Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

First conclusion. It was necessary for human salvation that there be a certain doctrine according to divine revelation besides the physical disciplines. St. Thomas proves this conclusion first in the argument On the contrary, from the testimony of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 3: All scripture inspired of God is profitable for teaching, for arguing, for correcting, for instructing in justice: but scripture inspired of God does not belong to the physical disciplines, therefore, etc. Then he proves it by reason thus. For man is ordered to God as to an end which exceeds the comprehension of reason, according to Isai. 64: Eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that love thee: but this end cannot be known through the physical disciplines, therefore.

Second conclusion. Even as regards those things which can be investigated about God by human reason, it was necessary to instruct man by divine revelation. The reason is: because the truth about God investigated by reason would come to man from few men, and over a long time, and with an admixture of many errors: but man's salvation necessarily depends on the knowledge of certain truths which natural reason is able to know about God, e.g. that there is one eternal God and the first cause of all things; therefore it was necessary that men be instructed by divine revelation also for knowing truths of this kind.

Third conclusion, in the solution to the second. The theology which belongs to sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is posited as a part of philosophy, namely metaphysics. The reason for this is: because metaphysics treats of God himself insofar as he is knowable by the natural light; but our theology considers God insofar as he is known by the light of divine revelation.

BEFORE we come to the graver disputations, certain things are to be noted, especially for novice theologians.

The first is that theology, according to the propriety of the word, is the same as discourse about God, or the account and expertise of divine things. Whence the theologian is an expert in divine things; and his office is to contemplate and to speak of God, and of other things insofar as they are from God and tend to him. Now theology is twofold, namely natural and supernatural. The former indeed contemplates those truths which can be investigated about God by the natural light and by discourse, such as that God is one, infinite, etc. The supernatural, however, inquires into and considers those truths which can be had by divine revelation, or are gathered from the things revealed themselves.

NEXT observe that doctrine is called revealed which has not been devised by human wit, but handed down by divine revelation alone: according to Gal. 1: I make known to you the gospel which was preached by me, that it is not according to man. For neither did I receive it from man, nor did I learn it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. Where Jerome observes that Apocalypse, that is, revelation, is a word proper to the Scriptures, deservedly devised by the Seventy interpreters: for it is not found among Gentile writers. Now the proper and genuine signification of this word is not revelation in any way whatever, but when something which of itself was covered and veiled, the impediment now being removed, is shown and brought forth into the light. Whence the theologian who prepares to profess the discipline of this sacred doctrine should consider that he himself is to be transferred into another, invisible world, and that, as it were a second Paul, the natural scales are to be removed from his eyes, that he may see the kingdom of God.

NOW revealed doctrine, according to its common signification, is divided into faith, into prophecy, and into that doctrine which is necessary for explaining the divine letters. The Apostle makes mention of this in Eph. 4 when he said: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors. Namely, doctors able to instruct the people in divine and human things which are necessary for eternal salvation. Which doctrine indeed is sometimes occupied with the explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of the articles of faith; sometimes it gathers from the things revealed and understood themselves conclusions conducive to a fuller knowledge of the mysteries and to their defense against heretics. Wherefore it uses different means according to the variety of errors and arguments by which sacred doctrine is attacked by the ignorant.

MOREOVER the physical discipline in the present article is not taken strictly, as signifying only the science of mobile being, but is used broadly, as signifying every discipline which can be had from the power of nature.

AND finally, necessary can be taken in two ways. In one way for the simply necessary, as that God exists, that man is an animal: in the other way, for what is useful and fitting for the end: but in either way the necessary is said according to the four kinds of causes, as Aristotle teaches, 5 Metaphysics, text 6, e.g. a stone must rise on the part of the efficient cause, if it is pushed upward by a greater power. Likewise, a man must be risible from the formal cause; and corruptible from the material cause; and endowed with virtue from the necessity of the end, that he be blessed. In the present article, therefore, it is clear that the discourse concerns the necessary according to the final cause, namely, whether revealed doctrine is necessary for man unto salvation. But whether he speaks of the simply necessary, as an eye is necessary for seeing, or rather of the necessary in a certain respect, that is, for the more commodious attainment of the end, as a horse is necessary for a journey and shoes for walking; there is a difference among the interpreters of St. Thomas.

IT IS DOUBTED, then, first, concerning the first conclusion: whether it was simply necessary for human salvation that revealed doctrine be handed down to men.

It is argued first for the negative side. All creatures can attain their end by their own powers; therefore man does not simply need some supernatural gift for attaining his own end, otherwise he would seem to be of a worse condition than the other created things.

It is argued second. For the Apostle, Rom. 1, vehemently accuses the Gentile philosophers, not indeed because they did not know God, but because, when they had known him naturally, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks: therefore natural knowledge suffices for worshipping God, and consequently for the end of beatitude. And it is confirmed. For that God exists and that he is a rewarder are knowable by the natural light: but, as the Apostle testifies, Heb. 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to them that seek him; these things seem to suffice for justification: therefore revealed doctrine is not simply necessary. And it is confirmed secondly. For when a man first comes to the use of reason, if he does what is in him by the powers of nature, so as to be converted to God, he is justified from sin; and yet he has no supernatural knowledge, therefore.

It is argued third. For although according to the ordinary law no one attains salvation except through some revealed doctrine; nevertheless, speaking absolutely, God could lead a man into eternal life without any supernatural revelation conferred on him in this life; therefore, speaking absolutely, revealed doctrine is not necessary for salvation, as an eye is for seeing.

It is argued fourth. Be it granted that some revealed doctrine is necessary for salvation, yet our theology does not seem to be simply necessary; therefore St. Thomas asserted in vain that this sacred theology, to the study of which we come, is necessary. The minor is proved from Mark, last chapter: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And it is proved by reason. For by faith our end and the means necessary for it are sufficiently known.

AND finally it is argued. For be it granted that knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures is necessary in the Church of Christ, namely that there be doctors who interpret the Sacred letters; yet our scholastic theology seems superfluous, which so tediously, and with so great a number of arguments tossed about on this side and that, divine things with excessive curiosity discusses and handles; therefore such subtle disputation is superfluous. The minor is proved. For the holy Fathers, who were fit doctors of the Church of God, did not engage in ventilating subtleties of this kind. And it is confirmed from Chrysostom, Hom. 1 on the Epistle to Titus, where he says that the sacred Gospel contains all things, present and future, and all things which are necessary for piety. And St. Augustine, tract. 49 on John, says: Not all the things which the Lord Jesus did are written, as John testifies, but those things were selected which should be written, all things which are necessary for the human race unto salvation. Likewise St. Basil, in the Homily on the human generation of Christ, says: O absurd and depraved ingratitude! The Magi come to adore, and Christians more curiously ask how God is in the flesh, and of what flesh, and whether the man assumed is perfect or imperfect. Let the curious be silent, and let them cease to investigate superfluous things in the Church of God. And yet our scholastics dispute questions of this kind, and others much more curious, namely: whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be distinguished from him? and whether, if Adam had not sinned, the Son of God would have assumed human nature? and very many others of this kind, therefore.

FOR the decision of this doubt let there be a first conclusion, most certain according to the Catholic faith. Revealed doctrine is simply necessary according to the ordinary law of God for the salvation of individual men who have come to the use of reason. I have said 'according to the ordinary law of God'; for according to his absolute power God could have justified men by his grace and transferred them to beatitude. This conclusion has a special place where it is explained by theologians and confirmed by the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures and of the Councils; namely, in 2-2, q. 2, arts. 3, 4, 5 and following. For the present, however, let that testimony suffice for us, Heb. 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things that appear not. We have, therefore, that if by the name of revealed doctrine we understand also the doctrine of the Catholic faith, as in truth it is most of all to be understood under such a name, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for men to obtain salvation: and that this is certain according to the Catholic faith.

