Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

THE principal doubt in this article is whether the first conclusion of St. Thomas is true?

It is argued first for the negative side. Our theology is a finite science, therefore it does not have God as its adequate object or subject. The consequence is clear. Because it is impossible that the infinite be adequated to the finite.

It is argued second. We wayfarers do not know God quidditatively: therefore God is not the adequate subject of our science. The consequence is proved. Because the middle term of the demonstration of any science must be the what-it-is of its subject. But the antecedent is clear. Because in this life we know God and his attributes only as regards the question, Whether he is. And it is confirmed. Because it is no less repugnant that a science adequated to God be given, than an intelligible likeness; but we do not have an intelligible likeness representing God: therefore neither a science. It is confirmed secondly, especially if we hold with Capreolus, in 1, q. 3 of the Prologue, that science is a collection of likenesses. Then the argument is: no likeness, or no collection of likenesses, represents God immediately and per se: therefore our theology does not have God as its immediate and per se subject. The antecedent is proved. Because all the intelligible likenesses which we have represent creatures immediately.

It is argued third. For from the conclusion of St. Thomas it follows that all knowable things pertain per se to the consideration of our theology. The consequence is proved. Because all things are orderable to God himself.

It is argued fourth. A science ought to presuppose concerning its subject, Whether it is and what it is, as is clear in 1 Posterior Analytics. But our theology does not presuppose concerning God that he is, but rather demonstrates this, as St. Thomas does in q. 2; therefore.

It is argued fifth, and it is proved that God under the account of Deity is not the subject of our theology. For God terminates our science for that reason insofar as he is known by us; but by us in this life he is always known according to some property, e.g. that he is Creator, or Savior, through the effects of nature or of grace, as St. Thomas teaches in the solution to the first: therefore he should better have said that the Creator or the Savior is the subject of our theology. And it is confirmed. Because St. Thomas in the preceding article said that theology considers God insofar as he is the first and most universal Cause; therefore the subject of theology is not God under the account of Deity.

It is argued sixth. Faith has God as its object; therefore God is not the object of theology. The consequence is clear. Because there cannot be one and the same object of diverse habits; therefore the ground of St. Thomas is not a good one. And it is confirmed. For if the ground of St. Thomas is good, which is founded on this, that the object of the principles and of the whole science is the same, it follows that the subject of theology ought to be called the First Truth. The consequence is clear. Because St. Thomas in 2.2, q. 1, art. 1 teaches that the object of faith is the First Truth.

It is argued seventh. If the ground of St. Thomas is good, it follows that the object of metaphysics is God. The consequence is clear. Because metaphysics considers more principally of God, and refers all other things to the knowledge of him. But if you answer that metaphysics does not consider God as such, but as he is being: On the contrary. Because this very thing can be said of theology, namely that it considers God as he is uncreated being, and all other things as they are from him and are ordered to him.

It is argued eighth against the same ground, insofar as it says that the whole science is contained virtually in the principles, and that all things which are treated in a science must be referred to its subject. The argument is: for if St. Thomas speaks of the containment of the effect in the cause, this seems false: because in other sciences many things are contained which are not effects of their objects. Or he understands it of the containment by which species are contained under a genus, as the ternary is contained under number, and a subjective part under the common whole. And this too is false, as is clear from the second conclusion of St. Thomas to the second argument. Or finally he understands it of containment according to order, insofar as certain things are referred to one thing, and then it follows that all things would pertain to individual sciences. The consequence is clear. Because no created things are so disparate that they cannot be ordered to one another according to some account. Therefore no mode of this containment is left, and consequently the ground is null.

It is argued ninth. Christ the Lord is the adequate subject of our theology, therefore it is not well posited that it is God. The antecedent is proved by the same ground of St. Thomas. Because all things which the theologian considers are referred to Christ either as he is God or as he is man. And it is confirmed. Because just as there are seven articles of the divinity, so also there are seven of the humanity; therefore our theology is no less concerned with Christ as man than with God. And it is confirmed secondly. Because Christ is the subject of Sacred Scripture. For Christ is the end of the law. Rom. 10. And that word: Search the scriptures. Jn. 5. For they are they which bear testimony of me. And again Paul, 1 Cor. 1: We preach Christ and him crucified. And, I judged not myself to know anything among you but Jesus Christ, and him crucified. 1 Cor. 2. Therefore our science in this life has Christ as its subject.

