Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

Just as, therefore, the supernatural order is higher than the whole natural order, so those things which per se pertain to that supernatural order are more abstract according to their proper account than the immaterial things which pertain to the order of nature. For He has given us the greatest and most precious promises, that through these we may be made partakers of the divine nature, 2. Petri. 1. And indeed even the supreme Seraph has a greater immateriality and purity from grace than he has from the proper quiddity of his nature. Which purity is manifested in the best action, such as is the vision of God, which makes the rational creature God-like. Let what has been said suffice thus far, that you may understand how great and how excellent is the abstraction of our theology. All the rest, however, which it considers, which pertain to the order of nature, it assumes insofar as they are either presupposed for the order of God's grace, or are ordainable to it. And this is the cause for which the theologian undertakes so many logical, physical, and metaphysical disputations, that in all of them he may inquire into the difference of nature and grace; and judge in what way the order of nature is subjected and ordered to the supernatural order of grace; so far is it from being repugnant to it. Whether, however, the formal account of our theology and its abstraction regard and demand an evident or an obscure light, or indifferently either, can already be plain from what was said in doubt 3 of the preceding article; and will be plainer in the solution to the sixth of the present doubt.

TO the arguments to the contrary it is answered.

To the first it is answered that the unity of a science is taken also from the unity of the formal account of the object which is attained, not considered according to its real being simply and absolutely — for thus being could not specify metaphysics, since entity is not a specific account, but rather an analogous and more than generic one — but that formal account which is attained must be considered as it underlies the light, by reason of which it is abstracted according to an indivisible abstraction, in which there is no more and less. And in this way sciences are specified by their real objects. There is an example quite suited to the present matter. The power of sight is specified by its object, which is the colored thing: and yet it is plain that the colored thing is a genus in relation to many species of colors. And nonetheless, if it be considered according to its mode of immuting the power and terminating its action, it has the account not of a genus, but of an atomic species: because whiteness and blackness immute in the same way, and in the same way terminate the action of the power. So therefore in the present matter, the account of being as specifying metaphysics is not to be considered absolutely in the account of a thing, but as it underlies some light that abstracts in an altogether same way. In this sense, therefore, the antecedent of the argument is granted and the consequence denied. To the proof it is answered that both are true; and that the Godhead, as it underlies revelation, is the formal account: and also revelation, as it shows the Godhead. For these are reckoned as one, as will also have to be repeated in the seventh article.

To the second argument the minor is denied. To the proof it has already been sufficiently explained, around the third conclusion of this doubt, how the formal account of mathematics does not consist in an indivisible, but is a greater or lesser abstraction from sensible matter. But the formal account of our theology consists in an indivisible. For it abstracts from every thing of the natural order, as will be explained more fully in the solution to the sixth.

To the third argument the consequence is denied. To the proof we grant that the difference of a science is taken by order to something real, which is grounded on the part of the object, which is the formal account that is attained. But this would not suffice to specify the science, unless as it underlies the formal account grounded on the part of the light through which the revelation of the object is made, which is the account under which. Whence the consequence drawn does not hold.

To the fourth argument I distinguish the antecedent. For God could reveal to me the objects of those sciences in two ways. In one way, by infusing distinct habits such as a man could have acquired by his own efforts. And in this way I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence: because such a revelation is not formally of the supernatural order, except only as regards the miraculous mode on the part of the effective principle, which does not vary the species of the thing. Just as a man raised from the dead by God and one begotten by another are of the same species. In another way God can infuse a knowledge of those objects such as a man could not acquire from purely natural powers. And in this way God could, through a single habit and under a single account of light, teach a man many objects of the human sciences. And thus Christ the Lord had infused knowledge per se, whose formal account, one according to species, extends to all the objects of our sciences, and many more.

To the fifth argument someone could answer first, that that major premise from the doctrine of Aristotle is to be understood of sciences acquired by the powers of human genius, but not of sciences either infused or acquired by supernatural light. And the reason for this difference is: because in the acquisition of the sciences we proceed from sensible things, which are material and less intelligible, abstracting quiddities from matter as far as can be done. And therefore according to a greater or lesser abstraction the species of sciences are distinguished. But in the theological science of God we proceed immediately from the knowledge of God through a supernatural light, which surpasses all sense and our reason. And thence by the mediation of the same light we proceed to the knowledge of the conclusions which are deduced from such a principle; and therefore our theology has no need to be specified by abstraction from matter.

It is answered secondly, and better in my judgment, according to the doctrine handed down around the third conclusion, that although metaphysics abstracts from intelligible matter, because it treats of being and of substance, which in its definition does not include corporeal matter, and is therefore said to abstract from intelligible matter, because no corporeal matter is understood in the definition of substance: nevertheless it pertains to metaphysics to consider per se the species of substance, which all include a certain metaphysical matter, namely potency and act. For the angels themselves are composed of to-be and essence, which is related as potency to the to-be itself. But theology considers per se only of God, who is pure act: of creatures, however, it does not consider as of the subjective parts of its object: but it treats of them insofar as they can fall under divine revelation and be ordered to God Himself. Wherefore the abstraction of our theology is greater than that of metaphysics: for it abstracts from metaphysical matter.

