Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

The CONCLUSION is negative. The reason is, because that past things have not been involves a contradiction.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE that this conclusion is most acceptable to all, both to the ancient philosophers and to the Theologians, with one exception, Gregory of Rimini, in 1, dist. 42, q. 1, art. 2. The conclusion of St. Thomas is that of St. Augustine, bk. 26 Against Faustus, ch. 5, and of St. Jerome, the Epistle to Eustochium, whose judgment is reported in the Decretum 52, q. 5, ch. Si Paulus. Gregory of Rimini argues against this conclusion, and certain of his arguments try to show that God can not have known and not have willed future contingents which He willed and knew, for instance Antichrist. But on this matter it was said above, q. 14, art. 13, and q. 19, art. 8. Other arguments are taken from this: the power of God has not been diminished; and consequently, if God could bring it about, before Adam existed, that he should not have been, so also, after Adam existed, He could bring it about that he should not have been. But on this we have said enough in the article 18 cited, in the reply to the second.

It is argued, however, against the conclusion, first. If there were no power in God with respect to the past, it would be because the past and the not-past have repugnant conditions; but even the future and the not-future have repugnant conditions, and yet God can bring it about that future things are not future: therefore also that the past not be past. It is answered with St. Thomas, above, q. 10, art. 5, ad 3, by denying the consequence; and the difference is that the past is supposed as posited in the nature of things, and as to the material and as to the formal: for instance, if Adam existed, and it is posited that he existed and in past time, hence from the intrinsic connection of the terms — not absolutely, but because the material subject has already passed away — it is repugnant that the past have not been. But as for the future and the not-future, although they formally convey repugnant conditions, yet because the material element of the future is not posited in the nature of things, it is therefore not repugnant that the future, as to its material element, not come about. Yet it must be conceded that, formally speaking, it involves a contradiction that the future not be future, but materially nothing is repugnant.

Second, it is argued: by the same reasoning it would follow that there is no power in God with respect to this, that what is present not be; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: for there is a similar contradiction, for it follows that the thing be and not be. To this it is answered that it is said with sufficient probability that there is no power as regards the present that it not be. For a thing, while it is, must be; and consequently, while it is, it is impossible that it not be. It is answered second that there is a distinction between the past and the present: that what is in the present by a free and contingent cause is freely and contingently produced, since the free cause then uses its liberty and pours it back into the effect when it produces that act; and so in that instant in which the cause produces the effect, it could fail to produce it; but the past, since it is posited in being, does not depend in any way on the liberty or contingency of the cause. Hence to the argument the sequel is denied. And to the proof I say that there is a repugnance that the thing be and not be, and for this there is no power in God; but there is no implication that the effect which is produced in this instant not be produced in the same instant; for then it is not to be conceded that the effect is and is not, but it is only conceded that it is not.