Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

BEFORE we come to the graver disputations, certain things are to be noted, especially for novice theologians.

The first is that theology, according to the propriety of the word, is the same as discourse about God, or the account and expertise of divine things. Whence the theologian is an expert in divine things; and his office is to contemplate and to speak of God, and of other things insofar as they are from God and tend to him. Now theology is twofold, namely natural and supernatural. The former indeed contemplates those truths which can be investigated about God by the natural light and by discourse, such as that God is one, infinite, etc. The supernatural, however, inquires into and considers those truths which can be had by divine revelation, or are gathered from the things revealed themselves.

NEXT observe that doctrine is called revealed which has not been devised by human wit, but handed down by divine revelation alone: according to Gal. 1: I make known to you the gospel which was preached by me, that it is not according to man. For neither did I receive it from man, nor did I learn it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. Where Jerome observes that Apocalypse, that is, revelation, is a word proper to the Scriptures, deservedly devised by the Seventy interpreters: for it is not found among Gentile writers. Now the proper and genuine signification of this word is not revelation in any way whatever, but when something which of itself was covered and veiled, the impediment now being removed, is shown and brought forth into the light. Whence the theologian who prepares to profess the discipline of this sacred doctrine should consider that he himself is to be transferred into another, invisible world, and that, as it were a second Paul, the natural scales are to be removed from his eyes, that he may see the kingdom of God.

NOW revealed doctrine, according to its common signification, is divided into faith, into prophecy, and into that doctrine which is necessary for explaining the divine letters. The Apostle makes mention of this in Eph. 4 when he said: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors. Namely, doctors able to instruct the people in divine and human things which are necessary for eternal salvation. Which doctrine indeed is sometimes occupied with the explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of the articles of faith; sometimes it gathers from the things revealed and understood themselves conclusions conducive to a fuller knowledge of the mysteries and to their defense against heretics. Wherefore it uses different means according to the variety of errors and arguments by which sacred doctrine is attacked by the ignorant.

MOREOVER the physical discipline in the present article is not taken strictly, as signifying only the science of mobile being, but is used broadly, as signifying every discipline which can be had from the power of nature.

AND finally, necessary can be taken in two ways. In one way for the simply necessary, as that God exists, that man is an animal: in the other way, for what is useful and fitting for the end: but in either way the necessary is said according to the four kinds of causes, as Aristotle teaches, 5 Metaphysics, text 6, e.g. a stone must rise on the part of the efficient cause, if it is pushed upward by a greater power. Likewise, a man must be risible from the formal cause; and corruptible from the material cause; and endowed with virtue from the necessity of the end, that he be blessed. In the present article, therefore, it is clear that the discourse concerns the necessary according to the final cause, namely, whether revealed doctrine is necessary for man unto salvation. But whether he speaks of the simply necessary, as an eye is necessary for seeing, or rather of the necessary in a certain respect, that is, for the more commodious attainment of the end, as a horse is necessary for a journey and shoes for walking; there is a difference among the interpreters of St. Thomas.

IT IS DOUBTED, then, first, concerning the first conclusion: whether it was simply necessary for human salvation that revealed doctrine be handed down to men.

It is argued first for the negative side. All creatures can attain their end by their own powers; therefore man does not simply need some supernatural gift for attaining his own end, otherwise he would seem to be of a worse condition than the other created things.

It is argued second. For the Apostle, Rom. 1, vehemently accuses the Gentile philosophers, not indeed because they did not know God, but because, when they had known him naturally, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks: therefore natural knowledge suffices for worshipping God, and consequently for the end of beatitude. And it is confirmed. For that God exists and that he is a rewarder are knowable by the natural light: but, as the Apostle testifies, Heb. 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to them that seek him; these things seem to suffice for justification: therefore revealed doctrine is not simply necessary. And it is confirmed secondly. For when a man first comes to the use of reason, if he does what is in him by the powers of nature, so as to be converted to God, he is justified from sin; and yet he has no supernatural knowledge, therefore.

It is argued third. For although according to the ordinary law no one attains salvation except through some revealed doctrine; nevertheless, speaking absolutely, God could lead a man into eternal life without any supernatural revelation conferred on him in this life; therefore, speaking absolutely, revealed doctrine is not necessary for salvation, as an eye is for seeing.

