Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion. This proposition, God is, is known per se in itself. The reason is: because its predicate is the same as its subject, for God is his own to-be; therefore.

Second conclusion. God is, is not a proposition known per se to us. The reason is: because we do not know of God what he is; but it needs to be demonstrated through those things which are more known to us; therefore.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question some dispute in 8 Physics, explaining the force of Aristotle's arguments for proving the first cause; and in book 12 of the Metaphysics, around text 29 and following. See Plato in the Timaeus; and what Marsilio Ficino adduces concerning Trismegistus. Cicero speaks wonderfully of this matter, especially book 1 On the Nature of the Gods; Augustine Eugubinus, book 6 On the Perennial Philosophy. See the sacred interpreters on Rom. 1, «Who when they had known God»; and the scholastics on 1 Sentences, dist. 2.

CONCERNING this article there is a doubt about the conclusions of St. Thomas: Whether this proposition, God is, is known per se? And it seems that it is.

First. The first practical principles are known per se to us just as the speculative ones, e.g. good is to be done, evil is to be avoided; but one practical principle is that God is to be worshiped, for to this the habit of first principles inclines; therefore that God is is known per se to us. The consequence is proved, because that principle would not be known per se unless it were known per se that God is; therefore.

It is argued second. This proposition, God is, is immediate; therefore it belongs to the habit of first principles. The consequence is good. For the habit of first principles inclines to propositions known without discourse and without a middle term. And the antecedent is proved. For there is no middle term for proving this proposition: for it has neither a cause nor a formal ground, since the very essence of God is his own to-be. Further: this proposition belongs to the habit of first principles; therefore it is known per se to us.

But if someone should say that this proposition, God is, can be proved a posteriori, against this: an a posteriori demonstration does not manifest a proposition in itself. For it does not render the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; therefore if this proposition, God is, is not known per se to us, it will never be known to us.

It is argued third: that is known per se which cannot be thought not to be; but no one can think God not to be; therefore it is known per se. The major is proved: for that proposition is known per se which no one can deny in his mind, and which, once heard, he immediately approves. The minor is proved: because no thing can be understood together with the opposite of that which is of its quiddity; but to-be is of the essence and quiddity of God, as will be said in q. 3; therefore. Again the minor is proved: because no one can deny that God is unless he does not know what is conveyed by the subject.

It is confirmed: for God is that than which a better cannot be thought; but that is better of which we cannot think that it is not; therefore we cannot think of God that he is not.

It is argued fourth. The first intellection, which is the foundation of all discourse, is that God is; therefore it is known per se that God is. The consequence is good, and the antecedent is proved. When a man reaches the use of reason, he is bound to turn himself to God, and otherwise he sins mortally, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 89, art. 6; therefore in the first instant of the use of reason he can know God without discourse. The consequence is clear: for if he needed discourse, he could not turn himself to God. It is confirmed: in the first instant of the use of reason a man knows the law, otherwise he could not sin; therefore he knows God the lawgiver, for the law cannot be without a lawgiver.

It is argued fifth. That proposition is known per se in which the predicate is included in the account of the subject: for then it is impossible to understand the subject without the predicate being understood; but in this proposition God is, the predicate is of the account of the subject; therefore. It is confirmed: God is his very to-be; but it cannot be thought without the same being predicated of itself, as that a man is not a man. Nor does it avail to say that we do not know what is of the subject, and for that reason do not comprehend the connection which it has with that predicate. For against this it is rejoined: for in order that a proposition be known per se, even to us, it is not required that its extremes be known to us by a proper and quidditative concept, but it is enough that we have confused concepts of them; but of the extremes of this proposition, God is, we have concepts of this sort; therefore. The major is proved. St. Thomas teaches in the article that this proposition «immaterial things are not in a place» is known per se to the wise, but no man can form a proper and expressed quidditative concept of immaterial things: because the likenesses by which we understand represent spiritual things imperfectly, and we have only confused concepts; therefore this suffices.

It is argued sixth. All things desire the supreme good, but God alone is the supreme good; therefore all things desire God; but that which is not known cannot be desired: for nothing is willed unless foreknown; therefore it is known per se that God is.

Last, it is argued. All understand by the name God that than which nothing greater is, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 7; but it is known per se that there is something supreme in the nature of things, than which nothing is greater; therefore.

It is confirmed: all nations call God by a name of four letters (as the Platonists noted); for the Greeks it is θεός, for the Hebrews the tetragrammaton name Jehovah was most solemn; the Latins call him God; the Magi, Persians and Syrians call him Orsi; the Egyptians, Teut; the Arabs, Al Ha. In which matter the Platonists say there is signified first excellence in his essence, second in to-be, third in power, fourth in operation.

It is confirmed second: God is understood by us as something most perfect of all; but that which is is more perfect than that which is not; therefore we cannot think of God with assent that he is not. For if we understood God not to be, how would we attribute to him the highest perfection?

ON the contrary, first. For if this proposition, God is, is known per se, and belongs per se to the habit of first principles, because its predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, it follows that this proposition too is known per se, God is three and one. But the consequent is utterly false: for that is had through faith, and can in no way belong to the habit of first principles. The sequel is proved. The predicate in that proposition is of the intrinsic account of the subject; therefore it is a proposition known per se. It is confirmed: for that proposition, God is three and one, lacks a middle term, just as that one, God is; but the latter, God is, is known per se for this reason alone; therefore so too is the former.

Second, it follows that this proposition, God is eternal, and others of this sort are known per se; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, and one who knew the subject would immediately know the predicate to belong to it; therefore. The minor is proved: for these propositions are demonstrated, God is immutable, God is eternal.

Third: those things which are known per se from themselves are known without any deduction from effects to causes; for as soon as the terms are known they are known, as is said in 1 Posterior Analytics; but we do not know that God is except through his effects, as is had in Rom. 1: «From the creation of the world, through the things that are made, being understood, they are seen etc.»; therefore that God is is not known per se.

Finally: although God, and his to-be, and likewise essence and to-be, are the same, they are nevertheless distinguished at least by reason; therefore we can think the divine essence without to-be. The antecedent is known; the consequence is proved: for those things which are distinguished by reason can be known separately, and hence one is not of the concept and quiddity of the other; therefore this proposition God is is not known per se.

It is confirmed: in God, to-be is the same as to be just; but it is not known per se that God is just, as with the other attributes: for many think that God is not just, because they say that evils are pleasing to God; therefore.

