Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

The CONCLUSION is affirmative. The reason is: because it is natural to man that through sensible things he come to intelligible things; therefore spiritual things are fitly handed down to us in Sacred Scripture under the metaphors of corporeal things. See the solution to the third, where from St. Dionysius, ch. 2, Caelest. Hierar., he assigns a threefold reason why in the divine Scripture things are handed down rather under the figures of vile bodies than of noble ones.

IT IS DOUBTED in this article: whether the conclusion of St. Thomas is true?

For the negative side it is argued first. Theology is a true science, as was defined above, art. 2; but a science ought not to use metaphors; therefore neither ought sacred Theology. The consequence is plain. The minor is proved. For, as Aristotle says, 2 Posterior Analytics, text 22, demonstrative reasoning ought to shun metaphorical expressions, because the demonstrator proceeds by discourse, in which the middle term and the extremes must be taken in their proper signification; otherwise equivocation is committed. And it is confirmed. For figurative speech is obscure; therefore Sacred Doctrine ought not to use figurative speech. Secondly.

In supernatural cognition we descend from God to the creatures themselves, as St. Thomas teaches, 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 2; therefore the intellect in the cognition of supernatural things does not need any likeness taken from creatures. The consequence is plain. For in this cognition it is prior to know God than every creature. Thirdly.

An intellect which understands a thing otherwise than it is, is false; but the intellect which understands God through metaphors of this kind understands God otherwise than He is; therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved. For God in Himself is spiritual and immaterial; but through likenesses of this kind He is represented corporeally; therefore the intellect through metaphors understands God otherwise than He is; therefore it is not fitting that Sacred Doctrine use metaphors. Fourthly.

Science is made through the assimilation of the intellect to the thing known; but our intellect, since it is incorporeal and immaterial, has a greater likeness to divine things than to corporeal things, which are material; therefore it is more disposed to knowing divine things than corporeal things of this kind; and consequently divine things ought not to be manifested through the likeness of corporeal things. Finally it is argued.

For the reason of St. Thomas is null; therefore his conclusion is false. The antecedent is proved. For from the fact that the intellect of man receives its cognition from sense, it is not rightly gathered that it ought to use metaphors; otherwise it follows that in every cognition it ought to use metaphors, which is most false.

For all our cognition has its origin from sense. FOR the understanding of this question it is to be noted first, with St. Thomas, below in q. 88, art. 2, that spiritual and immaterial things are known by man for this state through comparison and removal with respect to material things. And so St. Dionysius, book 2 On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 20, says that from material things we can ascend to some cognition of immaterial things, yet not a perfect one: Because the comparison of material things to immaterial things is not sufficient, but if any likenesses are taken for immaterial things, they are to be understood as very unlike them in other respects. And this foundation is proved. For all our cognition for this state has its origin from sense. Whence nothing can be in the intellect which was not first in sense, either by reason of itself, or by reason of another object which has a proportion with it. Likewise the object of our intellect for this state is the quiddity of a material thing, as St. Thomas teaches below in q. 84, art. 7; therefore the intellect for this state can understand nothing except what has a proportion with the quiddity of a material thing.

Secondly it is to be noted that spiritual and immaterial things cannot be per se in the phantasy nor in sense; and therefore they must be in sense by reason of some material object. For which reason Theologians define that immaterial and spiritual things cannot be known for this state through their proper likenesses, but through the likenesses of material things. Because likenesses are abstracted from the phantasms of corporeal things, but of spiritual things there are no phantasms by which they might be represented; whence they can neither be in sense by reason of themselves.

Thirdly it is to be noted that in supernatural cognition there is a twofold cognition, one apprehensive, the other judicative. For apprehension is presupposed to judgment. But in supernatural judgment there is a descent. For we first judge concerning divine things and descend to human things, and we judge concerning those in order to divine things. But in apprehensive cognition there is always an ascent from the creature up to God. Because apprehension pertains to the order of nature. For thus the pagan apprehends just as the Christian. For they do not differ except in the firm judgment. And the reason is manifest. For the supernatural mysteries which pertain to faith are known by the Christian through acquired and natural likenesses; for new likenesses are not infused into the Christian; but the acquired likenesses in man are abstracted from phantasms. Hence the thing which has a likeness in our intellect was first in a phantasm. But a phantasm is of a corporeal thing; therefore whatever we understand in this state must be material, or through comparison to a material thing, so that there is an ascent from a material thing up to a spiritual one.

Finally note that this science, as we said art. 4, on account of its eminence has the aspect of a practical and speculative science. Hence it is ordered not only to the contemplation of supernatural truth, but also to right operation.

