Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

IT IS DOUBTED solely concerning the first conclusion: Whether it is true.

It is argued first for the negative side. Theology is truly and properly a science, as was said in art. 2; therefore it is not properly wisdom. The consequence is proved. For wisdom and science are co-distinguished in the genus of intellectual virtues, as is clear from Arist., lib. 6. Ethicor., cap. 4 and 8, where he distinguishes the intellectual virtues into understanding, wisdom, science, prudence, and art; therefore the same intellectual virtue cannot be both wisdom and science.

It is argued secondly. Wisdom is a higher virtue than science and understanding, as is gathered from Arist., lib. 11. Metaph., cap. 1, and St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 66. artic. 5. ad ultimum. But our theology is not something higher than the habit of principles, which is faith itself; therefore it is not wisdom.

It is argued thirdly. Wisdom properly consists in the pure contemplation of truth, as Aristotle says, 1. Metaphy., cap. 2. Wherefore he says that it is free, and that it is acquired for its own sake: but theology, as was said in artic. 4, does not consist in the contemplation of truth alone, but is also in a certain way practical and directing actions; therefore it is not wisdom.

It is argued fourthly. Wisdom, as Aristotle teaches in the same place, is that which can assign the causes of all things knowable: but theology does not effect this, as is clear: therefore it is not wisdom.

It is argued fifthly, and it is proved that at least it is not wisdom in the highest degree. The argument is: That is wisdom in the highest degree which is directive of the other sciences, just as metaphysics directs the other sciences; but theology does not direct metaphysics, nay rather metaphysics seems to direct theology: therefore. The minor is proved. Because there is almost no theological question in which we do not adduce very many things from metaphysics. But metaphysics determines all things without the assistance of theology: therefore.

It is argued sixthly. Because revealed wisdom consists in the fulfillment of the commandments of God, according to that word of Deuter. 4, where, after speech had been made concerning the commandments, and it had been said: You shall observe and fulfill them, it is added: For this is your wisdom and understanding before the peoples; but this office does not belong to theology: therefore it is not revealed wisdom. Conradus, super 1. 2. quaest. 57. arti. 2, denies that theology is wisdom.

For the understanding of this difficulty, note with Cajetan, 1. Poster. ca. 10. dub. ulti. ad secundam obiectionem, where he says that just as science is taken in two ways: in one way formally, as it is a habit acquired through demonstration; in another way as a virtue, which makes the one who has it good and renders his work good; so also wisdom can be considered in two ways. In one way as a virtue; in the other way as it is acquired through demonstration. If we speak of wisdom and of science as they are in the genus of virtue, thus they are co-distinguished from one another. Since the intellect is perfected in one way by judging concerning things through the highest causes, and in another way by judging through lower causes. And because Aristotle, 6. Ethic., was speaking of wisdom and science as they are virtues, therefore he distinguished wisdom against science; and similarly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 57. art. 2, where he sets down three speculative intellectual habits, namely understanding, science, and wisdom. And similarly in Opusc. 70, super Boëtium de Trin., q. 5, according to the order of the questions from the beginning of the Opuscule, artic. 1. ad primum, he says that 6. Ethic. determines Aristotle concerning the intellectual habits insofar as they are intellectual virtues. And he says that they are distinguished according to the modes by which they perfect the intellect. Cajetan teaches secondly in the same place that wisdom is not distinguished from science as one species against another, but as the proper against the common. And thus it will differ from the other sciences only as a perfect species from the other, more imperfect ones. And indeed that this is true is proved from Arist., 1. Metap. cap. 1 and 2, where he teaches that metaphysics is wisdom, and yet it is evident that metaphysics does not differ from the other sciences except as the most perfect species. And St. Thomas in the cited Opusc., q. 2. art. 2. ad 1, says that wisdom is not divided against science as an opposite, but because it stands by way of addition to science. For wisdom is, as the Philosopher says, 6. Ethic. c. 8, the head of all the sciences, ruling all the others insofar as it is concerned with the highest principles. And in 1. Metaphy. it is called the goddess of the sciences.

Note secondly, that some theologians wish to distinguish wisdom in such a way that it is taken in two ways. In one way, as it is the science which considers through the highest cause. And thus they say that what we were just now saying is verified, namely that wisdom differs from the other sciences only as the most perfect species. In the other way they wish it to be taken for a certain supreme and eminent habit, which under a single formal account, which is the account of the habit itself, extends itself to the cognition of all principles and conclusions. And thus that habit is neither understanding nor science; but eminently understanding and science. In which acceptation they say that wisdom differs from all the other sciences not as a species contained under the genus of science, but under another genus. And concerning such wisdom they verify that it is higher than the habit of understanding. And thus they interpret St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 66. art. 5, and Arist., 6. Ethic. cap. 5.

