Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

THERE is a single doubt in this article: Whether the first conclusion of St. Thomas is true.

An argument is made first for the negative side. Theology cannot be eminently practical and speculative, nor formally both, therefore in no way. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. For if theology were eminently both, this proposition would be simply false: Theology is speculative. Since things which are said eminently of something are not predicated simply, as God is eminently fire and yet is not fire, and the sun is eminently hot and yet is not hot. Again it is proved that sacred doctrine is not formally both. Because the practical and the speculative are opposed differences dividing habits and virtues, as the Philosopher teaches, 2. Metaph., tex. 3, and book 6, chap. 1, and 3. De Anima, tex. 49. But opposed differences cannot formally belong to the same thing, as rational and capable of neighing, the gathering power of sight and the dispersing one, therefore.

An argument is made secondly. Theology is in no way practical, therefore it is not at once practical and speculative. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. The object of theology is not operable by us, since it is God Himself, therefore theology itself is not practical. The consequence is plain. Because the first condition necessary for a practical science is that its object be operable by us. For it is also for this reason that it is called practical. It is confirmed. Theology is not the proximate rule and principle of operation, therefore it is not practical. The consequence is plain. Because a practical habit must be the proximate rule and principle of operation. But the antecedent is proved. Because theology of itself does not direct studious action, except by the mediation of prudence, which is the proximate rule on the part of the intellect for directing the acts of the virtues. And it is confirmed secondly. For otherwise every theologian would be simply good (which would that it were true.) But experience shows the opposite.

An argument is made thirdly. If theology is a practical science, it would be so for the reason that it directs to the love of the last end, which is God: but for this reason it cannot be practical, since for the love of the last end it suffices, on the part of the intellect, that the object be proposed to the will itself through the habit of faith; therefore theology is not required in order to direct the will to the last end. And it is confirmed. Because the natural knowledge which is had of God as author of nature, such as metaphysics or physics purely is, is speculative; therefore supernatural knowledge of God as author of grace will not be practical. The consequence is proved from the parity of the account.

An argument is made fourthly. Moral philosophy is not properly practical, therefore neither is theology. The consequence seems good. Because moral philosophy is related to the moral and natural virtues as theology is to the supernatural virtues. For just as moral philosophy defines and divides the moral virtues in common, and shows their properties, so theology is engaged with the quiddity and difference of the supernatural virtues. But the antecedent is proved. For moral philosophy does not give the philosopher the capacity to act well, but he needs to acquire the virtues.

An argument is made fifthly, and it is proved that theology is not speculative. Because the end of theology is to act well and to attain the last end, therefore it is practical. The consequence is proved. For the Philosopher in the places cited says that a practical science consists in this, that it is for the sake of the work. But the antecedent is proved from that of 2. ad Timot. 3: All Scripture inspired by God etc., that the man of God may be perfect, instructed for every good work. And it is confirmed. Because faith is a practical habit, therefore theology also. The antecedent, besides being St. Thomas's, in 2. 2., q. 4, art. 2, is proved from that of 1. Petri 1: Bringing back the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls. And the consequence is proved. Because faith is the habit of the principles of theology; therefore if the habit of the principles is practical, so too is the habit of the conclusions which are deduced from those principles.

IN this question the opinions of the Doctors are various. Some say that theology is formally speculative: some think that it is formally practical. Others teach that both belong to it formally. Finally St. Thomas in the first conclusion of the article seems to teach that theology is eminently speculative and practical. But that it is so formally, he does not expressly define. These opinions Durandus reports in q. 6 of the Prologue, and Scotus, q. 4 of the Prologue. Setting aside, however, the foreign opinions, we intend to investigate only what St. Thomas thought on this matter.

For its understanding, it must be noted first that in this matter those things must be supposed as principal foundations which Master Soto says in the Logic, q. 4 of the proemium, on the distinction of practical and speculative science. And, other things omitted, that difference is especially to be noted which is essential, namely that a speculative science is the proximate rule of speculation, but not of operating, as the science of the rose directs the intellect to a scientific cognition of the rose, but is in no way a rule of making a rose. But a practical science is the proximate rule of operating, and does not direct to contemplation, as the art of painting.