Lastly it is argued. Our salvation is the proximate end of the whole of theology, therefore not God. The antecedent is clear. For all things which God made, he made proximately for us and for our salvation. But the consequence is clear. Because that is the subject which adequately and proximately terminates the science.

CONCERNING this question the opinions of the Doctors are various. Durandus, q. 5 of the Prologue, holds that the subject of theology is the meritorious act; but the subject of the theologian, insofar as he explains the articles of faith and deduces conclusions from them, is God as savior. St. Bonaventure, q. 1 of the Prologue, says that the subject of theology is Christ as God and man. Giles, in 1 Sentences, q. 3 of the Prologue, and Quodlibet 3, q. 2, holds that it is God as rewarder. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, ch. 2, holds that it is the work of reparation. Scotus, in 1, q. 3 of the Prologue, holds that it is God as this essence. And among the Thomists some say that the subject is God as true. But others say that the subject of theology is God in himself, while the object is the complex truth which is concluded. But others say that the subject is not only God in himself, but God as knowable in effect and through effect. And St. Thomas in the Prologue of the first Sentences, q. 4, expressly teaches that theology has as its object the divine being knowable through inspiration, and God only as the principal subject. And so, just as metaphysics treats of every natural being, yet partially of God: so theology treats of every supernatural being, yet partially of God.

FOR the understanding of this question, we must presuppose first that "subject" is not here taken as meaning only the material cause about which, but also as meaning that of which the properties are demonstrated in a science, as "subject" is most properly said with respect to a science. Which St. Thomas insinuates when he says that as the object is related to a power, so the subject to a science. As if he said that just as the object is properly said with respect to a power, because it immediately terminates the act of that power: so the subject is properly said with respect to a science, because the act of the science is immediately of it and about it. Wherefore the opinion of Capreolus pleases me, in 1, q. 4 of the Prologue, art. 2, who holds that "object" is properly said only of the conclusions which are inferred. In which Durandus also follows him, in 1, q. 5 of the Prologue.

It is to be noted secondly that the subject is twofold: one adequate, the other inadequate or of attribution and principality. For their definitions and conditions see Master Soto, q. 5 of the proemial [questions] of the Logic.

THESE things being posited, for the decision of the question let the first conclusion be: neither the meritorious work, nor the salvation of man, nor anything of this sort, is the adequate subject of theology. It is proved first. For all these things, as they are considered by the theologian, are ordered to something else; therefore the knowledge of theology does not stop in them, and consequently they are not adequate subjects. The antecedent is proved. For all these things are considered as they are from God, and tend to God. Secondly. When any science considers the effect and the cause, it considers the effect less principally: but theology considers the meritorious act and our salvation as they are from God; and it considers God himself as he is the cause of them: therefore it considers the meritorious act and other such things less principally, and consequently they will not be the subject. And it is confirmed. For the essence of God is not [constituted] by attribution to our acts, but rather the contrary; therefore they fall under the science of theology in the same order. The consequence is proved. Because as they are compared in reality, so are they considered by a science. It is proved thirdly. Even if there were no meritorious act, or no future salvation of man, a theology of the same account and mode could nonetheless be preserved; and yet then it would not have the meritorious act as its adequate object; therefore. The major is clear. For if an angel or a man had a supernatural faith in God in himself, and from it deduced conclusions, then ours would be theology, even if God had decreed that there be no merit or future salvation. Whence it is inferred against Durandus, in 1, q. 5 of the Prologue, art. 2, that God as savior cannot be the subject of theology: both because to be savior is ordered to glorification, and also because, although God were not savior or rewarder, a theology of the same species and mode concerning him in himself could nonetheless be had. Second conclusion.

