Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

IT IS DOUBTED therefore: Whether the principal conclusion of St. Thomas is true, and his reason a good one?

An argument is made first for the negative side. The specific unity of a science must be taken from the unity of the formal account of the object which is attained; therefore from the unity of divine revelation the unity of the science of theology is not well concluded. The consequence is proved. Because the formal account which is attained by the theologian is the Godhead, since it is per se a science of God, as St. Thomas teaches in art. 7; therefore divine revelation is not the formal account of the specific unity of this science.

An argument is made secondly. If divine revelation pertains in any way to the formal account of this science, it seems that it pertains as the formal account under which; but from the unity of the formal account under which the specific unity of a science is not necessarily gathered; therefore the reason of St. Thomas does not prove the conclusion. The minor is proved. Because the mathematical sciences are concerned with quantity under one formal account, which is abstraction from sensible matter, and yet there are four mathematical sciences differing in species, e.g. arithmetic, music, geometry, and optics; therefore divine revelation, which is the formal account under which the theologian considers things so diverse and of diverse genera, will not suffice to make a specific unity in theological science.

An argument is made thirdly. Revealability posits nothing in the thing revealed itself, therefore it is not a formal account specifying a science. The consequence is plain. Because the difference of a science is taken by order to something real, whereas from the fact that God reveals to us that He is three and one, and that the divine Word became flesh, nothing is posited in the object itself.

An argument is made fourthly. If God were to reveal to me all mathematical and astrological truths, I would nonetheless have several sciences from the plurality of knowable objects; therefore divine revelation does not make a specific unity in the things revealed.

An argument is made fifthly. For sciences are distinguished, as Aristotle teaches, 6. Metaph., tex. 2, according to a greater or lesser abstraction from matter: but metaphysics abstracts from matter equally with theology; therefore it does not differ in species from it. The minor is proved. Because metaphysics abstracts from intelligible matter, than which abstraction there cannot be a greater; but in theology it cannot be lesser, since otherwise it would be a lower science; therefore it abstracts equally with metaphysics.

An argument is made sixthly. The same account cannot specify the habit of first principles and the habit of conclusions: but divine revelation specifies the habit of faith, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2., q. 1, and we have disputed on the matter at length in that place; therefore it cannot be the formal account specifying theology. The consequence is plain. Because the habit of faith is of principles, whereas that of theology is of conclusions, as is plain from what was said in the preceding article; therefore etc.

An argument is made seventhly. To every assent to a theological conclusion there always concur two lights that are more than specifically distinct; therefore the account of assenting to conclusions is not one and simple according to species, but rather mixed: and consequently theology is not a habit of one species. The consequence is plain. Because the light is the account of assenting to conclusions. But the antecedent is proved. Because in every theological demonstration not only does the light of faith concur immediately, but the assent to the other premise is made from some natural light, or one naturally acquired. Or if both premises were immediately of faith, the consequence is nonetheless known by natural light.

Finally, an argument is made. If divine revelation is the formal account of theology, it follows that those things which fall under particular revelations pertain to theology, or that from them theological conclusions can be gathered.

FOR the understanding of this difficulty, certain things must be premised by us as, so to speak, foundations drawn from logic and metaphysics.

Let the first foundation be, that the formal account is considered as twofold in any science whatsoever. One is called the account Which, the other the account under which; that is, one is the account which is attained by the very cognition of the science, another is the account under which it is attained. The former account is that which is grounded on the part of the object according to its entity, which is the very quiddity and essence of the object, concerning which are the proximate principles of the science, and which is the root of those things that are demonstrated in the science. The account under which is that which is grounded on the part of the science itself. And it is called under which, because the object itself, insofar as it underlies that account, is proportioned to the science. We can set an example in the senses, in respect of which the formal account which and the formal account under which are likewise distinguished, as e.g. color is called the formal account of the object of sight, which is attained and seen by sight: whereas light is said to be the formal account under which color itself is seen. Although this example does not fit in every respect. For light is also an account which is attained by the power of sight, and more principally than color. For the sun is most visible by reason of its light. But the example is brought forward because light, in comparison with colors, is the account under which. But let there be another example in the mathematical sciences, whose formal account which is attained is said to be quantity: whereas the formal account of the object under which is said to be abstraction from sensible matter. Indeed abstraction from matter, as it is signified in common, is the common account under which falls every knowable object. On this matter see Cajetan, book 2 of the Posterior Analytics, in the question on the abstraction of the sciences. Now therefore in this article we do not investigate the formal account which is attained by theology. For concerning this there will be a special disputation in the seventh article. Now, however, we inquire which is the formal account under which the object of theology is considered.