Secondly it is to be noted that the speculative and the practical can be considered in two ways. In one way, as they are opposed differences dividing finite habits of a lower order. Of which Aristotle treats, 3. De Anima, tex. 49, and 2. Metaph., chap. 1, and 6. Ethic., chap. 2, and St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 14, last article, and in 3. d. 23, q. 1, and De Verit. q. 14, art. 4. In the other way the practical and the speculative can be taken, not as they are determinate and contrary differences, but with the imperfections removed by which they are opposed to one another: and in this way they belong to the divine science. For the speculative, as it is of a lower order, states a perfection, namely that it be ordered to contemplation: it has however joined to it an imperfection, namely that it be in no way a rule of operating. The practical, however, states a perfection, namely that it be the cause of the work, which indeed is a very great perfection, for to be an effective cause states a perfection; it has however mingled with it a certain imperfection, namely that it be in no way ordered to contemplation. The practical, therefore, and the speculative can be taken with these imperfections removed, so that they are not differences mutually excluding one another. In which sense every habit which perfectly disposes to the work, whether it be the proximate rule of the work or a remote one, is formally practical, whether it be compatible with the speculative account or exclude it. And in the same way it must be spoken of the speculative habit, that every habit will be speculative which per se disposes to speculation, whether it be a proximate rule or a remote one. But in the first way they are taken as they are differences essentially dividing finite science. I said finite; for, as Cajetan well says, in respect of the infinite science the practical and the speculative are not essential differences. And in this sense the speculative is that which is the proximate and immediate rule directing to speculation, such that it is not at the same time a proximate rule directing to the work. But the practical is, in this sense, that which is so the proximate rule of the work that it is not at the same time the proximate rule of speculation.

Thirdly it is to be noted with Cajetan in this article that some form is said to contain many things eminently for the reason that it is of a higher and more perfect order. And the things which in lower beings are dispersed have unity in higher beings. As the supreme Angel knows many things through one concept which are known by a lower one through many. And the cognition of Christ the Lord, whereby He knows infinite things, is equivalent to infinitely many of a lower order, as the same Cajetan teaches most elegantly in 3. p., q. 10, art. 3, where he says that one individual of a higher order exceeds infinitely many of a lower order. And so a form of a higher order produces the effects of many forms of a lower order with great perfection, with the imperfections removed. Which would not happen in lower beings except with distinction and multiplicity of forms. And thus to contain something eminently is to be a form of another order, which with the greatest unity and without imperfection produces the effects of many forms.

Finally, note with the same Cajetan in this article that theology is a science and a form of another order. For all the natural sciences are of the natural and lower order; theology, however, since it is a certain participation of the divine science, is a science of a higher order. And therefore it contains eminently, without any division and imperfection, the things that are found in all the lower sciences. And so St. Thomas in art. 3 expressly teaches that theology is related to the other sciences as the common sense is to the proper senses. For just as the common sense is not diversified by the differences of the objects of the other senses, but without division and with the greatest perfection contains all things which the other senses contain, because it is of a higher order: so is theology related in respect of the other sciences.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion now be. Theology is at once practical and speculative eminently, if the practical and the speculative be taken in the former way, as they are differences dividing a habit of a lower order. And so it does not imply a contradiction that opposed differences belong eminently to the same thing. This conclusion is proved. The object of theology eminently contains the practical and the speculative, therefore theology itself also eminently contains both. The consequence is proved. For a habit savors of the nature of its object. But the antecedent is proved first. Because the object of theology is God as He pertains to the supernatural order; but God is the supreme speculable; and on the part on which He is the last end of all desires, He directs to operation. The antecedent is proved secondly. Faith is eminently practical and speculative, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2., where above; therefore the same will be true of theology. And it is confirmed. Because faith itself, when perfect, requires the companionship of the gifts of the Holy Spirit which pertain to the intellect: but the gifts of the Holy Spirit are plainly practical, therefore faith itself according to its own perfect species is practical, and consequently the science also which proceeds per se from such principles, such as theology is, will also be practical. The conclusion is proved secondly. The divine theology, which is the exemplar of our theology, is at once practical and speculative; therefore our theology also, which is an impression of that divine science. It is proved thirdly. The beatific vision is eminently practical and speculative, therefore theology itself also is eminently practical and speculative. The consequence is plain. For the account seems to be the same of theology, which is of the supernatural order, and of the beatific vision.

SECOND conclusion. If we speak of the practical and the speculative in the second acceptance, with the imperfections removed, theology is formally speculative and practical. And indeed that it is formally speculative is easily granted by all theologians. But that it is at the same time formally practical in the second acceptance can be proved first by the arguments made for the first conclusion. It is proved secondly. The human intellect in respect of diverse things is formally practical and speculative, as St. Thomas teaches, in 1. p., q. 79, art. 11; therefore theology also can have this same thing much better. The consequence is proved. Because it is of a higher nature and a more excellent order. It is proved thirdly. The practical and the speculative formally in that second acceptance belong to the divine science; therefore they can also belong to theology. The antecedent is proved manifestly. For the practical imports that it be a cause acting and a rule of operation ad extra; but an active cause states a perfection simply, therefore it can belong to God formally. As knowledge and wisdom belong to Him formally. But the consequence is proved. For there seems to be altogether the same account, since theology is a certain participation of the divine science.