IN this matter there is the greatest diversity of opinions among the doctors. For Cicero, book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, asserts that God is, is known per se to such an extent that he calls it an anticipation of nature; because without a teacher, without custom and law, it is known to all. He holds the same opinion in the book On the Laws, and says that this opinion is Epicurus's. St. John Damascene seems to teach the same sentence, book 1 of the Orthodox Faith, chs. 1 and 3; and St. Jerome on ch. 36 of Job, on those words, All men see him, and on Ps. 95, on those words, For he hath corrected the world, teaches that no nation is so barbarous as not to understand by nature God and its Creator. And on that passage of Gal. 1, «But when it pleased him who separated me», and from that of Jn. 1, «He was the true light, which enlighteneth etc.», he infers thus: «From which it is evident that by nature the knowledge of God is in all». St. Anselm teaches the same, in the book Against the Fool; Abulensis on Exod. 5, q. 2, on those words, I know not the Lord, and I will not let Israel go; and Lyra in the same place. Nor does the solution of St. Thomas here to the first seem to avail, that those doctors are not to be understood of the expressed knowledge of God but of the confused: for even after an a posteriori demonstration God is not known except under a certain confusion, e.g. that he is a certain immortal nature more eminent than all, as St. Augustine says, book 1 On Christian Doctrine, chs. 6, 7 and 8; or through other common concepts, by which Justin Martyr describes him in the Trypho a little after the beginning, Basil, Homily 1 on the Hexaemeron, Cicero in book 1 of the Tusculan Disputations, Suidas in the entry Trostheos; or even through negations, as St. Dionysius teaches, ch. 1 of the Celestial Hierarchy, and as Plato defines him in the Timaeus. From this it is argued thus. After the demonstration it is known to us that God is, because we know that he is under a certain common concept; therefore even before the demonstration we know per se that God is: because he is known per se to us under a certain common concept, as St. Thomas says here, to the first. Aegidius Romanus seems to incline to this sentence: for he holds that this proposition, God is, is known per se, and even as regards the wise, and he proves it first, because only the fool said, there is no God. Second, because it is known to the wise that the predicate is included in the account of the subject; therefore it is known in itself, and as regards them.

There is another opinion, which at the other extreme teaches that it is not known per se that God is, not even to us: nor can it be demonstrated by natural reason, but is believed by faith alone. This opinion we shall show in the following article to be erroneous.

The third opinion is the middle one: that it is not known per se to us that God is, but is known naturally through discourse; yet it is known in itself. This opinion is that of St. Thomas here and in 1 Against the Gentiles, chs. 11 and 12; On Truth, q. 10, art. 12; and 1 Sentences, which Durandus follows, d. 3, q. 3. And it is common to all the theologians.

FOR the decision of this doubt it must be noted that a proposition is said to be known per se in three ways. First, in itself only; second, to us only; third, both in itself and to us together. This distinction is explained. For a proposition known per se excludes a medium of cognition: for "known per se" means that which is not known through another. Either, then, it excludes the medium of cognition in itself only, because it excludes the medium of the connection of its extremes: which happens not only when the predicate is of the account of the subject, but also when a primary property belongs to a proper and immediate subject, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 Posterior Analytics, lect. 36; and therefore propositions of this sort are said to be known per se in themselves only, because on account of our imperfection the connection of subject and predicate is not known by us immediately. Or the medium is excluded to us only — namely because the medium has in itself the connection of its extremes, but we do not need a medium in order to know that connection: e.g. in these propositions, snow is white, motion is, of which although we have the causes in being, nevertheless they become known to us through sense without another medium; and these propositions are said to be known per se to us only. Or else it excludes a medium both in itself and to us: because we know intimately the essences of the extremes, and from them, without another medium, we understand that one belongs to the other; and a proposition of this sort is known in itself and to us: e.g. Every whole is greater than its part. On propositions known per se see Capreolus, in 1, dist. 2, question 2, and Cajetan, 1 Posterior Analytics, chs. 2 and 3; Soto, ibid., q. 2, to the ninth; Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 11.

This supposed, let the first conclusion be: this proposition God is is known per se in itself. This conclusion is St. Thomas's, here and in the place above; St. Gregory holds it in the Moralia on Job, ch. 36; and it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas here: for the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject; therefore. The antecedent is proved: for to-be is of the essence of God, as we shall say in q. 3. And the consequence is clear.

It is confirmed first. For when the nature of the subject, namely God, is seen and understood, his to-be is immediately understood; therefore.

It is confirmed second. That proposition God is lacks an a priori medium: for it cannot be demonstrated, neither through a cause nor through a formal ground a priori; therefore it is known per se in itself and from its own nature. The arguments made for the first part of the question prove this truth.

Second conclusion. This proposition God is is not known per se to us. This conclusion the authors cited above hold, especially St. Gregory in the place above, who says that for this reason Job says, all men see God, because by reasoning and discourse they can easily come to the knowledge of him; but that which is known by reasoning is not known per se to us, as is clear from what has been said; therefore. And in sign of this matter, as Eusebius is the author, book 11 On the Preparation for the Gospel, the Egyptians thus described God in their temples: «I am what was, what is, and what is to come: no one has ever revealed my veil». By which words they signified that although to-be is of the essence of God, nevertheless men knew this only through discourse. This is explained further from that passage of Exod. 6: «I am the Lord who appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in God almighty, that is, who revealed to them the attributes of my strength and power, giving them victories; and my name Adonai I did not make known to them». Where in the Hebrew there is a name signifying to-be, Jehovah. In which place the Lord prefers Moses to the ancient Fathers, because although they had the cognition of the meaning of the name and a confused knowledge from the effects of omnipotence, nevertheless that name Jehovah, which was the proper name of God, he did not manifest to them as he did to Moses. From which it is argued thus: in order that a proposition be known per se to us, it is required that from the knowledge of the subject we immediately know that the predicate belongs to it, and how it belongs; but from the knowledge of God, even that which the Fathers had through revelation, they did not know how to-be belonged to God, as is clear from the passages adduced; therefore neither will it be known per se to us.

