Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

It is argued first for the negative side by the first argument of St. Thomas: every science properly so called must proceed from principles known per se: but theology does not proceed from principles known per se, therefore it is not a science. But if you reply, with St. Thomas, that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known by the light of a higher science; it is urged against this. For if someone were now to take the principles of optics, which are otherwise conclusions of geometry, and assented to them only on the authority of the master of geometry who hands them down, that man would not have a science properly of optics; therefore neither do we properly have the science of theology. The antecedent is proved. For the whole discourse of the disciple is founded on the human faith of the master. And it is confirmed. If the principles of our theology are not evident to us, it follows that our theology is only a science of consequences, not of conclusions, and hence does not differ from logic. The consequence is proved. For in this consequence: every man is risible, Christ is a man, therefore Christ is risible, the major is evident to the physicist, the minor belongs immediately to faith; therefore the theologian's office will be only to judge that the consequence is good.

It is argued second: a heretic who errs in one article of faith can syllogize from the other articles. And yet a syllogism of this kind in a heretic does not generate science, therefore neither in a Catholic. The minor is admitted by all. The consequence is proved. For those principles from which the heretic proceeds are also known per se in the light of the science of the Blessed; therefore if this suffices for our theology to be a science, that too will be a science, or neither. And it is confirmed, and I suppose, that a Catholic theologian falls into one error only, e.g. that there is no purgatory, or that the souls of the saints do not see God until the day of judgment. Then this theologian does not immediately lose the acquired habit of theology; therefore if in that man that habit is not a science, neither was it a science before in the same Catholic.

It is argued third: if a conclusion which is called theological is to be deduced from the principles of faith, this must be done either by an evident consequence or by a probable one. If by an evident one, then the conclusion is also of faith, e.g. Christ is risible. But if by a non-evident one; then the conclusion will for the most part be a probable opinion, therefore theology is not properly a science.

It is argued fourth: a science properly so called must be concerned with necessary conclusions and from necessary principles: but very many of the principles of our theology are contingent, e.g. that the Word was made flesh, that he suffered in the flesh, that Antichrist will be born, and other similar things: to which nevertheless we assent immediately through faith; therefore the conclusions which are gathered from such principles are not necessary, and consequently there is no science properly so called concerning them.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that although Cajetan said in the preceding article that by the name of sacred doctrine St. Thomas did not understand faith determinately, or theology determinately, but took it indifferently for revealed doctrine either immediately, such as faith is, or mediately, such as theology is; nevertheless now in this article sacred doctrine is verified not of faith, but of the doctrine which inclines to the assent of the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith. For faith is related to this doctrine as the habit of first principles is to the natural sciences

Note secondly that Aristotle in 1 Posterior Analytics defined science with the utmost rigor, so that scarcely can any demonstration be brought into the middle for the form of that exemplar, except in mathematics. Just as Cicero also described the supreme orator, such as you will never find. But he will be a good orator who has come for the most part to the prototype. Wherefore Aristotle himself also taught, book 1 Ethics, ch. 3, that it is foolish to demand in every science and matter demonstrations equal in certainty and clarity. For this is the mark of an undisciplined mind. But in each science one must require demonstrations more or less exact according to the subject matter. For there is greater certainty and clarity in mathematics than in physics, inasmuch as physics, which is concerned with mobile being, shows its principles from the effect. But mathematics, since it deals with quantity, which is also plain to the senses, although it abstracts from sensible matter and from things subject to motions, nevertheless in the account of whole and part is most manifest to the intellect, and therefore the mathematical principles, Every whole is greater than its part, and, Things equal to one third thing are equal to one another, and similar ones, are most manifest to the intellect: since the terms of these principles are known to all. But in metaphysics, on account of the excessive abstraction of the object from intelligible matter, not all the principles are known per se to us. Whence very many metaphysical demonstrations are with difficulty comprehended by us. But indeed in moral matters, according to the Aristotelian precepts, a demonstration can scarcely be made, unless one adds that the demonstration is according to the subject matter. And nevertheless disciplines of this kind are called and are sciences.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: if theology be considered according to itself, that is, according to its proper species and object, it is properly and most exactly a science, and in a more perfect mode than the Aristotelian precepts require. It is proved. For theology according to itself is a habit for assenting to the conclusions which are drawn from supernatural principles and principles known per se by a supernatural light: but a habit of this kind is perfect according to its proper species in the theologians who see those first principles immediately by the beatific light; therefore in them it is a most perfect science.