NEVERTHELESS certain of the modern theologians linger overmuch in this place, asking: whether it can be proved by natural reason that, besides the physical disciplines, another revealed doctrine is necessary for man for living rightly and obtaining happiness. And they argue in many ways for the affirmative side. First indeed by induction. For it is the common sense of men that such doctrine is necessary: e.g. unbelieving Jews hold that they have a revealed doctrine, awaiting the Messiah. The Saracens too think that Mohammed was a prophet of God who brought a salutary law to men. Likewise heretics think that they have a revealed doctrine; indeed the Gentiles also think the same. And their foundation is: that what they have received from their parents is to be believed: and for that reason they are called Gentiles. For Augustine relates, 8 City of God, ch. 5, from Varro, that among the Gentiles there was a threefold theology; a certain natural one, which men devised by their own powers; another fabulous, which the poets invented; a third civil, which belonged to the priests, by which cities were ordered to the worship of God. And this they held to have been handed down to men by God through revelation. And finally the Christians above all affirm that this is necessary. Hence, therefore, a morally evident argument is drawn. It is impossible that that in which all nations agree be false: but all nations agree in this, that revealed doctrine is necessary for men, therefore this is true. To me, however, this argument seems persuasive rather than demonstrative. For among the philosophers who were judged wise by men, some denied that God exists, as Pythagoras and Protagoras; some denied the providence of God, as the Epicurean and his followers; and, what is more to be wondered at, Aristotle seems to have denied divine providence. For he asserted nothing about the providence of God; indeed he thought that the world emanated from God himself by a necessity of nature, not by his free will, which, below, in q. 19, art. 10, we shall show to have been an error against the natural light; and in q. 46, art. 1. It is also clear how doubtful Aristotle was about the immortality of the soul.

Likewise, 12 Metaphysics, ch. 8, after he had demonstrated certain things which can be demonstrated about God himself, he says thus: Certain things have been handed down by our forefathers and by the most ancient, besides these: but all the rest have been brought forward fabulously to persuade the multitude, or on account of the laws, or for expediency. Behold, therefore, how the aforesaid argument, drawn from authority and the consensus of all, can be shaken.

A second argument is brought from St. Thomas, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 3, namely: because we naturally desire to know the quiddity of whatever thing comes in any way into our knowledge, therefore we naturally desire to know the quiddity of the first Cause. Again: But through the physical disciplines we cannot know God quidditatively, as is plain from Aristotle, 2 Metaphysics, ch. 1, where he says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the night-owl to the light of the sun. And Plato in the Parmenides, when he had said many things about the first being, concluded: that man cannot know what it is, but only what it is not; therefore it follows that a revealed science is necessary. But this argument and others like it, which are drawn from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the place cited above, contribute to this (as St. Thomas says at the end of the aforesaid chapter): that it be shown that what is said of God is not to be cast aside as false, although it cannot be investigated by reason: indeed it is also shown how revealed doctrine does not destroy but rather perfects nature, in that it perfects and completes imperfect but natural desires, which are rather called velleities. For I will never grant, revelation being set aside, that there is in man or in an angel a natural desire, simply and absolutely, of knowing God quidditatively: indeed, if an angel were created in pure natural endowments, he would tend by no way to such knowledge of God, nor desire it, since he would evidently judge it impossible for himself. Let us then conclude, in confirmation of the first fundamental conclusion, asserting what is said in Wis. 13: Vain are all men who have not the knowledge of God. Therefore the aforesaid conclusion cannot be had certainly by any other way than from the Catholic faith. But that this revealed doctrine is made evidently credible by many arguments: it is not for this place to show. But this we have done in 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

Second conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine we understand prophecy, it is necessary in the Church, not indeed that prophetic revelation be made to each individual man, but to those whom God has chosen, that through their ministry he might instruct the faithful concerning future things. This conclusion is to be understood according to the law ordained by God, who, according to the diversity of times, prophetically enlightened the minds of certain men, that on God's part they might instruct and console the rest, according to Amos, ch. 3: For the Lord God will do nothing, unless he reveal his secret to his servants the prophets. Whence the first prophet was Adam, when he said, Gen. 2: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife. The mystery of which prophecy the Apostle explains, Eph. 5: This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. But how much utility prophetic doctrine brought to the confirmation of the Gospel doctrine, the Apostle sufficiently teaches, Rom. 1, when he says: Separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning his Son. See on this matter Chrysostom on Isaiah, ch. 6, Homil. 2, where he says: Prophetic oracles are not promulgated for this, that men know future things in any way, but that they reap great benefits from them. The first is that men be made more modest through fear of punishment and of the prophetic threat. The second is that men be made more eager to undertake virtue from the promise of goods. The third is that from both sides they may know the power of God and his providence toward men. The fourth, that they may judge that the future things which are foretold come about not by chance but by God's most firm decree. The fifth, that men may know themselves to be sinners and have recourse to Christ.

Third conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine is understood the science which is occupied with the understanding and explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of those things which pertain to faith, it is not simply necessary for individual men unto salvation. This is plain. For many are simple Christians who, simply believing the articles of faith, keep his commandments out of love of God and are saved.

Fourth conclusion. Nevertheless a doctrine of this kind, revealed, which by us is called theological science, is necessary in the Church of God for the salvation of men and the preservation of the faithful. This conclusion is understood of the necessity of the end simply, supposing the divine ordination. For the understanding and confirmation of this conclusion it is to be observed, as we intimated before, that theological science is occupied in two ways with the things which have been revealed by God. First, by interpreting the Sacred Scriptures from what precedes and what follows, from the traditions of the Church, from expertise in languages, and other similar things. In the other way, by gathering from the testimonies of the Scriptures or from the truths of faith conclusions by a good or probable consequence, for the edification of the faithful or the defense of the faith. Note secondly that although the theologian exercises these two offices with diligence and study; nevertheless, because he proceeds from faith and from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, sometimes also by a special grace of God freely given, such sacred science is deservedly called sacred and revealed. For what is ours in it is the least part. Now, therefore, the conclusion is proved in both senses; and first in the former sense, from Eph. 4: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. Behold the end of these offices, namely the edification of the faithful. Likewise, 1 Cor. 12, where Paul, relating the gifts with which Christ adorned his Church, says: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another the interpretation of speeches. What is, I ask, the word of wisdom and of knowledge, if not the spirit of teaching and declaring all things which are necessary for salvation? And ch. 14 he speaks elegantly of the interpretation of revelations, which he calls prophecy: whose use is, as St. Thomas explains, to set forth the word of exhortation to the people, by expounding the Sacred Scriptures. And the same Apostle calls interpreters those same men whom he calls prophets; and he calls interpreting prophesying. And St. Peter in the second epistle, ch. 1, says thus: Knowing this first, that no prophecy of scripture is made by private interpretation. That is, it is not of human wit, nor of private authority, but proceeds from the divine light. And ch. 3 he says: In the epistles of Paul there are some things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, to their own destruction; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary, which may explain what is doubtful and interpret what is difficult. Moreover the same is effectively confirmed. For God never fails in necessary things, much less than nature: but not only is the handing down of the Scriptures necessary, but also the understanding of them; therefore God has not left his Church without doctors sufficient for explaining the Sacred Scriptures. Moreover, if holy Scripture is obscure and ambiguous, and has diverse and contrary expositions; to whom must one have recourse for the true understanding of Scripture? e.g. concerning these four words, This is my body, there is great controversy in the Church of Christ. For Oecolampadius says that their legitimate interpretation is: this is a sign of my body. Calvin declares: this is my body in power. The Church says: this is truly my body. In a matter, therefore, of so great moment, to whom must one have recourse? Certainly to none other than the doctors of the Church. Just as the Antiochenes in a very difficult matter fled to none other than the apostles and elders who were at Jerusalem.

But here two things are to be observed. The one is that this doctrine is not necessary for all Christians, but it is necessary that it exist in the Christian commonwealth. Just as it is not necessary that all Christians be bishops, but it is necessary that there be bishops in the Church. The other is that this doctrine is not necessary for new revelations, nor for bringing forth a new faith, but for eliciting the true expositions of sacred Scripture already handed down to us. Whence the doctors of this discipline do not have new revelations; they have, however, a special divine assistance and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, that they may proceed fittingly in the exposition of sacred Scripture, as is expedient for the utility of the Church.