THIRD conclusion. Theology is first and per se speculative, and secondarily per se practical. This conclusion St. Thomas teaches in this article, when he says that theology is more speculative than practical, because it treats more principally of divine things than of human acts, of which it treats insofar as through them man is ordered to the perfect cognition of God, in which eternal beatitude consists. And so according to St. Thomas, if theology treats of practice and operation, it is in order to cognition; therefore it is first and per se about cognition, and secondarily per se about practice as about a means necessary for cognition. Then it is proved by reason. First, the object of theology is the divine true as it is in itself, absolutely speaking; the secondary, however, is God Himself as He is referred to man as his end, which he must reach through works; but theology, in the account in which it is speculative, contemplates God in the first way; in the account in which it is practical it contemplates Him in the second way; therefore it is first and per se speculative, and secondarily practical. It is proved secondly. For the practical true is always posterior to the speculative: but theology is speculative and practical; therefore it is speculative before it is practical. The major is proved. For the true is prior in the measure that it is simpler and more abstract; but the speculative true is more abstract than the practical true, for the practical true concerns the appetite, the speculative one not at all; therefore it is more abstract. It is confirmed. For being is simpler and more abstract and something nobler than the good, as St. Thomas teaches below in this part, q. 82, art. 3, in that the good states being as concrete, stating an order to the appetite: but the practical true concerns the appetite, while the speculative true does not state an order to the appetite; therefore it is first and per se speculative, secondarily per se practical: and so too it will be with the habit, which savors of the nature of the object. Thirdly. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as intellect, knowledge, wisdom, are per se first speculative, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2., q. 8, art. 3, and q. 9, art. 3, and q. 45, art. 3, to the third: therefore the same will be true of theology. And the reason is excellent. For the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and theology, and faith are engaged with things to be done insofar as those things to be done are referred to contemplation and vision; therefore divine contemplation is intended per se first through these habits. And this is the most powerful reason of St. Thomas in all those places, and the literal exposition of St. Thomas in this article.

But someone asks whether theology is formally speculative, taking the speculative in the former way, as it is a difference of a science of a lower order; and I say the same of the practical.

For its understanding, let the fourth conclusion be. It is probable that theology is not formally speculative, nor formally practical, taking the speculative and the practical as they are differences of a finite and lower-order science. This opinion Cajetan expressly holds in this article. And St. Thomas seems to teach it in art. 3, for he says that theology, in respect of the sciences of a lower order, is related as the common sense is to the other senses: but no difference of the lower senses formally belongs to the common sense, therefore no difference of a lower-order science can formally belong to theology. Then it is proved by reason: for that something be eminently such is nothing other than that it be such through the form of another order, as we said in the third note: but our theology is eminently speculative, therefore it is speculative through the form of another order; therefore the difference of a lower-order science does not formally belong to it. Secondly. God is not formally wise, if wisdom be taken for the wisdom of a lower order, but is only eminently wise, since wisdom in that way states an imperfection: but to be speculative, as it is a difference of a lower-order science, intrinsically states an imperfection; therefore it cannot be found formally in a science of a higher order, such as theology is. It is confirmed. The sun is eminently hot and not formally, because it is hot through a form of a higher order, namely through light, which virtually and eminently contains heat: but our theology is practical and speculative, taking the practical and the speculative as they are a difference of a lower-order science, through a form of a higher order; therefore it is not formally speculative nor practical. Lastly. Theology is not ordered per se to speculation and contemplation in such a way that it is in no way ordered to operation; therefore theology is not formally speculative, taking the speculative as it is a difference of a finite and lower-order science. The consequence is plain. For the speculative, as it is a difference of a lower order, is so ordered to speculation that it is in no way ordered to practice.

