Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

Second conclusion. If we speak of theology as it is in us wayfarers, who do not know the principles evidently, but nevertheless assent to them most certainly and immediately by the light of faith; it is truly and properly a science, although imperfect. This conclusion is proved first. For a theological habit of this kind is an intellectual virtue, since it always inclines to the true: but this virtue is not the habit of first principles, since it is occupied with conclusions, nor is it prudence, because it is not occupied with singular things to be done here and now, nor is it art, because it is not occupied with things to be made, therefore it is wisdom or science. I prove the consequence. Since Aristotle, 6 Ethics, distributed the intellectual virtues into the aforesaid number.

But perhaps someone will reply that theology is a theological virtue, which is called faith. But against this is that faith does not assent to complex truths by discourse, but rests immediately on divine revelation, as we discussed at length in 2-2, q. 1, art. 1. And it is confirmed from the first canonical epistle of John, ch. 5: He that believeth in the Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself: therefore the theological habit is deservedly and properly called a science. It is proved secondly. For when Aristotle taught that science proceeds from evident things, he either understood from things evident to us or from things evident in themselves. If the first, then metaphysics will not be properly a science, which often proceeds from things evident in themselves only and not to us, e.g. when it is demonstrated that substances separate from matter are incorruptible: and that God is eternal, because he is immutable, and that he moves all things, because he is the first being; which principles are not known per se to us, such as that God exists, or that an angel exists. But if he understands it of principles known per se in themselves; then I argue thus. Theological principles are most certain and most evident in themselves, e.g. that the Father begets the Son, therefore on this side it will not cease to be properly a science.

BUT someone will say that the principles of the other sciences, although they are not immediately evident to us, nevertheless become evident to us a posteriori, e.g. from the motion of things, evident to us, we gather that God exists and that he is one, and similar things, and that nature is the principle of motion and rest: but this does not happen in theological principles. For their assent always remains obscure in us. I admit that this is so. But hence I shall make a stronger argument. If the evidence of the conclusions which are deduced from such principles need not be produced in us from the evidence of the principles in themselves, then it is not per se necessary that the scientific assent of the conclusion receive its evidence from the principles: since it is granted that the principles, as principles, do not have evidence as regards us, but only have evidence from without and from the effect. And it is confirmed. If for the account of a proper science it suffices that the principles have in us a certain evidence, as it were borrowed from the effects; and on account of it the assent of the principles is held as certain and necessary, so that from there the effects may in turn be demonstrated; then much more ought it to suffice that the principles of our theology have their certainty from God himself, infallibly revealing to us by the light of faith that those principles are most true. The conclusion is proved third. When Aristotle said, no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge; he did not exclude our theology from the account of science. For we theologians have either knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge, namely divine faith, which surpasses all human science, indeed even the natural light itself. And it is confirmed. For evidence is required in the principles to the extent that it conduces to the intellect being convinced and adhering firmly to the truth: but the certainty of our faith alone makes the intellect adhere more strongly to the assent of the principles than any natural habit, therefore our theology will with better right be called properly a science than all the other human disciplines. And also most rightly is our theology called by St. Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book 12 On the Trinity, ch. 14, a science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened. But he says that faith is begotten by this science, because it is the theologian's office by reasoning to remove the impediments by which unbelievers are held back from receiving the faith. St. Jerome too, in the epistle to Paulinus, tome 4, says: Let us learn on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. It must be observed, however, that what we said in the second conclusion, that our theology is an imperfect science, can be understood in two ways. In one way by comparison with the other sciences. And thus it is not to be called imperfect, but rather simply much more perfect than all human sciences: since it surpasses them incomparably in certainty. It will, however, be imperfect in a certain respect on account of its non-evidence. In the other way it can be called imperfect by comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species. As an infant is an imperfect man: because he cannot yet exercise the perfect actions of his proper species. And in this way our theology is truly imperfect, because for this present state it lacks the evidence which it will have within its own species in the fatherland, when that which is perfect shall come. For then the principles to which we now assent by faith we shall see by the light of glory. In the meantime, however, we shall sit under the shadow of him whom we desire, however sweet its fruit may be to our palate. And the contrary was the error of certain men, who are called the Illuminati in Spain, who boasted that they had evidence of the mysteries of faith.