THESE foundations being laid, for the decision of the truth let there be a single and certain conclusion. Most fittingly Sacred Scripture and Sacred Doctrine use metaphors. This conclusion is proved first from the usage of Sacred Scripture. For in various and diverse places it uses metaphors and likenesses; therefore that is most fitting.

Secondly it is proved. Whatever man understands in this life is the quiddity of a material thing, or something related in the manner of a material quiddity; therefore if he understands spiritual and divine things, he must understand them in the manner of a material thing, and through a material comparison. And so Cajetan says in this article that a likeness and a metaphor supply the place of a likeness, which is to say that through the likeness of the thing of which it is a likeness we understand the spiritual thing. And this is the explanation of St. Thomas. It is confirmed.

The supernatural mysteries exceed the capacity of our intellect on account of their loftiness; therefore we cannot know supernatural and divine things according to their own mode, but they must be proposed to us according to our mode, namely through an order to material things. And this is the sense of that place, 1 Cor. 2, where Paul says, speaking of mysteries of this kind: «Neither have they ascended into the heart of man». For as St. Augustine says, tractate 1 on John: «Divine mysteries, when they are known by man, since they are known through an order and comparison to a material thing, and through material likenesses, lose something of their perfection. And therefore they do not ascend into the heart, but descend, since they are not perceived by man according to their most high mode which they have in themselves, but according to our mode». And so St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 23, art. 6, ad 1, says that those things which are beneath the soul are in the soul in a nobler mode than in themselves, because each thing is in the soul according to the mode of that in which it is, as is had in the book On causes.

But those things which are above the soul are in themselves in a nobler mode than they are in the soul. It is proved thirdly. In man there is a twofold cognitive part, namely the intellective and the sensitive; therefore it pertains to divine providence that each part, as far as is possible, be brought back in divine things; therefore it is fitting that it use the figures of corporeal things, which can be grasped by the sensitive part. This reason St. Thomas amplifies in 1 Sent., d. 34, q. 3, art. 1. See also in him several other reasons in the Prologue of I Sent., art. 5.

Fourthly it is proved. This science, on account of its eminence, is at once practical and speculative, and consequently not only demonstrative but also exhortatory; therefore it fittingly uses metaphors in exhortations. The antecedent is plain from the fourth note. The consequence is proved. Because metaphorical expressions of this kind more delight and move the hearer. For figurative speech is nothing other than a figure and likeness of something; but when something is represented by corporeal figures and likenesses, it affects more than if it were proposed by simple speech.

Finally. Other sciences sometimes use metaphors; therefore Theology also can use them. The antecedent is proved. For in the first part of a science, even a demonstrative one, it is lawful to use metaphors, as is plain in Aristotle, 1 Physics, where he proves through a metaphor drawn from artifacts that there are two principles in a natural being. But in the second part, where it infers conclusions, it is not lawful to use metaphors; therefore sciences sometimes use metaphors. See St. Augustine, book Against lying, ch. 10, and book 3 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 5 to 16; and book 10 of The City, ch. 14. From these places the reasons of St. Thomas are drawn.

Other reasons are customarily adduced by the holy Fathers to prove that Sacred Scripture fittingly uses metaphors. The first is that we may hold sacred things more tenaciously in memory. For the whole difficulty of remembering arises in us from the sensitive powers. Wherefore it was necessary to aid those powers by sensible signs proportioned to them. The second reason is that we may grasp divine things more sweetly. For since in themselves they are most remote from all sense, unless they were clothed in sensible signs, they would appear insipid to men, who use the senses. Concerning this reason see St. Thomas here in the solution to the first. Concerning which it is to be noted that St. Thomas does not teach that sensible signs of this kind are not employed in Sacred Scripture on account of delight; but he only teaches that the poetic art has no other proximate end than to afford delight. And therefore it uses metaphors on account of delight as on account of a most principal end. But the proper and immediate end of Sacred Scripture and Doctrine is not delight, but the cognition of divine truth itself. And to this cognition it orders metaphors as to a proper end, but to delight as to something greatly conducive, that men may attain their end.

The third reason is that the divine truths acquired through this science be more precious to us. For the things which we find easily we quickly despise. Whence the proverb: difficult things are beautiful.

The fourth reason is that we may learn the divine mysteries with greater avidity. For man is most full of curiosity for knowing and investigating secrets and hidden things.

The fifth reason is that distaste be removed. For since Sacred Doctrine often inculcates the same things upon us, and this indeed on account of a most grave necessity, that they not fall from our memory, it was necessary that these mysteries be recounted to us under diverse figures, lest the repetition generate distaste. This reason is St. Augustine's, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 6.