NEXT the conclusion is proved in the other sense, namely insofar as sacred theology, from the divine revelations and the articles of faith, which are as it were first principles, gathers conclusions conducive to the edifying of the faithful and the defense of the Church from the attack of heretics. Of this science the Apostle speaks, 1 Cor. 12, when he says: To another is given the word of knowledge in the same Spirit. Explaining which passage, Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, says: This is the science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, strengthened and defended. With which science indeed very many of the faithful are not endowed, although they are endowed with faith. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for obtaining beatitude; and another to know how this very faith helps the pious and is defended against the impious. So he. The Apostle also makes mention of this science, Titus 1, when he says: A bishop must be blameless, etc., embracing him who is according to doctrine, the faithful word, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers; that is, to convince with arguments and to refute the errors of those who contradict. To this also pertains what the Apostle Peter in the first canonical epistle, ch. 3, admonishes the faithful, that they be ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you. And although this office in a certain way pertains to individual faithful; nevertheless it especially belongs to the doctors of the Church, who give continuous attention to sacred theology. Moreover we find examples of this sacred theology also in the authors of the Sacred Scriptures, who often argue and reason from certain revealed things to persuade men of the truth. But there is a very great difference between those canonical writers and the other doctors of the Church. Since the former argue infallibly by the same Spirit of God; the other doctors, however, in their argumentations do not have infallibly the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the canonical writers have left us most firm examples, which we might imitate in our theological discourses. Indeed Christ the Lord himself, the supreme Doctor of all doctors, often argued to convince the experts in the law and the Pharisees. As for example, John 10: Is it not written in your law, I said, You are gods? If he called them gods, to whom the word of God was made, and the scripture cannot be broken, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world; you say, because I blaspheme, because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, if you will not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father. Moreover Luke 11 he says: If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children; how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him? And in the same chapter, against those blaspheming that he cast out devils in Beelzebub the prince of devils, he argues wonderfully. The apostles themselves also, imitating their master, very often made theological arguments, among whom the Apostle, the doctor of the Gentiles, seems to have excelled. In whose epistles there are examples so frequent that it is not pleasing to relate any one of them above the others. But the other doctors, imitating these examples, have left us very many writings filled with theological arguments. To this doctrine also is consonant what was instituted in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. 11: that readers of sacred Scripture be established in all cathedral churches, and especially of those things which pertain to the reformation of morals. Which was confirmed in the Council of Trent, session 22, On Reformation, ch. 2. Very many supreme pontiffs also established universities of studies, in which the divine science of sacred theology might be taught, and adorned them with riches, honors and privileges. How much utility, moreover, scholastic theology has brought to the Church of God, the doctrine of St. Thomas alone manifests. For in all the councils celebrated after St. Thomas, almost all the dogmas decreed by them were taken from the doctrine of the holy doctor. Which is plain in the Council of Vienne under Clement V, in the Council of Florence under Eugene IV, in the Lateran under Leo X, and in Trent under Paul III and Julius III and Pius IV. Wherefore not without cause do heretics pursue scholastic theology with the utmost hatred: since by the shrewdness of the theologians their pestiferous arguments are dissolved.

TO the arguments in opposition.

TO the first argument certain of the modern theologians, in order to answer, dispute in this place, not opportunely enough, that celebrated question: whether to see God as he is is the natural end of man. Which question nevertheless claims for itself its proper place in 1-2, q. 3, art. 8. We, however, will say something in part about this difficulty below, in q. 12, art. 1, where it is also opportunely disputed by others. In the meantime, however, that we may satisfy the argument, we suppose that a man in the state of fallen nature cannot be made blessed by the attainment of any end, unless he first obtain salvation by the grace of the Savior. But if man had been created in pure natural endowments, he would have needed some gift of the Creator in order to acquire natural beatitude by his own actions. Which gift God supplied much more abundantly, creating man with grace healing nature and ordering him to a supernatural end. After sin, however, no remedy remains except the grace of God through Jesus Christ.

TO the second argument it is answered that from the testimony of the Apostle it is not gathered that natural knowledge is sufficient for worshipping God as was required for the end of beatitude. But only this is gathered, that natural knowledge is a sufficient cause for the condemnation of those who, when they had known God, did not glorify him as God, but turned to idolatry. To the first confirmation it is answered that it does not suffice for justification, as far as concerns the intellect, that a man believe that God exists as the author of nature, and that he is a rewarder with a natural reward: but it is required that God be believed as the author of the grace that justifies the impious, and as a rewarder promising supernatural beatitude; according to the word of the Apostle, Rom. 4: But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God. But on this difficulty, whether for justification a supernatural faith is required also on the part of the object believed: I have disputed more at length in 2-2, q. 2, art. 8, doubt 2, where we showed that it is not enough for someone to have an implicit faith in Christ, without which no one is justified, that he believe some natural principle. Since in that principle what is supernatural cannot be contained implicitly. To the second confirmation it is answered that when a man first comes to the use of reason, he can indeed sin by the powers of nature, if he is not converted to the good. But by the powers of nature he cannot be sufficiently disposed to be converted to God and justified from sin, unless he has been forestalled by the help of divine mercy. And thus it will be verified that God does not deny grace to him who does what is in him. But to what a man is bound when he comes to the use of reason is usually disputed in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6. I, however, having found an occasion not unsuitable, disputed it at length in 2-2, q. 10, art. 1, doubt 2.

TO the third argument the intent of it is granted, as we explained in the first conclusion.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that it proves the third conclusion.

TO the fifth argument, where objection is made against the necessity of scholastic theology, and indeed it is intended that it is superfluous, useless and pernicious; one must answer carefully against certain men of our own time who are students of human rather than of divine writings, who on account of the difficulty of scholastic theology and their own sloth or natural dullness do not cease continually to bark against the scholastic theologians. These surely seem to me like sluggish hare-hounds, which, when they cannot by the swiftness of their course pursue the hare, bark vehemently against the others who pursue and outrun it swiftly. I for my part am not of the number of those who despise expertise in languages and the diligent reading of histories; on the contrary, mindful of the apostolic doctrine: As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God; I have always venerated men of this kind who profess expertise in languages, and especially those who devote themselves to elucidating the phrases of the Sacred Scriptures. But the arrogance and pernicious ignorance of some I cannot bear. For they think that we, occupied with useless questions, lose oil and labor. Against them let a certain conclusion be laid down.

SCHOLASTIC theology as it is learned and held in the Church of God from the time of the Master of the Sentences to the present day is necessary with that necessity which we explained in the fourth conclusion. This conclusion is proved by the same arguments by which the fourth was also confirmed. Then it is proved. Since scholastic theology does not differ from the theology of the holy Fathers as to substance, but differs only as to its compendious mode and as reduced more to the art of a discipline, so that the theologian may now have, as it were in ready cash, all the heads of things and the arguments by which Catholic doctrine can both be explained and defended against heretics. Of which matter a great proof is what we did above in the meditation on the second document on the prologue of St. Thomas. Supposing, therefore, the variety of the heresies of the most recent times, and the fox-like cunning of heretics, it is necessary that there be at hand in the Church of Christ doctors who may answer subtly, learnedly and briefly the sophistries of the heretics, and strongly refute them. For this pertains to the providence of Christ, that he make such doctors in his Church as he knows to be necessary according to the diversity of times. But in this scholastic theology many things are contained which pertain to ornament and perfection rather than to utility. And nevertheless they are sometimes not without utility. For Augustine teaches, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 4, that to assume human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is nothing other than to imitate the children of Israel, who, fleeing Pharaoh, carried off with them the vessels of gold and all the furniture of the Egyptians, that they might afterwards spend all precious things for the ornament of the Tabernacle. So also St. Jerome, in the epistle to Magnus the orator; and to Pope Damasus, On the prodigal son, says: To assume human philosophy and all human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is to bring a most beautiful woman as a believing captive into the people of God. According to Deut. 21, where it was commanded that if anyone took in war a woman who pleased him, he should bring her into his house and shave her hair and cut her nails, and put off the garment in which she was taken captive. So, therefore, it befits the theologian to learn human disciplines, that he cut away whatever in them is superfluous, and make them serve the holy doctrine. For what harm did it do to Daniel that he learned the letters of the Chaldeans? What to Moses, that he was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians? On which matter see the excellent treatise of Rupert the abbot, On the works of the Holy Spirit, book 7, or, what is the same, On knowledge, in a single book, especially from ch. 10 to the end. Where he shows elegantly and very learnedly the utility of the liberal arts for the treatment of the Sacred Scriptures.