TO the arguments in opposition it is answered. TO the first St. Thomas answers very well that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known per se by the light of a higher science. But to the rejoinder it is answered that in that case that man would not have science, but human faith as regards the principles immediately, and as regards the conclusions mediately, whose assent would be called an opinion founded on human faith. And then I deny the consequence. For the parallel adduced by St. Thomas is not so to be understood that one man has only optics and another geometry. For in that way optics would not be a science, according to the Aristotelian doctrine: no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge. But that man does not have knowledge of the premises, but mere human faith; therefore he cannot have the science of optics. The parallel is therefore to be understood as regards this, that just as the science of optics receives its principles from another science; and this does not prevent it from being a science: so our theology receives its principles from the blessed science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. But there is a great difference. For our theology can be a science even if it is not together with the blessed science; but optics cannot be a science unless it has been conjoined with the science of geometry in the same intellect. And the reason for this difference is: because the principles of theology are communicated to us from the blessed science of God through the light of the supernatural order, which is the light of faith, which is firmer than every human science, although the evidence of the science of the Blessed is not communicated to us. But the principles of optics in one who lacks geometry are not communicated to him except through human faith, which ground of assenting is weak, and hence he will not have science of the conclusions either. And in this way let the example be understood which St. Thomas brings, On Truth, q. 14, art. 10, where he compares our theology to the discipline of some disciple who believes the principles on the authority of the master. But there is surely a difference, that our master is God himself, who opens our ears that we may hear him as a master and be truly taught of God, as is said John 6. And because the authority of this master is altogether infallible, our theology, reasoning from there to the conclusions, properly has the account of a science. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. For the assent of that conclusion, Christ is risible, is produced jointly from the assent of the premises. And to that extent, from the light of the antecedent applied through a good consequence, there is caused an acquired light of a higher order than the natural. And that causes certainty in the assent of the conclusion. Which is more evident when each premise is of faith.

TO the second argument it is denied that a heretic can be a true theologian, even if he was previously a Catholic. And the reason is: because now he believes all the principles by human faith alone or by opinion. And to the confirmation it is answered that the other sciences are not lost on account of one error concerning a conclusion. But if the error were concerning the formal account of the principles; then the whole science would be corrupted: although a certain aptitude would remain, as it were the corpse of a science. And because a heretic errs concerning the formal account of the principles, which is divine revelation, for believing the things which the Church proposes; therefore consequently the whole theology, which rests on those principles, is straightway destroyed, just as also the whole faith perishes.

TO the third argument the most learned Master Friar Dominic de Soto, 1 Posterior Analytics, q. 2, at the confirmation of the seventh argument, says that when a conclusion is deduced from a principle of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith. Wherefore he judges that only those conclusions pertain to theological science which are deduced from the principles of faith by probable consequences. But this opinion is false. It is proved first. For it would follow that our theology is mere opinion. The consequence is plain. For from principles however certain and evident, through a probable consequence, nothing but opinion can be generated; as is plain in the argumentation which is taken from evident examples, e.g. Peter in some business became rich; and Paul likewise; therefore if you have done business in that way, you will be rich. Here nothing but an opinion of the consequent is generated. Likewise it is false that he says that it is similarly of faith that Christ is a man and that Christ is risible. For if anyone confessed that Christ is a perfect man, but denied that he is risible; because he is of the opinion that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not been defined by the Church up to now that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine; then whoever denied that Christ is risible would be a heretic. Because he would be opposing the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and ground of truth.

It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident, by a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of them is said to be an error concerning faith mediately: and he who holds the contrary comes into suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher: because he is not to be believed to deny the things which are known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny a principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, in book 12 On Theological Places, ch. 2.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that certain first principles of theology are most necessary, e.g. that God is three and one, that the Father begets the Son. Others, however, there are which, considered from their proper terms, seem to be contingent, e.g. that Christ was crowned with thorns. But if these very things are considered as they are subject to divine revelation, they are altogether necessary: just as it is necessary that God be truthful, so that he can neither be deceived nor deceive. And this suffices for the certainty of theological science.