It is argued fourth. Be it granted that some revealed doctrine is necessary for salvation, yet our theology does not seem to be simply necessary; therefore St. Thomas asserted in vain that this sacred theology, to the study of which we come, is necessary. The minor is proved from Mark, last chapter: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And it is proved by reason. For by faith our end and the means necessary for it are sufficiently known.

AND finally it is argued. For be it granted that knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures is necessary in the Church of Christ, namely that there be doctors who interpret the Sacred letters; yet our scholastic theology seems superfluous, which so tediously, and with so great a number of arguments tossed about on this side and that, divine things with excessive curiosity discusses and handles; therefore such subtle disputation is superfluous. The minor is proved. For the holy Fathers, who were fit doctors of the Church of God, did not engage in ventilating subtleties of this kind. And it is confirmed from Chrysostom, Hom. 1 on the Epistle to Titus, where he says that the sacred Gospel contains all things, present and future, and all things which are necessary for piety. And St. Augustine, tract. 49 on John, says: Not all the things which the Lord Jesus did are written, as John testifies, but those things were selected which should be written, all things which are necessary for the human race unto salvation. Likewise St. Basil, in the Homily on the human generation of Christ, says: O absurd and depraved ingratitude! The Magi come to adore, and Christians more curiously ask how God is in the flesh, and of what flesh, and whether the man assumed is perfect or imperfect. Let the curious be silent, and let them cease to investigate superfluous things in the Church of God. And yet our scholastics dispute questions of this kind, and others much more curious, namely: whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be distinguished from him? and whether, if Adam had not sinned, the Son of God would have assumed human nature? and very many others of this kind, therefore.

FOR the decision of this doubt let there be a first conclusion, most certain according to the Catholic faith. Revealed doctrine is simply necessary according to the ordinary law of God for the salvation of individual men who have come to the use of reason. I have said 'according to the ordinary law of God'; for according to his absolute power God could have justified men by his grace and transferred them to beatitude. This conclusion has a special place where it is explained by theologians and confirmed by the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures and of the Councils; namely, in 2-2, q. 2, arts. 3, 4, 5 and following. For the present, however, let that testimony suffice for us, Heb. 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things that appear not. We have, therefore, that if by the name of revealed doctrine we understand also the doctrine of the Catholic faith, as in truth it is most of all to be understood under such a name, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for men to obtain salvation: and that this is certain according to the Catholic faith.

NEVERTHELESS certain of the modern theologians linger overmuch in this place, asking: whether it can be proved by natural reason that, besides the physical disciplines, another revealed doctrine is necessary for man for living rightly and obtaining happiness. And they argue in many ways for the affirmative side. First indeed by induction. For it is the common sense of men that such doctrine is necessary: e.g. unbelieving Jews hold that they have a revealed doctrine, awaiting the Messiah. The Saracens too think that Mohammed was a prophet of God who brought a salutary law to men. Likewise heretics think that they have a revealed doctrine; indeed the Gentiles also think the same. And their foundation is: that what they have received from their parents is to be believed: and for that reason they are called Gentiles. For Augustine relates, 8 City of God, ch. 5, from Varro, that among the Gentiles there was a threefold theology; a certain natural one, which men devised by their own powers; another fabulous, which the poets invented; a third civil, which belonged to the priests, by which cities were ordered to the worship of God. And this they held to have been handed down to men by God through revelation. And finally the Christians above all affirm that this is necessary. Hence, therefore, a morally evident argument is drawn. It is impossible that that in which all nations agree be false: but all nations agree in this, that revealed doctrine is necessary for men, therefore this is true. To me, however, this argument seems persuasive rather than demonstrative. For among the philosophers who were judged wise by men, some denied that God exists, as Pythagoras and Protagoras; some denied the providence of God, as the Epicurean and his followers; and, what is more to be wondered at, Aristotle seems to have denied divine providence. For he asserted nothing about the providence of God; indeed he thought that the world emanated from God himself by a necessity of nature, not by his free will, which, below, in q. 19, art. 10, we shall show to have been an error against the natural light; and in q. 46, art. 1. It is also clear how doubtful Aristotle was about the immortality of the soul.

