Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (pars prior)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
Commentarium
Dubium 1: Objectiones
An argument is made first for the negative side. Theology cannot be eminently practical and speculative, nor formally both, therefore in no way. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. For if theology were eminently both, this proposition would be simply false: Theology is speculative. Since things which are said eminently of something are not predicated simply, as God is eminently fire and yet is not fire, and the sun is eminently hot and yet is not hot. Again it is proved that sacred doctrine is not formally both. Because the practical and the speculative are opposed differences dividing habits and virtues, as the Philosopher teaches, 2. Metaph., tex. 3, and book 6, chap. 1, and 3. De Anima, tex. 49. But opposed differences cannot formally belong to the same thing, as rational and capable of neighing, the gathering power of sight and the dispersing one, therefore.
An argument is made secondly. Theology is in no way practical, therefore it is not at once practical and speculative. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. The object of theology is not operable by us, since it is God Himself, therefore theology itself is not practical. The consequence is plain. Because the first condition necessary for a practical science is that its object be operable by us. For it is also for this reason that it is called practical. It is confirmed. Theology is not the proximate rule and principle of operation, therefore it is not practical. The consequence is plain. Because a practical habit must be the proximate rule and principle of operation. But the antecedent is proved. Because theology of itself does not direct studious action, except by the mediation of prudence, which is the proximate rule on the part of the intellect for directing the acts of the virtues. And it is confirmed secondly. For otherwise every theologian would be simply good (which would that it were true.) But experience shows the opposite.
An argument is made thirdly. If theology is a practical science, it would be so for the reason that it directs to the love of the last end, which is God: but for this reason it cannot be practical, since for the love of the last end it suffices, on the part of the intellect, that the object be proposed to the will itself through the habit of faith; therefore theology is not required in order to direct the will to the last end. And it is confirmed. Because the natural knowledge which is had of God as author of nature, such as metaphysics or physics purely is, is speculative; therefore supernatural knowledge of God as author of grace will not be practical. The consequence is proved from the parity of the account.
An argument is made fourthly. Moral philosophy is not properly practical, therefore neither is theology. The consequence seems good. Because moral philosophy is related to the moral and natural virtues as theology is to the supernatural virtues. For just as moral philosophy defines and divides the moral virtues in common, and shows their properties, so theology is engaged with the quiddity and difference of the supernatural virtues. But the antecedent is proved. For moral philosophy does not give the philosopher the capacity to act well, but he needs to acquire the virtues.
An argument is made fifthly, and it is proved that theology is not speculative. Because the end of theology is to act well and to attain the last end, therefore it is practical. The consequence is proved. For the Philosopher in the places cited says that a practical science consists in this, that it is for the sake of the work. But the antecedent is proved from that of 2. ad Timot. 3: All Scripture inspired by God etc., that the man of God may be perfect, instructed for every good work. And it is confirmed. Because faith is a practical habit, therefore theology also. The antecedent, besides being St. Thomas's, in 2. 2., q. 4, art. 2, is proved from that of 1. Petri 1: Bringing back the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls. And the consequence is proved. Because faith is the habit of the principles of theology; therefore if the habit of the principles is practical, so too is the habit of the conclusions which are deduced from those principles.