Let the second foundation be, that the specific unity of a science is to be judged not only from the unity of the formal object as it is a certain thing, but at the same time from the unity of the formal object according to the formal account under which; as e.g. metaphysics is indeed one science according to species, but its formal object, as it is a thing, does not have a specific formal unity, indeed nor even a generic one. For being insofar as being is the object of metaphysics. And this is per se divided into ten genera of things primarily diverse. Nevertheless the account of being is the same, as it underlies abstraction from matter, even intelligible matter, which is the formal account under which being is considered; and therefore metaphysics is one science according to an atomic species, because such abstraction consists in an indivisible. See Cajetan, book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, chap. 23, and St. Thomas in opusculum 79, quaest. 5, art. 1.

Let the third foundation be: that although, according to the doctrine of Aristotle in 6. Metaph., tex. 2, sciences are distinguished according to a greater or lesser abstraction from matter, and abstraction is called the formal account under which, nevertheless it is not so to be understood that abstraction itself is the light manifesting the object, but it is a necessary condition, so that such an object be known through such a light. And therefore abstraction itself is called the account under which. For its explanation I suppose that abstraction from matter is sometimes real and without the operation of the intellect, as an angel is a substance really abstracted from matter. Sometimes, however, abstraction from matter is only a second intention, which follows upon the operation of the intellect, as e.g. man by a common concept is abstracted from singular matter, and quantity from sensible matter, although in reality there is no man without singular matter, no quantity without sensible matter. This supposed, our third foundation is proved, namely that abstraction from matter cannot be the formal account under which, except only as a condition. The argument is: if abstraction from matter were per se the formal account under which the knowable object is known, constituted, and distinguished, it follows that since abstraction itself is only a second intention, it would then too constitute and distinguish the knowable by itself; the consequent is false. Because a second intention is a being of reason consequent upon the operation of the intellect, therefore it does not really constitute or distinguish science from science. Furthermore it is proved that a real abstraction from matter still cannot be the formal account under which. The argument is: the formal account under which must be something by which the science is formally constituted in its species and distinguished from another, therefore it must be something intrinsic to the science itself: but the real abstraction of the knowable object exists outside the intellect, therefore it cannot be that by which the science is really and formally constituted and distinguished. And it is confirmed. Because the relation of the science to the knowable is real: but every real relation is intrinsic to that which it denominates, therefore the relation of the science to the knowable is intrinsic to the science itself. Then further: therefore much more is the formal account specifying the science intrinsic. The consequence is plain. Because the relation follows such a formal account as its foundation and as the proper difference of the science, which is intrinsic. It is necessary therefore to assert that the true and real account under which every knowable thing is known is some light intrinsic to the scientific habit, whether natural, or supernatural, or acquired. For everything that is manifested, or everything that manifests, as the Apostle says, is light. Furthermore it is proved, and shown as it were a posteriori and from a sign, that abstraction from matter cannot be per se the formal account of distinguishing, but rather the diversity of light. The argument is: wherever there is no diversity of light, even if there be a greater or lesser abstraction from matter in the things known, the habit is not diversified; as for example the habit of all first principles is altogether the same, even if not all first principles are equally abstracted from matter. For this principle, that anything is or is not, abstracts from matter, even intelligible matter. But this principle, that things equal to one third are equal to each other, does not abstract from intelligible matter: and this principle, that nature is the principle of motion and rest, abstracts only from singular matter, and nonetheless the habit of all of them is the same: because by the same natural light they are immediately shown to be true. But afterwards in the discourse from these principles another and another light is needed, so that things more or less abstracted from matter be known and scientifically grasped. And thus sciences are distinguished in species.