Likewise, 12 Metaphysics, ch. 8, after he had demonstrated certain things which can be demonstrated about God himself, he says thus: Certain things have been handed down by our forefathers and by the most ancient, besides these: but all the rest have been brought forward fabulously to persuade the multitude, or on account of the laws, or for expediency. Behold, therefore, how the aforesaid argument, drawn from authority and the consensus of all, can be shaken.

A second argument is brought from St. Thomas, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 3, namely: because we naturally desire to know the quiddity of whatever thing comes in any way into our knowledge, therefore we naturally desire to know the quiddity of the first Cause. Again: But through the physical disciplines we cannot know God quidditatively, as is plain from Aristotle, 2 Metaphysics, ch. 1, where he says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the night-owl to the light of the sun. And Plato in the Parmenides, when he had said many things about the first being, concluded: that man cannot know what it is, but only what it is not; therefore it follows that a revealed science is necessary. But this argument and others like it, which are drawn from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the place cited above, contribute to this (as St. Thomas says at the end of the aforesaid chapter): that it be shown that what is said of God is not to be cast aside as false, although it cannot be investigated by reason: indeed it is also shown how revealed doctrine does not destroy but rather perfects nature, in that it perfects and completes imperfect but natural desires, which are rather called velleities. For I will never grant, revelation being set aside, that there is in man or in an angel a natural desire, simply and absolutely, of knowing God quidditatively: indeed, if an angel were created in pure natural endowments, he would tend by no way to such knowledge of God, nor desire it, since he would evidently judge it impossible for himself. Let us then conclude, in confirmation of the first fundamental conclusion, asserting what is said in Wis. 13: Vain are all men who have not the knowledge of God. Therefore the aforesaid conclusion cannot be had certainly by any other way than from the Catholic faith. But that this revealed doctrine is made evidently credible by many arguments: it is not for this place to show. But this we have done in 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

Second conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine we understand prophecy, it is necessary in the Church, not indeed that prophetic revelation be made to each individual man, but to those whom God has chosen, that through their ministry he might instruct the faithful concerning future things. This conclusion is to be understood according to the law ordained by God, who, according to the diversity of times, prophetically enlightened the minds of certain men, that on God's part they might instruct and console the rest, according to Amos, ch. 3: For the Lord God will do nothing, unless he reveal his secret to his servants the prophets. Whence the first prophet was Adam, when he said, Gen. 2: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife. The mystery of which prophecy the Apostle explains, Eph. 5: This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. But how much utility prophetic doctrine brought to the confirmation of the Gospel doctrine, the Apostle sufficiently teaches, Rom. 1, when he says: Separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning his Son. See on this matter Chrysostom on Isaiah, ch. 6, Homil. 2, where he says: Prophetic oracles are not promulgated for this, that men know future things in any way, but that they reap great benefits from them. The first is that men be made more modest through fear of punishment and of the prophetic threat. The second is that men be made more eager to undertake virtue from the promise of goods. The third is that from both sides they may know the power of God and his providence toward men. The fourth, that they may judge that the future things which are foretold come about not by chance but by God's most firm decree. The fifth, that men may know themselves to be sinners and have recourse to Christ.

Third conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine is understood the science which is occupied with the understanding and explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of those things which pertain to faith, it is not simply necessary for individual men unto salvation. This is plain. For many are simple Christians who, simply believing the articles of faith, keep his commandments out of love of God and are saved.

