood, they are seen etc.»; therefore that God is is not known per se.

Finally: although God, and his to-be, and likewise essence and to-be, are the same, they are nevertheless distinguished at least by reason; therefore we can think the divine essence without to-be. The antecedent is known; the consequence is proved: for those things which are distinguished by reason can be known separately, and hence one is not of the concept and quiddity of the other; therefore this proposition God is is not known per se.

It is confirmed: in God, to-be is the same as to be just; but it is not known per se that God is just, as with the other attributes: for many think that God is not just, because they say that evils are pleasing to God; therefore.

IN this matter there is the greatest diversity of opinions among the doctors. For Cicero, book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, asserts that God is, is known per se to such an extent that he calls it an anticipation of nature; because without a teacher, without custom and law, it is known to all. He holds the same opinion in the book On the Laws, and says that this opinion is Epicurus's. St. John Damascene seems to teach the same sentence, book 1 of the Orthodox Faith, chs. 1 and 3; and St. Jerome on ch. 36 of Job, on those words, All men see him, and on Ps. 95, on those words, For he hath corrected the world, teaches that no nation is so barbarous as not to understand by nature God and its Creator. And on that passage of Gal. 1, «But when it pleased him who separated me», and from that of Jn. 1, «He was the true light, which enlighteneth etc.», he infers thus: «From which it is evident that by nature the knowledge of God is in all». St. Anselm teaches the same, in the book Against the Fool; Abulensis on Exod. 5, q. 2, on those words, I know not the Lord, and I will not let Israel go; and Lyra in the same place. Nor does the solution of St. Thomas here to the first seem to avail, that those doctors are not to be understood of the expressed knowledge of God but of the confused: for even after an a posteriori demonstration God is not known except under a certain confusion, e.g. that he is a certain immortal nature more eminent than all, as St. Augustine says, book 1 On Christian Doctrine, chs. 6, 7 and 8; or through other common concepts, by which Justin Martyr describes him in the Trypho a little after the beginning, Basil, Homily 1 on the Hexaemeron, Cicero in book 1 of the Tusculan Disputations, Suidas in the entry Trostheos; or even through negations, as St. Dionysius teaches, ch. 1 of the Celestial Hierarchy, and as Plato defines him in the Timaeus. From this it is argued thus. After the demonstration it is known to us that God is, because we know that he is under a certain common concept; therefore even before the demonstration we know per se that God is: because he is known per se to us under a certain common concept, as St. Thomas says here, to the first. Aegidius Romanus seems to incline to this sentence: for he holds that this proposition, God is, is known per se, and even as regards the wise, and he proves it first, because only the fool said, there is no God. Second, because it is known to the wise that the predicate is included in the account of the subject; therefore it is known in itself, and as regards them.

There is another opinion, which at the other extreme teaches that it is not known per se that God is, not even to us: nor can it be demonstrated by natural reason, but is believed by faith alone. This opinion we shall show in the following article to be erroneous.

The third opinion is the middle one: that it is not known per se to us that God is, but is known naturally through discourse; yet it is known in itself. This opinion is that of St. Thomas here and in 1 Against the Gentiles, chs. 11 and 12; On Truth, q. 10, art. 12; and 1 Sentences, which Durandus follows, d. 3, q. 3. And it is common to all the theologians.

FOR the decision of this doubt it must be noted that a proposition is said to be known per se in three ways. First, in itself only; second, to us only; third, both in itself and to us together. This distinction is explained. For a proposition known per se excludes a medium of cognition: for "known per se" means that which is not known through another. Either, then, it excludes the medium of cognition in itself only, because it excludes the medium of the connection of its extremes: which happens not only when the predicate is of the account of the subject, but also when a primary property belongs to a proper and immediate subject, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 Posterior Analytics, lect. 36; and therefore propositions of this sort are said to be known per se in themselves only, because on account of our imperfection the connection of subject and predicate is not known by us immediately. Or the medium is excluded to us only — namely because the medium has in itself the connection of its extremes, but we do not need a medium in order to know that connection: e.g. in these propositions, snow is white, motion is, of which although we have the causes in being, nevertheless they become known to us through sense without another medium; and these propositions are said to be known per se to us only. Or else it excludes a medium both in itself and to us: because we know intimately the essences of the extremes, and from them, without another medium, we understand that one belongs to the other; and a proposition of this sort is known in itself and to us: e.g. Every whole is greater than its part. On propositions known per se see Capreolus, in 1, dist. 2, question 2, and Cajetan, 1 Posterior Analytics, chs. 2 and 3; Soto, ibid., q. 2, to the ninth; Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 11.

This supposed, let the first conclusion be: this proposition God is is known per se in itself. This conclusion is St. Thomas's, here and in the place above; St. Gregory holds it in the Moralia on Job, ch. 36; and it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas here: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject; therefore. The antecedent is proved: for to-be is of the essence of God, as we shall say in q. 3. And the consequence is clear.

It is confirmed first. For when the nature of the subject, namely God, is seen and understood, his to-be is immediately understood; therefore.

