Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

Domingo Báñez

Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)

First published 1584

Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.

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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem

In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio

Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat

Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia

Commentarium

THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.

First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)

Dubium 1 (continuatio)

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

IT IS DOUBTED third: Whether our theology remains in the fatherland, or rather is exchanged for the other theology of the Blessed

It is argued first for the negative side from 1 Cor. 13: When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Whence the theologians gather that faith does not remain in the fatherland: because faith is an imperfect and obscure knowledge; but our theology is imperfect and obscure, therefore it does not remain in the fatherland. It is confirmed, because in the same place it is said: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, therefore it is signified that our theology will not remain in the fatherland. On which passage Cajetan holds that our theology does not remain in the fatherland: and Theophylact holds the same on the same passage.

It is argued second. The formal account of our theology does not remain in the fatherland, therefore neither does theology itself. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the following article, the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith: but this account does not remain in the fatherland, since faith does not remain, therefore, etc.

It is argued third. Our theology is generated from non-evident assents, therefore it itself cannot be a habit inclining to an evident assent: but theology in the fatherland inclines to an evident assent, therefore it is the other one.

It is argued fourth. A non-evident assent cannot itself become evident, as seems manifest, therefore a non-evident habit cannot likewise become evident, therefore the habit of our theology does not remain in the fatherland.

It is argued fifth. The theology of the Blessed is a habit infused per se: and our theology is a habit acquired per se: but a habit acquired per se cannot be the same as a habit infused per se; therefore our theology does not remain in the fatherland, or certainly we shall have a twofold theology, one infused and the other acquired. The consequence and the minor are evident. The major is proved. For the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, seems to be of the same account as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ, which is indeed not infused accidentally, but per se; therefore the knowledge which all the Blessed have outside the Word will also be infused per se, or certainly derived per se from the beatific knowledge.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that a habit or a virtue which we have on the way can remain in the fatherland in two ways. In one way for ornament, but not for exercise. As temperance and fortitude, which are occupied with the passions, will remain. In the other way a virtue can remain not only for ornament, but also for exercise. As prudence, even acquired prudence, will remain, religion will remain, and other similar virtues. And if you ask why faith and hope will not remain at least for ornament, as temperance and fortitude remain, although they do not exercise their proper acts? It is answered that there is a very great difference. Because the formal account of the object of faith and hope is intrinsically repugnant to the formal account of the beatific vision. According to that: Faith is to believe what you do not see; and according to that: What a man sees, why does he hope for? And therefore it does not pertain to the ornament of the blessed soul to be adorned with habits of this kind. But the formal account of the object of fortitude and temperance has no repugnance to the formal account of beatitude: indeed in Christ the Lord, whose soul was blessed from the beginning of the incarnation, there was at once the exercise of fortitude and temperance together with the beatific vision; and yet the exercise of faith or hope could not be together with the vision. Wherefore there is not the same account of faith and hope, and of the other virtues.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the theology which we acquire on the way through necessary consequences from revealed principles remains in the fatherland not only for ornament, but also for exercise. This conclusion is easily proved once the decision of the preceding doubts is presupposed. For if our theology is properly a science, although it is imperfect by reason of its state and not from its proper species, as has been sufficiently explained in the first doubt of this article, there is no reason why it should not remain in the fatherland for ornament and exercise, the imperfection which it has accidentally on the way being removed. And it is confirmed. For the obscurity which our theology has on the way is accidental to the formal account of its specific object, which indeed is considered as subject to divine revelation mediately through evident discourse. But that that revelation, certain as it is, is obscure in its principles, although it pertains per se to faith; nevertheless accrues accidentally to the science of theology. For it belongs to it as it is small and beginning: but it will be made perfect and evident, when the evidence which it seeks has come to it from principles evidently known. And I wonder at Cajetan, who, although he holds that our theology abstracts from the obscure and the evident, nevertheless asserts in the passage cited that it does not remain in the fatherland.

It is proved secondly, from the ground of St. Thomas in this article, by which he proves that sacred doctrine is a science whose principles are known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed, therefore it is not repugnant for it to be conjoined with a higher science, just as it is not repugnant for a subalternated science, indeed it most of all agrees that it be conjoined with the subalternating science.

