Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

IT IS DOUBTED secondly: Whether the first conclusion of the article is true? And it seems that it is not true, nay that there is a contradiction in the letter of St. Thomas. For that there will be a general resurrection of the dead is an article of faith; and yet the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, argues to show the general resurrection of the dead from this, that Christ rose again; therefore sacred doctrine argues to prove its principles: and St. Thomas wrongly adduced the testimony of the Apostle in order to conclude that sacred doctrine does not argue to prove its principles — nay, from this testimony the opposite is established: since from one principle of faith another principle is concluded.

It is argued second. The principles of our faith are evidently credible, as is shown at length in 2.2, q. 1, art. 5; therefore arguments are made by which they are shown to be evidently credible; and very many such arguments we have set out in 2.2 in the place above; therefore theology argues to prove its principles. It is argued third. Because St.

Thomas himself in the Summa against the Gentiles persuades the dogmas of our faith by very many reasons, even natural ones. As, for example, that there is a resurrection of the dead, that it is possible to see God as he is, and many other things; therefore.

It is argued fourth. This is a necessary consequence: Christ rose again, therefore Christ died; therefore the theologian can efficaciously prove one principle from another.

TO this doubt there is a brief answer; let it be the first conclusion.

Theology does not argue to prove its principles by concluding efficaciously and necessarily, neither a priori, nor from the effect. This conclusion is clear from the ground of St. Thomas. And it is confirmed. Because if they are truly the principles of that science, that science cannot begin from other things; otherwise they would no longer be the principles of the science.

And if someone objects that the physicist can begin from the effects which he perceives by sense in order to show that the principles of those effects exist; therefore also in theology the principles can at least be efficaciously proved a posteriori. It is answered: whatever be the case with the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For the account is not the same. Because natural effects, especially those which are open to sense, can sufficiently show their natural principles. Since there is a proportion between the effects and their cause, known by the natural light. But in respect of the principles of theology, which are concerning God insofar as he is the author of grace above the whole order of nature, there are no effects evident to us which have a proportion and a necessary connection with those first principles. And therefore neither a posteriori can we evidently prove the principles of sacred theology.

Let the second conclusion be: It pertains to sacred theology not only to explain its first principles, but also to show probably that they are true, and to demonstrate that they are evidently credible. Of which thing you have an example in the commentaries on 2.2 above, where we adduced very many arguments by which the evangelical doctrine is demonstrated to be evidently credible. And arguments of this sort conduce not only to inducing the unbeliever to the faith, but also to removing the temptations of the believer, by which he is sometimes assailed against the truth of the faith. Nor is this contrary to the saying of Ambrose, lib. 1 On Faith, ch. 5, where he says: Take away arguments where faith is sought, because arguments of this sort are not brought in as a reason for believing, but as a reason destroying the false arguments by which someone is tempted to depart from the faith. For the scandal is taken away from that weak man, lest he depart from the faith.

Third conclusion, for the understanding of the second conclusion of St. Thomas. When sacred theology argues against those who deny certain principles, if they concede others, it proceeds sometimes not only probably, but even with necessary consequence. As, for example, against the Jews, who admit the Old Testament, necessary arguments are made from the supposition of the Old Testament, by which it is concluded that the Messiah has already come, and has fulfilled the Old Testament.

And if someone says: Why then are not all the Jews converted? It is answered with the Apostle, 2 Cor. 3, that a veil is placed before their face while Moses is read. Since therefore St. Thomas in the second conclusion says that sacred doctrine argues against those who deny certain principles, he does not understand it of an argumentation that is only probable. For in that way it would also argue against those who deny all the principles, which St. Thomas denies in the third conclusion, where he speaks in the same form as in the second. He therefore understands in both conclusions an argumentation that is not only probable but necessary.

TO the arguments on the opposite side it is answered that the argumentation of the Apostle is directed rather to unbelievers and to those who deny the resurrection of the dead than to the faithful. For he says: If Christ be preached that he rose again from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? Behold, one article of faith they conceded, namely that Christ rose again, but the other they denied. And therefore the Apostle, from the resurrection of Christ and other things which they admitted, argues to prove the resurrection of the dead, not only from things conceded but also from the prophecy of Hosea 13, as it were leading to an inconvenience: that if there were no resurrection of the dead, the prophecy would never be fulfilled which says: Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? For if the dead rise not again, death would conquer for ever. But that consequence which the Apostle makes in concluding that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again, is not evident by the natural light, but is evidently credible from the supposition, namely that Christ, who is the head and redeemer of men, rose again. Nor did St. Thomas wrongly adduce the testimony of the Apostle to prove that sacred doctrine does not argue to prove its principles. Since although the resurrection of the dead is a principle of theology, nevertheless the argument was made to those who denied a principle of this sort. St. Thomas also adduced this example, that he might teach us to argue similarly. To the second argument it is answered that it does not militate against the first conclusion.