Fourth conclusion. Nevertheless a doctrine of this kind, revealed, which by us is called theological science, is necessary in the Church of God for the salvation of men and the preservation of the faithful. This conclusion is understood of the necessity of the end simply, supposing the divine ordination. For the understanding and confirmation of this conclusion it is to be observed, as we intimated before, that theological science is occupied in two ways with the things which have been revealed by God. First, by interpreting the Sacred Scriptures from what precedes and what follows, from the traditions of the Church, from expertise in languages, and other similar things. In the other way, by gathering from the testimonies of the Scriptures or from the truths of faith conclusions by a good or probable consequence, for the edification of the faithful or the defense of the faith. Note secondly that although the theologian exercises these two offices with diligence and study; nevertheless, because he proceeds from faith and from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, sometimes also by a special grace of God freely given, such sacred science is deservedly called sacred and revealed. For what is ours in it is the least part. Now, therefore, the conclusion is proved in both senses; and first in the former sense, from Eph. 4: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. Behold the end of these offices, namely the edification of the faithful. Likewise, 1 Cor. 12, where Paul, relating the gifts with which Christ adorned his Church, says: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another the interpretation of speeches. What is, I ask, the word of wisdom and of knowledge, if not the spirit of teaching and declaring all things which are necessary for salvation? And ch. 14 he speaks elegantly of the interpretation of revelations, which he calls prophecy: whose use is, as St. Thomas explains, to set forth the word of exhortation to the people, by expounding the Sacred Scriptures. And the same Apostle calls interpreters those same men whom he calls prophets; and he calls interpreting prophesying. And St. Peter in the second epistle, ch. 1, says thus: Knowing this first, that no prophecy of scripture is made by private interpretation. That is, it is not of human wit, nor of private authority, but proceeds from the divine light. And ch. 3 he says: In the epistles of Paul there are some things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, to their own destruction; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary, which may explain what is doubtful and interpret what is difficult. Moreover the same is effectively confirmed. For God never fails in necessary things, much less than nature: but not only is the handing down of the Scriptures necessary, but also the understanding of them; therefore God has not left his Church without doctors sufficient for explaining the Sacred Scriptures. Moreover, if holy Scripture is obscure and ambiguous, and has diverse and contrary expositions; to whom must one have recourse for the true understanding of Scripture? e.g. concerning these four words, This is my body, there is great controversy in the Church of Christ. For Oecolampadius says that their legitimate interpretation is: this is a sign of my body. Calvin declares: this is my body in power. The Church says: this is truly my body. In a matter, therefore, of so great moment, to whom must one have recourse? Certainly to none other than the doctors of the Church. Just as the Antiochenes in a very difficult matter fled to none other than the apostles and elders who were at Jerusalem.

But here two things are to be observed. The one is that this doctrine is not necessary for all Christians, but it is necessary that it exist in the Christian commonwealth. Just as it is not necessary that all Christians be bishops, but it is necessary that there be bishops in the Church. The other is that this doctrine is not necessary for new revelations, nor for bringing forth a new faith, but for eliciting the true expositions of sacred Scripture already handed down to us. Whence the doctors of this discipline do not have new revelations; they have, however, a special divine assistance and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, that they may proceed fittingly in the exposition of sacred Scripture, as is expedient for the utility of the Church.

NEXT the conclusion is proved in the other sense, namely insofar as sacred theology, from the divine revelations and the articles of faith, which are as it were first principles, gathers conclusions conducive to the edifying of the faithful and the defense of the Church from the attack of heretics. Of this science the Apostle speaks, 1 Cor. 12, when he says: To another is given the word of knowledge in the same Spirit. Explaining which passage, Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, says: This is the science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, strengthened and defended. With which science indeed very many of the faithful are not endowed, although they are endowed with faith. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for obtaining beatitude; and another to know how this very faith helps the pious and is defended against the impious. So he. The Apostle also makes mention of this science, Titus 1, when he says: A bishop must be blameless, etc., embracing him who is according to doctrine, the faithful word, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers; that is, to convince with arguments and to refute the errors of those who contradict. To this also pertains what the Apostle Peter in the first canonical epistle, ch. 3, admonishes the faithful, that they be ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you. And although this office in a certain way pertains to individual faithful; nevertheless it especially belongs to the doctors of the Church, who give continuous attention to sacred theology. Moreover we find examples of this sacred theology also in the authors of the Sacred Scriptures, who often argue and reason from certain revealed things to persuade men of the truth. But there is a very great difference between those canonical writers and the other doctors of the Church. Since the former argue infallibly by the same Spirit of God; the other doctors, however, in their argumentations do not have infallibly the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the canonical writers have left us most firm examples, which we might imitate in our theological discourses. Indeed Christ the Lord himself, the supreme Doctor of all doctors, often argued to convince the experts in the law and the Pharisees. As for example, John 10: Is it not written in your law, I said, You are gods? If he called them gods, to whom the word of God was made, and the scripture cannot be broken, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world; you say, because I blaspheme, because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, if you will not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father. Moreover Luke 11 he says: If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children; how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him? And in the same chapter, against those blaspheming that he cast out devils in Beelzebub the prince of devils, he argues wonderfully. The apostles themselves also, imitating their master, very often made theological arguments, among whom the Apostle, the doctor of the Gentiles, seems to have excelled. In whose epistles there are examples so frequent that it is not pleasing to relate any one of them above the others. But the other doctors, imitating these examples, have left us very many writings filled with theological arguments. To this doctrine also is consonant what was instituted in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. 11: that readers of sacred Scripture be established in all cathedral churches, and especially of those things which pertain to the reformation of morals. Which was confirmed in the Council of Trent, session 22, On Reformation, ch. 2. Very many supreme pontiffs also established universities of studies, in which the divine science of sacred theology might be taught, and adorned them with riches, honors and privileges. How much utility, moreover, scholastic theology has brought to the Church of God, the doctrine of St. Thomas alone manifests. For in all the councils celebrated after St. Thomas, almost all the dogmas decreed by them were taken from the doctrine of the holy doctor. Which is plain in the Council of Vienne under Clement V, in the Council of Florence under Eugene IV, in the Lateran under Leo X, and in Trent under Paul III and Julius III and Pius IV. Wherefore not without cause do heretics pursue scholastic theology with the utmost hatred: since by the shrewdness of the theologians their pestiferous arguments are dissolved.