It is confirmed second. That proposition God is lacks an a priori medium: for it cannot be demonstrated, neither through a cause nor through a formal ground a priori; therefore it is known per se in itself and from its own nature. The arguments made for the first part of the question prove this truth.

Second conclusion. This proposition God is is not known per se to us. This conclusion the authors cited above hold, especially St. Gregory in the place above, who says that for this reason Job says, all men see God, because by reasoning and discourse they can easily come to the knowledge of him; but that which is known by reasoning is not known per se to us, as is clear from what has been said; therefore. And in sign of this matter, as Eusebius is the author, book 11 On the Preparation for the Gospel, the Egyptians thus described God in their temples: «I am what was, what is, and what is to come: no one has ever revealed my veil». By which words they signified that although to-be is of the essence of God, nevertheless men knew this only through discourse. This is explained further from that passage of Exod. 6: «I am the Lord who appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in God almighty, that is, who revealed to them the attributes of my strength and power, giving them victories; and my name Adonai I did not make known to them». Where in the Hebrew there is a name signifying to-be, Jehovah. In which place the Lord prefers Moses to the ancient Fathers, because although they had the cognition of the meaning of the name and a confused knowledge from the effects of omnipotence, nevertheless that name Jehovah, which was the proper name of God, he did not manifest to them as he did to Moses. From which it is argued thus: in order that a proposition be known per se to us, it is required that from the knowledge of the subject we immediately know that the predicate belongs to it, and how it belongs; but from the knowledge of God, even that which the Fathers had through revelation, they did not know how to-be belonged to God, as is clear from the passages adduced; therefore neither will it be known per se to us.

It is proved second. No one can doubt concerning things known per se to us, nor opine the opposite; but there were philosophers who doubted, indeed who even held the opposite; therefore. The minor is proved from Cicero, book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, where he reports that some doubted, as Protagoras did, and some held the opposite, as Diagoras did; and St. Augustine, book 3 Against the Letters of Petilian, ch. 21, mentions Diagoras the Atheist, that is, without God, who denied God. Likewise from Ps. 13: «The fool said in his heart, there is no God»; and so not only with the mouth but in the heart, that is, in the mind, he said: there is no God.

Third, it is not known that God is, except either from discourse — namely from the fact that a man knows visible things, and from them discourses to the knowledge of one supreme cause, because there is no process to infinity in subordinated causes; and this Aristotle demonstrates from other arguments taken from effects — or from human or divine faith; therefore it is not known per se to us that God is. The arguments made for the second part of the question also prove this conclusion.

TO the arguments set forth at the beginning.

To the first it is answered that although "God is to be worshiped" were an immediate principle to us, nevertheless it does not follow, therefore, that it is known per se to us that God is, because practical principles, however much they are known per se in their own genus, nevertheless presuppose speculative knowledge concerning the existence of the extremes: e.g. Parents are to be honored is a practical principle known per se; yet that we know that there are parents, and that they are in the nature of things, is not known per se. So I say that that principle, God is to be worshiped, is the first practical principle; yet it presupposes the speculative knowledge by which we know that God is, which knowledge must be acquired through discourse. For the explanation of which it must be noted that the practical intellect depends per se upon the speculative intellect: since the practical intellect bespeaks an order to the will, and since nothing is willed unless first known, hence it is that a practical judgment cannot be without a speculative judgment. Wherefore although the first practical principles are not known per se as regards what pertains to speculation, they are nevertheless reckoned to be known per se simply, practically, because they do not depend on another prior practical judgment: just as the speculative principles, whatever is either is or is not, every whole is greater than its part, are reckoned to be simply the first speculative principles and known per se to us, because they do not depend on another speculative judgment, although they depend on sensitive cognition and apprehension.

To the second it is answered that this proposition, God is, is immediate in itself, but has a medium to us and a posteriori; and so, although in itself it belongs to the habit of first principles, by which we assent to propositions without discourse, and there cannot be an a priori science of it, nevertheless it belongs to the habit of science a posteriori, and not to the habit of first principles as regards us. And to the rejoinder it is answered that an a posteriori demonstration does not make the proposition known by rendering the cause and reason why the predicate belongs to the subject, since that demonstration does not proceed through a cause: it nevertheless manifests that proposition to us, at least as regards the truth it makes evident, that such a predicate belongs to the subject; and this suffices for that proposition to be evident to us through the medium of an a posteriori demonstration. Second, we could answer that to the habit of first principles belong only those propositions which are known per se in every way, both in themselves and to us: for to other propositions, which are known per se in themselves but not to us, we never assent through the habit of first principles; for the habit of first principles is given by nature so that we may know those truths which are most known to all.

To the third it is answered first that there are some who deny that proposition God is, as we said in the second conclusion. Second, it is answered that the argument would proceed if it were known to us what God is, which nevertheless is not manifest to us per se. And so that proposition, No thing can be understood together with the opposite of that which is of its quiddity, is true of him who understands the subject as regards its what-it-is. But in this life we do not know what God is, and so we can understand God together with the opposite of that which is of his quiddity.

