Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the second conclusion of St. Thomas is true and its ground good.

It is argued first for the negative side. When a man first comes to the use of reason, he sufficiently knows by the natural light those things which he is bound to know, so as to convert himself to the good; therefore revealed doctrine is not necessary for man to tend to his natural end. The antecedent is plain. For otherwise a man would not sin in the first instant of the use of reason, even if he did not convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason: which is contrary to St. Thomas, in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6.

It is argued second: supernatural revelation cannot be proportioned except to a supernatural object; therefore a truth which by its nature is of the natural order cannot be known under the account of supernatural revelation.

It is argued third: a faithful simple man is not of a better condition than a faithful philosopher: but a faithful philosopher does not assent to those natural truths from divine revelation, but from a natural means; therefore a faithful simple man does not assent from divine revelation. The consequence is plain, because otherwise he would be of a better condition.

It is argued fourth: if any natural truth ought to be known through divine revelation, this most of all, God exists; but it seems to imply a contradiction that this truth be known from divine revelation; therefore. The minor is proved: for if anyone assents to this truth, God exists, because God himself reveals it, he already presupposes that God exists: inasmuch as he presupposes that God is a revealer, and consequently before divine revelation man knows that God exists.

FINALLY it is argued against the ground of the conclusion, which presupposes that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of natural truth. This seems false: because it is possible for natural truth to be investigated by natural reason, and consequently natural knowledge would suffice: since the whole salvation of man depends on it.

TO this doubt Cajetan in this place teaches that this second conclusion is to be understood of a necessity not simply, but of well-being. Nevertheless St. Thomas seems to hold the contrary in 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1, where he expressly teaches that natural knowledge does not suffice for the human race for the knowledge of divine things, even of those which can be demonstrated by natural reason; and in 3 Sent., dist. 23, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1, he says that sufficient provision could not be made for the natural knowledge of God through man's nature; therefore not only for well-being, but simply, revealed doctrine must be asserted to be necessary for knowing truths of this kind. Wherefore Cajetan, in 2-2 above, moderates the opinion which he had held here. For either, he says, we speak of the human race according to individual men, or according to the community of the human race itself. If we speak in the former way, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for many. For there are many who, on account of natural ineptitude or other reasonable occupations, cannot investigate such truths by their own powers. If, however, we speak of the community itself of the human race; he says that such revelation is not necessary for all, because some can know those truths by their own powers. But neither does this moderation seem to us to agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For then it would already be verified that natural reason suffices for the knowledge of those truths. For that this knowledge fails in some proceeds from an accidental cause: and yet St. Thomas refers a defect of this kind to human nature. Then because even the philosophers themselves acquired such knowledge only over a long time and with an admixture of errors, as is plain to one reading the dogmas of the philosophers.