TO the arguments in opposition.

TO the first argument certain of the modern theologians, in order to answer, dispute in this place, not opportunely enough, that celebrated question: whether to see God as he is is the natural end of man. Which question nevertheless claims for itself its proper place in 1-2, q. 3, art. 8. We, however, will say something in part about this difficulty below, in q. 12, art. 1, where it is also opportunely disputed by others. In the meantime, however, that we may satisfy the argument, we suppose that a man in the state of fallen nature cannot be made blessed by the attainment of any end, unless he first obtain salvation by the grace of the Savior. But if man had been created in pure natural endowments, he would have needed some gift of the Creator in order to acquire natural beatitude by his own actions. Which gift God supplied much more abundantly, creating man with grace healing nature and ordering him to a supernatural end. After sin, however, no remedy remains except the grace of God through Jesus Christ.

TO the second argument it is answered that from the testimony of the Apostle it is not gathered that natural knowledge is sufficient for worshipping God as was required for the end of beatitude. But only this is gathered, that natural knowledge is a sufficient cause for the condemnation of those who, when they had known God, did not glorify him as God, but turned to idolatry. To the first confirmation it is answered that it does not suffice for justification, as far as concerns the intellect, that a man believe that God exists as the author of nature, and that he is a rewarder with a natural reward: but it is required that God be believed as the author of the grace that justifies the impious, and as a rewarder promising supernatural beatitude; according to the word of the Apostle, Rom. 4: But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God. But on this difficulty, whether for justification a supernatural faith is required also on the part of the object believed: I have disputed more at length in 2-2, q. 2, art. 8, doubt 2, where we showed that it is not enough for someone to have an implicit faith in Christ, without which no one is justified, that he believe some natural principle. Since in that principle what is supernatural cannot be contained implicitly. To the second confirmation it is answered that when a man first comes to the use of reason, he can indeed sin by the powers of nature, if he is not converted to the good. But by the powers of nature he cannot be sufficiently disposed to be converted to God and justified from sin, unless he has been forestalled by the help of divine mercy. And thus it will be verified that God does not deny grace to him who does what is in him. But to what a man is bound when he comes to the use of reason is usually disputed in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6. I, however, having found an occasion not unsuitable, disputed it at length in 2-2, q. 10, art. 1, doubt 2.

TO the third argument the intent of it is granted, as we explained in the first conclusion.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that it proves the third conclusion.