BUT it seems to me to be noted thirdly that the aforesaid acceptation, in the way in which it is proposed by certain moderns, is unintelligible. First indeed because Arist. speaks of the human intellectual virtues, which are either naturally implanted or acquired by their own operation. As, e.g., understanding is a naturally implanted habit: but science is an acquired habit. Hence the argument. Wisdom in the aforesaid acceptation is not a habit naturally implanted in men, otherwise all would be wise. Again, neither is it an acquired habit. For either it is acquired through demonstration, and thus it is science; or it is acquired from acts which proceed from the habit of the first principles, and this would be ridiculous: both because a habit is not generated concerning the first principles, and also because that generated habit would be less perfect than the habit of the first principles, in whose virtue it is generated. Therefore there is in us no habit of wisdom which is not under the genus of science per se and formally. I confess, however, that such wisdom is found in God, who under the same account knows principles and conclusions through the highest cause, namely through the cognition of the divine essence. It is found also in the blessed, insofar as they see God, and in Him, as in the highest cause, they see all the objects of the sciences together with their principles. And similarly I grant that the infused science of the soul of Christ the Lord is wisdom in that mode eminent above our science and the habit of the first principles: nay more, even in the angels this wisdom is naturally present, in whom the habit of science is not distinguished from the habit of the first principles. But in all the three aforesaid wisdoms the account of science is found, insofar as that cognition itself extends to the conclusions or effects, although it is the same cognition of the cause. But in human cognition, I confess, I do not understand what, and how, and whence this wisdom is, whose formal account is higher than the formal account of the habit of the first principles, which is called understanding; since it immediately perfects the intellect for assent without any discourse, but, as soon as the terms are known, judges truth or falsity, and again is also higher than the habit acquired through demonstration. And finally, in Arist. I do not acknowledge any other wisdom simply than metaphysics, which all confess to be acquired through demonstration.

It is to be noted therefore fourthly, that just as in the predicament of Quality disposition, which is the first species of quality, is divided into habit and disposition, as into species; and nevertheless a habit is a disposition difficult to change. In which locutions it must be observed that the name "disposition" is taken equivocally. In one way as it is the name of a subaltern genus, as it abstracts from quality easily or with difficulty changeable. In the other way as it is appropriated to the other specific part and co-distinguished from habit, which intrinsically includes that it be easily changeable: so it seems to me that science is to be distinguished, in such a way that in one way it is taken in a genus for the habit acquired through demonstration; and is then divided into wisdom and science: so that wisdom is science through the highest cause; but science, as it is co-distinguished from wisdom, imports cognition through lower causes. But wisdom itself, which is the habit acquired through demonstration, has the difficulty of how it is higher than understanding, which is the habit of the first principles. But nevertheless it seems to me that it must be explained thus: that this superiority in human wisdom does not consist in this, that through it we assent to the first principles. For this is proper to understanding, that, once the terms are known, it immediately assents to the first principles. Nor does it consist in this, that wisdom demonstrates the first principles, since they are indemonstrable. But it consists in this, that through wisdom, that is, through acquired metaphysics, a man is able to explain the first principles not only of the other sciences, but also of metaphysics itself, and to defend them against attackers; which belongs to no other science, but every lower science wholly presupposes its principles, nor is it its office to explain or defend them, but this is proper to metaphysics. And the reason for this is: because metaphysics has as its object being itself, whose distinct and perfect cognition man does not acquire through another science than through metaphysics. For we begin in our discourse from the confused cognition of being, and gradually through the other sciences our cognition is perfected concerning certain particular accounts of being. But nevertheless only in metaphysics is a perfect cognition of being had, to which it belongs to consider its proper passions and the distinction of its to-be from essence. And from this account of being, which is most abstract from matter, and is found essentially in the first being, it comes about that this wisdom judges in the way that is possible concerning the other sciences and concerning their principles; and moreover returns upon itself and exercises itself concerning its own principles, because it penetrates its terms more distinctly, and consequently can render a certain account of them. Which does not belong to the habit of the first principles, and consequently as regards this wisdom is placed by St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 66. art. 5, as the greatest among the intellectual virtues. But if anyone has attentively read St. Thomas in 1. 2. q. 57. art. 2, he will see that we have not devised the aforesaid teachings out of our own brain, but have received them from the very doctrine of St. Thomas. But furthermore the account itself supports us. Since what we say is intelligible, but the opposite cannot be understood, as we have shown in the third notable.

THESE things being thus established concerning science and human wisdom, it will now be easy to show how our sacred theology has truly and properly the account of wisdom.

Let there be, therefore, a single conclusion. Sacred theology is truly and properly wisdom. It is proved. Because sacred theology is science through the highest cause; therefore it is wisdom. The consequence is clear from the definition of wisdom. The antecedent is proved. Because sacred theology has as its proper object God Himself, who is the greatest being and the cause of the whole genus under being. And it is confirmed. Because it has as its proper object God Himself as knowable by the light of a higher order: therefore if metaphysics is wisdom above all the other human sciences, for the reason that its proper object is being, in whose cognition one arrives in some way at the cognition of God, much more will sacred doctrine be wisdom, whose proper object is God Himself under such an account of so eminent a light, that even those things are known of God which surpass the natural light. And besides, the conclusion is proved. Because all the properties which belong to wisdom, as it is defined by Aristotle and the Philosophers, belong to our theology, as will be clear in the solutions of the arguments: therefore it is wisdom.