It is proved third. For the gifts of the Holy Spirit which in this life pertain to the intellect have non-evidence for this state, and nevertheless they remain in the fatherland with evidence, as St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. 68, art. 6. Therefore it is not repugnant that the habit of theology, which now is non-evident, can become evident in the blessed life, since that non-evidence is not intrinsic to its species. And finally it is proved from St. Jerome in the epistle to Paulinus: Let us learn (he says) on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. And it is confirmed. For in the fatherland there will be no oblivion of the demonstrations which were acquired on the way concerning the objects of the other disciplines, therefore neither concerning the object of theology. Those authors, however, who hold that our theology acquired on the way is not a science; or that it is opinion, as Scotus, Durandus, and Marsilius, Gabriel, Ockham, and Adam, and Master Soto in the passage cited above, who said that our theology proceeds only by probable consequences, all these will speak consequently if they deny that our theology remains in the fatherland. For the habit of opinion can never become scientific.

Second conclusion. It is very probable to me that in the Blessed, besides the beatific knowledge, there is no other theology infused per se, but every other theology besides the beatific vision is in the angels acquired per se by the power of the light of glory, the natural light being added for gathering the conclusions from those principles which they know through their proper species; and the blessed men who did not learn theology in this life will do likewise. But those who did learn it will there be perfected and will know more things through their proper species than those who did not learn it while they were on the way. For grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. From this conclusion we except the soul of Christ the Lord, who had a habit of knowledge not accidentally but per se infused, as we shall say in the solution to the last argument.

TO the arguments, then, made in opposition it is answered.

TO the first, that that testimony of the Apostle is legitimately understood of faith itself, as is plain from what follows. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. But what he says: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, can also be understood of the knowledge of faith, which on account of its certainty is sometimes called knowledge, according to John 11: I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. And elsewhere Job 19: I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth. And many other similar things will be found in the Sacred Scriptures.

It is answered secondly that the Apostle does not affirm that the knowledge which is acquired here will be destroyed, but speaks conditionally, as when he says, whether tongues shall cease; and yet it is certain that in the Blessed the knowledge of tongues will remain: indeed, as is probably asserted, after the resurrection they will sometimes praise God with bodily tongues, as St. Thomas says, lect. 3 on the same passage of the Apostle. But tongues are said to cease, because it will not be necessary to use various tongues so that the Blessed may understand one another, because in the future glory anyone will understand any tongue. And perhaps in that state, as in the beginning of the human race, there will be only one speech and one lip. Or finally, if it is more pleasing, say with St. Thomas on that passage, whether knowledge shall be destroyed, not indeed as regards the habit or the intelligible species which the soul acquired in this life, but because, separated from the body, it will not know by conversion to phantasms. But nevertheless on the day of judgment the soul will be able to understand and know freely by conversion to phantasms. But this will not be necessary, just as neither will it be necessary to use various tongues. Whence this solution nearly coincides with the preceding one. However the matter may stand, certainly St. Thomas in the place cited above reproves the opinion of those who, on the occasion of the apostolic testimony, deny that acquired knowledge remains in the fatherland.

TO the second argument, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that St. Thomas in the following article does not say that the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith, but that sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are divinely revealed. It is therefore accidental to the formal account of our theology that that revelation of the principles be obscure. For this pertains to its imperfect state.

TO the third argument it is answered that that antecedent, our theology is generated from non-evident assents, if it makes formal sense, is false. For our theology according to its proper species is not per se generated from non-evident assents, although it is materially true that here and now, for this state, it is generated from non-evident assents. In which sense the antecedent is true, but the consequence is worth nothing: indeed the same habit, if there be removed what is accidental to the proper species of theology, namely the obscurity concerning the principles, will nevertheless remain the same habit, more perfect and more illustrious than before, on account of its conjunction with the light of glory.

TO the fourth argument it is answered first, let the antecedent pass and I deny the consequence. As perhaps the same assent in number of unformed faith cannot become formed: because it is varied according to that circumstance of one living or dead: nevertheless it does not follow from this that the habit of faith does not remain the same, formed by charity, which before had been unformed.