It is proved second. No one can doubt concerning things known per se to us, nor opine the opposite; but there were philosophers who doubted, indeed who even held the opposite; therefore. The minor is proved from Cicero, book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, where he reports that some doubted, as Protagoras did, and some held the opposite, as Diagoras did; and St. Augustine, book 3 Against the Letters of Petilian, ch. 21, mentions Diagoras the Atheist, that is, without God, who denied God. Likewise from Ps. 13: «The fool said in his heart, there is no God»; and so not only with the mouth but in the heart, that is, in the mind, he said: there is no God.

Third, it is not known that God is, except either from discourse — namely from the fact that a man knows visible things, and from them discourses to the knowledge of one supreme cause, because there is no process to infinity in subordinated causes; and this Aristotle demonstrates from other arguments taken from effects — or from human or divine faith; therefore it is not known per se to us that God is. The arguments made for the second part of the question also prove this conclusion.

TO the arguments set forth at the beginning.

To the first it is answered that although "God is to be worshiped" were an immediate principle to us, nevertheless it does not follow, therefore, that it is known per se to us that God is, because practical principles, however much they are known per se in their own genus, nevertheless presuppose speculative knowledge concerning the existence of the extremes: e.g. Parents are to be honored is a practical principle known per se; yet that we know that there are parents, and that they are in the nature of things, is not known per se. So I say that that principle, God is to be worshiped, is the first practical principle; yet it presupposes the speculative knowledge by which we know that God is, which knowledge must be acquired through discourse. For the explanation of which it must be noted that the practical intellect depends per se upon the speculative intellect: since the practical intellect bespeaks an order to the will, and since nothing is willed unless first known, hence it is that a practical judgment cannot be without a speculative judgment. Wherefore although the first practical principles are not known per se as regards what pertains to speculation, they are nevertheless reckoned to be known per se simply, practically, because they do not depend on another prior practical judgment: just as the speculative principles, whatever is either is or is not, every whole is greater than its part, are reckoned to be simply the first speculative principles and known per se to us, because they do not depend on another speculative judgment, although they depend on sensitive cognition and apprehension.

To the second it is answered that this proposition, God is, is immediate in itself, but has a medium to us and a posteriori; and so, although in itself it belongs to the habit of first principles, by which we assent to propositions without discourse, and there cannot be an a priori science of it, nevertheless it belongs to the habit of science a posteriori, and not to the habit of first principles as regards us. And to the rejoinder it is answered that an a posteriori demonstration does not make the proposition known by rendering the cause and reason why the predicate belongs to the subject, since that demonstration does not proceed through a cause: it nevertheless manifests that proposition to us, at least as regards the truth it makes evident, that such a predicate belongs to the subject; and this suffices for that proposition to be evident to us through the medium of an a posteriori demonstration. Second, we could answer that to the habit of first principles belong only those propositions which are known per se in every way, both in themselves and to us: for to other propositions, which are known per se in themselves but not to us, we never assent through the habit of first principles; for the habit of first principles is given by nature so that we may know those truths which are most known to all.

To the third it is answered first that there are some who deny that proposition God is, as we said in the second conclusion. Second, it is answered that the argument would proceed if it were known to us what God is, which nevertheless is not manifest to us per se. And so that proposition, No thing can be understood together with the opposite of that which is of its quiddity, is true of him who understands the subject as regards its what-it-is. But in this life we do not know what God is, and so we can understand God together with the opposite of that which is of his quiddity.

To the confirmation it is answered with Cajetan here that when we grant that by this word God all nations conceive that which is higher and cannot be thought beyond, the comparison is to be taken in the signified act, not in the exercised act — that is, it is not to be understood that God surpasses all other things according as they exist in the nature of things, but according as they are apprehended by their proper concepts; so that the sense is that God, as he is conceived by us upon hearing this word God, excels man as he is conceived by us upon hearing this word man: and so in other things, whether these things are in the nature of things or not; e.g., if someone in his mind fashioned a musician absolutely perfect in all numbers, although he were not in the nature of things, we would say that he is more excellent than all others — not indeed insofar as they exist, for under that account it is certain that they are more excellent than he, just as being surpasses non-being, but he surpasses them according as they are comprehended by their proper concepts. I say, therefore, that it is not known per se that God in the exercised act, and according to actual existence, excels the other things that exist. And so it is not known per se that God is: yet it is known per se that God surpasses all in the signified act, that is, according as he is conceived by us and according as other things are conceived by us; and thus St. Thomas is understood, to the second.

To the fourth it is answered that its solution, with its confirmation, pertains to 1-2, q. 89, art. 6, which I disputed not without profit in 2-2, q. 10, art. 1. But briefly for now it is answered that a child in the first instant of the use of reason is not bound explicitly to know God, or formally to turn himself to him; but is bound only to refer himself to the good which he then knows, in which he virtually refers himself to the supreme good, which is God. For the understanding of this, note that in the first instant of the use of reason the natural law is promulgated to man through synderesis naturally implanted and inciting to the good according to reason, in which God is virtually contained; and therefore if he does not turn himself to this good, he will sin mortally.

To the confirmation it is answered that the child in that instant does not formally know the Lawgiver: but only knows the dictate of natural reason, which proposes something to him as consonant or dissonant to reason. And if the child assents to this dictate, he is said to observe the law of God; if he resists it, he is reckoned to violate it, because he contemns the law of God which is included there. For the dictate of reason is, as it were, God's vicar, and the promulgation of the divine law made to man in particular.

To the fifth it is answered that that argument concludes that this proposition, God is, is known per se in itself, but not to us, because the extremes are not known to us, although the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject; and he who knew the subject and its quiddity would immediately know that the predicate belongs to the subject.

To the confirmation, it is clear. But to the rejoinder made there we say that sometimes it suffices for the account of a proposition known per se to us that its terms be known confusedly. For when a proposition is negative, a confused cognition of the subject can suffice for it to be immediately known that some predicate is denied of the subject: as in this proposition, incorporeal things are not in a place, it is immediately known that the predicate is denied of the subject: because for this a negative concept suffices, which we have of spiritual things, by which we remove the account of being in a place circumscriptively: because by the very fact that it is not a body, it is understood not to be circumscribed by place.

To the sixth it is answered that the supreme good is desired in two ways: in the first way, in its essence and in particular; and thus not all things desire the supreme good: in the other way, in its likeness and in common; and thus all things desire the supreme good, because nothing is desirable except insofar as the likeness of the supreme good is found in it. Wherefore from this it cannot be gathered that it be known per se that God is, who is the supreme good by essence.