Second conclusion. If we speak of theology as it is in us wayfarers, who do not know the principles evidently, but nevertheless assent to them most certainly and immediately by the light of faith; it is truly and properly a science, although imperfect. This conclusion is proved first. For a theological habit of this kind is an intellectual virtue, since it always inclines to the true: but this virtue is not the habit of first principles, since it is occupied with conclusions, nor is it prudence, because it is not occupied with singular things to be done here and now, nor is it art, because it is not occupied with things to be made, therefore it is wisdom or science. I prove the consequence. Since Aristotle, 6 Ethics, distributed the intellectual virtues into the aforesaid number.

But perhaps someone will reply that theology is a theological virtue, which is called faith. But against this is that faith does not assent to complex truths by discourse, but rests immediately on divine revelation, as we discussed at length in 2-2, q. 1, art. 1. And it is confirmed from the first canonical epistle of John, ch. 5: He that believeth in the Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself: therefore the theological habit is deservedly and properly called a science. It is proved secondly. For when Aristotle taught that science proceeds from evident things, he either understood from things evident to us or from things evident in themselves. If the first, then metaphysics will not be properly a science, which often proceeds from things evident in themselves only and not to us, e.g. when it is demonstrated that substances separate from matter are incorruptible: and that God is eternal, because he is immutable, and that he moves all things, because he is the first being; which principles are not known per se to us, such as that God exists, or that an angel exists. But if he understands it of principles known per se in themselves; then I argue thus. Theological principles are most certain and most evident in themselves, e.g. that the Father begets the Son, therefore on this side it will not cease to be properly a science.

BUT someone will say that the principles of the other sciences, although they are not immediately evident to us, nevertheless become evident to us a posteriori, e.g. from the motion of things, evident to us, we gather that God exists and that he is one, and similar things, and that nature is the principle of motion and rest: but this does not happen in theological principles. For their assent always remains obscure in us. I admit that this is so. But hence I shall make a stronger argument. If the evidence of the conclusions which are deduced from such principles need not be produced in us from the evidence of the principles in themselves, then it is not per se necessary that the scientific assent of the conclusion receive its evidence from the principles: since it is granted that the principles, as principles, do not have evidence as regards us, but only have evidence from without and from the effect. And it is confirmed. If for the account of a proper science it suffices that the principles have in us a certain evidence, as it were borrowed from the effects; and on account of it the assent of the principles is held as certain and necessary, so that from there the effects may in turn be demonstrated; then much more ought it to suffice that the principles of our theology have their certainty from God himself, infallibly revealing to us by the light of faith that those principles are most true. The conclusion is proved third. When Aristotle said, no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge; he did not exclude our theology from the account of science. For we theologians have either knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge, namely divine faith, which surpasses all human science, indeed even the natural light itself. And it is confirmed. For evidence is required in the principles to the extent that it conduces to the intellect being convinced and adhering firmly to the truth: but the certainty of our faith alone makes the intellect adhere more strongly to the assent of the principles than any natural habit, therefore our theology will with better right be called properly a science than all the other human disciplines. And also most rightly is our theology called by St. Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book 12 On the Trinity, ch. 14, a science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened. But he says that faith is begotten by this science, because it is the theologian's office by reasoning to remove the impediments by which unbelievers are held back from receiving the faith. St. Jerome too, in the epistle to Paulinus, tome 4, says: Let us learn on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. It must be observed, however, that what we said in the second conclusion, that our theology is an imperfect science, can be understood in two ways. In one way by comparison with the other sciences. And thus it is not to be called imperfect, but rather simply much more perfect than all human sciences: since it surpasses them incomparably in certainty. It will, however, be imperfect in a certain respect on account of its non-evidence. In the other way it can be called imperfect by comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species. As an infant is an imperfect man: because he cannot yet exercise the perfect actions of his proper species. And in this way our theology is truly imperfect, because for this present state it lacks the evidence which it will have within its own species in the fatherland, when that which is perfect shall come. For then the principles to which we now assent by faith we shall see by the light of glory. In the meantime, however, we shall sit under the shadow of him whom we desire, however sweet its fruit may be to our palate. And the contrary was the error of certain men, who are called the Illuminati in Spain, who boasted that they had evidence of the mysteries of faith.