TO the testimonies of the Saints cited in the last argument it is answered. To St. Chrysostom: that he speaks of the Gospel as containing these things as in a principle and a fountain: but it is necessary that the things contained in the Gospel be explained and defended by the doctors. And similarly it must be said to Augustine. But to St. Basil it is answered that he inveighs against certain imprudent men who in the churches disputed such questions before the people. For which vice certain preachers of our own time are deservedly to be reproved, who dispute and define before the people scholastic and subtle questions, of which perhaps they themselves would not dare to speak in the schools. But that such scholastic disputations, however subtle, are very useful in the Church of Christ, provided they be conducted with due modesty, the examples of the saints confirm. For such things did the holy Doctor dispute, who sometimes, out of excessive love of Christ, was rapt into ecstasy; such things did he also dispute who is called the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure. And among the holy Fathers we find not a few examples of this, as often as the perverse and subtle dogmas of heretics compelled them to dispute piously indeed, but subtly. Read, I beseech you, St. Hilary, book 2 On the Trinity, where among other things he says thus: We are compelled by the vices of heretics and blasphemers to do unlawful things, to climb steep places, to speak the ineffable, to presume what is not granted, and to extend the lowliness of our speech to things that are ineffable, and we are forced into one fault by another's fault. So he. Do not, however, think that Hilary judged anything to be done viciously, but he speaks in the manner in which it is commonly said: it is lawful to repel force by force. Although defense ought not properly to be called force. Now, indeed, the prudent reader will pardon me that in this first doubt I have not altogether kept the scholastic method of disputing. Nor is it wonderful, since this first question of St. Thomas, and especially this first article, still has an affinity with the plan of the prologue.

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the second conclusion of St. Thomas is true and its ground good.

It is argued first for the negative side. When a man first comes to the use of reason, he sufficiently knows by the natural light those things which he is bound to know, so as to convert himself to the good; therefore revealed doctrine is not necessary for man to tend to his natural end. The antecedent is plain. For otherwise a man would not sin in the first instant of the use of reason, even if he did not convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason: which is contrary to St. Thomas, in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6.

It is argued second: supernatural revelation cannot be proportioned except to a supernatural object; therefore a truth which by its nature is of the natural order cannot be known under the account of supernatural revelation.

It is argued third: a faithful simple man is not of a better condition than a faithful philosopher: but a faithful philosopher does not assent to those natural truths from divine revelation, but from a natural means; therefore a faithful simple man does not assent from divine revelation. The consequence is plain, because otherwise he would be of a better condition.

It is argued fourth: if any natural truth ought to be known through divine revelation, this most of all, God exists; but it seems to imply a contradiction that this truth be known from divine revelation; therefore. The minor is proved: for if anyone assents to this truth, God exists, because God himself reveals it, he already presupposes that God exists: inasmuch as he presupposes that God is a revealer, and consequently before divine revelation man knows that God exists.

FINALLY it is argued against the ground of the conclusion, which presupposes that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of natural truth. This seems false: because it is possible for natural truth to be investigated by natural reason, and consequently natural knowledge would suffice: since the whole salvation of man depends on it.

TO this doubt Cajetan in this place teaches that this second conclusion is to be understood of a necessity not simply, but of well-being. Nevertheless St. Thomas seems to hold the contrary in 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1, where he expressly teaches that natural knowledge does not suffice for the human race for the knowledge of divine things, even of those which can be demonstrated by natural reason; and in 3 Sent., dist. 23, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1, he says that sufficient provision could not be made for the natural knowledge of God through man's nature; therefore not only for well-being, but simply, revealed doctrine must be asserted to be necessary for knowing truths of this kind. Wherefore Cajetan, in 2-2 above, moderates the opinion which he had held here. For either, he says, we speak of the human race according to individual men, or according to the community of the human race itself. If we speak in the former way, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for many. For there are many who, on account of natural ineptitude or other reasonable occupations, cannot investigate such truths by their own powers. If, however, we speak of the community itself of the human race; he says that such revelation is not necessary for all, because some can know those truths by their own powers. But neither does this moderation seem to us to agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For then it would already be verified that natural reason suffices for the knowledge of those truths. For that this knowledge fails in some proceeds from an accidental cause: and yet St. Thomas refers a defect of this kind to human nature. Then because even the philosophers themselves acquired such knowledge only over a long time and with an admixture of errors, as is plain to one reading the dogmas of the philosophers.

IT must therefore be said, as seems to us, and let it be a certain conclusion, that revealed doctrine is necessary in order that men be instructed even in natural truths as much as is required for them to be taught concerning supernatural things. For grace presupposes nature. And it is proved first. For although some knowledge of God can befall some after a long time, nevertheless this does not in fact befall without some admixture of errors. Whence it is necessary that revealed doctrine perfect nature. It is proved secondly. For the wound of ignorance, which we drew with original sin, is not only in the practical reason, but also in the speculative, inasmuch as in the state of integral nature the speculative intellect had an infallible order to the true, nor could it be retarded by the corruptibility of the body. Whence St. Thomas below, q. 101, art. 1, ad 3, grants to children in the state of innocence a sufficient knowledge which would direct them in good works. But after sin man remained with a corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, so that it cannot tend infallibly to the true. And the intellect itself, to which it is natural to understand by conversion to phantasms, received the wound of ignorance, so that it easily declines from the true; therefore, etc. And finally, distinct knowledge, certain and without admixture of error and acquired in a short time, concerning natural truths about God himself, which are indeed necessary for man, cannot be had in the state of fallen nature by human powers; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary for instructing men about truths of this kind. Through which doctrine, as Chrysostom says, hom. 4 to the people, Christians, even peasants, learn more in one day than the philosophers attained in the whole time of their life: for straightway through sacred doctrine the untaught countrymen, once instructed, believe that God is one and that his providence exists and that he is to be worshipped and adored above all things. But even the most weighty philosophers attained some truths after much time and with an admixture of errors. For Plato traveled to Egypt and Italy to learn philosophy. Aristotle labored twenty years with Plato. And these men fell into very grave errors. For Plato said that matter is coeternal with God and is not created by him, and he posited a return of souls to bodies. Likewise he said that every soul of brute animals is immortal and that all are of the same species, and that God is the soul of the world. Aristotle also said that the world necessarily existed from eternity. Nor does he make mention of human eternal happiness. And in 7 Politics he asserted that men who are born deprived of some limb or in any way monstrous are to be killed. He also taught in the same place that abortion is to be procured, at least before the animation of the fetus. Then Cicero denied the providence of God, and to make men free he made them sacrilegious. Likewise with Aristotle he judged that indignation at the prosperity of inferiors is a virtue, which is absurd according to right reason. And in book 3 of Offices he taught that it is just to harm the guilty, which is against the law of nature. Moreover Galen, a man most brilliant in genius, taught that the soul is mortal and that it is a relation, that is, a harmony and concord of the humors. Augustine finally, endowed by nature with a most excellent genius, was held for nine years in many errors of the Manichees. Therefore if men of such great and excellent genius erred concerning natural things, revealed doctrine is necessary for all, lest error befall them in those matters in which ignorance or error is even opposed to Catholic doctrine.

TO the arguments, then, in opposition.

TO the first it is answered that it is true that when a man first comes to the use of reason he is most sufficiently enlightened by the natural light, synderesis dictating, so as to convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason. But afterwards he will not be able to live his life without some error concerning natural things, unless he has been enlightened by revealed doctrine.

TO the second argument it is answered that revealed doctrine is not proportioned to natural truths as regards this, that it demonstrates them through itself, as they are demonstrable. But the proportion is in this, that through revealed doctrine a man is certified by a light of a higher order concerning those truths which by their nature are demonstrable.

TO the third argument it is answered that a faithful simple man is not of a better condition, other things being equal, than a faithful philosopher. And to the proof it is answered that a faithful philosopher is not less certain that God exists than a faithful simple man. And the reason is: because faith in the philosopher does not destroy the demonstration of the conclusion, but moreover as to certainty confirms it with supernatural certainty: although as to the obscurity of faith the philosopher cannot assent to a conclusion that is known. But on this matter we have said more, 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

TO the fourth argument, I deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that divine revelation certifies at once and together that God exists and that God reveals, in exercised act. Just as at once and together we see light and colors.

TO the last argument it is answered that it is one thing to say that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of certain natural truths: and another to say that the knowledge of them suffices for salvation. The second St. Thomas did not say. The first, however, is true. But observe that a dependence of this kind is rather as on a material cause and the capacity of nature, which is presupposed to grace, just as intellect and free will are presupposed; so too faith presupposes that there be no error in the intellect concerning certain natural truths. Whence that God exists is said to be a preamble to faith rather than to pertain per se to faith.