Christ is not the adequate subject of theology. It is proved first. Because he is not the adequate subject of faith, as is demonstrated in 2.2, q. 1, art. 1; therefore neither of theology. Secondly, because Christ is not the subject of the science of the blessed, therefore neither of our science. The antecedent is clear. For the blessed know God per se first, and not Christ as he is man. Moreover. Many things are treated in theology which are not ordered to Christ as God and man; therefore. The antecedent is proved. For that God is three and one, eternal, etc., are [truths] concerning God in himself alone; therefore. Moreover. For Christ cannot formally terminate theology as God and man together; therefore. The antecedent is clear. For then the subject of theology would be a complex and a multiple account; since therefore he does not terminate [it] as man, as is manifest of itself, nor as God and man, as we have proved, it remains that Christ is not formally the subject of theology.

Third conclusion. God is not the adequate subject of theology according to any one of his attributes. It is proved first. For the attributes are compared to God as his properties; therefore theology, which treats of God, does not have any one of his attributes as its formal object. Just as a science treating of man cannot have a passion of his as its formal object. And it is confirmed. For an attribute is predicated and proved of God by the theologian; therefore it will not be the formal account of the subject. The consequence is proved. Because the subject and its account is not that which is said of another, but that of which the properties are demonstrated. Moreover it is proved. For the resolution of theology does not stop in any attribute; therefore. The antecedent is proved. For once any attribute is known, the resolution tends to the what-it-is of God.

Fourth conclusion. The formal account specifically [constituting] the object of faith cannot be formally specifically [constituting that] of theology. This conclusion must be true in every opinion. For this is what the formal specific account of any habit signifies, by which the habit is specified. If therefore the specific account of each habit — namely of faith and of theology — were the same, the one could not differ specifically from the other. You will find this conclusion more fully explained in our commentaries on 2.2, q. 1, art. 1, dub. 2.

But let there now be a fifth conclusion. The subject of theology is the same as that of faith, namely God under the account of Deity. St. Thomas proves this and holds it in this article, as is clear in the ground of the first conclusion. But advert that St. Thomas in this article is not treating of the formal object, or of the formal account of the object of theology, by which it is per se first specified. For if this were God insofar as he is God, the light of glory, of faith, and of theology would be of the same species: but he treats of the subject of theology, by which name is signified the object of which knowledge is had, or even assent from the habit of the first principles. And such an object of which, or subject of the science, is and ought to be the same with respect to the principles and with respect to the science itself, as is clear inductively in all sciences. That this is so, is clear. Since St. Thomas in art. 3 had already shown that the unity of theology is to be taken from the unity of the object according to the formal account, which is divine revelation. Which we have sufficiently explained there; therefore he intends to determine something else in this article than concerning the formal object specifying theology: which we have already said to be virtually revealed. And therefore St. Thomas in this article inquires concerning the subject of this science, which is not an object in any way whatever, but is an object of which, under some formal account, something is said, or demonstrated in the science. And this it is certain to be, in our theology, God principally and per se. But all the other things which come into the consideration of theology are neither the formal nor the material object, as [being] the subject of the science of which it intends to know something as of something somehow orderable to God. And this very thing he insinuates in the argument On the contrary, from the signification of the name "theology", which is called speech concerning God. Whence it is gathered how much out of tune those seem to sing who investigate other formalities concerning the subject of theology.

TO the arguments on the opposite side an answer is easily given from what has been said.

To the first it is answered that for one thing to be adequated to another can be understood in two ways. In one way by arithmetical equality: as two bodies are equal, because both have so many palms or digits of quantity; and two numbers are equated, because they have so many units. In the other way something is said to be adequated to another by a certain equality of proportion. And this happens when that which is said to be equated is considered to be assimilated to the other according to some account (whose limit it does not transcend) and not according to every account. And so we are accustomed to say that accidental dispositions are adequated to the form of generating: and yet it is certain that that form is substantial, and exceeds the accidental dispositions in the account of being. We say therefore that our theology is adequated to the subject of which it treats according to some formal account of revelation, namely because it considers all things which are virtually revealed in the principles per se and immediately revealed concerning God himself, such as that he is three and one, etc. Yet it is not required for this state that it attain the end of this intention, so that there not be something else virtually revealed than what is known by the theologian. For there is no arithmetician so perfect as to know all the conclusions which are virtually contained in the principles. See St. Thomas below, q. 12, art. 1, to the fourth argument. To the second argument I grant the antecedent, and deny the consequence.