Since that conclusion does not deny that the things which are of faith can be proved according to the common account of the credible, but it denies that they can be proved simply by theology. But according to the common account St. Thomas teaches, 2.2, q. 1, art. 4, to the second argument, that the things which are of faith can be seen under the common account of the credible. To the third argument it is answered that St.

Thomas in the Summa against the Gentiles does not intend to make demonstrations of the things which are of faith, but vehement persuasions that they are possible and not repugnant to natural reason.

To the fourth argument it is answered that consequences of this sort, in which one article can be gathered from another, are useless argumentations, unless they are made to those who deny one principle and concede another. Wherefore, simply speaking, theology does not argue to prove its principles. So much concerning this difficulty.

CONCERNING the third conclusion of the article it is to be noted that, since every argument convincing the intellect must proceed from true things and by a good consequence, the theologian must in two ways dissolve the arguments made against the faith. In one way by denying the antecedent, in the other way by denying the consequence. But further he can deny the antecedent or the consequence in two ways. In one way from things proper to theology, not indeed known but believed: as, for example, if someone objects against the faith of the Trinity that no thing numerically one is several hypostases; and then the theologian answers: I deny the antecedent; nay, God is one substance in number and three hypostases. In the other way he can answer from things known, either simply or as regards something: as if, for example, to the same objection the theologian answers, I deny the antecedent if that thing be an infinite essence or an infinite substance. Then he answers from things known, not simply: for he does not know but believes that an infinite thing is several hypostases, but he knows that it is not repugnant to the intellect that an unlimited essence be in several supposits. And so he at least makes the objection doubtful, so that it does not conclude certainly. Further, if another objects against the mystery of the Eucharist in this way: To be an accident is to be in a subject; therefore if the accidents are in this sacrament, it follows that they are in a substance. Then the theologian will answer from things known that to be an accident is not formally to be actually in a subject, but in aptitude. Which proposition is known, although not from the proper principles of theology: yet the theologian by his own office uses other sciences as handmaids for dissolving objections contrary to his own principles. It must therefore be said that solutions of the first kind are not theological; but it belongs to any believer so to answer. But the remaining solutions are theological, which proceed from things known in either way.

Again, also in the denial of the consequence there can be two ways of answering. In one way by denying absolutely any consequence in which something against the faith is inferred, so that the one answering gives no reason or assigns no defect of the consequence; and such a response belongs to any Christian. In the other way one can answer by assigning some difference of comparison, or by showing the defect of the consequence; and such a response pertains to the office of the theologian. As if, for example, someone objects against the mystery of the Trinity: This is a good consequence: every man begets, Peter is a man, therefore Peter begets: therefore also this is a good consequence: every God begets, the Son is God, therefore the Son begets. Then the theologian will answer that those consequences are not of a like form; and he will assign an instance: Every motion is an action, passion is a motion, therefore passion is an action. In which the antecedent is conceded by all, and the consequent denied. And accordingly, just as the natural philosopher or the metaphysician will be bound to answer to this third consequence and to say that it is not like the first on account of some logical defect: so too the theologian will answer that the second consequence is not like the first, and will assign the same defect as the philosopher, or certainly another similar one according to the rules of prioristic resolution. Of which it is not now to be spoken one by one.

On the Theological Places.

NOW indeed we must come to those things which are more weighty; namely, that concerning the fourth, fifth and sixth conclusions of St. Thomas, in which the difference of the places from which the theologian draws his arguments is set out by St. Thomas, we carefully examine the most principal doubts which can offer themselves.