TO the arguments in opposition it is answered. TO the first St. Thomas answers very well that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known per se by the light of a higher science. But to the rejoinder it is answered that in that case that man would not have science, but human faith as regards the principles immediately, and as regards the conclusions mediately, whose assent would be called an opinion founded on human faith. And then I deny the consequence. For the parallel adduced by St. Thomas is not so to be understood that one man has only optics and another geometry. For in that way optics would not be a science, according to the Aristotelian doctrine: no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge. But that man does not have knowledge of the premises, but mere human faith; therefore he cannot have the science of optics. The parallel is therefore to be understood as regards this, that just as the science of optics receives its principles from another science; and this does not prevent it from being a science: so our theology receives its principles from the blessed science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. But there is a great difference. For our theology can be a science even if it is not together with the blessed science; but optics cannot be a science unless it has been conjoined with the science of geometry in the same intellect. And the reason for this difference is: because the principles of theology are communicated to us from the blessed science of God through the light of the supernatural order, which is the light of faith, which is firmer than every human science, although the evidence of the science of the Blessed is not communicated to us. But the principles of optics in one who lacks geometry are not communicated to him except through human faith, which ground of assenting is weak, and hence he will not have science of the conclusions either. And in this way let the example be understood which St. Thomas brings, On Truth, q. 14, art. 10, where he compares our theology to the discipline of some disciple who believes the principles on the authority of the master. But there is surely a difference, that our master is God himself, who opens our ears that we may hear him as a master and be truly taught of God, as is said John 6. And because the authority of this master is altogether infallible, our theology, reasoning from there to the conclusions, properly has the account of a science. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. For the assent of that conclusion, Christ is risible, is produced jointly from the assent of the premises. And to that extent, from the light of the antecedent applied through a good consequence, there is caused an acquired light of a higher order than the natural. And that causes certainty in the assent of the conclusion. Which is more evident when each premise is of faith.

TO the second argument it is denied that a heretic can be a true theologian, even if he was previously a Catholic. And the reason is: because now he believes all the principles by human faith alone or by opinion. And to the confirmation it is answered that the other sciences are not lost on account of one error concerning a conclusion. But if the error were concerning the formal account of the principles; then the whole science would be corrupted: although a certain aptitude would remain, as it were the corpse of a science. And because a heretic errs concerning the formal account of the principles, which is divine revelation, for believing the things which the Church proposes; therefore consequently the whole theology, which rests on those principles, is straightway destroyed, just as also the whole faith perishes.

TO the third argument the most learned Master Friar Dominic de Soto, 1 Posterior Analytics, q. 2, at the confirmation of the seventh argument, says that when a conclusion is deduced from a principle of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith. Wherefore he judges that only those conclusions pertain to theological science which are deduced from the principles of faith by probable consequences. But this opinion is false. It is proved first. For it would follow that our theology is mere opinion. The consequence is plain. For from principles however certain and evident, through a probable consequence, nothing but opinion can be generated; as is plain in the argumentation which is taken from evident examples, e.g. Peter in some business became rich; and Paul likewise; therefore if you have done business in that way, you will be rich. Here nothing but an opinion of the consequent is generated. Likewise it is false that he says that it is similarly of faith that Christ is a man and that Christ is risible. For if anyone confessed that Christ is a perfect man, but denied that he is risible; because he is of the opinion that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not been defined by the Church up to now that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine; then whoever denied that Christ is risible would be a heretic. Because he would be opposing the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and ground of truth.