And to the proof it is answered that even in this life, although we do not perfectly and distinctly know the quiddity of God, nevertheless not only through revelation but also from effects we know certain things which pertain to the quiddity of God. As that the essence of God is his to-be, that he is three in persons and one in substance. Whence from this knowledge both the metaphysician and the theologian can have knowledge concerning God. To the first confirmation the major is denied. And the reason for the difference is that likenesses are taken from sensible things. And therefore they have only to represent sensible things. But secondarily and as it were in a riddle they represent things abstracted from matter. Once the knowledge of these is supposed — that they are, and in some way what they are, whether naturally or supernaturally — thereafter science, whether metaphysical or theological, is had by discourse. Which theology nevertheless we confess to be imperfect for this state. But in the fatherland it will be most perfect, when its subject is known by the light of glory.

To the second confirmation it is answered that that opinion of Capreolus never pleased me. But nevertheless, that opinion being admitted, some answer that intelligible likenesses can be ordered in two ways. In one way with respect to the object which they adequately and per se represent. In the other way with respect to those things to which they extend themselves inadequately and secondarily. Whence just as the account of a science with respect to its adequate object consists in the first ordering of the likenesses; so they say that the account of the science of theology consists in the second coordination of the likenesses. And they wish to confirm this from St. Thomas, in 2.2, q. 173, art. 2, saying that from the ordering of the likenesses in the phantasy and intellect of the prophet the light of prophecy proceeds to the knowing of divine things. And also in 3 p., q. 11, art. 4, and q. 12, art. 4 he teaches that Christ the Lord used lower likenesses through infused knowledge, which was more excellent than they. But in truth these testimonies of St. Thomas do not prove that the collection of likenesses itself has the account of a science: nay rather in Christ the Lord he posits an infused habit of knowledge distinct from the ordered likenesses. And in the prophets he posits the light as the principle of understanding.

To the third argument the consequence is denied. Because St. Thomas teaches, On Truth, q. 14, art. 8, to 16, that it is not necessary that a science consider all the things which can be enunciated of its subject. For many things can be enunciated of mobile being which do not fall under physics. Because they are not made manifest through the principles of the science of physics. But if someone asks, by what then is a science limited, so that its consideration does not extend itself to all things which are said of the subject? It is answered that it is limited by the formal account, under which, of the principles themselves. And so the virtual revelation of the theological object is limited by the formal and immediate revelation of the principles, so that it does not extend itself to more than those things which can appear under the light of virtual revelation.

It is answered secondly that the extension of any science to more or fewer things can be considered in two ways. In one way insofar as it is on the part of the formal account and the light. And in this way every science can extend itself to the individual things which can be set before it under that formal account. Just as the power of sight can extend itself to seeing any species of color, even one newly creatable. And so our theology can extend itself individually to infinite conclusions, if only they are infinitely multiplicable, as are the proportions of numbers in arithmetic and music. In the other way it can be considered on the part of the subject and as it is found in fact in learners: and in this way no theology extends itself except to limited and finite conclusions.

To the fourth argument it is answered that for God to be is a preamble to God's being three and one. And just as nature is presupposed to grace, and the intellect to faith, and again grace and faith perfect nature; hence it comes about that the theologian considers of his subject whether it is, through demonstrations which can naturally be had. Not because such demonstrations pertain per se to theology itself and are elicited by it: but as to a mistress commanding and judging how they agree with, and do not conflict with, the principles of faith; and if they fall short in anything, theology corrects and perfects [them].

To the fifth argument it is answered that although it is proper to acquired science, especially in this life, to know God in his effects, nevertheless from them we gather both that God is and what he is as regards certain things. Whence again we philosophize, and give the reason of God's attributes, and show that he is immutable and eternal and that he has free choice. Yet also theology, which is a science virtually revealed by reason of its principles, from the effects of God the Savior gathers a more distinct knowledge of God himself as regards Whether he is, and what he is, according to the order which shines forth above all nature in the effects of grace. Whence it comes about that theologians deservedly explain the saying of the Apostle, Heb. 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to them that seek him; not insofar as God is known only as the author of nature, but as he is a certain principle of the supernatural order of grace, and of supernatural recompense, which truly consists in the open vision of God. For although it is the same God who is demonstrated to be from natural effects, nevertheless the very to-be of God is known in a more eminent mode as he is the principle of grace, than as he is the principle of nature. Just as he is known in a more eminent mode as a supernatural end to be attained by supernatural actions, than as he is the natural end of all things, to which all things are ordered by their own and natural actions. Whence to the argument the consequence is denied. Because the subject of which theology demonstrates something is God himself according to himself, although for knowing whether God is, and in some way what he is, we use natural or supernatural effects, as St. Thomas says in the solution to the first.

