Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

TO the arguments to the contrary.

To the first argument it is answered from the first conclusion, and the second note. For we confess it to be simply true that theology is formally speculative and practical, if indeed the practical and the speculative be taken with the imperfections removed, and not insofar as they are limited differences of the lower-order sciences: as if we were to say that an Angel formally has mathematical knowledge, although he does not have it with the limited difference according as it is distinguished in us from physics; indeed rather by a single habit he formally knows many objects of our sciences, and that habit is formally of metaphysics and of physics, in that it has a simpler formal account concerning all those objects. It is answered secondly, according to the doctrine of the last conclusion, that theology is simply formally speculative, but not formally practical, rather eminently.

To the second argument it is answered that, for a science to be practical in the lower sciences, it is necessary that its object be operable by us: because their object is a creature, and is not the last end. But in a higher science, such as theology is, a condition of this kind is not necessary, because it is engaged with the last end of all human actions and thus the last end cannot be a human action: otherwise there would be a process to infinity. It will therefore suffice that theology be engaged with the attainment of the last end, and direct the operation of the means which are proportioned to the end, namely the works of the virtues.

To the first confirmation the consequence is denied. For both the natural habit of synderesis is practical, and yet it does not immediately direct studious operation, but by the mediation of prudence.

To the second confirmation the sequel is denied. And there is a similar instance in the example of synderesis, which although it is practical, does not however make a man simply good. Because it does not dispose to right action immediately by itself here and now, and in every event, which is proper to virtue simply. Indeed, as Aristotle teaches, book 1 of the Magna Moralia, chap. 1: He who knows the virtues is not forthwith studious: and nonetheless moral science is called practical: because it reduces its conclusions to universal practical principles, which synderesis itself naturally dictates, and in common inclines to operating according to those principles. So therefore our theology will be called practical in this way, not only on the part of the learner, who ought to order it to the love of God; (for even Aristotle so esteemed his Ethics that he did not think a hearer worthy unless he were endowed with good morals, 1. Ethic., chap. 3.) but theology is also practical from the revealed light and the habit of faith from which it proceeds. And so further in two ways. First from faith, which is a virtue not only speculative, but is also like a certain infused synderesis, which murmurs against evil and instigates to good, which is the office of natural synderesis, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p., q. 29, art. 12. Secondly theology is also practical from the conjunction of the gifts of intellect, knowledge, and wisdom with the light of faith itself, which gifts are beyond doubt practical, as St. Thomas teaches, where above, 2. 2.; with which agrees what St. Augustine says, 12. De Trin., chap. 2, that the higher reason is engaged with the divine things to be beheld and consulted. Therefore the higher reason, as it is engaged with God as a supernatural object, must needs behold and consult divine things in a higher way: and this it does through faith and the supernatural gifts. Hence it follows that, other things being equal, he will be more learned in theology who has charity, than he who has it not. Because without charity such gifts of the Holy Spirit are not conjoined with faith, which illuminate the mind and give understanding to the little ones. Whence we see that eminent theologians were endowed with no mediocre sanctity.

To the third argument it is answered that it proves that a man can attain the last end without the means of theology: just as someone can be morally good without the science of moral philosophy. But it does not prove that, where theology is present, it cannot be practical according to the ways which we have explained in the conclusions.

To the confirmation the consequence is denied, and the disparity of the account consists in this, that physics and metaphysics do nothing about the attainment of the last end of beatitude. But theology, for a good part, is engaged with the means by which beatitude can be obtained. But on the part of the learner, any science, however speculative, can be directed to the praise and worship of God. For the Apostle also, in this regard, to the Romans, 1, vehemently reproaches the philosophers because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God.

To the fourth argument, I readily grant that theology agrees with moral philosophy as regards the fact that both direct human actions in common and not in particular; and as regards the fact that both need the virtues in order to act rightly; indeed also as regards the fact that both presuppose principles which are dictated by a practical habit, and are commanded in common. And in this way both are called practical. But there is a difference. Because our theology is still called more practical than moral philosophy. Because the principles of theology are had from faith, which is a quasi-supernatural synderesis, and from its own species, if it is perfect, it demands rectitude of will, according to what St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2., q. 4, art. 2 and 3, and especially in 5, where he says: For the act of faith to be perfect, it is required that the will be infallibly ordered to the last end. And that this perfection is through charity. But natural synderesis, even before the acquired virtues, is perfect in its species. And therefore theology is more practical, because it proceeds from such principles as are not perfect according to their proper species without charity.

To the fifth argument it is answered that the first per se end of theology is not to act rightly, but rather to contemplate what follows from such principles. Whence theology is not simply practical in the way in which Aristotle speaks of practice. It will however be practical eminently, or even formally, according to the various modes explained in the conclusions themselves. It is nonetheless always more speculative than practical, although the second per se end is to direct human actions in common to the attainment of the last end. To the testimony of the Apostle, however, it is answered first that perhaps he speaks of every good work which is the ministry of the evangelical doctor. For this is understood by that word, man of God, namely the minister of God, to whom it pertains to exercise the acts which he had set down there, namely to teach, to argue, to reprove, and to instruct in justice. If, however, by every good work every work of virtue is understood, then it is answered that revealed knowledge is indeed useful for exercising works of this kind, although it is not the end intended per se first by the science of theology.

To the confirmation it is answered, as has often been said, that it is per accidens to theology that it proceed from an obscure cognition of the principles. Whence the consequence of the confirmation does not hold.