To the last it is answered that it is not known per se that there is one supreme being in the nature of things. To the first confirmation it is answered that all those excellences of God are known through discourse. To the second, that those who truly know God know that there is one most perfect being, not only in thought but in reality: but this they had naturally from discourse: we, however, say that such knowledge is not had immediately without discourse, namely that one thing is supreme in act among all.

TO the arguments on the opposite side, insofar as they proceed against the first conclusion, it must be answered.

To the first it is answered that that proposition, God is three and one, and similar ones, are immediate and known per se in order to the supernatural light, because in that order they lack a medium, and the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, and on that account they belong to the habit of first principles of that order; nevertheless they are in no way to be called immediate propositions and known per se in order to the natural light: since it is of a lower order, and so cannot attain the thing of a higher order. The distinction, therefore, of a proposition known per se into one known per se in itself and one known per se to us is understood of propositions which fall under the natural light.

To the second it is answered that although the predicate is of the intrinsic account of the subject, it nevertheless has a cause at least virtually, and another prior proposition through which it is properly demonstrated; and so it is not immediate, nor known per se, but through another. To the second proof it is answered that he who knew the subject would immediately know that the predicate belongs to it through a virtual cause, namely immutability.

To the third it is answered that although that proposition, God is, is known per se in itself, it is nevertheless not known per se to us, from the defect of our knowledge, in that we cannot know God except from effects.

To the fourth it is answered that those things which are distinguished by reason can be known by us, one without the other, on account of the imperfection of our knowledge. Wherefore although God is most simple, having but a single definition, he is known by us by many concepts and dividedly; whom nevertheless, if we knew him perfectly, we could not conceive one thing without the other of him, since the perfect knowledge of the divine Essence includes the knowledge of its existence and of all the attributes, because all are of its intrinsic account. But observe that when one thing is distinguished by reason from another, it can be understood without it by negative abstraction, thinking nothing of the other, by forming diverse concepts; yet we cannot know one without the other by precisive abstraction, by denying one of the other. And so, since to-be is of the quiddity of the divine Essence, we cannot deny it of it. To the confirmation, it is clear from the solution to the second.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion. It is not demonstrable by a demonstration propter quid, namely from the cause. The reason is: the middle term of a demonstration propter quid is the what-it-is; but concerning God we cannot know that he is, therefore we cannot demonstrate that he is. *SECOND conclusion. That God is is demonstrable by a demonstration quia, that is, from the effects. This he proves first in the argument On the contrary, by the authority of St. Paul to the Romans 1: «The invisible things of God through those things which are made, etc.». Second, in the body: From any effect we can demonstrate that its proper cause is, provided the effect be better known than the cause; therefore from the effects of God it is demonstrable that he is.

THIRD, to the first. That God is, and propositions of this sort, which can be demonstrated by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but preambles to faith.

FOURTH, to the third. From effects we cannot know God perfectly according to his essence. The reason is: because from effects not proportioned to the cause a perfect cognition of the cause cannot be had; but whatever effects of God there are are disproportionate to God, therefore.*

COMMENTARY.

THERE IS A DOUBT, whether that God is is demonstrable? And it seems that it is not.

It is argued for the negative side. First. This proposition, God is, pertains to faith, and is had through divine revelation; therefore it cannot be demonstrated. The consequence seems good, for faith is about supernatural things, which pertain to the supernatural order, since it is a supernatural habit and of the divine order. Likewise, because this object, that God is, is entirely supernatural in itself; indeed it is God's very essence, therefore it is not attainable by the natural intellect. But if you say that that proposition does not pertain per se to faith,

but per accidens, as St. Thomas says, 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, against this it is replied: habits which differ in genus by reason of a diverse mode of proceeding cannot be terminated at the same thing, either per se or per accidens; but faith and natural science differ in genus, therefore.

Second. It cannot be understood that God is three and one unless we understand that God is; but that God is three and one is not demonstrable, but is had only through faith. The consequence is proved: for otherwise the cognition of faith would depend on natural cognition, which seems to be false. But the antecedent is manifest, since that God is three intrinsically presupposes that God is.

Third. If that God is is demonstrable, it follows that that which is most perfect in God is demonstrable; but the consequent is false, therefore etc. The consequence is proved: for the most perfect thing which is in God is to-be, as we shall say below. But the falsity of the consequent is proved: for we know God through effects and creatures; but no effect or creature can represent the most perfect thing which is in God, nay from creatures alone can we arrive at an imperfect cognition of God, therefore.

It is confirmed. To-be in God is the same as his Essence; but the Essence of God is not demonstrable through effects, because it consists in the Trinity of Persons and the unity of Essence: but the Trinity of Persons is indemonstrable, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 32, art. 1, therefore.