IT could be doubted third, concerning the third conclusion, which we noted in the solution to the second: whether theology and metaphysics differ in species, or rather in kind? And the reason for doubting was: because each is in the predicament of quality and in the species of habit. But the solution of this doubt will easily appear in the following article. In the meantime, however, know that this generic difference must be weighed according to the formal account of the knowable, which in respect of theology is elevated to such a degree that it surpasses by its abstraction every formal account of the natural knowable.

AND finally observe, concerning the solution to the second, that St. Thomas so answers as to deny expressly the consequence of the argument, and he assigns the reason: because concerning the same material knowable there can be several sciences under different accounts. From which it follows that Cajetan contends in vain with Scotus, who censures this solution, objecting that by it the necessity of theology is not saved. We, however, answer that it does not pertain to a good solution to prove the conclusion, but to defend it from the contrary objection. Which the solution of St. Thomas abundantly enough provides.

First conclusion is affirmative. He proves it by the express testimony of St. Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1.

Second conclusion, explanatory of the former. Sacred doctrine is a science. The reason is: because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, which of course is the science of God and of the Blessed.

It is argued first for the negative side by the first argument of St. Thomas: every science properly so called must proceed from principles known per se: but theology does not proceed from principles known per se, therefore it is not a science. But if you reply, with St. Thomas, that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known by the light of a higher science; it is urged against this. For if someone were now to take the principles of optics, which are otherwise conclusions of geometry, and assented to them only on the authority of the master of geometry who hands them down, that man would not have a science properly of optics; therefore neither do we properly have the science of theology. The antecedent is proved. For the whole discourse of the disciple is founded on the human faith of the master. And it is confirmed. If the principles of our theology are not evident to us, it follows that our theology is only a science of consequences, not of conclusions, and hence does not differ from logic. The consequence is proved. For in this consequence: every man is risible, Christ is a man, therefore Christ is risible, the major is evident to the physicist, the minor belongs immediately to faith; therefore the theologian's office will be only to judge that the consequence is good.

It is argued second: a heretic who errs in one article of faith can syllogize from the other articles. And yet a syllogism of this kind in a heretic does not generate science, therefore neither in a Catholic. The minor is admitted by all. The consequence is proved. For those principles from which the heretic proceeds are also known per se in the light of the science of the Blessed; therefore if this suffices for our theology to be a science, that too will be a science, or neither. And it is confirmed, and I suppose, that a Catholic theologian falls into one error only, e.g. that there is no purgatory, or that the souls of the saints do not see God until the day of judgment. Then this theologian does not immediately lose the acquired habit of theology; therefore if in that man that habit is not a science, neither was it a science before in the same Catholic.

It is argued third: if a conclusion which is called theological is to be deduced from the principles of faith, this must be done either by an evident consequence or by a probable one. If by an evident one, then the conclusion is also of faith, e.g. Christ is risible. But if by a non-evident one; then the conclusion will for the most part be a probable opinion, therefore theology is not properly a science.

It is argued fourth: a science properly so called must be concerned with necessary conclusions and from necessary principles: but very many of the principles of our theology are contingent, e.g. that the Word was made flesh, that he suffered in the flesh, that Antichrist will be born, and other similar things: to which nevertheless we assent immediately through faith; therefore the conclusions which are gathered from such principles are not necessary, and consequently there is no science properly so called concerning them.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that although Cajetan said in the preceding article that by the name of sacred doctrine St. Thomas did not understand faith determinately, or theology determinately, but took it indifferently for revealed doctrine either immediately, such as faith is, or mediately, such as theology is; nevertheless now in this article sacred doctrine is verified not of faith, but of the doctrine which inclines to the assent of the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith. For faith is related to this doctrine as the habit of first principles is to the natural sciences

Note secondly that Aristotle in 1 Posterior Analytics defined science with the utmost rigor, so that scarcely can any demonstration be brought into the middle for the form of that exemplar, except in mathematics. Just as Cicero also described the supreme orator, such as you will never find. But he will be a good orator who has come for the most part to the prototype. Wherefore Aristotle himself also taught, book 1 Ethics, ch. 3, that it is foolish to demand in every science and matter demonstrations equal in certainty and clarity. For this is the mark of an undisciplined mind. But in each science one must require demonstrations more or less exact according to the subject matter. For there is greater certainty and clarity in mathematics than in physics, inasmuch as physics, which is concerned with mobile being, shows its principles from the effect. But mathematics, since it deals with quantity, which is also plain to the senses, although it abstracts from sensible matter and from things subject to motions, nevertheless in the account of whole and part is most manifest to the intellect, and therefore the mathematical principles, Every whole is greater than its part, and, Things equal to one third thing are equal to one another, and similar ones, are most manifest to the intellect: since the terms of these principles are known to all. But in metaphysics, on account of the excessive abstraction of the object from intelligible matter, not all the principles are known per se to us. Whence very many metaphysical demonstrations are with difficulty comprehended by us. But indeed in moral matters, according to the Aristotelian precepts, a demonstration can scarcely be made, unless one adds that the demonstration is according to the subject matter. And nevertheless disciplines of this kind are called and are sciences.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: if theology be considered according to itself, that is, according to its proper species and object, it is properly and most exactly a science, and in a more perfect mode than the Aristotelian precepts require. It is proved. For theology according to itself is a habit for assenting to the conclusions which are drawn from supernatural principles and principles known per se by a supernatural light: but a habit of this kind is perfect according to its proper species in the theologians who see those first principles immediately by the beatific light; therefore in them it is a most perfect science.

Second conclusion. If we speak of theology as it is in us wayfarers, who do not know the principles evidently, but nevertheless assent to them most certainly and immediately by the light of faith; it is truly and properly a science, although imperfect. This conclusion is proved first. For a theological habit of this kind is an intellectual virtue, since it always inclines to the true: but this virtue is not the habit of first principles, since it is occupied with conclusions, nor is it prudence, because it is not occupied with singular things to be done here and now, nor is it art, because it is not occupied with things to be made, therefore it is wisdom or science. I prove the consequence. Since Aristotle, 6 Ethics, distributed the intellectual virtues into the aforesaid number.

But perhaps someone will reply that theology is a theological virtue, which is called faith. But against this is that faith does not assent to complex truths by discourse, but rests immediately on divine revelation, as we discussed at length in 2-2, q. 1, art. 1. And it is confirmed from the first canonical epistle of John, ch. 5: He that believeth in the Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself: therefore the theological habit is deservedly and properly called a science. It is proved secondly. For when Aristotle taught that science proceeds from evident things, he either understood from things evident to us or from things evident in themselves. If the first, then metaphysics will not be properly a science, which often proceeds from things evident in themselves only and not to us, e.g. when it is demonstrated that substances separate from matter are incorruptible: and that God is eternal, because he is immutable, and that he moves all things, because he is the first being; which principles are not known per se to us, such as that God exists, or that an angel exists. But if he understands it of principles known per se in themselves; then I argue thus. Theological principles are most certain and most evident in themselves, e.g. that the Father begets the Son, therefore on this side it will not cease to be properly a science.