It is answered, secondly, I deny the antecedent. Indeed from the nature of the thing it is possible that the same assent in number, e.g. of this conclusion, Christ is risible, which is now had from a principle known by faith, be continued in the fatherland, if God suddenly infused the light of glory concerning the same principle. But because, speaking regularly, the actual assent of theological conclusions is interrupted, not only when a man passes from this life to the other, but also at intervals in the present life; therefore it is never verified that the same assent in number is now non-evident and afterwards evident. But the habit, because from its nature it remains, can well be the same, now non-evident and afterwards evident. Just as the same man is an infant and afterwards a man.

TO the fifth argument, I deny the major, if we speak of the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word: indeed I think that it is either acquired by their own acts or consequent upon the beatific vision. And however it be, I do not concede that it is infused per se: indeed it is of such a species that it can be acquired by our acts. Just as the knowledge was instilled by God himself in our first parent, which the theologians call infused accidentally, because it was such as he could acquire by his own acts.

To the proof of the major it is answered that the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, is not of the same species as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ. And the reason is: because the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ extends per se to the knowledge of the thoughts of the heart, to which act no knowledge of men or of angels can extend itself. From which it is plainly gathered that it is a knowledge infused per se. Whose formal account is more universal and simpler than the formal account of our theology, or of the Blessed.

For the greater understanding of this, observe what we shall dispute at length in q. 57, art. 4: that although the angels can know the thoughts of the heart revealed by the one thinking, or by God himself revealing specially, and then, when the angel knows them, there is no need for him to acquire new species, but he knows the thoughts of the heart and the free actions of the will through the old ones; nevertheless an angel, even a blessed one, does not have a habitual faculty, or knowledge, which can extend itself to knowledge of this kind without a new revelation. But the soul of Christ the Lord has so great a fullness of knowledge that it penetrates our thoughts and affections not only by the light of glory and the beatific vision, but is also able, from the habit of infused knowledge, to know the thoughts of hearts without a new revelation. All of which is plain from the doctrine of St. Thomas in 3rd part, q. 11, art. 1. Whence I would deservedly say that the knowledge of the soul of Christ is infused per se and of another species than our theology and that of the Blessed.

Observe concerning the foregoing that there are not wanting theologians who say that our theology is acquired accidentally and nevertheless is of the same species as the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word, which they say is infused per se. Just as it happens conversely that some knowledge is accidentally infused, such as was conferred on our first parent, which nevertheless according to itself and the proper account of its object is acquired. But they are mistaken in this opinion. For it is not possible that knowledge which is infused per se and from the proper account of its object be acquired by anyone, even accidentally: because an inferior power cannot attain to a superior effect, not even accidentally. But conversely, from a superior power one can have by infusion what he could acquire by his own powers.

CONCERNING the solution to the second argument of St. Thomas observe that singularity which does not arise from a material object does not prevent something from being able to be the object of a science. For God himself, unique and most singular, is most of all knowable. Because his singularity is subsistent to-be itself and pure act. Indeed there can be a science about Michael: because his singularity is according to his proper species and not according to matter. The reason for this doctrine can be assigned from the account of the object of the intellect, which is being. Whence what is more perfectly being is more knowable. But a thing is more perfectly being the more it is in act and the less in potency. Therefore if there be given a singular being whose singularity does not arise from matter and potentiality, but because that being is pure act, it will also be most of all knowable. Similarly also, because the principle of individuation in angels is not matter, but they are individuated from their proper species negatively, insofar as such a nature has nothing by which it might be multiplied, for that reason there can be a science about this nature of Michael. But about singulars composed of matter there cannot per se be a science: because according to themselves they are individuated from matter, which is unknowable, as being pure potency which is known only through its order to form and act. But form and act pertain to the species of the thing; and by reason of the participated species material individuals have the account of form and act, and to that extent there can be a science about them, but not per se insofar as they are singulars.

