Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
IT IS DOUBTED second, concerning the second conclusion: Whether our theology is properly subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed.
It is argued first for the negative side by the argument of Scotus, q. 3 of the prologue of the first book of the Sentences. Theology is a science about God: but the science about God cannot be other than one, therefore there is not one theology subalternating and another subalternated. The minor is proved. For the deity is not other than a single formal account.
It is argued second: where the subalternating science ends, the subalternated begins, that is, the conclusions of the subalternating science are the principles of the subalternated science; but the theology of the Blessed is also concerned with the same conclusions with which our theology is concerned, therefore.
It is argued third: the subject of the subalternated science adds some difference accidentally contracting the subject of the subalternating science, according to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics (e.g. number as sounding is the subject of music, and adds an accidental difference, namely of sounds, above number, which is the subject of arithmetic) but the object of our theology is not so related to the object of the theology of the Blessed, therefore. Nor does it avail to answer that our theology is occupied with God obscurely known, while the theology of the Blessed is occupied with God known according to himself: since this obscurity is not an account which the theologian considers in his conclusions. Indeed it is not even a necessary condition: since otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, nor be together with the subalternating science.
TO this difficulty Cajetan in this place, although he does not think our theology to be a science simply, as it is in us; nevertheless he absolutely concedes that it is subordinated to the science of God and of the Blessed. But to the arguments made he answers that this single condition is necessary for some science to be called subalternated to another, that its principles be evident in the other science. But this opinion seems false. First indeed, because if it is enough for a science to be subalternated that its principles be evident in another science, and a distinct account of the object is not necessary; it follows that if someone believes certain propositions of geometry on the authority of a master asserting them, and then deduces many conclusions from those suppositions by evident consequences, it follows, I say, that this disciple acquires a habit subalternated to that science by which the prior conclusions are demonstrated; and the consequent is false. For if that disciple afterwards learns the demonstrations of the prior conclusions, there will not be in him a twofold science, but a single geometry; therefore a distinct account of the object of the subalternated science is necessary. Then Cajetan does not seem sufficiently to explain the account of the object of our theology and of that which is in the Blessed. For he says that God clearly seen is the object of the Blessed, but the object of our theology is God revealed, abstracting from clarity and obscurity. Against this is that then the object of the subalternating science would be less universal and more determinate; and the object of the subalternated would be more common. For it is plain that God seen clearly or obscurely is not an object as determinate as God clearly seen. Then when the wayfarer theologian has come to God clearly seen, then his theology is truly concerned with God clearly seen; therefore there will be nothing there by which it is distinguished from the subalternating science.
FOR the decision of this difficulty it must be supposed first that in the Blessed there is a twofold knowledge. One by which they know God openly and in him certain creatures, seeing as it were in a single intuition the principle and the conclusions. And this is the beatific vision, immutable and measurable by participated eternity. And this is in a more eminent mode a science than every other one defined by Aristotle. For it is an open knowledge of truths in their first principle, without any discourse. The other knowledge is in the Blessed, by which they know things through their proper species, which is called by Augustine evening knowledge; but the former is called morning knowledge.
It must be supposed secondly that the evening knowledge can be considered in two ways in the Blessed themselves. One by which they know certain principles by the natural light, and in them the conclusions. And this is natural science, which remained also in the demons. The other, by which they see certain supernatural principles in God himself by the light of glory. Whence they become able to deduce certain conclusions from them, which they consider through their proper species. And this is properly theological science.
These things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the beatific knowledge is eminently a subalternating science not only in respect of our theology, but also in respect of every natural science. It is proved. For all the principles of the sciences, however known by the natural light, have there a higher and more manifest account of their truth; therefore in respect of that knowledge every other science is in a certain way subalternated: and much more our theology, whose principles are obscure to us but are seen there.
Second conclusion. If our theology be compared to the theology which is in the Blessed, through which from principles known in the Word they deduce conclusions and consider them through their proper species; then our theology is not properly subalternated, but is related only as the imperfect to the perfect within the same species. This conclusion is proved first, by the third argument made for the negative side. Then, because each theology proceeds from principles revealed immediately through divine revelation: but that this revelation is obscure is accidental to the proper account of theological science, just as it is accidental to water to be warm, therefore, etc. I prove the minor. Because otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, just as faith cannot remain, whose necessary condition of object is obscurity, and whose formal account is obscure revelation: of which, however, we shall say more in art. 3. In the meantime, however, let us answer the arguments posited at the beginning.
TO the first argument of Scotus it is answered: I deny the minor. And to the proof it is answered that although the deity is single in itself and most simple: nevertheless as it is subject to different formal accounts, under which it is knowable, it has a sufficient foundation for the distinction of sciences and habits. E.g. God pertains to the object of metaphysics as knowable by the natural light: and he is the object of our faith as subject to the light of obscure revelation: and he is the object of our theology as subject to the light which, from principles otherwise revealed by God, shows certain things about God himself: he is also the object of the beatific vision as subject to the light of glory, in respect of which vision our theology is said to be eminently subalternated.
TO the second argument it is answered that it proves our second conclusion.
TO the third argument it is answered that St. Thomas never asserted that our theology is simply subalternated, but that it is related as a subalternated science. And in truth the most powerful condition of a subalternated science is that its principles be shown in the subalternating science. There is supposed, however, a distinction of the formal object, which must be more limited and less simple in the subalternated than in the subalternating. And moreover the object of the subalternated science, accidentally contracted, must be considered insofar as it is subject to the subalternated science. All of which, although they do not belong to our theology in respect of the theology of the Blessed, which they have through their proper species of things: nevertheless they belong well to our theology and to the theology of the Blessed in respect of the beatific vision, whose object, as it is subject to the light of glory, is purer and simpler, and this light shows the accounts of the other things known through their proper species much more perfectly than any other lower light. But that condition, that the object of the subalternated science be accidentally contracted, is also verified after its own manner in the present case. For God himself, as he shines forth in his creatures, is, as it were, accidentally contracted: and thus he is known through the species of creatures. But insofar as he is known by the light of glory, his purity and substance are considered as they are in themselves.
And if anyone objects that the light of glory also concurs in the assent to the conclusions which the Blessed deduce from the vision of God, so that they consider them in their proper species, therefore the formal account of the object is the same. It is answered that the light of glory does not concur immediately in the assent to those conclusions, but through the natural light, by which the consequence of the conclusion is seen, or also through the light acquired by the power of the infused light, or certainly through some light which by natural consequence is begotten in the Blessed from the reverberation (so to speak) of the light of glory, which produces a certain splendor in the evening knowledge. Nor is this wonderful. Since the theologians also concede that in the exercise of the infused virtues we acquire in the same powers certain virtues which we call acquired, so that sometimes, the infused virtues being lost through mortal sin, there remain in us certain habits of virtues similar to the former virtues. And so it can happen that from the exercise of the light of glory about God clearly seen there results in the natural power of the intellect a certain divine splendor by which the intellect is perfected and becomes able to know other things through their proper species in a more excellent mode than they would be known by the natural light alone. From what has been said we shall easily proceed to the solution of the following doubt.