BUT someone will say that the principles of the other sciences, although they are not immediately evident to us, nevertheless become evident to us a posteriori, e.g. from the motion of things, evident to us, we gather that God exists and that he is one, and similar things, and that nature is the principle of motion and rest: but this does not happen in theological principles. For their assent always remains obscure in us. I admit that this is so. But hence I shall make a stronger argument. If the evidence of the conclusions which are deduced from such principles need not be produced in us from the evidence of the principles in themselves, then it is not per se necessary that the scientific assent of the conclusion receive its evidence from the principles: since it is granted that the principles, as principles, do not have evidence as regards us, but only have evidence from without and from the effect. And it is confirmed. If for the account of a proper science it suffices that the principles have in us a certain evidence, as it were borrowed from the effects; and on account of it the assent of the principles is held as certain and necessary, so that from there the effects may in turn be demonstrated; then much more ought it to suffice that the principles of our theology have their certainty from God himself, infallibly revealing to us by the light of faith that those principles are most true. The conclusion is proved third. When Aristotle said, no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge; he did not exclude our theology from the account of science. For we theologians have either knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge, namely divine faith, which surpasses all human science, indeed even the natural light itself. And it is confirmed. For evidence is required in the principles to the extent that it conduces to the intellect being convinced and adhering firmly to the truth: but the certainty of our faith alone makes the intellect adhere more strongly to the assent of the principles than any natural habit, therefore our theology will with better right be called properly a science than all the other human disciplines. And also most rightly is our theology called by St. Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book 12 On the Trinity, ch. 14, a science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened. But he says that faith is begotten by this science, because it is the theologian's office by reasoning to remove the impediments by which unbelievers are held back from receiving the faith. St. Jerome too, in the epistle to Paulinus, tome 4, says: Let us learn on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. It must be observed, however, that what we said in the second conclusion, that our theology is an imperfect science, can be understood in two ways. In one way by comparison with the other sciences. And thus it is not to be called imperfect, but rather simply much more perfect than all human sciences: since it surpasses them incomparably in certainty. It will, however, be imperfect in a certain respect on account of its non-evidence. In the other way it can be called imperfect by comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species. As an infant is an imperfect man: because he cannot yet exercise the perfect actions of his proper species. And in this way our theology is truly imperfect, because for this present state it lacks the evidence which it will have within its own species in the fatherland, when that which is perfect shall come. For then the principles to which we now assent by faith we shall see by the light of glory. In the meantime, however, we shall sit under the shadow of him whom we desire, however sweet its fruit may be to our palate. And the contrary was the error of certain men, who are called the Illuminati in Spain, who boasted that they had evidence of the mysteries of faith.

TO the arguments in opposition it is answered. TO the first St. Thomas answers very well that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known per se by the light of a higher science. But to the rejoinder it is answered that in that case that man would not have science, but human faith as regards the principles immediately, and as regards the conclusions mediately, whose assent would be called an opinion founded on human faith. And then I deny the consequence. For the parallel adduced by St. Thomas is not so to be understood that one man has only optics and another geometry. For in that way optics would not be a science, according to the Aristotelian doctrine: no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge. But that man does not have knowledge of the premises, but mere human faith; therefore he cannot have the science of optics. The parallel is therefore to be understood as regards this, that just as the science of optics receives its principles from another science; and this does not prevent it from being a science: so our theology receives its principles from the blessed science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. But there is a great difference. For our theology can be a science even if it is not together with the blessed science; but optics cannot be a science unless it has been conjoined with the science of geometry in the same intellect. And the reason for this difference is: because the principles of theology are communicated to us from the blessed science of God through the light of the supernatural order, which is the light of faith, which is firmer than every human science, although the evidence of the science of the Blessed is not communicated to us. But the principles of optics in one who lacks geometry are not communicated to him except through human faith, which ground of assenting is weak, and hence he will not have science of the conclusions either. And in this way let the example be understood which St. Thomas brings, On Truth, q. 14, art. 10, where he compares our theology to the discipline of some disciple who believes the principles on the authority of the master. But there is surely a difference, that our master is God himself, who opens our ears that we may hear him as a master and be truly taught of God, as is said John 6. And because the authority of this master is altogether infallible, our theology, reasoning from there to the conclusions, properly has the account of a science. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. For the assent of that conclusion, Christ is risible, is produced jointly from the assent of the premises. And to that extent, from the light of the antecedent applied through a good consequence, there is caused an acquired light of a higher order than the natural. And that causes certainty in the assent of the conclusion. Which is more evident when each premise is of faith.

TO the second argument it is denied that a heretic can be a true theologian, even if he was previously a Catholic. And the reason is: because now he believes all the principles by human faith alone or by opinion. And to the confirmation it is answered that the other sciences are not lost on account of one error concerning a conclusion. But if the error were concerning the formal account of the principles; then the whole science would be corrupted: although a certain aptitude would remain, as it were the corpse of a science. And because a heretic errs concerning the formal account of the principles, which is divine revelation, for believing the things which the Church proposes; therefore consequently the whole theology, which rests on those principles, is straightway destroyed, just as also the whole faith perishes.

TO the third argument the most learned Master Friar Dominic de Soto, 1 Posterior Analytics, q. 2, at the confirmation of the seventh argument, says that when a conclusion is deduced from a principle of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith. Wherefore he judges that only those conclusions pertain to theological science which are deduced from the principles of faith by probable consequences. But this opinion is false. It is proved first. For it would follow that our theology is mere opinion. The consequence is plain. For from principles however certain and evident, through a probable consequence, nothing but opinion can be generated; as is plain in the argumentation which is taken from evident examples, e.g. Peter in some business became rich; and Paul likewise; therefore if you have done business in that way, you will be rich. Here nothing but an opinion of the consequent is generated. Likewise it is false that he says that it is similarly of faith that Christ is a man and that Christ is risible. For if anyone confessed that Christ is a perfect man, but denied that he is risible; because he is of the opinion that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not been defined by the Church up to now that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine; then whoever denied that Christ is risible would be a heretic. Because he would be opposing the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and ground of truth.

It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident, by a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of them is said to be an error concerning faith mediately: and he who holds the contrary comes into suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher: because he is not to be believed to deny the things which are known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny a principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, in book 12 On Theological Places, ch. 2.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that certain first principles of theology are most necessary, e.g. that God is three and one, that the Father begets the Son. Others, however, there are which, considered from their proper terms, seem to be contingent, e.g. that Christ was crowned with thorns. But if these very things are considered as they are subject to divine revelation, they are altogether necessary: just as it is necessary that God be truthful, so that he can neither be deceived nor deceive. And this suffices for the certainty of theological science.

IT IS DOUBTED second, concerning the second conclusion: Whether our theology is properly subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed.

It is argued first for the negative side by the argument of Scotus, q. 3 of the prologue of the first book of the Sentences. Theology is a science about God: but the science about God cannot be other than one, therefore there is not one theology subalternating and another subalternated. The minor is proved. For the deity is not other than a single formal account.

It is argued second: where the subalternating science ends, the subalternated begins, that is, the conclusions of the subalternating science are the principles of the subalternated science; but the theology of the Blessed is also concerned with the same conclusions with which our theology is concerned, therefore.

It is argued third: the subject of the subalternated science adds some difference accidentally contracting the subject of the subalternating science, according to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics (e.g. number as sounding is the subject of music, and adds an accidental difference, namely of sounds, above number, which is the subject of arithmetic) but the object of our theology is not so related to the object of the theology of the Blessed, therefore. Nor does it avail to answer that our theology is occupied with God obscurely known, while the theology of the Blessed is occupied with God known according to himself: since this obscurity is not an account which the theologian considers in his conclusions. Indeed it is not even a necessary condition: since otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, nor be together with the subalternating science.

TO this difficulty Cajetan in this place, although he does not think our theology to be a science simply, as it is in us; nevertheless he absolutely concedes that it is subordinated to the science of God and of the Blessed. But to the arguments made he answers that this single condition is necessary for some science to be called subalternated to another, that its principles be evident in the other science. But this opinion seems false. First indeed, because if it is enough for a science to be subalternated that its principles be evident in another science, and a distinct account of the object is not necessary; it follows that if someone believes certain propositions of geometry on the authority of a master asserting them, and then deduces many conclusions from those suppositions by evident consequences, it follows, I say, that this disciple acquires a habit subalternated to that science by which the prior conclusions are demonstrated; and the consequent is false. For if that disciple afterwards learns the demonstrations of the prior conclusions, there will not be in him a twofold science, but a single geometry; therefore a distinct account of the object of the subalternated science is necessary. Then Cajetan does not seem sufficiently to explain the account of the object of our theology and of that which is in the Blessed. For he says that God clearly seen is the object of the Blessed, but the object of our theology is God revealed, abstracting from clarity and obscurity. Against this is that then the object of the subalternating science would be less universal and more determinate; and the object of the subalternated would be more common. For it is plain that God seen clearly or obscurely is not an object as determinate as God clearly seen. Then when the wayfarer theologian has come to God clearly seen, then his theology is truly concerned with God clearly seen; therefore there will be nothing there by which it is distinguished from the subalternating science.