And if anyone objects that about Christ the Lord there can per se be, and is, the science of theology. It is answered that Christ the Lord can be considered in two ways. In one way as regards his singular humanity; and thus there is no more a science about him than about Peter, about whom there is no science except insofar as he is a man. In the other way he can be considered by reason of his divine person. And in this way there is per se a science of theology about him. But about his singular humanity there is a science of theology through its order to God himself, just as about many other singulars which fall under divine revelation, as St. Thomas says in the following article, to the first.

Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia

Commentarium

Dubium 1 (pars prior)

Dubium 1 (continuatio)

Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica

Commentarium

Dubium 1: Objectiones

Dubium 1: Commentarium

Dubium 1: Responsiones

Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis

Commentarium

Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)

Dubium 1

Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia

Commentarium

Dubium I

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae

Commentarium

Dubium I

Textus Augustini ante articulum 8

Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

Dubium 4

Dubium 5

Dubium 6

Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris

Commentarium

Commentarium; Dubium I

Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

Dubium 4

Dubium 5

Dubium 6

Dubium 7

Dubium 8

Dubium 9

Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit

Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum

Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit

Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus

Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae

Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura

Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse

Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo

Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex

Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat

Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus

Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum

Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo

Quaestio V: De bono in communi

Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente

Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens

Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum

Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis

Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine

Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile

Quaestio VI: De bonitate Dei

Articulus I: Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat

Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit summum bonum

Articulus III: Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei

Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sit bona bonitate divina

Quaestio VII: De Infinitate Dei

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit infinitus

Articulus II: Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam

Articulus III: Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem

Articulus IV: Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem

Quaestio VIII: De existentia Dei in rebus

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus

Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit ubique

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam

Articulus IV: Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei

Quaestio IX: De Dei immutabilitate

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis

Articulus II: Utrum esse inmutabile sit Dei proprium

Quaestio X: De Dei Aeternitate

Articulus I: Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio

Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit aeternus

Articulus III: Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei

Articulus IV: Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore

Articulus V: De differentia aevi et temporis

Articulus VI: Utrum sit unum aevum tantum

Quaestio XI: De unitate Dei

Articulus I: Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens

Articulus II: Utrum unum et multa opponantur

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit unus

Articulus IV: Utrum Deus sit maxime unus

Quaestio XII: Quomodo Deus cognoscatur a nobis

Articulus I: Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam

Articulus II: Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur

Articulus III: Utrum Essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus

Articulus IV: Utrum aliquis intellectus per sua naturalia Divinam Essentiam videre possit

Articulus V: Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei Essentiam aliquo creato lumine indigeat

Articulus VI: Utrum videntium Dei Essentiam unus alio perfectius videat

Articulus VII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, ipsum comprehendant

Articulus VIII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, omnia in Deo videant

Articulus IX: Utrum ea quae videntur in Deo a videntibus Divinam Essentiam, videantur per aliquas similitudines creatas

Articulus X: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, simul videant omnia quae in ipso vident

Articulus XI: Utrum aliquis in hac vita possit videre Deum per Essentiam

Articulus XII: Utrum per rationem naturalem Deum in hac vita cognoscere possimus

Articulus XIII: Utrum per gratiam habeatur altior cognitio Dei quam ea, quae habetur per rationem naturalem

Quaestio XIII: De nominibus Dei

Articulus I: Utrum aliquod nomen Deo conveniat

Articulus II: Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter

Articulus III: Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo proprie

Articulus IV: Utrum nomina dicta de Deo sint nomina synonyma

Articulus V: Utrum nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis, univoce dicantur de ipsis

Articulus VI: Utrum nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo

Articulus VII: Utrum nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, dicantur de Deo ex tempore

Articulus VIII: Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen naturae

Articulus IX: Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit incommunicabile

Articulus X: Utrum hoc nomen Deus dictum de Deo per participationem, secundum naturam, et secundum opinionem

Articulus XI: Utrum hoc nomen Qui est sit maxime Dei proprium

Articulus XII: Utrum propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo

Quaestio XIV: De scientia Dei

Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit scientia

Articulus II: Utrum Deus intelligat se

Articulus III: Utrum Deus comprehendat seipsum

Articulus IV: Utrum ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius substantia