To the confirmation it is answered with Cajetan here that when we grant that by this word God all nations conceive that which is higher and cannot be thought beyond, the comparison is to be taken in the signified act, not in the exercised act — that is, it is not to be understood that God surpasses all other things according as they exist in the nature of things, but according as they are apprehended by their proper concepts; so that the sense is that God, as he is conceived by us upon hearing this word God, excels man as he is conceived by us upon hearing this word man: and so in other things, whether these things are in the nature of things or not; e.g., if someone in his mind fashioned a musician absolutely perfect in all numbers, although he were not in the nature of things, we would say that he is more excellent than all others — not indeed insofar as they exist, for under that account it is certain that they are more excellent than he, just as being surpasses non-being, but he surpasses them according as they are comprehended by their proper concepts. I say, therefore, that it is not known per se that God in the exercised act, and according to actual existence, excels the other things that exist. And so it is not known per se that God is: yet it is known per se that God surpasses all in the signified act, that is, according as he is conceived by us and according as other things are conceived by us; and thus St. Thomas is understood, to the second.

To the fourth it is answered that its solution, with its confirmation, pertains to 1-2, q. 89, art. 6, which I disputed not without profit in 2-2, q. 10, art. 1. But briefly for now it is answered that a child in the first instant of the use of reason is not bound explicitly to know God, or formally to turn himself to him; but is bound only to refer himself to the good which he then knows, in which he virtually refers himself to the supreme good, which is God. For the understanding of this, note that in the first instant of the use of reason the natural law is promulgated to man through synderesis naturally implanted and inciting to the good according to reason, in which God is virtually contained; and therefore if he does not turn himself to this good, he will sin mortally.

To the confirmation it is answered that the child in that instant does not formally know the Lawgiver: but only knows the dictate of natural reason, which proposes something to him as consonant or dissonant to reason. And if the child assents to this dictate, he is said to observe the law of God; if he resists it, he is reckoned to violate it, because he contemns the law of God which is included there. For the dictate of reason is, as it were, God's vicar, and the promulgation of the divine law made to man in particular.

To the fifth it is answered that that argument concludes that this proposition, God is, is known per se in itself, but not to us, because the extremes are not known to us, although the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject; and he who knew the subject and its quiddity would immediately know that the predicate belongs to the subject.

To the confirmation, it is clear. But to the rejoinder made there we say that sometimes it suffices for the account of a proposition known per se to us that its terms be known confusedly. For when a proposition is negative, a confused cognition of the subject can suffice for it to be immediately known that some predicate is denied of the subject: as in this proposition, incorporeal things are not in a place, it is immediately known that the predicate is denied of the subject: because for this a negative concept suffices, which we have of spiritual things, by which we remove the account of being in a place circumscriptively: because by the very fact that it is not a body, it is understood not to be circumscribed by place.

To the sixth it is answered that the supreme good is desired in two ways: in the first way, in its essence and in particular; and thus not all things desire the supreme good: in the other way, in its likeness and in common; and thus all things desire the supreme good, because nothing is desirable except insofar as the likeness of the supreme good is found in it. Wherefore from this it cannot be gathered that it be known per se that God is, who is the supreme good by essence.

To the last it is answered that it is not known per se that there is one supreme being in the nature of things. To the first confirmation it is answered that all those excellences of God are known through discourse. To the second, that those who truly know God know that there is one most perfect being, not only in thought but in reality: but this they had naturally from discourse: we, however, say that such knowledge is not had immediately without discourse, namely that one thing is supreme in act among all.

TO the arguments on the opposite side, insofar as they proceed against the first conclusion, it must be answered.

To the first it is answered that that proposition, God is three and one, and similar ones, are immediate and known per se in order to the supernatural light, because in that order they lack a medium, and the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, and on that account they belong to the habit of first principles of that order; nevertheless they are in no way to be called immediate propositions and known per se in order to the natural light: since it is of a lower order, and so cannot attain the thing of a higher order. The distinction, therefore, of a proposition known per se into one known per se in itself and one known per se to us is understood of propositions which fall under the natural light.

To the second it is answered that although the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, it nevertheless has a cause at least virtually, and another prior proposition through which it is properly demonstrated; and so it is not immediate, nor known per se, but through another. To the second proof it is answered that he who knew the subject would immediately know that the predicate belongs to it through a virtual cause, namely immutability.

To the third it is answered that although that proposition, God is, is known per se in itself, it is nevertheless not known per se to us, from the defect of our knowledge, in that we cannot know God except from effects.

To the fourth it is answered that those things which are distinguished by reason can be known by us, one without the other, on account of the imperfection of our knowledge. Wherefore although God is most simple, having but a single definition, he is known by us by many concepts and dividedly; whom nevertheless, if we knew him perfectly, we could not conceive one thing without the other of him, since the perfect knowledge of the divine Essence includes the knowledge of its existence and of all the attributes, because all are of its intrinsic account. But observe that when one thing is distinguished by reason from another, it can be understood without it by negative abstraction, thinking nothing of the other, by forming diverse concepts; yet we cannot know one without the other by precisive abstraction, by denying one of the other. And so, since to-be is of the quiddity of the divine Essence, we cannot deny it of it. To the confirmation, it is clear from the solution to the second.