It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident, by a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of them is said to be an error concerning faith mediately: and he who holds the contrary comes into suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher: because he is not to be believed to deny the things which are known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny a principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, in book 12 On Theological Places, ch. 2.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that certain first principles of theology are most necessary, e.g. that God is three and one, that the Father begets the Son. Others, however, there are which, considered from their proper terms, seem to be contingent, e.g. that Christ was crowned with thorns. But if these very things are considered as they are subject to divine revelation, they are altogether necessary: just as it is necessary that God be truthful, so that he can neither be deceived nor deceive. And this suffices for the certainty of theological science.

IT IS DOUBTED second, concerning the second conclusion: Whether our theology is properly subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed.

It is argued first for the negative side by the argument of Scotus, q. 3 of the prologue of the first book of the Sentences. Theology is a science about God: but the science about God cannot be other than one, therefore there is not one theology subalternating and another subalternated. The minor is proved. For the deity is not other than a single formal account.

It is argued second: where the subalternating science ends, the subalternated begins, that is, the conclusions of the subalternating science are the principles of the subalternated science; but the theology of the Blessed is also concerned with the same conclusions with which our theology is concerned, therefore.

It is argued third: the subject of the subalternated science adds some difference accidentally contracting the subject of the subalternating science, according to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics (e.g. number as sounding is the subject of music, and adds an accidental difference, namely of sounds, above number, which is the subject of arithmetic) but the object of our theology is not so related to the object of the theology of the Blessed, therefore. Nor does it avail to answer that our theology is occupied with God obscurely known, while the theology of the Blessed is occupied with God known according to himself: since this obscurity is not an account which the theologian considers in his conclusions. Indeed it is not even a necessary condition: since otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, nor be together with the subalternating science.

TO this difficulty Cajetan in this place, although he does not think our theology to be a science simply, as it is in us; nevertheless he absolutely concedes that it is subordinated to the science of God and of the Blessed. But to the arguments made he answers that this single condition is necessary for some science to be called subalternated to another, that its principles be evident in the other science. But this opinion seems false. First indeed, because if it is enough for a science to be subalternated that its principles be evident in another science, and a distinct account of the object is not necessary; it follows that if someone believes certain propositions of geometry on the authority of a master asserting them, and then deduces many conclusions from those suppositions by evident consequences, it follows, I say, that this disciple acquires a habit subalternated to that science by which the prior conclusions are demonstrated; and the consequent is false. For if that disciple afterwards learns the demonstrations of the prior conclusions, there will not be in him a twofold science, but a single geometry; therefore a distinct account of the object of the subalternated science is necessary. Then Cajetan does not seem sufficiently to explain the account of the object of our theology and of that which is in the Blessed. For he says that God clearly seen is the object of the Blessed, but the object of our theology is God revealed, abstracting from clarity and obscurity. Against this is that then the object of the subalternating science would be less universal and more determinate; and the object of the subalternated would be more common. For it is plain that God seen clearly or obscurely is not an object as determinate as God clearly seen. Then when the wayfarer theologian has come to God clearly seen, then his theology is truly concerned with God clearly seen; therefore there will be nothing there by which it is distinguished from the subalternating science.

FOR the decision of this difficulty it must be supposed first that in the Blessed there is a twofold knowledge. One by which they know God openly and in him certain creatures, seeing as it were in a single intuition the principle and the conclusions. And this is the beatific vision, immutable and measurable by participated eternity. And this is in a more eminent mode a science than every other one defined by Aristotle. For it is an open knowledge of truths in their first principle, without any discourse. The other knowledge is in the Blessed, by which they know things through their proper species, which is called by Augustine evening knowledge; but the former is called morning knowledge.

It must be supposed secondly that the evening knowledge can be considered in two ways in the Blessed themselves. One by which they know certain principles by the natural light, and in them the conclusions. And this is natural science, which remained also in the demons. The other, by which they see certain supernatural principles in God himself by the light of glory. Whence they become able to deduce certain conclusions from them, which they consider through their proper species. And this is properly theological science.