To the sixth argument it is already clear from what has been said in the fourth and fifth conclusions, in which we have shown how the formal object of faith differs from the formal object of theology, and nevertheless the subject of both is the same, namely God; because by the name "subject" is understood the object of which something is considered in a science, and the formal account under which it is considered is not understood. And by this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the seventh the answer has been given excellently in the same place. To the reply it is answered by denying the antecedent. For theology immediately considers of God himself certain properties which follow upon his to-be as he is known [to be] the principle of the order of grace. But all other things it considers not as parts pertaining per se to God himself, but insofar as they are in some way orderable to God himself as the principle and end of grace, as St. Thomas insinuates in the solution to the second.

To the eighth argument it is answered that all things of which theological science is per se first pertain to God as properties which follow from the revealed principles: as, for example, supposing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is most excellently concluded that he does not proceed by an action of the intellect but of the will: and many other similar things, of which it is not now to be spoken one by one. But there are other things which are demonstrated in this science, which pertain per se secondly to its subject: and these are neither God, nor subjective parts, of which sort God himself has none. For although he is in three persons, he is not nevertheless as a genus in species, or something common abstracted, but as something most singular and perfect, which is in three persons. But they are effects of the supernatural order, which are referred to God as to the principle of the order of grace. Such are the sacraments, and the sacred writings, the dispositions of man to grace. But there are others which, although according to themselves they are of the natural order, and are not effects of God as he is the principle of the supernatural order, are nevertheless orderable to a supernatural end: and for this reason they are considered by the theologian. And then it is answered to the consequence that the account is not the same for individual sciences. Because not all things which are treated in one science under a certain formal account can pertain to another under that other's formal account. As, for example, that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles can in no way pertain to physics or music.

To the ninth argument we have already spoken in the second conclusion. For also the consideration of Christ himself is in the end reduced to God. According to that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 3: For all things are yours, and you are Christ's. And Christ is God's. For although Christ the Lord is the proximate principle of our salvation, he is not nevertheless the first effective principle of the order of grace, except insofar as he is God. Since God was in him reconciling the world to himself. Nor again is Christ the last end of our beatitude insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is God. For our beatitude consists in the immediate vision of God, just as also the beatitude of Christ's soul consists in the same vision of God.

To the confirmation it is answered that the articles of the humanity are reduced to the articles of the divinity. For God himself is the savior: and Christ himself, insofar as he is man, is ordered to the effect of human salvation by the Savior himself, insofar as he is God.

It is answered secondly that all the articles which we call of the humanity pertain to faith to that extent insofar as in them there is something eternal which faith considers and believes, namely that the Son of God is incarnate, that the Son of God was born and died, etc.

To the second confirmation it is answered that Christ is not the primary and per se first subject of the sacred writings, except insofar as he is God. Just as he is also the object and subject of faith and the savior and rewarder of men. But since God effects this salvation of the human race by means of the merit and ministry of Christ, in whom God himself willed to be greatly glorified, therefore the greatest part of the scriptures sounds forth Christ. Yet Christ himself is the first and most principal effect of God the Savior.

To the last argument it is answered: I deny the antecedent: nay rather our salvation is the proximate end of faith rather than of the science of theology itself, which per se first consists in the contemplation of truth, and consequently in some way directs to salvation, while we are on the way. But the direction into eternal life pertains to faith, which works through charity.

But to the passage of St. Thomas which we adduced from q. 4 in the prologue of the Sentences, it is answered that St. Thomas there followed the common opinions of the scholastics.

It is answered secondly that there he does not speak of the subject of theology, but of the object as it can in any way fall under the account of divine revelation: and of this sort are many singular and contingent things. But in this article he speaks of the proper and per se subject of theology.