Fourth. If we could know that God is through demonstration, most of all through a demonstration a posteriori and from an effect, as St. Thomas teaches in the article. But this is not so: first, because otherwise through such a demonstration we would know God perfectly: for since an effect has a likeness to its cause, it leads us into a perfect cognition of its cause. Second. This demonstration a posteriori, that God is, can be had neither by angels nor by men; therefore it is in no way possible. That it cannot be had by angels is proved: for St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, art. 3, holds that angels do not have a demonstration a posteriori that God is, and he proves it: for this demonstration begins from the cognition of creatures and is terminated at God; but angels descend from the cognition of God to the cognition of creatures, therefore. That it cannot be had by men is proved: for as St. Thomas teaches, 1, q. 94, art. 1, ad 3, the first man in the state of nature did not know by a demonstration taken from an effect, therefore. For the explanation of this matter it must be known that there were anciently certain Philosophers who opined that God cannot be demonstrated, not even by a demonstration from an effect and a posteriori: but is known only by divine revelation and believed with certitude by faith alone. This opinion St. Thomas reports in bk. I Against the Gentiles, ch. 12, and it is commonly wont to be ascribed to Rabbi Moses, bk. 3, ch. 6. Among the more recent Theologians there is one, Peter of Ailly, who in I Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, follows this opinion and strives to solve all the reasons of Aristotle in 7 and 8 of the Physics and 11 and 12 of the Metaphysics. But this opinion is rash, and as it seems to some, erroneous. But nevertheless it seems to me that a distinction must be drawn. For if anyone denies that it can be naturally known, as much as suffices to oblige men to the worship of God, that God is can be demonstrated, it is heresy: but if anyone says that it is not demonstrated according to the Aristotelian art, it is not an error in faith, but in Physics or Metaphysics, and rash in faith. WHEREFORE let this be our certain conclusion: the opinion of St. Thomas in his second conclusion is most certain, and the opposite of it is rash.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: for in Rom 1 it is said: «For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable». Note the word are seen, for he does not say are believed by opinion. Note so that they are inexcusable, and yet if they had not known with certitude, they would have an excuse. Likewise Wis 13: «For from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the creator of them could be seen, being known». In which place those words must be weighed: being known, which is the same as evidently, and to be seen, which signifies evidence. These two testimonies are most manifest for proving the conclusion of St. Thomas. Nevertheless Ailly, in the place above, strives to solve them, saying that certain properties of God are demonstrated from creatures, but not that he is; for example, it is demonstrated that he is one, that he is immutable, etc. But this solution is worthless, since the reasons of Aristotle evidently prove that there is one first mover: and in bk. 12 of the Metaphysics, ch. 7, he concludes: «It is clear therefore that there is one first and immortal substance»; and in Wis 13 the Holy Spirit accuses those who from these things which are seen as good could not know him who is. Very many other passages of Sacred Scripture also hint at the same thing, as is that of Ps 18: «The heavens declare the glory of God, etc.», and that of Ps 88: «The heavens shall confess thy wonders», where see Cajetan; and that of Ps 103: «Stretching out the heaven like a skin». By which it is signified that heaven is like an open book, which was formerly made from the skins of animals, so that from the knowledge of it, as from a book, we might be taught about God, whence in Acts 14 it is said: «We are mortal men, announcing to you that you should be converted to God, who made heaven and earth. And indeed he did not leave himself without testimony, doing good to us from heaven, giving rains, etc.» On which passage Ambrose, bk. 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 1, says: «Even before the Sacred Letters the world served as a testimony to the Lord, and the ineffable beauty of the heavens, through which certain tablets were offered to men, so that as in the pages of the elements and of the heavens the doctrine of the divine institution might be read». And in Wis 1 it is said: «The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things has knowledge of the voice», that is, the Holy Spirit has filled by his works, and that which contains all things. The sense of which seems to be that it is a periphrasis of the world, when it is said that which contains all things, that the world be understood, which, as Pliny says, bk. 2, ch. 1, all things dwell within its circuit; or, as Pomponius Mela says, bk. 1, ch. 1, because in one circuit it has encompassed itself and all things; this, I say, has knowledge of the voice, that is, like our teacher, from whose sight, as from the voice of an instructor, we are instructed that we may know him: on which see Basil, homily 1 of the Hexaemeron; similarly Ps 128: «Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me», that is, from the creation of man the wonderful knowledge of God became known to the world. So Basil, hom. 10 of the Hexaemeron. Further the conclusion is proved by the authority of all the Saints, because everywhere the sacred Doctors affirm our conclusion. Origen, homily 2 [on various passages]; Basil, homilies 1, 2, 6, 10 and 11 of the Hexaemeron; Hilary on Ps 12; St. Augustine, bk. 10 of the Confessions, ch. 6; On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 12, and bk. 8 of The City of God, ch. 6, and Sermon 55 On the Words of the Lord; St. Gregory, bk. 27 of the Moralia, ch. 2, on ch. 36 of Job; Jerome, bk. 11 on Isaiah at the end, and on Romans 1, and there Ambrose, and in the place above, and Chrysostom there and homilies 9 and 10 To the People; Theodoret, the book On the Gods and Angels, and the book On Providence; St. Dionysius, ch. 7 On the Divine Names; Damascene, bk. 1 On the Faith, ch. 1; Theophilus, bk. 1 to Autolycus; St. Cyril, bk. 3 on John, chs. 3 and 13; St. Gregory Nazianzen, bk. 2 of the Theology; Lactantius Firmianus, bk. 1 of the Divine Institutes. And all the scholastic Doctors in 1 Sent., d. 2 and 3. Likewise from profane authors: Philo the Jew, bk. 2 of the Allegories of the Sacred Letters, before the middle; Ammonius in the preface to the Categories; Cicero, 1 of the Tusculans and 2 On the Nature of the Gods; Lucretius, bk. 5.

It is proved then by natural and theological reasons. The cognition of God is the first foundation of all religion, nay even of the whole rational life rightly ordered; therefore if it could not be demonstrated by natural reason that God is, it would be all over with religion, with the natural and the moral virtues, if we kept ourselves within the limits of nature.

It is confirmed: for if man had been constituted in pure nature without any supernatural cognition, he could attain his end; therefore he could have a most certain cognition that God is: but this cannot be had except through demonstration, therefore. Other natural demonstrations for this conclusion St. Thomas sets out in the following article, which we shall examine there.

TO THE arguments set down at the beginning it is answered.

To the first it must be noted that the seven articles of faith which pertain to the Divinity are distinguished and proposed to be believed by the whole Church and by individual faithful, among whom there are very many ignorant of these demonstrations. For few are they who grasp them, and therefore the seven articles are distinguished: and therefore, formally speaking, that which is demonstrated — whether a priori or a posteriori — cannot be the object of faith, because faith is about things not seen and obscure. Nevertheless, because the habit of faith and the supernatural light render the intellect more certain concerning this, God is, than the natural light does through discourse, it is not to be denied that through faith we in some way assent to this, God is, even we who have demonstrations. And I say that we assent through faith in some way, as regards certitude. For two habits concur in the Christian philosopher to the assent of this, God is: otherwise the peasant would assent to it more firmly than the Theologian, because the former does so through supernatural faith, the latter through natural discourse; on which matter I say more in 2-2, q. 1, art. 5. Yet it must be guarded against that in the vulgar speech of sermons it be said that God is one is not an article of faith. But we can say that it is not obscure to the wise that God is one God, but open by natural reason, although even they, on account of the faith which they have, are more certain of that truth than are the natural philosophers. To the argument, therefore, it is answered that the solution there assigned is good. To the reply, that habits which differ in genus are not terminated at the same formal object under the same formal account: yet they are terminated at the same material object: for faith is terminated at that truth strengthening the intellect as regards supernatural certitude; but the light of science under a certain natural and evident account.