These things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the beatific knowledge is eminently a subalternating science not only in respect of our theology, but also in respect of every natural science. It is proved. For all the principles of the sciences, however known by the natural light, have there a higher and more manifest account of their truth; therefore in respect of that knowledge every other science is in a certain way subalternated: and much more our theology, whose principles are obscure to us but are seen there.

Second conclusion. If our theology be compared to the theology which is in the Blessed, through which from principles known in the Word they deduce conclusions and consider them through their proper species; then our theology is not properly subalternated, but is related only as the imperfect to the perfect within the same species. This conclusion is proved first, by the third argument made for the negative side. Then, because each theology proceeds from principles revealed immediately through divine revelation: but that this revelation is obscure is accidental to the proper account of theological science, just as it is accidental to water to be warm, therefore, etc. I prove the minor. Because otherwise our theology could not remain in the fatherland, just as faith cannot remain, whose necessary condition of object is obscurity, and whose formal account is obscure revelation: of which, however, we shall say more in art. 3. In the meantime, however, let us answer the arguments posited at the beginning.

TO the first argument of Scotus it is answered: I deny the minor. And to the proof it is answered that although the deity is single in itself and most simple: nevertheless as it is subject to different formal accounts, under which it is knowable, it has a sufficient foundation for the distinction of sciences and habits. E.g. God pertains to the object of metaphysics as knowable by the natural light: and he is the object of our faith as subject to the light of obscure revelation: and he is the object of our theology as subject to the light which, from principles otherwise revealed by God, shows certain things about God himself: he is also the object of the beatific vision as subject to the light of glory, in respect of which vision our theology is said to be eminently subalternated.

TO the second argument it is answered that it proves our second conclusion.

TO the third argument it is answered that St. Thomas never asserted that our theology is simply subalternated, but that it is related as a subalternated science. And in truth the most powerful condition of a subalternated science is that its principles be shown in the subalternating science. There is supposed, however, a distinction of the formal object, which must be more limited and less simple in the subalternated than in the subalternating. And moreover the object of the subalternated science, accidentally contracted, must be considered insofar as it is subject to the subalternated science. All of which, although they do not belong to our theology in respect of the theology of the Blessed, which they have through their proper species of things: nevertheless they belong well to our theology and to the theology of the Blessed in respect of the beatific vision, whose object, as it is subject to the light of glory, is purer and simpler, and this light shows the accounts of the other things known through their proper species much more perfectly than any other lower light. But that condition, that the object of the subalternated science be accidentally contracted, is also verified after its own manner in the present case. For God himself, as he shines forth in his creatures, is, as it were, accidentally contracted: and thus he is known through the species of creatures. But insofar as he is known by the light of glory, his purity and substance are considered as they are in themselves.

And if anyone objects that the light of glory also concurs in the assent to the conclusions which the Blessed deduce from the vision of God, so that they consider them in their proper species, therefore the formal account of the object is the same. It is answered that the light of glory does not concur immediately in the assent to those conclusions, but through the natural light, by which the consequence of the conclusion is seen, or also through the light acquired by the power of the infused light, or certainly through some light which by natural consequence is begotten in the Blessed from the reverberation (so to speak) of the light of glory, which produces a certain splendor in the evening knowledge. Nor is this wonderful. Since the theologians also concede that in the exercise of the infused virtues we acquire in the same powers certain virtues which we call acquired, so that sometimes, the infused virtues being lost through mortal sin, there remain in us certain habits of virtues similar to the former virtues. And so it can happen that from the exercise of the light of glory about God clearly seen there results in the natural power of the intellect a certain divine splendor by which the intellect is perfected and becomes able to know other things through their proper species in a more excellent mode than they would be known by the natural light alone. From what has been said we shall easily proceed to the solution of the following doubt.

IT IS DOUBTED third: Whether our theology remains in the fatherland, or rather is exchanged for the other theology of the Blessed

It is argued first for the negative side from 1 Cor. 13: When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Whence the theologians gather that faith does not remain in the fatherland: because faith is an imperfect and obscure knowledge; but our theology is imperfect and obscure, therefore it does not remain in the fatherland. It is confirmed, because in the same place it is said: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, therefore it is signified that our theology will not remain in the fatherland. On which passage Cajetan holds that our theology does not remain in the fatherland: and Theophylact holds the same on the same passage.