FIFTH conclusion. If the speculative be taken as it is a difference of a finite and lower-order science, it is probable that theology is formally speculative, yet not formally practical, but eminently. This conclusion is set down against Cajetan, in this art. For its exposition note that the speculative does not exclude any rule whatsoever directing to the work, but only the proximate rule. And similarly the practical excludes only the proximate rule of speculation. And so nothing forbids that a science which is formally speculative should also, per se speaking, dispose to operation, provided it does not dispose proximately. And similarly, a formally practical science, per se speaking, can be a remote disposition of speculation; in which this opinion differs from Cajetan. Nevertheless our conclusion is proved. For the speculative and the practical are not essentially opposed differences, except in the account in which they state the proximate rule, one of ruling, the other of speculating; therefore they do not mutually exclude one another except precisely according to this account. The antecedent is supposed by us from the first foundation. For a practical science essentially consists in this, that it becomes the proximate rule of the work; and a speculative one in this, that it be the proximate rule of speculation. This supposed, the conclusion is proved. Theology is the proximate rule directing to the speculation of the divine truth, therefore it is formally speculative. The consequence is proved. Because the speculative, which is a difference of a science, only excludes the proximate rule of operating; therefore it stands that theology is speculative, and that it can remotely direct to the work, provided it not direct proximately. The major and the minor are proved. Theology proceeds in the resolutory mode, by definition and argumentation, and does not proceed in the compositive mode, therefore it is the proximate rule of speculation, and not of the work. The consequence is plain. For that a science be the proximate rule of speculation comes about most of all, as Master Soto notes in the question cited, because it proceeds in the resolutory mode; whereas that it be the proximate rule of operating arises from the fact that it proceeds in the compositive mode. Likewise the minor is proved, namely that theology is not the proximate rule of the work, but only a remote one, by the third argument made at the beginning of the question together with its confirmation, which most effectively proves that theology is not the proximate rule of the work, and consequently that it is not formally practical. And thus St. Thomas is expounded in this article, when he says that theology is more speculative than practical, since, speaking of the practical and the speculative as they are differences of a lower-order science, theology is formally speculative, but is not formally practical, because it is the proximate rule of speculation, and is not the proximate rule of the work.

The second part of the conclusion is proved. It belongs to theology per se to direct to moral and practical work, but it does not direct to the work as the proximate rule of operating, but as a higher account including the speculative account, therefore etc. For the understanding of this reason note that God is the last end of men insofar as He is a certain infinite speculable true. (For now we suppose that essential beatitude consists in the vision of God.) Since therefore theology is engaged with God insofar as He is an infinite speculable true by the divine light, it follows that theology regards God according to that formal account according to which He is the last end: and so, since the whole account of the means is taken from the end, it is gathered that it belongs to theology from its proper object to direct the will in order to the means proportioned to the last end, which are the works of the virtues. And so in the Sacred Scriptures, just as it is said of faith that it works and that it fulfills the commandments, so of the divine science it is said that it works. Whence in Proverbs, chap. 10, it is said of the divine Wisdom: Wisdom is prudence to a man. For just as Aristotle says, 3. De Anima, that the speculative intellect by extension to the work becomes practical: so it is said of the divine Wisdom, which is speculative, that in the man who exercises the works of a man, it extends itself to the work and becomes practical. For prudence sounds of a practical virtue. And the same is had in many other places. And from this the major of the principal argument is proved in this way. It belongs to theology from its formal object to direct to practical work, therefore it belongs to it per se. But the consequence of the principal argument is evident: for what is contained in a higher account, which extends itself to many things, is contained eminently. As heat is eminently contained in the sun, because the form of the sun is higher than heat itself, and extends itself to many other effects. Lastly all the conclusions are proved together. Theology is ordered to the beatific vision as to its last end, to which theology is per se proportioned, because it is of the same order, namely supernatural: but the beatific vision is speculative and practical, therefore theology is speculative and practical. The consequence is proved. Because the account of the speculative and the practical in the sciences is taken (Aristotle being the author, book 6 of the Metaphysics) from the end.

TO the arguments to the contrary.

To the first argument it is answered from the first conclusion, and the second note. For we confess it to be simply true that theology is formally speculative and practical, if indeed the practical and the speculative be taken with the imperfections removed, and not insofar as they are limited differences of the lower-order sciences: as if we were to say that an Angel formally has mathematical knowledge, although he does not have it with the limited difference according as it is distinguished in us from physics; indeed rather by a single habit he formally knows many objects of our sciences, and that habit is formally of metaphysics and of physics, in that it has a simpler formal account concerning all those objects. It is answered secondly, according to the doctrine of the last conclusion, that theology is simply formally speculative, but not formally practical, rather eminently.

To the second argument it is answered that, for a science to be practical in the lower sciences, it is necessary that its object be operable by us: because their object is a creature, and is not the last end. But in a higher science, such as theology is, a condition of this kind is not necessary, because it is engaged with the last end of all human actions and thus the last end cannot be a human action: otherwise there would be a process to infinity. It will therefore suffice that theology be engaged with the attainment of the last end, and direct the operation of the means which are proportioned to the end, namely the works of the virtues.