To the second it is answered: I deny the consequence. Because, as St. Thomas says here, at the second, it is no inconvenience that something natural be presupposed to the supernatural cognition of faith, not as that on which that assent rests, but as something presupposed and material

To the third, that that which is most perfect in God is demonstrated imperfectly, and according to an imperfect account: for it is only demonstrated that it is in the nature of things. For the confirmation see St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 12, and Ferrariensis there. Nevertheless it is answered that even concerning the Essence it is demonstrated that it is and that it is not distinguished from to-be.

To the fourth it is answered that all created effects in respect of God are disproportionate and inadequate effects; and for that reason only an imperfect cognition of God is had through these effects. To the second proof of the minor it is answered that every natural cognition which both angels and men have naturally begins from creatures and is terminated at God, and so is a posteriori. And to that of St. Thomas concerning the angel it is answered either that he was speaking according to their beatific cognition, for this begins from God and is terminated at creatures; or he only excludes the necessity of cognition through exterior created effects, because they know God through their essences. And to that concerning Adam, St. Thomas there teaches the excellence of the cognition of God which Adam had in that state. For it was not necessary for him to arrive at the cognition of God through sensible effects, as we arrive: but through intelligible effects, and in these he understood God better than we do from sensible things.

Concerning the fourth conclusion note that it is of St. Dionysius, bk. On the Divine Names, chs. 1 and 2, where he says that God according to his substance is unknown: and the reason is the one we assigned in the conclusion.

But against this there is the argument from that of Rom 1: «For the invisible things of him, etc., his eternal power also and divinity»; therefore not only is a power for working shown, but also the divine Essence itself.

It is answered, and note, from St. Thomas on this passage, that from creatures man can know God in three ways. First through causality, because movable things are reduced to one immovable, and thus it is shown that God is. Second through the way of excellence, insofar as from the perfections of creatures we gather that those excellences are in God. Third through the way of negation, insofar as we deny of God everything that is imperfect in creatures. Since therefore the Apostle says that the philosophers knew these three things — the invisible things, the eternal power, the Divinity — the invisible things pertains to the what-it-is of God; the eternal power to the efficient cause; the Divinity to the final cause: for the supreme good must be the end of all other things. But that they knew these things not in the same way, must be said. The invisible things through the way of negation, because these pertain to the essence in itself; but he speaks in the plural, the invisible things, because through many negations we know the divine essence to be pure act. The second, namely the eternal power, is known through the way of causality. The third, namely the Divinity, through the way of excellence; for by the name of Divinity a good is conveyed, which is participated by all in their own way, but in God it is in a most excellent way. It is clear therefore from this that St. Thomas held in the aforesaid conclusion when he says that we cannot know God perfectly through his Essence. For he does not deny that in some way it is known through the way of negation, as has been said.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

WE have a single affirmative conclusion, which St. Thomas confirms by five demonstrations, taken from the Philosopher. The first is taken from 7 Physics, and 8 and 12 Metaphysics, ch. 7. The second is taken from 2 Metaphysics, text 4. The third and fourth are taken from 2 Metaphysics, text 5, and from 4 Metaphysics. The fifth argument is taken from St. John Damascene, book 1 of the Orthodox Faith, ch. 3, and from the Commentary on book 2 of the Physics, comment 7.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning this article whether the aforesaid arguments are good?

It is argued first against all the arguments in common: for all those taken together do not prove the intended point, namely that God is; therefore. The antecedent is proved: for the first argument convinces only that there is found in the nature of things a first immovable mover; the second proves that there is one first cause productive of all things; the third proves that there is some necessary being not begging its necessity from another; the fourth, some supreme good; the fifth, that there is one supreme governor: but in these it is supposed that God is; therefore they do not demonstrate that God is.

It is argued second against the first argument. For in it it is said that everything that is moved is moved by another: but this principle is neither demonstrated nor known per se; therefore the first demonstration is null. The minor is proved. For the reasoning by which it is proved that everything that is moved is moved by another reaches only this, that in physical bodily motion one must arrive at something which is not moved per se; but it does not prove that it is not moved per accidens: e.g., in the motion of a man we arrive at showing that the soul moving the body is not moved per se, although it moves the body per se; therefore by that way it is only shown that there is one first mover, such as the soul, which is the act of the body. It is confirmed first: granted that we arrive at showing that there is one first mover, it is enough if it be the mover of the first heaven, which nevertheless is not God, but an intelligence separate from corporeal matter and subsisting per se. This argument is explained more evidently. For that maxim, everything that is moved etc., is understood either of physical motion or of metaphysical motion. If the first, it concludes nothing: for even if it be understood of the first mover altogether immovable with physical motion, both per se and per accidens, as Soto understands it in 8 Physics, q. 4, it convinces only that one must arrive at a motive intelligence, on which all physical motion depends; which intelligence nevertheless is moved with neither per se nor per accidens physical motion. Likewise from this it is only gathered that in the same living thing a part moving per se is distinguished from a part moved per se. But it cannot be understood of metaphysical motion: for in metaphysical motion, such as understanding, the same thing can be both mover and moved according to diverse accounts, as Cajetan teaches below, q. 79, art. 2; for the intellect is the same thing that acts the intellection and is acted upon, that is, producing and receiving it; therefore if it be understood of all motion, it is not true that everything that is moved is moved by another.

It is confirmed second: for that other proposition from which this argument proceeds, namely, nothing is at the same time in act and in potency, although it is true of act and potency according to the same account, as Aristotle and St. Thomas speak, nevertheless it is not true in the case of formal potency and virtual act, as Scotus says — namely when something is in act through a principle more eminent for producing some effect of another account: for the intellect through the likenesses is in virtual act and formal potency with respect to the intellection; but here someone could say that the argument for the most part proves that one must arrive at one first mover of the others, which can move itself through this virtual act, which nevertheless does not suffice for St. Thomas's intended point.

It is argued third against the second argument, in which it is presupposed that there is no process to infinity in efficient causes. For someone could solve that argument by saying that the ultimate and middle causes do not have a necessary dependence on one first cause, but on prior ones. And when it is inferred, therefore motion will never begin, if one first cause is not given, he will reply: I deny the consequence, because the prior causes, which are infinite in number, flow in at the same time; and therefore no time will be awaited for the first cause to move; just as in fact the multitude of finite universal causes always flows into these lower things, and yet all the higher ones flow in by nature prior to the lower ones; nevertheless the particular motions of lower things begin and cease according as they are applied in diverse ways to the universal causes; therefore it matters little whether the causes be finite or infinite, if they flow in at the same time.