FOR the decision of this difficulty it must be supposed first that in the Blessed there is a twofold knowledge. One by which they know God openly and in him certain creatures, seeing as it were in a single intuition the principle and the conclusions. And this is the beatific vision, immutable and measurable by participated eternity. And this is in a more eminent mode a science than every other one defined by Aristotle. For it is an open knowledge of truths in their first principle, without any discourse. The other knowledge is in the Blessed, by which they know things through their proper species, which is called by Augustine evening knowledge; but the former is called morning knowledge.

It must be supposed secondly that the evening knowledge can be considered in two ways in the Blessed themselves. One by which they know certain principles by the natural light, and in them the conclusions. And this is natural science, which remained also in the demons. The other, by which they see certain supernatural principles in God himself by the light of glory. Whence they become able to deduce certain conclusions from them, which they consider through their proper species. And this is properly theological science.

These things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the beatific knowledge is eminently a subalternating science not only in respect of our theology, but also in respect of every natural science. It is proved. For all the principles of the sciences, however known by the natural light, have there a higher and more manifest account of their truth; therefore in respect of that knowledge every other science is in a certain way subalternated: and much more our theology, whose principles are obscure to us but are seen there.

Second conclusion. If our theology be compared to the theology which is in the Blessed, through which from principles known in the Word they deduce conclusions and consider them through their proper species; then our theology is not properly subalternated, but is related only as the imperfect to the perfect within the same species. This conclusion is proved first, by the third argument made for the negative side. Then, because each theology proceeds from principles revealed immediately through divine revelation: but that this revelation is obscure is accidental to the proper account of theological science, just as it is accidental to water to be warm, therefore, etc. I prove the minor. Because otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, just as faith cannot remain, whose necessary condition of object is obscurity, and whose formal account is obscure revelation: of which, however, we shall say more in art. 3. In the meantime, however, let us answer the arguments posited at the beginning.

TO the first argument of Scotus it is answered: I deny the minor. And to the proof it is answered that although the deity is single in itself and most simple: nevertheless as it is subject to different formal accounts, under which it is knowable, it has a sufficient foundation for the distinction of sciences and habits. E.g. God pertains to the object of metaphysics as knowable by the natural light: and he is the object of our faith as subject to the light of obscure revelation: and he is the object of our theology as subject to the light which, from principles otherwise revealed by God, shows certain things about God himself: he is also the object of the beatific vision as subject to the light of glory, in respect of which vision our theology is said to be eminently subalternated.

TO the second argument it is answered that it proves our second conclusion.

TO the third argument it is answered that St. Thomas never asserted that our theology is simply subalternated, but that it is related as a subalternated science. And in truth the most powerful condition of a subalternated science is that its principles be shown in the subalternating science. There is supposed, however, a distinction of the formal object, which must be more limited and less simple in the subalternated than in the subalternating. And moreover the object of the subalternated science, accidentally contracted, must be considered insofar as it is subject to the subalternated science. All of which, although they do not belong to our theology in respect of the theology of the Blessed, which they have through their proper species of things: nevertheless they belong well to our theology and to the theology of the Blessed in respect of the beatific vision, whose object, as it is subject to the light of glory, is purer and simpler, and this light shows the accounts of the other things known through their proper species much more perfectly than any other lower light. But that condition, that the object of the subalternated science be accidentally contracted, is also verified after its own manner in the present case. For God himself, as he shines forth in his creatures, is, as it were, accidentally contracted: and thus he is known through the species of creatures. But insofar as he is known by the light of glory, his purity and substance are considered as they are in themselves.

And if anyone objects that the light of glory also concurs in the assent to the conclusions which the Blessed deduce from the vision of God, so that they consider them in their proper species, therefore the formal account of the object is the same. It is answered that the light of glory does not concur immediately in the assent to those conclusions, but through the natural light, by which the consequence of the conclusion is seen, or also through the light acquired by the power of the infused light, or certainly through some light which by natural consequence is begotten in the Blessed from the reverberation (so to speak) of the light of glory, which produces a certain splendor in the evening knowledge. Nor is this wonderful. Since the theologians also concede that in the exercise of the infused virtues we acquire in the same powers certain virtues which we call acquired, so that sometimes, the infused virtues being lost through mortal sin, there remain in us certain habits of virtues similar to the former virtues. And so it can happen that from the exercise of the light of glory about God clearly seen there results in the natural power of the intellect a certain divine splendor by which the intellect is perfected and becomes able to know other things through their proper species in a more excellent mode than they would be known by the natural light alone. From what has been said we shall easily proceed to the solution of the following doubt.

IT IS DOUBTED third: Whether our theology remains in the fatherland, or rather is exchanged for the other theology of the Blessed

It is argued first for the negative side from 1 Cor. 13: When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Whence the theologians gather that faith does not remain in the fatherland: because faith is an imperfect and obscure knowledge; but our theology is imperfect and obscure, therefore it does not remain in the fatherland. It is confirmed, because in the same place it is said: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, therefore it is signified that our theology will not remain in the fatherland. On which passage Cajetan holds that our theology does not remain in the fatherland: and Theophylact holds the same on the same passage.

It is argued second. The formal account of our theology does not remain in the fatherland, therefore neither does theology itself. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the following article, the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith: but this account does not remain in the fatherland, since faith does not remain, therefore, etc.

It is argued third. Our theology is generated from non-evident assents, therefore it itself cannot be a habit inclining to an evident assent: but theology in the fatherland inclines to an evident assent, therefore it is the other one.

It is argued fourth. A non-evident assent cannot itself become evident, as seems manifest, therefore a non-evident habit cannot likewise become evident, therefore the habit of our theology does not remain in the fatherland.

It is argued fifth. The theology of the Blessed is a habit infused per se: and our theology is a habit acquired per se: but a habit acquired per se cannot be the same as a habit infused per se; therefore our theology does not remain in the fatherland, or certainly we shall have a twofold theology, one infused and the other acquired. The consequence and the minor are evident. The major is proved. For the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, seems to be of the same account as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ, which is indeed not infused accidentally, but per se; therefore the knowledge which all the Blessed have outside the Word will also be infused per se, or certainly derived per se from the beatific knowledge.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that a habit or a virtue which we have on the way can remain in the fatherland in two ways. In one way for ornament, but not for exercise. As temperance and fortitude, which are occupied with the passions, will remain. In the other way a virtue can remain not only for ornament, but also for exercise. As prudence, even acquired prudence, will remain, religion will remain, and other similar virtues. And if you ask why faith and hope will not remain at least for ornament, as temperance and fortitude remain, although they do not exercise their proper acts? It is answered that there is a very great difference. Because the formal account of the object of faith and hope is intrinsically repugnant to the formal account of the beatific vision. According to that: Faith is to believe what you do not see; and according to that: What a man sees, why does he hope for? And therefore it does not pertain to the ornament of the blessed soul to be adorned with habits of this kind. But the formal account of the object of fortitude and temperance has no repugnance to the formal account of beatitude: indeed in Christ the Lord, whose soul was blessed from the beginning of the incarnation, there was at once the exercise of fortitude and temperance together with the beatific vision; and yet the exercise of faith or hope could not be together with the vision. Wherefore there is not the same account of faith and hope, and of the other virtues.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the theology which we acquire on the way through necessary consequences from revealed principles remains in the fatherland not only for ornament, but also for exercise. This conclusion is easily proved once the decision of the preceding doubts is presupposed. For if our theology is properly a science, although it is imperfect by reason of its state and not from its proper species, as has been sufficiently explained in the first doubt of this article, there is no reason why it should not remain in the fatherland for ornament and exercise, the imperfection which it has accidentally on the way being removed. And it is confirmed. For the obscurity which our theology has on the way is accidental to the formal account of its specific object, which indeed is considered as subject to divine revelation mediately through evident discourse. But that that revelation, certain as it is, is obscure in its principles, although it pertains per se to faith; nevertheless accrues accidentally to the science of theology. For it belongs to it as it is small and beginning: but it will be made perfect and evident, when the evidence which it seeks has come to it from principles evidently known. And I wonder at Cajetan, who, although he holds that our theology abstracts from the obscure and the evident, nevertheless asserts in the passage cited that it does not remain in the fatherland.

It is proved secondly, from the ground of St. Thomas in this article, by which he proves that sacred doctrine is a science whose principles are known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed, therefore it is not repugnant for it to be conjoined with a higher science, just as it is not repugnant for a subalternated science, indeed it most of all agrees that it be conjoined with the subalternating science.