TO the fifth argument, where objection is made against the necessity of scholastic theology, and indeed it is intended that it is superfluous, useless and pernicious; one must answer carefully against certain men of our own time who are students of human rather than of divine writings, who on account of the difficulty of scholastic theology and their own sloth or natural dullness do not cease continually to bark against the scholastic theologians. These surely seem to me like sluggish hare-hounds, which, when they cannot by the swiftness of their course pursue the hare, bark vehemently against the others who pursue and outrun it swiftly. I for my part am not of the number of those who despise expertise in languages and the diligent reading of histories; on the contrary, mindful of the apostolic doctrine: As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God; I have always venerated men of this kind who profess expertise in languages, and especially those who devote themselves to elucidating the phrases of the Sacred Scriptures. But the arrogance and pernicious ignorance of some I cannot bear. For they think that we, occupied with useless questions, lose oil and labor. Against them let a certain conclusion be laid down.

SCHOLASTIC theology as it is learned and held in the Church of God from the time of the Master of the Sentences to the present day is necessary with that necessity which we explained in the fourth conclusion. This conclusion is proved by the same arguments by which the fourth was also confirmed. Then it is proved. Since scholastic theology does not differ from the theology of the holy Fathers as to substance, but differs only as to its compendious mode and as reduced more to the art of a discipline, so that the theologian may now have, as it were in ready cash, all the heads of things and the arguments by which Catholic doctrine can both be explained and defended against heretics. Of which matter a great proof is what we did above in the meditation on the second document on the prologue of St. Thomas. Supposing, therefore, the variety of the heresies of the most recent times, and the fox-like cunning of heretics, it is necessary that there be at hand in the Church of Christ doctors who may answer subtly, learnedly and briefly the sophistries of the heretics, and strongly refute them. For this pertains to the providence of Christ, that he make such doctors in his Church as he knows to be necessary according to the diversity of times. But in this scholastic theology many things are contained which pertain to ornament and perfection rather than to utility. And nevertheless they are sometimes not without utility. For Augustine teaches, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 4, that to assume human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is nothing other than to imitate the children of Israel, who, fleeing Pharaoh, carried off with them the vessels of gold and all the furniture of the Egyptians, that they might afterwards spend all precious things for the ornament of the Tabernacle. So also St. Jerome, in the epistle to Magnus the orator; and to Pope Damasus, On the prodigal son, says: To assume human philosophy and all human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is to bring a most beautiful woman as a believing captive into the people of God. According to Deut. 21, where it was commanded that if anyone took in war a woman who pleased him, he should bring her into his house and shave her hair and cut her nails, and put off the garment in which she was taken captive. So, therefore, it befits the theologian to learn human disciplines, that he cut away whatever in them is superfluous, and make them serve the holy doctrine. For what harm did it do to Daniel that he learned the letters of the Chaldeans? What to Moses, that he was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians? On which matter see the excellent treatise of Rupert the abbot, On the works of the Holy Spirit, book 7, or, what is the same, On knowledge, in a single book, especially from ch. 10 to the end. Where he shows elegantly and very learnedly the utility of the liberal arts for the treatment of the Sacred Scriptures.

TO the testimonies of the Saints cited in the last argument it is answered. To St. Chrysostom: that he speaks of the Gospel as containing these things as in a principle and a fountain: but it is necessary that the things contained in the Gospel be explained and defended by the doctors. And similarly it must be said to Augustine. But to St. Basil it is answered that he inveighs against certain imprudent men who in the churches disputed such questions before the people. For which vice certain preachers of our own time are deservedly to be reproved, who dispute and define before the people scholastic and subtle questions, of which perhaps they themselves would not dare to speak in the schools. But that such scholastic disputations, however subtle, are very useful in the Church of Christ, provided they be conducted with due modesty, the examples of the saints confirm. For such things did the holy Doctor dispute, who sometimes, out of excessive love of Christ, was rapt into ecstasy; such things did he also dispute who is called the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure. And among the holy Fathers we find not a few examples of this, as often as the perverse and subtle dogmas of heretics compelled them to dispute piously indeed, but subtly. Read, I beseech you, St. Hilary, book 2 On the Trinity, where among other things he says thus: We are compelled by the vices of heretics and blasphemers to do unlawful things, to climb steep places, to speak the ineffable, to presume what is not granted, and to extend the lowliness of our speech to things that are ineffable, and we are forced into one fault by another's fault. So he. Do not, however, think that Hilary judged anything to be done viciously, but he speaks in the manner in which it is commonly said: it is lawful to repel force by force. Although defense ought not properly to be called force. Now, indeed, the prudent reader will pardon me that in this first doubt I have not altogether kept the scholastic method of disputing. Nor is it wonderful, since this first question of St. Thomas, and especially this first article, still has an affinity with the plan of the prologue.