It is argued second. The formal account of our theology does not remain in the fatherland, therefore neither does theology itself. The consequence is plain, and the antecedent is proved. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the following article, the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith: but this account does not remain in the fatherland, since faith does not remain, therefore, etc.

It is argued third. Our theology is generated from non-evident assents, therefore it itself cannot be a habit inclining to an evident assent: but theology in the fatherland inclines to an evident assent, therefore it is the other one.

It is argued fourth. A non-evident assent cannot itself become evident, as seems manifest, therefore a non-evident habit cannot likewise become evident, therefore the habit of our theology does not remain in the fatherland.

It is argued fifth. The theology of the Blessed is a habit infused per se: and our theology is a habit acquired per se: but a habit acquired per se cannot be the same as a habit infused per se; therefore our theology does not remain in the fatherland, or certainly we shall have a twofold theology, one infused and the other acquired. The consequence and the minor are evident. The major is proved. For the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, seems to be of the same account as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ, which is indeed not infused accidentally, but per se; therefore the knowledge which all the Blessed have outside the Word will also be infused per se, or certainly derived per se from the beatific knowledge.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that a habit or a virtue which we have on the way can remain in the fatherland in two ways. In one way for ornament, but not for exercise. As temperance and fortitude, which are occupied with the passions, will remain. In the other way a virtue can remain not only for ornament, but also for exercise. As prudence, even acquired prudence, will remain, religion will remain, and other similar virtues. And if you ask why faith and hope will not remain at least for ornament, as temperance and fortitude remain, although they do not exercise their proper acts? It is answered that there is a very great difference. Because the formal account of the object of faith and hope is intrinsically repugnant to the formal account of the beatific vision. According to that: Faith is to believe what you do not see; and according to that: What a man sees, why does he hope for? And therefore it does not pertain to the ornament of the blessed soul to be adorned with habits of this kind. But the formal account of the object of fortitude and temperance has no repugnance to the formal account of beatitude: indeed in Christ the Lord, whose soul was blessed from the beginning of the incarnation, there was at once the exercise of fortitude and temperance together with the beatific vision; and yet the exercise of faith or hope could not be together with the vision. Wherefore there is not the same account of faith and hope, and of the other virtues.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: the theology which we acquire on the way through necessary consequences from revealed principles remains in the fatherland not only for ornament, but also for exercise. This conclusion is easily proved once the decision of the preceding doubts is presupposed. For if our theology is properly a science, although it is imperfect by reason of its state and not from its proper species, as has been sufficiently explained in the first doubt of this article, there is no reason why it should not remain in the fatherland for ornament and exercise, the imperfection which it has accidentally on the way being removed. And it is confirmed. For the obscurity which our theology has on the way is accidental to the formal account of its specific object, which indeed is considered as subject to divine revelation mediately through evident discourse. But that that revelation, certain as it is, is obscure in its principles, although it pertains per se to faith; nevertheless accrues accidentally to the science of theology. For it belongs to it as it is small and beginning: but it will be made perfect and evident, when the evidence which it seeks has come to it from principles evidently known. And I wonder at Cajetan, who, although he holds that our theology abstracts from the obscure and the evident, nevertheless asserts in the passage cited that it does not remain in the fatherland.

It is proved secondly, from the ground of St. Thomas in this article, by which he proves that sacred doctrine is a science whose principles are known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed, therefore it is not repugnant for it to be conjoined with a higher science, just as it is not repugnant for a subalternated science, indeed it most of all agrees that it be conjoined with the subalternating science.