It is proved third. For the gifts of the Holy Spirit which in this life pertain to the intellect have non-evidence for this state, and nevertheless they remain in the fatherland with evidence, as St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. 68, art. 6. Therefore it is not repugnant that the habit of theology, which now is non-evident, can become evident in the blessed life, since that non-evidence is not intrinsic to its species. And finally it is proved from St. Jerome in the epistle to Paulinus: Let us learn (he says) on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. And it is confirmed. For in the fatherland there will be no oblivion of the demonstrations which were acquired on the way concerning the objects of the other disciplines, therefore neither concerning the object of theology. Those authors, however, who hold that our theology acquired on the way is not a science; or that it is opinion, as Scotus, Durandus, and Marsilius, Gabriel, Ockham, and Adam, and Master Soto in the passage cited above, who said that our theology proceeds only by probable consequences, all these will speak consequently if they deny that our theology remains in the fatherland. For the habit of opinion can never become scientific.

Second conclusion. It is very probable to me that in the Blessed, besides the beatific knowledge, there is no other theology infused per se, but every other theology besides the beatific vision is in the angels acquired per se by the power of the light of glory, the natural light being added for gathering the conclusions from those principles which they know through their proper species; and the blessed men who did not learn theology in this life will do likewise. But those who did learn it will there be perfected and will know more things through their proper species than those who did not learn it while they were on the way. For grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. From this conclusion we except the soul of Christ the Lord, who had a habit of knowledge not accidentally but per se infused, as we shall say in the solution to the last argument.

TO the arguments, then, made in opposition it is answered.

TO the first, that that testimony of the Apostle is legitimately understood of faith itself, as is plain from what follows. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. But what he says: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, can also be understood of the knowledge of faith, which on account of its certainty is sometimes called knowledge, according to John 11: I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. And elsewhere Job 19: I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth. And many other similar things will be found in the Sacred Scriptures.

It is answered secondly that the Apostle does not affirm that the knowledge which is acquired here will be destroyed, but speaks conditionally, as when he says, whether tongues shall cease; and yet it is certain that in the Blessed the knowledge of tongues will remain: indeed, as is probably asserted, after the resurrection they will sometimes praise God with bodily tongues, as St. Thomas says, lect. 3 on the same passage of the Apostle. But tongues are said to cease, because it will not be necessary to use various tongues so that the Blessed may understand one another, because in the future glory anyone will understand any tongue. And perhaps in that state, as in the beginning of the human race, there will be only one speech and one lip. Or finally, if it is more pleasing, say with St. Thomas on that passage, whether knowledge shall be destroyed, not indeed as regards the habit or the intelligible species which the soul acquired in this life, but because, separated from the body, it will not know by conversion to phantasms. But nevertheless on the day of judgment the soul will be able to understand and know freely by conversion to phantasms. But this will not be necessary, just as neither will it be necessary to use various tongues. Whence this solution nearly coincides with the preceding one. However the matter may stand, certainly St. Thomas in the place cited above reproves the opinion of those who, on the occasion of the apostolic testimony, deny that acquired knowledge remains in the fatherland.

TO the second argument, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that St. Thomas in the following article does not say that the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith, but that sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are divinely revealed. It is therefore accidental to the formal account of our theology that that revelation of the principles be obscure. For this pertains to its imperfect state.

TO the third argument it is answered that that antecedent, our theology is generated from non-evident assents, if it makes formal sense, is false. For our theology according to its proper species is not per se generated from non-evident assents, although it is materially true that here and now, for this state, it is generated from non-evident assents. In which sense the antecedent is true, but the consequence is worth nothing: indeed the same habit, if there be removed what is accidental to the proper species of theology, namely the obscurity concerning the principles, will nevertheless remain the same habit, more perfect and more illustrious than before, on account of its conjunction with the light of glory.

TO the fourth argument it is answered first, let the antecedent pass and I deny the consequence. As perhaps the same assent in number of unformed faith cannot become formed: because it is varied according to that circumstance of one living or dead: nevertheless it does not follow from this that the habit of faith does not remain the same, formed by charity, which before had been unformed.

It is answered, secondly, I deny the antecedent. Indeed from the nature of the thing it is possible that the same assent in number, e.g. of this conclusion, Christ is risible, which is now had from a principle known by faith, be continued in the fatherland, if God suddenly infused the light of glory concerning the same principle. But because, speaking regularly, the actual assent of theological conclusions is interrupted, not only when a man passes from this life to the other, but also at intervals in the present life; therefore it is never verified that the same assent in number is now non-evident and afterwards evident. But the habit, because from its nature it remains, can well be the same, now non-evident and afterwards evident. Just as the same man is an infant and afterwards a man.

TO the fifth argument, I deny the major, if we speak of the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word: indeed I think that it is either acquired by their own acts or consequent upon the beatific vision. And however it be, I do not concede that it is infused per se: indeed it is of such a species that it can be acquired by our acts. Just as the knowledge was instilled by God himself in our first parent, which the theologians call infused accidentally, because it was such as he could acquire by his own acts.

To the proof of the major it is answered that the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, is not of the same species as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ. And the reason is: because the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ extends per se to the knowledge of the thoughts of the heart, to which act no knowledge of men or of angels can extend itself. From which it is plainly gathered that it is a knowledge infused per se. Whose formal account is more universal and simpler than the formal account of our theology, or of the Blessed.

For the greater understanding of this, observe what we shall dispute at length in q. 57, art. 4: that although the angels can know the thoughts of the heart revealed by the one thinking, or by God himself revealing specially, and then, when the angel knows them, there is no need for him to acquire new species, but he knows the thoughts of the heart and the free actions of the will through the old ones; nevertheless an angel, even a blessed one, does not have a habitual faculty, or knowledge, which can extend itself to knowledge of this kind without a new revelation. But the soul of Christ the Lord has so great a fullness of knowledge that it penetrates our thoughts and affections not only by the light of glory and the beatific vision, but is also able, from the habit of infused knowledge, to know the thoughts of hearts without a new revelation. All of which is plain from the doctrine of St. Thomas in 3rd part, q. 11, art. 1. Whence I would deservedly say that the knowledge of the soul of Christ is infused per se and of another species than our theology and that of the Blessed.

Observe concerning the foregoing that there are not wanting theologians who say that our theology is acquired accidentally and nevertheless is of the same species as the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word, which they say is infused per se. Just as it happens conversely that some knowledge is accidentally infused, such as was conferred on our first parent, which nevertheless according to itself and the proper account of its object is acquired. But they are mistaken in this opinion. For it is not possible that knowledge which is infused per se and from the proper account of its object be acquired by anyone, even accidentally: because an inferior power cannot attain to a superior effect, not even accidentally. But conversely, from a superior power one can have by infusion what he could acquire by his own powers.

CONCERNING the solution to the second argument of St. Thomas observe that singularity which does not arise from a material object does not prevent something from being able to be the object of a science. For God himself, unique and most singular, is most of all knowable. Because his singularity is subsistent to-be itself and pure act. Indeed there can be a science about Michael: because his singularity is according to his proper species and not according to matter. The reason for this doctrine can be assigned from the account of the object of the intellect, which is being. Whence what is more perfectly being is more knowable. But a thing is more perfectly being the more it is in act and the less in potency. Therefore if there be given a singular being whose singularity does not arise from matter and potentiality, but because that being is pure act, it will also be most of all knowable. Similarly also, because the principle of individuation in angels is not matter, but they are individuated from their proper species negatively, insofar as such a nature has nothing by which it might be multiplied, for that reason there can be a science about this nature of Michael. But about singulars composed of matter there cannot per se be a science: because according to themselves they are individuated from matter, which is unknowable, as being pure potency which is known only through its order to form and act. But form and act pertain to the species of the thing; and by reason of the participated species material individuals have the account of form and act, and to that extent there can be a science about them, but not per se insofar as they are singulars.

And if anyone objects that about Christ the Lord there can per se be, and is, the science of theology. It is answered that Christ the Lord can be considered in two ways. In one way as regards his singular humanity; and thus there is no more a science about him than about Peter, about whom there is no science except insofar as he is a man. In the other way he can be considered by reason of his divine person. And in this way there is per se a science of theology about him. But about his singular humanity there is a science of theology through its order to God himself, just as about many other singulars which fall under divine revelation, as St. Thomas says in the following article, to the first.