TO the arguments on the opposite side an answer is given.

To the first, I deny the consequence; and to the proof it is answered that science is co-distinguished against wisdom insofar as it signifies the habit acquired through lower causes.

To the second argument it is answered that our theology in some respect agrees with human wisdom, as regards this, that each turns to explaining and defending its first principles. Hence we can well grant that in some respect theology is more excellent than faith. Since it does not belong to faith to render the account of itself. Nevertheless, simply speaking, the habit of faith is more perfect than our theology, especially for this state. But between human wisdom and the habit of the first principles there can be a greater difference in this, that human wisdom is more excellent than understanding. And the reason is: because the distinct cognition of being, concerning which are the first metaphysical principles, belongs to wisdom itself; but the distinct cognition of God, concerning whom is faith, does not belong to our theology, but to the light of glory. And therefore it does not have such, and so great, excellence above faith, as metaphysics has above understanding.

To the third argument it is answered that human wisdom, on account of its limitation, consists precisely in the pure contemplation of truth. And of this Aristotle speaks in the cited place. But our theology, because it is of a higher order, although it consists principally and primarily in the contemplation of truth, nevertheless also per se, secondarily, extends itself to actions, through which man is directed to the attainment of the perfect contemplation of the first truth.

To the fourth argument it is answered that it belongs to human wisdom neither to assign the causes of all things knowable immediately and through itself, but only to explain and defend the principles of the other things knowable, because wisdom is of the same order as the other sciences. But our theology, since it is of a higher order, has only to explain and defend its own principles. But concerning the other principles or conclusions of the other sciences it has to judge whether they are consonant or dissonant with its first principles; and how grace perfects nature, and nature does not conflict with grace. But if it finds anything in the other sciences which conflicts with the truths of faith, even if natural philosophers think that they have knowledge of it, it belongs to the theologian to show that their reasons are not demonstrations, and that they can be dissolved. As if, e.g., some gentile philosopher should intend to show by natural reason that in the sacrament of the altar there is the substance of bread, because there are proper accidents of bread, which cannot exist without a subject, since the to-be of an accident is to be in; it belongs to the theologian to answer and to find the solution, by saying that the Author of nature, who is the cause of the whole to-be of substance and of accident, can work above the natural order and conserve the to-be of an accident without actual inherence in a substance. For it is not of the essence of an accident to inhere in act, but to have the aptitude of inhering. And thus it is shown that the reasoning of the gentile philosopher does not conclude. And this office St. Thomas performed outstandingly in the Summa cont. gentes.

To the fifth argument an answer has already been partly given in the aforesaid solution to the fourth. But for greater completeness it is answered that no science, not even metaphysics, directs theology. But nevertheless all the sciences serve it as handmaids, and especially metaphysics, so that here too that may be verified, that the supreme of the lowest attains the lowest of the supreme. And thus it is of the greatest utility that the theologian exercise himself concerning metaphysical principles. But in truth metaphysics itself has greater splendor and perfection while it serves theology than while it commands lower things, or is learned separately. Which is manifest by experience, especially for those learning the theology of St. Thomas. For these beyond others come out most erudite in metaphysical matters. We have, therefore, that metaphysics is directed and perfected by theology.

To the sixth argument it is answered that for the most part in the Sacred Letters by the name of wisdom is understood either the gift of wisdom, of which St. Thomas says in the solution to the third that it judges of the things which are to be done by way of inclination; or also speech is made of the cognition of faith. Nevertheless at other times speech is also often made of theological wisdom, to which belongs the interpretation of the Scriptures, and reasoning concerning those things which are of faith, according to that which Christ the Lord says: Every scribe learned in the kingdom of heaven is like a man that is a father of a family, who brings forth out of his treasure new things and old. But he is called a scribe learned in the kingdom of heaven, the preacher and Doctor of the Gospel, who out of much cognition of the Scriptures knows how to bring forth what is expedient for each. And in Ecclesiast. 39 chapter, concerning this wisdom it is said: The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets. And many other things which belong to the theologian. But a little later it is said how necessary prayer is for the utility of theology and for its exercise and ministry. For it says: He will give his heart to watching early toward the Lord, who made him, and in the sight of the Most High he will pray. He will open his mouth in prayer, and will pray for his offenses. For if the great Lord wills, he will fill him with the spirit of understanding, and he himself will send forth as showers the words of his wisdom. Behold where it speaks of the gift of wisdom, which is called the spirit of wisdom, without which every other wisdom is vain and useless, at least for the one who has it. Since what does it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, but lose himself and make his own loss?