Articulus V: Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se

Articulus VI: Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione

Articulus VII: Utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva

Articulus VIII: Utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum

Articulus IX: Utrum Deus habeat scientiam non entium

Articulus X: Utrum Deus cognoscat mala

Articulus XI: Utrum Deus cognoscat singularia

Articulus XII: Utrum Deus possit cognoscere infinita

Articulus XIII: Utrum scientia Dei sit futurorum contingentium

Articulus XIV: Utrum Deus cognoscat enuntiabilia

Articulus XV: Utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis

Articulus XVI: Utrum Deus habeat de rebus scientiam speculativam

Quaestio XV: De Ideis

Articulus I: Utrum ideae sint

Articulus II: Utrum sint plures ideae

Articulus III: Utrum omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae

Quaestio XVI: De Veritate

Articulus I: Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu

Articulus II: Utrum veritas sit in intellectu componente et dividente

Articulus III: Utrum verum et ens convertantur

Articulus IV: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum

Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit veritas

Articulus VI: Utrum sit una sola veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera

Articulus VII: Utrum veritas creata sit aeterna

Articulus VIII: Utrum veritas sit immutabilis

Quaestio XVII: De Falsitate

Articulus I: Utrum falsitas sit in rebus

Articulus II: Utrum in sensu sit falsitas

Articulus III: Utrum falsitas sit in intellectu

Articulus IV: Utrum verum et falsum sint contraria

Quaestio XVIII: De vita Dei

Articulus I: Utrum omnium naturalium rerum sit vivere

Articulus II: Utrum vita sit quaedam operatio

Articulus III: Utrum Deo conveniat vita

Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sint vita in Deo

Quaestio XIX: De voluntate Dei

Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit voluntas

Articulus II: Utrum Deus velit alia a se

Articulus III: Utrum quicquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit

Articulus IV: Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum

Articulus V: Utrum voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam

Articulus VI: Utrum voluntas Dei semper impleatur

Articulus VII: Utrum voluntas Dei sit mutabilis

Articulus VIII: Utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis imponat

Articulus IX: Utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum

Articulus X: Utrum Deus habeat liberum arbitrium

Articulus XI: Utrum sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi

Articulus XII: Utrum convenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa

Quaestio XX: De amore Dei

Articulus I: Utrum amor sit in Deo

Articulus II: Utrum Deus omnia amet

Articulus III: Utrum Deus aequaliter diligat omnia

Articulus IV: Utrum Deus semper magis diligat meliora

Quaestio XXI: De iustitia et misericordia Dei

Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit iustitia

Articulus II: Utrum iustitia Dei sit veritas

Articulus III: Utrum misericordia competat Deo

Articulus IV: Utrum in omnibus operibus Dei sit misericordia et iustitia

Quaestio XXII: De Providentia Dei

Articulus I: Utrum providentia Deo conveniat

Articulus II: Utrum omnia sint subiecta divinae providentiae

Articulus III: Utrum Deus immediate omnibus provideat

Articulus IV: Utrum providentia rebus provisis necessitatem imponat

Quaestio XXIII: De Praedestinatione

Articulus I: Utrum homines praedestinentur a Deo

Articulus II: Utrum praedestinatio aliquid ponat in praedestinato

Articulus III: Utrum Deus aliquem hominem reprobet

Articulus IV: Utrum praedestinati eligantur a Deo

Articulus V: Utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis

Articulus VI: Utrum praedestinatio sit certa

Articulus VII: Utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus

Articulus VIII: Utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus sanctorum

Quaestio XXIV: De Libro vitae

Articulus I: Utrum liber vitae sit idem quod praedestinatio

Articulus II: Utrum liber vitae sit solum respectu vitae gloriae praedestinatorum

Articulus III: Utrum aliquis deleatur de libro vitae

Quaestio XXV: De potentia Dei

Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit potentia

Articulus II: Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit omnipotens

Articulus IV: Utrum Deus possit facere quod praeterita non fuerint

Articulus V: Utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit

Articulus VI: Utrum Deus possit facere meliora ea quae facit

Quaestio XXVI: De Divina beatitudine

Articulus I: Utrum beatitudo Deo competat

Articulus II: Utrum Deus dicatur beatus secundum intellectum

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati

Articulus IV: Utrum in Dei beatitudine omnis beatitudo includatur

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