But you ask: What then is it that is so frequently in the mouth of metaphysicians and dialecticians, that sciences are distinguished in species by abstraction from matter? It is answered that they speak in that way for the same reason as they also say which sciences are about universals: and yet it is plain that universality is a condition of the formal object, under which as a condition the formal is effected. So too abstraction from matter is called the account under which, as a necessary condition annexed to the object manifestable through such a light. In this way too we are wont to say that sciences are constituted and distinguished by order and relation to the knowable; and yet the difference of a science is not a relation, but something absolute, to which a relation is annexed; through which the dependence of the science on the knowable and its intrinsic difference is declared and understood. In this way, therefore, abstraction from matter is a condition of the knowable object annexed to it and manifesting the difference of the scientific light, which will be the more perfect the more abstracted from matter the object manifested. It must be noted, however, concerning this foundation, that the difference of abstraction has its foundation in the formal account of the object which, as it is a thing. For from the fact that the thing itself in itself participates more or less of matter, it comes about that the intellect is engaged with it with a greater or lesser abstraction from matter.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: Divine revelation is the formal account under which the theological object specifies theology. This conclusion is well gathered from St. Thomas in this art. and in art. 7. For in this article, seeking the specific unity of this doctrine, he assigned no other formal account of the object than divine revelation. And in the solution to the second he says that sacred doctrine considers all things under one account insofar as they are divinely revealable; therefore he understands revelation to be the formal account of the object under which. And again in art. 7 he says that the formal account of the subject of this science is that all things are considered under the account of God, that is, under the Godhead. But it is plain that the Godhead is the formal account which is attained; therefore divine revelation is the formal account under which.

SECOND conclusion. Divine revelation, as it is considered as the formal account under which, is not distinguished from the light itself, or from the formal effect of the light. For its understanding, note that divine revelation can be considered as it is an action of God existing in God Himself. And in this way it is not the formal account of our theology or of faith, under which the object of faith or of theology is attained. Because that action is extrinsic to us, being grounded on the part of the efficient and higher cause. In another way divine revelation is taken for the very effect which God revealing produces in us, whereby something formally becomes manifest or revealed to us. And in this way the formal account under which the object of theology or of faith is considered is nothing other than the light itself, or the formal effect of the light which God infuses into us, so that through it we assent immediately to principles, but mediately to the conclusions deduced from them. This conclusion is proved. Because from this theology is distinguished from metaphysics, as St. Thomas teaches, art. 1 of this question, because metaphysics treats of the same things as they are knowable by the light of natural reason; theology, however, as they are known by the light of divine revelation; therefore it is necessary that, in the way in which divine revelation is called the account under which, it not be distinguished from the light, or from the formal effect of the supernatural light. The consequence is plain. Because there cannot be two formal accounts under which and through which a science has unity. Likewise St. Thomas in the following art. says that sacred doctrine, being one, extends itself to those things which pertain to the other sciences, as they are knowable by the divine light. And it is confirmed from what the Apostle says, 2. Cor. c. 4: God, who said that light should shine out of darkness, has Himself shone in our hearts for the illumination of the knowledge of the brightness of God in the face of Christ Jesus. Behold, he posits the efficient cause on the part of God, when he says, has shone. He also posits the effect of God's action in us, when he says, for the illumination of the knowledge. He also posits the formal account which is attained, in that he says, of the brightness of God: that is, of the Divinity in the face of Christ, that is, in the person of Christ. Therefore the formal account under which we know God and the things that are God's is the light infused by God, through which those things that are in our intellect are formally illuminated into a theological intelligible being. And in this sense we say that divine revelation is the formal account under which. As also the Apostle says to the Romans, chap. 1: Because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God has manifested it to them. Where he plainly speaks of the manifestation or revelation which is made by the natural light implanted by the Author of nature. Therefore, just as God is said to manifest or reveal, as Author of nature, certain things which are naturally knowable of God, for no other reason than that He confers the natural light on men: so too He will be said to reveal those things which pertain to supernatural knowledge, insofar as He infuses the light by which such things are revealed. And in this way it will be verified that under divine revelation they pertain to one specific account of faith or of theology: although differently, as we are about to explain.