It is proved third. For the gifts of the Holy Spirit which in this life pertain to the intellect have non-evidence for this state, and nevertheless they remain in the fatherland with evidence, as St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. 68, art. 6. Therefore it is not repugnant that the habit of theology, which now is non-evident, can become evident in the blessed life, since that non-evidence is not intrinsic to its species. And finally it is proved from St. Jerome in the epistle to Paulinus: Let us learn (he says) on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. And it is confirmed. For in the fatherland there will be no oblivion of the demonstrations which were acquired on the way concerning the objects of the other disciplines, therefore neither concerning the object of theology. Those authors, however, who hold that our theology acquired on the way is not a science; or that it is opinion, as Scotus, Durandus, and Marsilius, Gabriel, Ockham, and Adam, and Master Soto in the passage cited above, who said that our theology proceeds only by probable consequences, all these will speak consequently if they deny that our theology remains in the fatherland. For the habit of opinion can never become scientific.

Second conclusion. It is very probable to me that in the Blessed, besides the beatific knowledge, there is no other theology infused per se, but every other theology besides the beatific vision is in the angels acquired per se by the power of the light of glory, the natural light being added for gathering the conclusions from those principles which they know through their proper species; and the blessed men who did not learn theology in this life will do likewise. But those who did learn it will there be perfected and will know more things through their proper species than those who did not learn it while they were on the way. For grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. From this conclusion we except the soul of Christ the Lord, who had a habit of knowledge not accidentally but per se infused, as we shall say in the solution to the last argument.

TO the arguments, then, made in opposition it is answered.

TO the first, that that testimony of the Apostle is legitimately understood of faith itself, as is plain from what follows. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. But what he says: Whether knowledge shall be destroyed, can also be understood of the knowledge of faith, which on account of its certainty is sometimes called knowledge, according to John 11: I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. And elsewhere Job 19: I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth. And many other similar things will be found in the Sacred Scriptures.

It is answered secondly that the Apostle does not affirm that the knowledge which is acquired here will be destroyed, but speaks conditionally, as when he says, whether tongues shall cease; and yet it is certain that in the Blessed the knowledge of tongues will remain: indeed, as is probably asserted, after the resurrection they will sometimes praise God with bodily tongues, as St. Thomas says, lect. 3 on the same passage of the Apostle. But tongues are said to cease, because it will not be necessary to use various tongues so that the Blessed may understand one another, because in the future glory anyone will understand any tongue. And perhaps in that state, as in the beginning of the human race, there will be only one speech and one lip. Or finally, if it is more pleasing, say with St. Thomas on that passage, whether knowledge shall be destroyed, not indeed as regards the habit or the intelligible species which the soul acquired in this life, but because, separated from the body, it will not know by conversion to phantasms. But nevertheless on the day of judgment the soul will be able to understand and know freely by conversion to phantasms. But this will not be necessary, just as neither will it be necessary to use various tongues. Whence this solution nearly coincides with the preceding one. However the matter may stand, certainly St. Thomas in the place cited above reproves the opinion of those who, on the occasion of the apostolic testimony, deny that acquired knowledge remains in the fatherland.

TO the second argument, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that St. Thomas in the following article does not say that the formal account of our theology is the divine revelation of faith, but that sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are divinely revealed. It is therefore accidental to the formal account of our theology that that revelation of the principles be obscure. For this pertains to its imperfect state.

TO the third argument it is answered that that antecedent, our theology is generated from non-evident assents, if it makes formal sense, is false. For our theology according to its proper species is not per se generated from non-evident assents, although it is materially true that here and now, for this state, it is generated from non-evident assents. In which sense the antecedent is true, but the consequence is worth nothing: indeed the same habit, if there be removed what is accidental to the proper species of theology, namely the obscurity concerning the principles, will nevertheless remain the same habit, more perfect and more illustrious than before, on account of its conjunction with the light of glory.

TO the fourth argument it is answered first, let the antecedent pass and I deny the consequence. As perhaps the same assent in number of unformed faith cannot become formed: because it is varied according to that circumstance of one living or dead: nevertheless it does not follow from this that the habit of faith does not remain the same, formed by charity, which before had been unformed.

It is answered, secondly, I deny the antecedent. Indeed from the nature of the thing it is possible that the same assent in number, e.g. of this conclusion, Christ is risible, which is now had from a principle known by faith, be continued in the fatherland, if God suddenly infused the light of glory concerning the same principle. But because, speaking regularly, the actual assent of theological conclusions is interrupted, not only when a man passes from this life to the other, but also at intervals in the present life; therefore it is never verified that the same assent in number is now non-evident and afterwards evident. But the habit, because from its nature it remains, can well be the same, now non-evident and afterwards evident. Just as the same man is an infant and afterwards a man.