It is confirmed, because it will be said that the motion of the higher causes, even infinite ones, is spiritual, and does not depend on time, so that there no delay is found between being moved and moving. We could use this argument against what is presupposed in the first argument, that there is no process to infinity in movers; and against what is presupposed in the third, which assumes this foundation, that in necessary things there is no process to infinity: for it will be said that it is not unfitting, just as it is not unfitting in efficient causes — e.g. if Peter had infinite efficient causes, namely father, grandfather, great-grandfather, etc.

It is confirmed last. A middle cause does not depend on the first cause in that it is a cause: for a cause as cause regards only the effect: nor in that it is a middle cause, because as such it only demands that it mediate in causing; therefore a middle cause as such only demands that it depend on a prior cause, not on the first. Likewise, this conditional is true: if the causes proceeded to infinity, all causes would be middle causes; therefore for the account of a middle cause it is not required that it depend on the first. The third argument is impugned by this same argument.

It is argued fourth against the third argument. For there it is presupposed that it is impossible that contingent things have always been: yet below, in q. 46, he teaches that the world, with the exception of man, could have been from eternity; therefore.

Fifth, against the fourth argument. And first against that: that which is most such is the cause of all things that are in that genus. It is argued thus: whiteness is most perfect in the genus of colors, and yet is not the cause of the other colors; and likewise man is the most perfect of all animals, yet is not the cause of the other animals; therefore.

It is argued sixth against that process: that in each and every degree of perfection one must arrive at one first. This seems not sufficiently to prove that there is a single supreme good: for in the genus of hot things one does not arrive at one hot thing in number, which is the cause of the others, but at one according to species, namely fire; therefore the argument concludes no more than that there is a good according to species, not in one singular thing which is the cause of the other goods.

It is argued last against the last argument: for someone can say that there are several governors of equal power, namely infinite, so that one is superior to another to infinity; whence it does not follow that there is a supreme governor.

FOR the solution of these arguments, note first what learned and modest men often admonish, from Aristotle, 1 Ethics, ch. 3, that it is not the part of a well-disciplined man to demand equal evidence in every matter; but the certainty of the mathematician is one thing, of the physicist another, of the metaphysician another. Hence, since these demonstrations which St. Thomas adduces are some of them physical, some metaphysical, and partly even moral, as the last, which proceeds from governance and can be adapted to morals, they are not equally evident.

Second, it must be noted that, as we said in the preceding article, we arrive at the contemplation of God from the knowledge of creatures in three ways: for we know invisible things by the way of negation; eternal power by the way of causality; Divinity by the way of excellence. And we arrive at these three modes from three things which are found in creatures. For a creature is a being, and from another, and from nothing. A being bespeaks perfection, and as regards this we know God by the way of excellence; from another bespeaks causality, and through it we know God by the way of excellence; from another bespeaks causality, and through it we know God by the way of efficiency; from nothing bespeaks imperfection, and through its removal we know God by the way of negation. But these three are what St. Thomas here demonstrates of God: his Essence in the fourth argument, showing what it is like by removing from it every limit of perfection that is found in creatures, namely that it is being in the highest degree; the force of his efficiency and his power, in the first and second arguments; his eternity, in the third; in the fifth, his Divinity by the way of excellence. And the order of these arguments is as follows: for since God is known through the things that are made, and a thing that is made as such immediately regards the power of the maker, whose part it is to reduce something from potency to act, therefore it is demonstrated that there is something in nature altogether immovable and moving the rest. And because the first mover must be the first efficient cause — otherwise it would be moved by the first efficient cause — therefore secondly he demonstrates that there must be one first efficient cause; and because this must be eternal and from itself — otherwise it would be produced by another — it must pre-contain in itself the perfections which it produces, in a more eminent mode; therefore thirdly he demonstrates that there is one necessary being and from itself; and fourthly, that it is the noblest and most such of all beings; finally, because, as Aristotle teaches, 12 Metaphysics, text 52, the whole ordering of the universe must proceed from the first mover, therefore in the last place he proves that he is the orderer of all things, in which it is also implicitly proved that he is the last end of all things: for the first efficient cause and the first orderer is the last end, as is said in 12 Metaphysics.

Third, it must be noted that these arguments can be brought to two ends: first, to prove that there is in the nature of things some infinite, immaterial being, etc., such as we say God is; second, to conclude that there are found in nature certain predicates which in truth are proper to God, without caring how they belong to him: e.g., the first argument can be brought to prove one immovable mover, whether it be the form of the heaven, or a created being, or anything else; or to prove that there is one mover altogether immovable, such as we posit God to be. Cajetan, in this article, says that these arguments conclude almost per accidens that God is, namely that the first mover is found, which is a predicate proper to God in truth. But this sentence is false. And it is proved first: for either the predicates which are here concluded of God are proper to God, or they are common to him and to the celestial body or its mover. If the first, then Cajetan wrongly teaches that by these arguments there is not concluded a mover more immovable than the intellective soul or the form of the heaven. If the second, then they do not conclude any predicates which in truth are proper to God: since common predicates are not proper.

It is confirmed: for if only this common predicate is concluded, it follows that these arguments do not even prove per accidens that God is. For that predicate immovable mover, without caring whether it is in any way, at least per accidens, movable, can belong to another than God, namely to the motive intelligence of the heaven; therefore even if it be proved that there is a mover of this sort, nothing proper to God is proved.

Second: for the predicates which are proved of God in the other arguments cannot belong to another than him, e.g. to be the first efficient cause, a being not from another, the most perfect being of all; therefore by these arguments it is proved directly that God is. So think Capreolus, in 1, dist. 3, q. 1, and Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13, on the second argument of St. Thomas.

TO the first argument, then, it is answered that although all those arguments taken together do not prove immediately and explicitly that God is, and much less that God is that most perfect being than which nothing more perfect can be thought (for this is reserved to be proved in the following questions), nevertheless those arguments most effectively prove that there are found in the nature of things certain perfections and properties which cannot belong to another than God; and consequently they prove virtually and implicitly that God is. For the first argument convinces that there is found in the nature of things a first immovable mover, and so the others effectively prove other properties which can belong to God alone.