THIRD conclusion. If abstraction from matter be considered as the necessary condition of the formal account under which, according to the doctrine explained in the third foundation, our theology also has a certain abstraction pertaining as a condition to its specific unity. And concerning this abstraction, all that was said in the third foundation will be verified in its own way. This conclusion is proved in no other way than because, since our theology is truly and properly a science, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary to attribute to it the properties of a science, as far as possible. Now it is a certain property of a science to abstract from matter, and that the higher a science is, the more it abstracts. Therefore since theology is the supreme among sciences, its abstraction must be the greatest and excelling above metaphysical abstraction.

But if you ask: What abstraction can be greater than from intelligible matter? It is answered that among natural beings there is a natural order, such that some are more immaterial and simple than others: and along this path three degrees of abstraction are found. The first is from singular matter; and this pertains to physical science, which I judge to be one according to species: because its abstraction from singular matter does not admit of more and less. But concerning this matter, in the beginning of the first book On Generation and Corruption, we shall say more. The second degree of abstraction is from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter. And this abstraction belongs to the mathematical sciences, in which a specific difference is found: because such abstraction does not consist in an indivisible. Whence arithmetic is the simplest of all. Because number is simpler than continuous quantity, which has the condition of matter, in that it is divisible to infinity, which quantity is the object of geometry; number, however, is reduced to unity as to an indivisible measure, which is the object of arithmetic. Then music and optics differ from these: because they abstract less from sensible matter, in that the object of optics is the visual line, whereas the object of music is sonorous number. Among themselves, however, on the part of the principles, music is judged the more perfect. Because its principles are the conclusions of arithmetic, whereas the principles of optics are the conclusions of geometry. But if they be considered on the part of the formal account of the object which is attained by each of them, optics seems nobler than music, in that the addition of the object of optics over geometry is considered by order to sight, which is a nobler power and more abstracting from motion, than the addition of music over arithmetic, which states an order to hearing, which does not abstract from motion as sight does. Because hearing is exercised with a certain real immutation around the medium and perhaps around the sense organ, according to a certain local motion and impulse of air. And therefore these subalternated sciences will be related among themselves as exceeding and exceeded. The third degree of abstraction is from intelligible matter as well. And this degree is proper to metaphysics, whose object is being. In whose account there is no matter. For the account of being can be found perfect without any matter or order to matter, which does not happen in the account of quantity, which is necessarily understood by order to a material subject. And therefore the mathematical sciences are said not to abstract from intelligible matter. But the adequate object itself of metaphysics, which is being, is also found as something intrinsic in material things. In which, however, the metaphysician considers something immaterial, namely that in material things there is found a certain order abstracting from matter, and from here and now. And thus we say that this demonstration is metaphysical: every man is a discursive animal, every discursive animal is risible, therefore every man is risible. Because although man himself is composed of matter: yet the metaphysician considers in him what is eternal and necessary, and belongs to him intrinsically by order to the proper object of metaphysics. And thus he proceeds from the definition of man, which is composed of parts not by a real composition, namely animal rational, but metaphysically from genus and difference, which in reality are not parts except insofar as they are subject to the abstraction of the intellect. But of these things elsewhere. But if we consider the abstraction proper to our theology in respect of its proper object, we shall find it to exceed the metaphysical abstraction very much. For the object of our theology is God Himself, who according to Himself is pure act, nor has any material part, as being has, which is the object of metaphysics. For God cannot be divided, as being is divided into ten genera, in which there is much matter and potentiality. Likewise, if the metaphysician in any way considers God, he does so insofar as in natural effects the divine power and divinity can shine forth. And for the same reason he considers substances separated from matter, insofar as he can investigate their quiddities from the quiddity of material things. The theologian, however, considers God Himself per se as He is in Himself and without order to natural effects naturally knowable. Whence God Himself, as He is set before theology, underlies the light of a higher order, which emanates from God alone into our intellect, not as due to us from our nature, nor consequent upon our quiddity or efficiency, as the natural light and the acquired light are in us.