To the sixth argument I have said a great many things in the commentaries which I dictated at Salamanca in the theological college on the Secunda secundae, question 1, article 1, doubt 2. Which, with the Lord's favor, will come to light shortly. Meanwhile, however, I answer the argument briefly, that divine revelation, or revealability, is the same formal account under which both faith and theology are considered. But not equally and in the same way. For divine revelation, as it is the formal account of faith, includes obscurity intrinsically. Because faith inclines to a certain assent from the sole authority of the one speaking. For which it is necessary that the object of assent be not seen. For as the saying goes, (El creer es cortesia.) But as it is the formal account under which theology is considered, it does not include obscurity intrinsically and per se, but per accidens, as was said in the preceding article, last doubt. Indeed I think that our theology, as far as it is on its own part, demands clarity in the principles: since it will have it when it is in the perfect state of its species. Whence what some say, that theology abstracts from revelation as clear or obscure, does not please me, unless it be said in the sense that the species of theology can be preserved under an obscure revelation, provided there be a certain revelation about God and from God Himself. Nevertheless such a preservation is not an argument that theology itself abstracts per se from an obscure or a clear revelation. Just as if we were to say that the form of water does not per se require intense coldness, because it can be preserved with a minimal coldness and intense heat. Behold the first difference, on account of which, speaking per se and formally, the formal account of faith and of theology is not the same, although it happens materially that the same revelation is the formal account of both. There is another difference. Because revealability, or divine revelation, insofar as it regards faith, is the immediate account of assenting to certain truths which are related as the principles of theology: but insofar as it regards theology, it is not the immediate account of assenting to the conclusions: but through the mediation of a consequence evident by another light. And thus the theological habit and a theological light are acquired, which is virtually from divine revelation. Wherefore the object properly and formally of theology is what is virtually revealed, as we said in the third conclusion of the commentaries on 2. 2., where above. Which matter will be explained more fully in the solution to the seventh.

To the seventh argument, therefore, that we may answer fully, it must be noted that theological demonstrations are of two kinds. For some are those which proceed from both premises certain according to faith. Others are those which proceed from one premise certain according to the Catholic faith, and the other naturally known by natural light, either immediately or mediately, whether in natural philosophy, or in moral philosophy, or in metaphysics. But the consequence of the syllogism must always be evident according to the dialectical rules, as we showed in the preceding article, doubt 1, to the third argument against the opinion of the most learned Soto.

Note secondly, that the most powerful theological demonstration is that where both premises are certain according to faith. Because the account of assenting to the premises is divine revelation: and the same is the account of assenting to the conclusion, not immediately, but mediately, namely through the consequence known by natural light. Let there be an example. The Son of God is equal to the Father, Christ is the Son of God, therefore Christ is equal to the Father. (I now pass over whether that conclusion is otherwise immediately believed by faith.) In demonstrations of this kind, therefore, the natural light by which the goodness of the consequences is judged is not the formal account of assenting, but a condition and, as it were, an application of the formal account of the antecedent to the conclusion. And therefore it might seem to someone that only the light of faith concurs to the assent of the conclusion. Nevertheless, as I shall immediately explain, even from demonstrations of this kind a certain theological habit and light is acquired for assenting to similar conclusions. Whence to the argument as made I gladly grant that to the assent of theological conclusions two lights always concur, one the light of faith, the other begotten from it in the very composition of the premises, by which light the conclusion is demonstrated. The revelation of this light Cajetan calls a virtual revelation of God, because such a light proceeds as a kind of splendor from the power of the light of faith joined to the demonstration. And indeed the light of faith in demonstrations of this kind is related as a universal cause, this light however as a particular one. The former is related as the natural light of first principles in the individual disciplines, the latter is related as a light acquired by the power of the natural light concerning some genus of knowable object. Hence therefore the full solution of the argument is gathered. For we say that, just as it does not hinder the specific unity of the science of geometry that the light of first principles concur to the assent of the conclusions together with the light of the acquired habit — indeed this is always necessary formally or virtually — so neither does it hinder the unity of theological science that the light of faith, which is of first principles, concur together with the theological light and habit to the assent of the conclusion. And the reason is. Because the unity of a science is to be weighed from the unity of the light by which we immediately assent to the conclusion: and this light in theology makes the object virtually revealed. It is true, however, that on account of the affinity of the theological light, and the subordination which it has to the light of faith, it is wont to be said by theologians that the same formal account belongs to the assent of faith and to theological conclusions, but in diverse ways. And this diverse way has been explained by us up to this point. But when one premise is of faith and the other known or demonstrated by natural light, then the acquired light is not so purely theological as when both premises are of faith, or both are demonstrated from two premises of faith. And the reason for this is. Because the assent of the conclusion is reduced not only to the principle of faith, but also to a principle known by natural light. Therefore since it has its origin from two principles of a diverse order, there is not in it as much simplicity as if it drew its origin from principles alone immediately known by the light of faith. But nevertheless even then the conclusion must be called theological. And the reason is. Because the premise known by natural light is not assumed by the theologian for its own sake: but for the sake of the ministry to the office of the theologian, which is per se to deduce conclusions from the things of faith. But because someone could say that the intention of the theologian does not change the account of the science, we say secondly that the conclusion is deservedly called theological. Because now in its obscurity it is assimilated to faith. Then because it is more certain than if it were demonstrated from two natural principles.