To the second it is answered that if by the name of motion only physical motion be understood, Cajetan rightly says that by that argument one arrives only at the first mover, immovable indeed per se, but able to be moved per accidens. But it should not be taken thus, but so as to comprehend also spiritual and metaphysical motions, such as is any operation, and also any application of a spiritual power to its act, and even metaphorical motions, such as the motion of the end. And then that argument should be set out thus: everything that is moved by any motion whatever, whether spiritual, metaphysical or moral, on account of the appetite for some higher end, is moved by another; and in these movers there is no process to infinity; therefore one must arrive at one mover who with respect to these motions is altogether immovable, such as God, who is moved by another neither really and finally, nor in any other way whatever; except only, according to our mode of understanding, by his own goodness.

To the first confirmation it is answered that intermediate powers, such as sense and intellect, are not in act and potency according to the same account, for through the likeness they are in first act, and are actuated from without, namely by the object or by the Author of nature, as the angelic intellect is. Yet they remain in potency to action, to which they cannot be reduced except by a knower who is always in act, such as God. Whence the application of these powers to act, although it be an operation, is nevertheless from some other mover, namely God; on which St. Thomas treats more fully in On Power, q. 3, art. 7, and often elsewhere.

Always, therefore, it is true that the same thing according to the same account cannot be at the same time in act and in potency, nor mover and moved.

To the second confirmation it is answered that although Aristotle set forth that proposition only in univocal agents, namely that according to the same account nothing can be in act and in potency, nevertheless it is verified also in principles and in equivocal agents, that even in them nothing is in act and in potency according to the same account: but in act by reason of the more eminent form, and in potency by reason of the less perfect form. Wherefore in the first argument St. Thomas says only that it is impossible for something to be, according to the same thing and in the same way, both mover and moved, in act and in potency.

To the third, which asks for the explanation of the second argument, it must be noted that, as is said in the book On Causes, lect. 1, essentially subordinated causes have this property, that the first cause flows into the effect prior, and from it the rest in all their operations receive the actual power of flowing into their effects: which reception of power is not to be understood habitually. For middle causes are not called middle for the reason that they have a power which they once received from a higher cause, but because in their actual operation they depend necessarily on the actual power which they receive from the higher cause. For in this consists the essential subordination of causes, namely that in actual operation the lower causes have a dependence on the higher. From which it follows that it is impossible that there be given a process to infinity in such subordinated efficient causes. It is proved first: for the last effect could not be brought about except from the ordered and actual influx of all the higher causes; but this could not be fulfilled if there were a process to infinity, so that one arrived at the last effect, because the infinite cannot be traversed, and it is impossible that infinite causes operate successively at the same time in a single instant; for this an infinite time would be necessary. It is proved second: every lower cause subordinated to another works for the end of that to which it is subordinated: but if there were infinite subordinated causes, no determinate end could be assigned for which all would work; therefore from the removal of the first efficient cause every other cause is taken away. That consequence is proved, because every operation of causes proceeds from the intention of a determinate end.

From this doctrine the third argument, with its first confirmation, is left solved. For it is answered that it is not unfitting that something have infinite non-subordinated efficient causes, as the argument rightly proves.

To the second confirmation it is answered that a middle cause depends on the first cause insofar as a middle cause is at the same time, as is clear from what has been said.

To the fourth, against the third argument, it is answered that for St. Thomas's demonstration it is enough if contingent things by their own nature cannot always be, although they have this from without and per accidens: for of themselves they are indifferent to be and not to be; and therefore, in order that they always be, one must posit a necessary cause which reduces them to act.

To the fifth, against the fourth argument, it is answered that that maxim is verified also of the formal or exemplary cause; and so whiteness is the exemplary cause and measure of the other colors, because it surpasses the others as regards light, which is the formal what with respect to color. And because whiteness has more of light than the other colors, for that reason it is their measure. So St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 2, art. 4, to the fourth; and the same must be said of man with respect to the other animals. This explanation agrees with the argument of St. Thomas, because thus he proves that God is the cause of all things in the threefold genus of cause: efficient, final and exemplary. Cajetan explains it otherwise in this article; read him; and Ferrariensis, book 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13.

To the sixth it is answered that for the present purpose it is only necessary to arrive at one most perfect according to species in that genus. It will be shown later that there cannot be but a single simple substance which is the supreme good.

To the last, against the last argument, it is answered that that fifth argument proves more openly that there is a first governor, and a unique one: for the order of the universe, which is the greatest perfection of the whole world, must be reduced to one will and providence; otherwise the world would be badly governed by two wills. But if someone should say that there are many Gods, equal in power and conformed in will, then he is to be refuted by the arguments which prove the unity of God in q. 11. Finally, concerning all these things, note from St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 13, that the most effective way of proving that God is is taken from the newness of the world: for everything that begins to be anew must be produced by something that is in act. But the newness of the world does not stand by the natural light; wherefore this argument will proceed against a man who admits such a newness.

Concerning the solution to the first of St. Thomas it must be noted that in this solution St. Thomas presupposes that God does not act by necessity of nature upon these lower things, but by his free will. For if he worked by natural necessity, since nature acts according to its whole power, the argument would have the greatest force. But supposing that God acts freely, he can permit evils, both of morals and also of nature. And the reason of St. Thomas which he took from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 11, on account of which God is said to permit evils, is sufficiently suitable. See also St. Thomas below, q. 22, art. 2, to the second; and 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 71. This solution as thus set out is that of Scotus in 2, d. 1, to the first, and seems good and legitimate. From it it is inferred that if, per impossibile, the sentence of those were true who asserted that God works by necessity of nature, then consequently it would have to be admitted that no evil is found in things, which is absurd. But this explanation does not please Cajetan at the end of this article; wherefore he solves this difficulty otherwise, and certainly elegantly. For he says that one contrary can expel another in two ways: first, formally, by expelling it from its proper subject; so that two contraries cannot be compatible at the same time in some thing, if one of them is in the highest degree; and hence it is that the supreme good formally excludes from itself every account of evil. In the second way, effectively, by expelling it from a subject which it makes like to itself. Wherefore if God could, per impossibile, make another supreme good, he would certainly expel from it all evil; just as if fire produced infinite heat, it would expel all cold. But because this is not doable, since only a finite and limited good can be produced according to the capacity of the subject, hence it is that even if he acted by necessity of nature, he would not exclude every evil from things, because an infinite good finitely participated does not exclude every account of its contrary; and so the supreme good participated in a limited way in creatures is compatible with some evil. See Cajetan, who speaks excellently. And let these things said concerning this whole second question suffice, in which the scholastics are less accustomed to dwell.