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the second conclusion of St. Thomas is true and its ground good.

It is argued first for the negative side. When a man first comes to the use of reason, he sufficiently knows by the natural light those things which he is bound to know, so as to convert himself to the good; therefore revealed doctrine is not necessary for man to tend to his natural end. The antecedent is plain. For otherwise a man would not sin in the first instant of the use of reason, even if he did not convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason: which is contrary to St. Thomas, in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6.

It is argued second: supernatural revelation cannot be proportioned except to a supernatural object; therefore a truth which by its nature is of the natural order cannot be known under the account of supernatural revelation.

It is argued third: a faithful simple man is not of a better condition than a faithful philosopher: but a faithful philosopher does not assent to those natural truths from divine revelation, but from a natural means; therefore a faithful simple man does not assent from divine revelation. The consequence is plain, because otherwise he would be of a better condition.

It is argued fourth: if any natural truth ought to be known through divine revelation, this most of all, God exists; but it seems to imply a contradiction that this truth be known from divine revelation; therefore. The minor is proved: for if anyone assents to this truth, God exists, because God himself reveals it, he already presupposes that God exists: inasmuch as he presupposes that God is a revealer, and consequently before divine revelation man knows that God exists.

FINALLY it is argued against the ground of the conclusion, which presupposes that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of natural truth. This seems false: because it is possible for natural truth to be investigated by natural reason, and consequently natural knowledge would suffice: since the whole salvation of man depends on it.

TO this doubt Cajetan in this place teaches that this second conclusion is to be understood of a necessity not simply, but of well-being. Nevertheless St. Thomas seems to hold the contrary in 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1, where he expressly teaches that natural knowledge does not suffice for the human race for the knowledge of divine things, even of those which can be demonstrated by natural reason; and in 3 Sent., dist. 23, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1, he says that sufficient provision could not be made for the natural knowledge of God through man's nature; therefore not only for well-being, but simply, revealed doctrine must be asserted to be necessary for knowing truths of this kind. Wherefore Cajetan, in 2-2 above, moderates the opinion which he had held here. For either, he says, we speak of the human race according to individual men, or according to the community of the human race itself. If we speak in the former way, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for many. For there are many who, on account of natural ineptitude or other reasonable occupations, cannot investigate such truths by their own powers. If, however, we speak of the community itself of the human race; he says that such revelation is not necessary for all, because some can know those truths by their own powers. But neither does this moderation seem to us to agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For then it would already be verified that natural reason suffices for the knowledge of those truths. For that this knowledge fails in some proceeds from an accidental cause: and yet St. Thomas refers a defect of this kind to human nature. Then because even the philosophers themselves acquired such knowledge only over a long time and with an admixture of errors, as is plain to one reading the dogmas of the philosophers.