TO the fifth argument, I deny the major, if we speak of the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word: indeed I think that it is either acquired by their own acts or consequent upon the beatific vision. And however it be, I do not concede that it is infused per se: indeed it is of such a species that it can be acquired by our acts. Just as the knowledge was instilled by God himself in our first parent, which the theologians call infused accidentally, because it was such as he could acquire by his own acts.

To the proof of the major it is answered that the knowledge of the Blessed, besides that which they have in the Word, is not of the same species as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ. And the reason is: because the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ extends per se to the knowledge of the thoughts of the heart, to which act no knowledge of men or of angels can extend itself. From which it is plainly gathered that it is a knowledge infused per se. Whose formal account is more universal and simpler than the formal account of our theology, or of the Blessed.

For the greater understanding of this, observe what we shall dispute at length in q. 57, art. 4: that although the angels can know the thoughts of the heart revealed by the one thinking, or by God himself revealing specially, and then, when the angel knows them, there is no need for him to acquire new species, but he knows the thoughts of the heart and the free actions of the will through the old ones; nevertheless an angel, even a blessed one, does not have a habitual faculty, or knowledge, which can extend itself to knowledge of this kind without a new revelation. But the soul of Christ the Lord has so great a fullness of knowledge that it penetrates our thoughts and affections not only by the light of glory and the beatific vision, but is also able, from the habit of infused knowledge, to know the thoughts of hearts without a new revelation. All of which is plain from the doctrine of St. Thomas in 3rd part, q. 11, art. 1. Whence I would deservedly say that the knowledge of the soul of Christ is infused per se and of another species than our theology and that of the Blessed.

Observe concerning the foregoing that there are not wanting theologians who say that our theology is acquired accidentally and nevertheless is of the same species as the theology of the Blessed which they have outside the Word, which they say is infused per se. Just as it happens conversely that some knowledge is accidentally infused, such as was conferred on our first parent, which nevertheless according to itself and the proper account of its object is acquired. But they are mistaken in this opinion. For it is not possible that knowledge which is infused per se and from the proper account of its object be acquired by anyone, even accidentally: because an inferior power cannot attain to a superior effect, not even accidentally. But conversely, from a superior power one can have by infusion what he could acquire by his own powers.

CONCERNING the solution to the second argument of St. Thomas observe that singularity which does not arise from a material object does not prevent something from being able to be the object of a science. For God himself, unique and most singular, is most of all knowable. Because his singularity is subsistent to-be itself and pure act. Indeed there can be a science about Michael: because his singularity is according to his proper species and not according to matter. The reason for this doctrine can be assigned from the account of the object of the intellect, which is being. Whence what is more perfectly being is more knowable. But a thing is more perfectly being the more it is in act and the less in potency. Therefore if there be given a singular being whose singularity does not arise from matter and potentiality, but because that being is pure act, it will also be most of all knowable. Similarly also, because the principle of individuation in angels is not matter, but they are individuated from their proper species negatively, insofar as such a nature has nothing by which it might be multiplied, for that reason there can be a science about this nature of Michael. But about singulars composed of matter there cannot per se be a science: because according to themselves they are individuated from matter, which is unknowable, as being pure potency which is known only through its order to form and act. But form and act pertain to the species of the thing; and by reason of the participated species material individuals have the account of form and act, and to that extent there can be a science about them, but not per se insofar as they are singulars.

And if anyone objects that about Christ the Lord there can per se be, and is, the science of theology. It is answered that Christ the Lord can be considered in two ways. In one way as regards his singular humanity; and thus there is no more a science about him than about Peter, about whom there is no science except insofar as he is a man. In the other way he can be considered by reason of his divine person. And in this way there is per se a science of theology about him. But about his singular humanity there is a science of theology through its order to God himself, just as about many other singulars which fall under divine revelation, as St. Thomas says in the following article, to the first.