IT must therefore be said, as seems to us, and let it be a certain conclusion, that revealed doctrine is necessary in order that men be instructed even in natural truths as much as is required for them to be taught concerning supernatural things. For grace presupposes nature. And it is proved first. For although some knowledge of God can befall some after a long time, nevertheless this does not in fact befall without some admixture of errors. Whence it is necessary that revealed doctrine perfect nature. It is proved secondly. For the wound of ignorance, which we drew with original sin, is not only in the practical reason, but also in the speculative, inasmuch as in the state of integral nature the speculative intellect had an infallible order to the true, nor could it be retarded by the corruptibility of the body. Whence St. Thomas below, q. 101, art. 1, ad 3, grants to children in the state of innocence a sufficient knowledge which would direct them in good works. But after sin man remained with a corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, so that it cannot tend infallibly to the true. And the intellect itself, to which it is natural to understand by conversion to phantasms, received the wound of ignorance, so that it easily declines from the true; therefore, etc. And finally, distinct knowledge, certain and without admixture of error and acquired in a short time, concerning natural truths about God himself, which are indeed necessary for man, cannot be had in the state of fallen nature by human powers; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary for instructing men about truths of this kind. Through which doctrine, as Chrysostom says, hom. 4 to the people, Christians, even peasants, learn more in one day than the philosophers attained in the whole time of their life: for straightway through sacred doctrine the untaught countrymen, once instructed, believe that God is one and that his providence exists and that he is to be worshipped and adored above all things. But even the most weighty philosophers attained some truths after much time and with an admixture of errors. For Plato traveled to Egypt and Italy to learn philosophy. Aristotle labored twenty years with Plato. And these men fell into very grave errors. For Plato said that matter is coeternal with God and is not created by him, and he posited a return of souls to bodies. Likewise he said that every soul of brute animals is immortal and that all are of the same species, and that God is the soul of the world. Aristotle also said that the world necessarily existed from eternity. Nor does he make mention of human eternal happiness. And in 7 Politics he asserted that men who are born deprived of some limb or in any way monstrous are to be killed. He also taught in the same place that abortion is to be procured, at least before the animation of the fetus. Then Cicero denied the providence of God, and to make men free he made them sacrilegious. Likewise with Aristotle he judged that indignation at the prosperity of inferiors is a virtue, which is absurd according to right reason. And in book 3 of Offices he taught that it is just to harm the guilty, which is against the law of nature. Moreover Galen, a man most brilliant in genius, taught that the soul is mortal and that it is a relation, that is, a harmony and concord of the humors. Augustine finally, endowed by nature with a most excellent genius, was held for nine years in many errors of the Manichees. Therefore if men of such great and excellent genius erred concerning natural things, revealed doctrine is necessary for all, lest error befall them in those matters in which ignorance or error is even opposed to Catholic doctrine.

TO the arguments, then, in opposition.

TO the first it is answered that it is true that when a man first comes to the use of reason he is most sufficiently enlightened by the natural light, synderesis dictating, so as to convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason. But afterwards he will not be able to live his life without some error concerning natural things, unless he has been enlightened by revealed doctrine.

TO the second argument it is answered that revealed doctrine is not proportioned to natural truths as regards this, that it demonstrates them through itself, as they are demonstrable. But the proportion is in this, that through revealed doctrine a man is certified by a light of a higher order concerning those truths which by their nature are demonstrable.

TO the third argument it is answered that a faithful simple man is not of a better condition, other things being equal, than a faithful philosopher. And to the proof it is answered that a faithful philosopher is not less certain that God exists than a faithful simple man. And the reason is: because faith in the philosopher does not destroy the demonstration of the conclusion, but moreover as to certainty confirms it with supernatural certainty: although as to the obscurity of faith the philosopher cannot assent to a conclusion that is known. But on this matter we have said more, 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

TO the fourth argument, I deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that divine revelation certifies at once and together that God exists and that God reveals, in exercised act. Just as at once and together we see light and colors.

TO the last argument it is answered that it is one thing to say that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of certain natural truths: and another to say that the knowledge of them suffices for salvation. The second St. Thomas did not say. The first, however, is true. But observe that a dependence of this kind is rather as on a material cause and the capacity of nature, which is presupposed to grace, just as intellect and free will are presupposed; so too faith presupposes that there be no error in the intellect concerning certain natural truths. Whence that God exists is said to be a preamble to faith rather than to pertain per se to faith.

IT could be doubted third, concerning the third conclusion, which we noted in the solution to the second: whether theology and metaphysics differ in species, or rather in kind? And the reason for doubting was: because each is in the predicament of quality and in the species of habit. But the solution of this doubt will easily appear in the following article. In the meantime, however, know that this generic difference must be weighed according to the formal account of the knowable, which in respect of theology is elevated to such a degree that it surpasses by its abstraction every formal account of the natural knowable.

AND finally observe, concerning the solution to the second, that St. Thomas so answers as to deny expressly the consequence of the argument, and he assigns the reason: because concerning the same material knowable there can be several sciences under different accounts. From which it follows that Cajetan contends in vain with Scotus, who censures this solution, objecting that by it the necessity of theology is not saved. We, however, answer that it does not pertain to a good solution to prove the conclusion, but to defend it from the contrary objection. Which the solution of St. Thomas abundantly enough provides.