At the outset, for beginning theologians, we must briefly say what a theological place is, and how many kinds of theological place there are. A theological place is therefore a certain seat and head from which the theologian draws his arguments. Nor must we dwell very long on the explanation of this definition. Since just as in the other human sciences each has its own heads and principles of arguments, which are arranged according to the dialectical art. Which Aristotle seems to have done in the Topics, setting out the common places from which every form of argumentation for every disputation might be found. In this way therefore we too, presupposing the things which from dialectic are common to all disciplines (whose ignorance I see to be very harmful to many theologians otherwise most diligent), set out certain places proper to theology as certain storehouses, from which the theologian may easily draw the necessary argumentations for confirming the truth and refuting falsehood. But the division of places of this sort, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in the aforesaid conclusions, is threefold. For he reduced the places of arguing which the theologian can use to three heads.

The FIRST head is the authority of Sacred Scripture. And accordingly the first and most principal place of arguing for the theologian is from the authority of Sacred Scripture. The reason for which St. Thomas gives in the solution to the second argument. Because the principles of this doctrine are had through revelation, and accordingly theology proceeds as from a most proper place from the authority of canonical Scripture. In which the things which pertain to faith are contained, revealed to the sacred writers.

The second place of arguing for the theologian is from the authority of the other doctors of the Church, whence the theologian (says St. Thomas) argues probably.

The third place, which the theologian uses as though it were extrinsic, is human reason and the authority of philosophers. From which he deduces probable arguments. These things we have from St. Thomas. BUT the more recent theologians, for the sake of distinction and that they might more exactly instruct their disciples, bring forward a greater number of these places. Among whom my teacher Cano seems to stand out most diligently and with wonderful erudition in this part. He therefore numbers ten heads of theological argumentations, from which the theologian proceeds according as opportunity requires.

The first place is the authority of Sacred Scripture, which is contained in the canonical books.

The second place is the Apostolic tradition, which although it is not written, is nevertheless a doctrine which is believed to have passed from Christ himself and the Holy Spirit through the Apostles from ear to ear even to us. And therefore traditions of this sort can rightly be called oracles of the living voice.

The third place is the authority of the Church.

The fourth place is the authority of a general Council.

The fifth is the authority of the Roman Church, in which is also included the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

The sixth is the authority of the holy Fathers, doctors of the Church.

The seventh is the authority of the scholastic theologians, to which is joined the authority of the experts in pontifical law.

The eighth is natural reason, which exercises itself in all the disciplines discovered by the natural light.

The ninth place is the authority of the natural philosophers, to which is joined the authority of the consultors of the imperial law, who profess true moral philosophy.

The tenth and last is the authority of human History, whether written by authors worthy of faith, or handed down by the report of ancestors.

BUT you ask what is the cause why St. Thomas mentioned only those three heads?

It is answered that St. Thomas set down those three by way of example, to which nevertheless the ten numbered can be reduced. Since to the authority of canonical Scripture can be reduced also the authority of the Roman Church and the firmness of the councils and of the Apostolic traditions. For in all these the divine authority is contained, which is found first in the Sacred Letters or in the authors of the sacred letters, in which also the authority of the Church is commended, when it was said to Peter, Matth. 16: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church. Then to the authority of the other doctors of the Church can be reduced, as something lesser, the authority of the scholastics and the philosophers, whose authority in this part is not as great as that of the holy Fathers, whom the scholastic theologians themselves deservedly venerate. But to the third head, of which St. Thomas makes mention, the rest which are numbered among the ten will easily be reduced. Behold what a theological place is, and how many kinds there are.

Thereafter, from the aforesaid numbered places, certain ones must be selected by us, concerning which a disputation is opportunely undertaken in this place. Let us therefore set apart those places which the scholastic theologians are accustomed to dispute more at length in other parts of the Summa of St. Thomas. Of this sort are the authority of the traditions of Christ and of the Apostles, the authority of the Catholic Church and of the Supreme Pontiff, bishop of the Roman Church, and also the authority of the Roman Church itself. Concerning all of which in 2.2, q. 1, art. 10 it has also been disputed by me abundantly enough. But from the remaining places not all have a special difficulty, such that they must be turned over more at length here and now. For it is clear, even to those who are not theologians, what and how great is the authority of human reason and of the philosophers and of human history. Wherefore, concerning things of this sort, it is neither pleasing nor permitted to linger at present. Our whole disputation therefore will legitimately be expended and terminated now concerning three theological places to be explained according to our strength, namely, concerning the authority of sacred Scripture, and concerning the authority of the holy Fathers, and concerning the authority of the scholastic theologians, and of the experts in pontifical law insofar as they are versed in theological matters. That we may therefore treat of these three in order.