IT must therefore be said, as seems to us, and let it be a certain conclusion, that revealed doctrine is necessary in order that men be instructed even in natural truths as much as is required for them to be taught concerning supernatural things. For grace presupposes nature. And it is proved first. For although some knowledge of God can befall some after a long time, nevertheless this does not in fact befall without some admixture of errors. Whence it is necessary that revealed doctrine perfect nature. It is proved secondly. For the wound of ignorance, which we drew with original sin, is not only in the practical reason, but also in the speculative, inasmuch as in the state of integral nature the speculative intellect had an infallible order to the true, nor could it be retarded by the corruptibility of the body. Whence St. Thomas below, q. 101, art. 1, ad 3, grants to children in the state of innocence a sufficient knowledge which would direct them in good works. But after sin man remained with a corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, so that it cannot tend infallibly to the true. And the intellect itself, to which it is natural to understand by conversion to phantasms, received the wound of ignorance, so that it easily declines from the true; therefore, etc. And finally, distinct knowledge, certain and without admixture of error and acquired in a short time, concerning natural truths about God himself, which are indeed necessary for man, cannot be had in the state of fallen nature by human powers; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary for instructing men about truths of this kind. Through which doctrine, as Chrysostom says, hom. 4 to the people, Christians, even peasants, learn more in one day than the philosophers attained in the whole time of their life: for straightway through sacred doctrine the untaught countrymen, once instructed, believe that God is one and that his providence exists and that he is to be worshipped and adored above all things. But even the most weighty philosophers attained some truths after much time and with an admixture of errors. For Plato traveled to Egypt and Italy to learn philosophy. Aristotle labored twenty years with Plato. And these men fell into very grave errors. For Plato said that matter is coeternal with God and is not created by him, and he posited a return of souls to bodies. Likewise he said that every soul of brute animals is immortal and that all are of the same species, and that God is the soul of the world. Aristotle also said that the world necessarily existed from eternity. Nor does he make mention of human eternal happiness. And in 7 Politics he asserted that men who are born deprived of some limb or in any way monstrous are to be killed. He also taught in the same place that abortion is to be procured, at least before the animation of the fetus. Then Cicero denied the providence of God, and to make men free he made them sacrilegious. Likewise with Aristotle he judged that indignation at the prosperity of inferiors is a virtue, which is absurd according to right reason. And in book 3 of Offices he taught that it is just to harm the guilty, which is against the law of nature. Moreover Galen, a man most brilliant in genius, taught that the soul is mortal and that it is a relation, that is, a harmony and concord of the humors. Augustine finally, endowed by nature with a most excellent genius, was held for nine years in many errors of the Manichees. Therefore if men of such great and excellent genius erred concerning natural things, revealed doctrine is necessary for all, lest error befall them in those matters in which ignorance or error is even opposed to Catholic doctrine.

TO the arguments, then, in opposition.

TO the first it is answered that it is true that when a man first comes to the use of reason he is most sufficiently enlightened by the natural light, synderesis dictating, so as to convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason. But afterwards he will not be able to live his life without some error concerning natural things, unless he has been enlightened by revealed doctrine.

TO the second argument it is answered that revealed doctrine is not proportioned to natural truths as regards this, that it demonstrates them through itself, as they are demonstrable. But the proportion is in this, that through revealed doctrine a man is certified by a light of a higher order concerning those truths which by their nature are demonstrable.

TO the third argument it is answered that a faithful simple man is not of a better condition, other things being equal, than a faithful philosopher. And to the proof it is answered that a faithful philosopher is not less certain that God exists than a faithful simple man. And the reason is: because faith in the philosopher does not destroy the demonstration of the conclusion, but moreover as to certainty confirms it with supernatural certainty: although as to the obscurity of faith the philosopher cannot assent to a conclusion that is known. But on this matter we have said more, 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

TO the fourth argument, I deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that divine revelation certifies at once and together that God exists and that God reveals, in exercised act. Just as at once and together we see light and colors.

TO the last argument it is answered that it is one thing to say that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of certain natural truths: and another to say that the knowledge of them suffices for salvation. The second St. Thomas did not say. The first, however, is true. But observe that a dependence of this kind is rather as on a material cause and the capacity of nature, which is presupposed to grace, just as intellect and free will are presupposed; so too faith presupposes that there be no error in the intellect concerning certain natural truths. Whence that God exists is said to be a preamble to faith rather than to pertain per se to faith.

IT could be doubted third, concerning the third conclusion, which we noted in the solution to the second: whether theology and metaphysics differ in species, or rather in kind? And the reason for doubting was: because each is in the predicament of quality and in the species of habit. But the solution of this doubt will easily appear in the following article. In the meantime, however, know that this generic difference must be weighed according to the formal account of the knowable, which in respect of theology is elevated to such a degree that it surpasses by its abstraction every formal account of the natural knowable.

AND finally observe, concerning the solution to the second, that St. Thomas so answers as to deny expressly the consequence of the argument, and he assigns the reason: because concerning the same material knowable there can be several sciences under different accounts. From which it follows that Cajetan contends in vain with Scotus, who censures this solution, objecting that by it the necessity of theology is not saved. We, however, answer that it does not pertain to a good solution to prove the conclusion, but to defend it from the contrary objection. Which the solution of St. Thomas abundantly enough provides.