But you will say: On the contrary. The conclusion follows the weaker part of the antecedent, but the certainty from a natural principle is lesser than from a principle of faith, therefore the conclusion follows the lesser certainty.

It is answered that the conclusion is said to follow the weaker part, not because if one premise be contingent the consequent is contingent, or if some premise is false the consequent is false. For those skilled in dialectic know that in a good consequence a false antecedent and a true consequent can be given. But the sense is that in a good consequence, whatever weak thing is found in the consequent must be referred to the weak premise. As e.g. if I say: Every animal is irrational, every man is an animal, therefore every man is irrational, the consequent is false, not on account of the minor, which is necessary, therefore on account of the major. But if that saying, that the conclusion follows the weaker part, be understood of conclusions which are in demonstrations; then it is still necessary to distinguish. For if the demonstration be a posteriori, it is false that the conclusion follows the weaker part; indeed the conclusion is more certain than the antecedent. As if you say: Every risible animal is rational, man is a risible animal, therefore man is rational. But if the demonstration be made a priori: then the conclusion will be said to follow the weaker part, insofar as if in the other part there is lesser certainty, or lesser evidence (for falsity there cannot be, since it is a demonstration), then in the conclusion there will not be as much certainty or as much clarity as there would have been, if that conclusion were as certain or evident as the other. Whence in this syllogism, Every man is risible, Christ is a man, therefore Christ is risible, the conclusion indeed has obscurity from the premise of faith. But even if it does not have as much certainty as it would have if both premises were of faith, it nonetheless has greater certainty from one premise of faith and the other known by natural light, than if both were certain only from natural light.

Finally, note that it is not necessary for a theological conclusion that both premises, or one of them, be immediately of faith: indeed it happens that both, or one, is also a theological conclusion. As e.g. Every discursive animal is risible, Christ is a discursive animal, therefore Christ is risible. For it will suffice that the premises, or a premise, be reduced to the principle of faith.

But for a greater completeness of what we have said, in this solution two things remain to be explained. One is, whether some principle of faith can also be demonstrated theologically. On which matter we have spoken in 2. 2., q. 1, art. 5, doubt 1, shortly before the solution of the arguments after the fifth conclusion. But now I say briefly that there is no inconvenience if we say that even an article of faith can be demonstrated theologically, at least a posteriori, as e.g.: Every man who rises again was dead; Christ rose again, therefore Christ was dead. Nevertheless demonstrations of this kind seem useless: because they confer nothing of certainty or of clarity on the conclusion. The other is, whether in the first theological demonstration there concurs, to the assent of the conclusion, some acquired theological light? To which it is answered that, just as in the other sciences in the first demonstration, which proceeds from first and immediate principles, the habit is not yet begotten, but is then first begotten; and nonetheless the assent of the conclusion is not made immediately from the light of first principles, otherwise it would not be science: so too it happens in the first theological demonstration, that although the light is not yet begotten at that time, the actual demonstration itself is a certain splendor having its origin from the light of faith.

To the last argument it is answered by denying the sequel. Because not all particular revelations are about God Himself: but theology proceeds from the light which per se and first reveals God as a supernatural object, whether it be the light of faith or the light of glory. Whence I think that without one of these lights there cannot be a true theology. From which I again gather that, however much someone might have the prophetic light, unless he had the light of faith, or the light of glory, which Christ had, he will not be able to have theological science. Of which you may gather the reason from St. Thomas in 3. d. 24, q. 1, art. 1, to the third, and art. 2, to the fourth, and De Verit. q. 14, art. 8, to the thirteenth, and in 3. p., q. 7, art. 8. In which places, among other differences, one is most powerful: that although prophecy and faith can be about the same object materially, as e.g. about the passion of Christ there was formerly prophecy and faith in the prophets; yet faith formally regards the passion insofar as it has something eternal and divine, namely insofar as it is God who suffered; the temporal, however, it regards materially. But prophecy is related the opposite way. For it regards the temporal itself as its proper object. So he says. Behold, then, the reason why the prophetic light alone does not suffice per se for the assent to the principles of theology, whose object, or subject, is God Himself. The rest, however, it considers by order to God immediately known by supernatural light. Thus far concerning this article.