To the first confirmation the consequence is denied. For both the natural habit of synderesis is practical, and yet it does not immediately direct studious operation, but by the mediation of prudence.

To the second confirmation the sequel is denied. And there is a similar instance in the example of synderesis, which although it is practical, does not however make a man simply good. Because it does not dispose to right action immediately by itself here and now, and in every event, which is proper to virtue simply. Indeed, as Aristotle teaches, book 1 of the Magna Moralia, chap. 1: He who knows the virtues is not forthwith studious: and nonetheless moral science is called practical: because it reduces its conclusions to universal practical principles, which synderesis itself naturally dictates, and in common inclines to operating according to those principles. So therefore our theology will be called practical in this way, not only on the part of the learner, who ought to order it to the love of God; (for even Aristotle so esteemed his Ethics that he did not think a hearer worthy unless he were endowed with good morals, 1. Ethic., chap. 3.) but theology is also practical from the revealed light and the habit of faith from which it proceeds. And so further in two ways. First from faith, which is a virtue not only speculative, but is also like a certain infused synderesis, which murmurs against evil and instigates to good, which is the office of natural synderesis, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p., q. 29, art. 12. Secondly theology is also practical from the conjunction of the gifts of intellect, knowledge, and wisdom with the light of faith itself, which gifts are beyond doubt practical, as St. Thomas teaches, where above, 2. 2.; with which agrees what St. Augustine says, 12. De Trin., chap. 2, that the higher reason is engaged with the divine things to be beheld and consulted. Therefore the higher reason, as it is engaged with God as a supernatural object, must needs behold and consult divine things in a higher way: and this it does through faith and the supernatural gifts. Hence it follows that, other things being equal, he will be more learned in theology who has charity, than he who has it not. Because without charity such gifts of the Holy Spirit are not conjoined with faith, which illuminate the mind and give understanding to the little ones. Whence we see that eminent theologians were endowed with no mediocre sanctity.

To the third argument it is answered that it proves that a man can attain the last end without the means of theology: just as someone can be morally good without the science of moral philosophy. But it does not prove that, where theology is present, it cannot be practical according to the ways which we have explained in the conclusions.

To the confirmation the consequence is denied, and the disparity of the account consists in this, that physics and metaphysics do nothing about the attainment of the last end of beatitude. But theology, for a good part, is engaged with the means by which beatitude can be obtained. But on the part of the learner, any science, however speculative, can be directed to the praise and worship of God. For the Apostle also, in this regard, to the Romans, 1, vehemently reproaches the philosophers because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God.

To the fourth argument, I readily grant that theology agrees with moral philosophy as regards the fact that both direct human actions in common and not in particular; and as regards the fact that both need the virtues in order to act rightly; indeed also as regards the fact that both presuppose principles which are dictated by a practical habit, and are commanded in common. And in this way both are called practical. But there is a difference. Because our theology is still called more practical than moral philosophy. Because the principles of theology are had from faith, which is a quasi-supernatural synderesis, and from its own species, if it is perfect, it demands rectitude of will, according to what St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2., q. 4, art. 2 and 3, and especially in 5, where he says: For the act of faith to be perfect, it is required that the will be infallibly ordered to the last end. And that this perfection is through charity. But natural synderesis, even before the acquired virtues, is perfect in its species. And therefore theology is more practical, because it proceeds from such principles as are not perfect according to their proper species without charity.

To the fifth argument it is answered that the first per se end of theology is not to act rightly, but rather to contemplate what follows from such principles. Whence theology is not simply practical in the way in which Aristotle speaks of practice. It will however be practical eminently, or even formally, according to the various modes explained in the conclusions themselves. It is nonetheless always more speculative than practical, although the second per se end is to direct human actions in common to the attainment of the last end. To the testimony of the Apostle, however, it is answered first that perhaps he speaks of every good work which is the ministry of the evangelical doctor. For this is understood by that word, man of God, namely the minister of God, to whom it pertains to exercise the acts which he had set down there, namely to teach, to argue, to reprove, and to instruct in justice. If, however, by every good work every work of virtue is understood, then it is answered that revealed knowledge is indeed useful for exercising works of this kind, although it is not the end intended per se first by the science of theology.

To the confirmation it is answered, as has often been said, that it is per accidens to theology that it proceed from an obscure cognition of the principles. Whence the consequence of the confirmation does not hold.