Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

NOTE before all things, concerning the reasons of St. Thomas, that although he could have shown the dignity of Sacred Theology above the rest because it is of a higher order, namely from revealed principles; nevertheless he preferred to demonstrate from those things in which it agrees with the other sciences according to the genus of science, namely from certitude and the dignity of the object, in which the sciences themselves excel one another,

that even in these our theology excels all.

THE chief doubt in this article is: Whether sacred doctrine is more certain than all the other sciences. For concerning its dignity there can be no doubt, since its object is God Himself as supernatural end. But it is especially to be noted that the whole ground of doubting about the certitude of theology in comparison with the certitude of the other sciences arises from the condition which theology has for the state of the present life, in which it proceeds from principles known by divine revelation, but under the obscurity of faith. For as theology will be in the Fatherland, where the principles will be known by the beatific light, there can be no ground of doubting whether it is more certain than the natural sciences, whose principles are known by natural light. And therefore all the arguments which can be brought in the present doubt against the first conclusion of St. Thomas proceed immediately to prove that faith is not more certain than the other natural sciences, which proceed from principles evident by natural light. Which disputation has its proper and legitimate place in 2. 2., q. 4, art. 8, where St. Thomas expressly asks whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. In which place I examined this doubt at length, and determined it as far as I could. And since no special difficulty occurs to me, and our commentaries on 2. 2. are already at hand, to come to light with the Lord's favor, therefore I deliberately refrain from a prolix repetition of this doubt. Nevertheless, meanwhile, in this place I shall say briefly the things that have seemed necessary for the understanding of this article.

For a certain novice theologian at once doubts how theology for this state surpasses the other sciences in certitude, since nonetheless St. Thomas admits in the solution to the first that nothing forbids that which is more certain according to its nature to be less certain for us because of the weakness of our intellect. And moreover he admits that the doubt which befalls some concerning the articles of faith is not on account of the uncertainty of the thing, but on account of the weakness of the human intellect. And then he says that the least that can be had of the cognition of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain cognition which is had of the least things. These three things have their difficulty. And that we may begin from the less difficult: what he says in the last place, that the least that can be had of the cognition of the highest things is more desirable, helps to confirm the dignity of theology above the other sciences, but does not attest to its certitude. But concerning the other two sayings there is greater difficulty. Because certitude is nothing other than the determination and adhesion of the intellect to some truth, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. Sent., distin. 2. 3, q. 2, art. 2, quaestiuncula 3. But greater is the adhesion of the intellect which is effected from the principles of the other sciences in respect of the conclusions, therefore the other sciences are more certain. The minor of this argument is proved. Because it is impossible to dissent from the conclusions of the other sciences, unless perhaps one forgets the principles; but one can dissent from a theological conclusion without forgetting the principles, if he doubts about the principles, or dissents from them. Behold, this argument touches the whole difficulty.

For its solution three things are to be noted. The first is that certitude is threefold. One is that of the object itself according to the real being which it has in itself, or in order to the divine intellect. And certitude of this kind can well be together with our opinion about such an object. As if, e.g., the Pope is in fact dead, but I only opine that he is dead. And the reason is. Because such certitude of the object confers nothing on the intellect. For as regards the mode of judging, even if the Pope were alive, I would opine that he is dead. Another certitude can be considered only on the part of the one knowing, who according to his own brain, without any probable reason, obstinately adheres to some affirmation or negation. And this is rather an obstinate inhesion of the one assenting than a true certitude, although the one assenting says that he is most certain; and in this way some heretics adhere more firmly to their errors (indeed they sometimes suffer death in testimony to them) than others do to truths. There is a third certitude of assent, which is effected from the certitude of the object, which is known as certain under its true formal account through a light and habit that inclines certainly and infallibly to the assent of a thing that is so related. And it is concerning this kind of certitude that our comparison is made, when we say that one science is more certain than another.

Note secondly that the certitude of the first kind consists in itself in an indivisible. For in reality, if the Pope is alive, it is not more or less certain because someone opines more or less certainly that the Pope is alive. And similarly that God is three and one, is not more or less certain in itself, whether one opine, or believe with certitude, or dissent. But the second certitude will be greater or lesser: according as a man is more or less obstinate, or brain-sick. But the certitude of the third kind is greater or lesser even in respect of the same object, insofar as the formal account of assenting has been more or less conveniently applied, and insofar as the habit itself inclining to assent has been more or less perfect. And in this way one Christian believes more firmly and certainly than another, insofar as within the same species he has a more perfect light than another. But any Christian assents more certainly and adheres more firmly to the things that are of faith than to other truths, however much demonstrated by human science. And the reason for this is. Because the object itself, which in itself is the highest truth, is applied to the believing intellect under an infallible formal account, and God Himself through the infused habit, and the help of the Holy Spirit, moves the intellect and the will to assent to the truths proposed. For although we believe willingly; yet not led by our own brain, but persuaded by the power and testimony of the Holy Spirit, we adhere firmly. For he who believes in the Son of God has the testimony of God in himself, as is said in the first Canonical Epistle of John, chap. 5. Christians therefore, using this means and account of assenting, adhere more strongly to the things of faith than to natural truths demonstrated.

It is to be noted thirdly that, when St. Thomas says in the solution to the first that nothing forbids that which is more certain according to nature to be less certain for us because of the weakness of our intellect, and that the doubt which befalls some concerning the articles of faith is not on account of the uncertainty of the thing, but on account of the weakness of the human intellect, this, I say, is not to be understood of the certitude of the thing itself as we explained it in the first way. For this certitude is irrelevant to the certitude of the intellect, unless the thing itself appear under some certain formal account: and nevertheless, because the intellect itself is in itself less proportioned to the highest truths, such as are those that are believed by faith, and because to use such helps to believing, namely the habit of faith and the light and help of God, is placed in our will, therefore it is possible that our intellect dissent from the truths of faith, when it does not use the aforesaid helps. And this is what some are wont to say, that faith is less certain than science on the part of the subject. I wish to elucidate this matter by an example. If the natural habit even of the first principles were of such a condition that we were free to put it off and on again at will like a garment, surely the habit itself would not be less certain in itself than it now is, although the intellect not using it could doubt, or even err, about the first principles. For this doubt and this error would be charged back upon the subject itself. Similarly, if someone about to fight with a beast would not use the safest weapons which he has at hand, it is not a defect of the weapons that he is torn apart by the beast. So therefore if we put on the armor of God, as the Apostle admonishes, Ephes. 6, we shall be able to stand against the snares of the devil. And if in all things we take up the shield of faith, we shall be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one. Our theology therefore, since it proceeds from the most certain habit and light of faith, acquires for itself greater certitude than the sciences which proceed from a natural habit and light. For the comparison is made of habit to habit, light to light, and science to science in itself, and as the intellect uses them. But if a man will not use the infused light and habit, but rather has cast it away from himself, then this defect does not belong to the habits in themselves, but to the subject itself in order to the habit, which it uses freely. And let these things said suffice for this difficulty at present.

But finally, concerning the account of the second conclusion, note that when St. Thomas says that of the practical sciences that one is nobler which is not ordered to the further end of another, it is to be understood of those which are subordinated. For e.g. the culinary art is not nobler than the military, although the military is ordered to the end of the civil art, and the culinary is not ordered to the end of another art. But because the end of our theology, insofar as it is considered as practical, is the last of all, to which are ordered the ends of all the arts and all things that are, therefore beyond doubt it is most noble. Nor understand it to mean that eternal beatitude is the end of all who work from art, but it is the end of the work done and of the accounts of operating.