The last reason is that by one and the same letter the Holy Spirit may comprehend in Scripture many senses of faith, and most suited for composing morals, as St. Augustine teaches, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 19. As, for example, when Christ said: You are the salt of the earth, it is wonderful how many ways this metaphor is expounded on account of the many properties of salt.

Nevertheless, concerning this conclusion note that in understanding metaphorical expressions we must shun two extremes. One is that of those who are vehemently delighted with figurative expressions, and where there is no figure, they fashion a figure themselves. Into which extreme Origen fell, on Genesis, as Jerome says in the Epistle to Pammachius against the errors of John of Jerusalem, tome 3. Whence Augustine, book 8 on Genesis literally, ch. 7, lays down the rule that whenever words in their proper signification do not import an absurd and false sense, they must always be expounded in their proper signification; for otherwise the firm truth of Sacred Scripture could not stand, because all would take refuge in the metaphorical sense. But when in their proper signification they make an absurd sense, then one must take refuge in the metaphorical, as, the lion of the tribe of Juda has conquered. The other extreme is that of those who follow the Jewish manner, interpreting all things in their proper signification, even those things which are written metaphorically; and many formerly fell into this extreme, as Jerome says on Ezechiel, ch. 36. On which matter see St. Augustine, book 3 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 10, 15 and 16.

Secondly it is to be noted that when the divine Scripture uses a metaphor, the Theologian ought to take care to understand very well the nature and property of the thing which Scripture uses in the figure, and to note only that in which the metaphor is founded — as there, «Be ye simple as doves», to note the simplicity of the dove, the prudence of the serpent, but to leave aside its other properties. See Eusebius, book 8 On the preparation of the Gospel, ch. 3.

THESE things being supposed, it is answered to the arguments to the contrary.

To the first it is answered that, since this science is practical and speculative, it is not only demonstrative but also exhortatory, and so it fittingly uses metaphors, as we have said.

Secondly it is answered that a science in its first part uses metaphors even if it be speculative, as we said of the Philosopher in 1 Physics.

Finally it is answered that this science, since it is supreme and of a higher order, and we know divine things through comparison and removal with respect to material things, must necessarily use metaphors.

To the second argument it is answered that in the apprehensive cognition of God there is also an ascent from the creature of the world up to God, as we said in the third note; and therefore the comparison and likeness of a metaphor is necessary, that we may apprehend divine things and judge rightly.

To the third it is answered, with St. Thomas, below q. 13, art. 12, ad 3, and q. 14, art. 6, ad 1, and q. 85, art. 1, ad 1, and 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 3, that to understand a thing otherwise than it is happens in two ways. In one way on the part of the object, as if someone understands an object to be otherwise than it is; and in this consists falsity. As if someone thought that God in Himself is corporeal, whereas He is spiritual.

In the second way a thing can be understood otherwise than it is on the part of the intellect, so that that mode does not pass over to the thing, but the intellect has in understanding a mode contrary to the mode which the thing has in itself; for example, the intellect understands material things, yet the intellect itself has a contrary mode, because it understands spiritually. Likewise the intellect understands God, who is most simple, in a complex way and by composing. But to understand a thing otherwise than it is in this way does not cause falsity. For the mode of the intellect does not pass over to the thing nor is it attributed to it, but is a necessary mode on the part of the intellect itself. So also in the present matter: God is understood through material comparisons and likenesses otherwise than He is, that is, in another mode; yet it does not follow from this that there is falsity.

To the fourth it is answered that there is a certain assimilation according to convenience in nature, and thus there is a greater likeness of our intellect to divine things than to sensible things. But this is not the one which is required for science. There is also another assimilation through information, which is required for cognition, as sight is assimilated to color, by whose likeness the pupil is informed. But this information cannot be made in our intellect according to the way of nature except through likenesses abstracted from the senses. Because, as the Philosopher says, 3 On the Soul, ch. 7, as color is related to sight, so phantasms are related to the intellect; and therefore it is established that in this way the intellect can be more assimilated to sensible things than to divine things.

To the last, Master Cajetan answers in this article that the reason of St. Thomas is most excellent. For from the fact that it is connatural to man to know intelligible things through sensible things, it is necessary that, if he is to know spiritual things easily and in his own mode, he know them through metaphors. Because metaphors supply the place of spiritual likenesses, which ought to be had concerning spiritual things according to themselves. But it is not necessary simply, because even without metaphors, though not without phantasms, man even in this state could grasp the things that are said, although not so easily; and so it is necessary not simply, but for the better.

Concerning the solution to the third argument, St. Thomas disputes whether sacred Doctrine ought to use likenesses and metaphors of the lowest things. On which matter St. Thomas himself is to be seen, in I Sent., d. 34, q. 3, art. 2.