Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (pars prior)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
Commentarium
Dubium 1: Objectiones
Dubium 1: Commentarium
Dubium 1: Responsiones
Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)
Dubium 1
Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia
Commentarium
Dubium I
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae
Commentarium
Dubium I
Textus Augustini ante articulum 8
Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris
Commentarium
Commentarium; Dubium I
Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Dubium 7
Dubium 8
Dubium 9
Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit
Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae
Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura
Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse
Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo
Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex
Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat
Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum
Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo
Quaestio V: De bono in communi
Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente
Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens
Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum
Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis
Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine
Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile
Quaestio VI: De bonitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit summum bonum
Articulus III: Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sit bona bonitate divina
Quaestio VII: De Infinitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit infinitus
Articulus II: Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam
Articulus III: Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem
Articulus IV: Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem
Quaestio VIII: De existentia Dei in rebus
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit ubique
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam
Articulus IV: Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei
Quaestio IX: De Dei immutabilitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis
Articulus II: Utrum esse inmutabile sit Dei proprium
Quaestio X: De Dei Aeternitate
Articulus I: Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit aeternus
Articulus III: Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore
Articulus V: De differentia aevi et temporis
Articulus VI: Utrum sit unum aevum tantum
Quaestio XI: De unitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens
Articulus II: Utrum unum et multa opponantur
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit unus
Articulus IV: Utrum Deus sit maxime unus
Quaestio XII: Quomodo Deus cognoscatur a nobis
Articulus I: Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam
Articulus II: Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur
Articulus III: Utrum Essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus
Articulus IV: Utrum aliquis intellectus per sua naturalia Divinam Essentiam videre possit
Articulus V: Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei Essentiam aliquo creato lumine indigeat
Articulus VI: Utrum videntium Dei Essentiam unus alio perfectius videat
Articulus VII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, ipsum comprehendant
Articulus VIII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, omnia in Deo videant
Articulus IX: Utrum ea quae videntur in Deo a videntibus Divinam Essentiam, videantur per aliquas similitudines creatas
Articulus X: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, simul videant omnia quae in ipso vident
Articulus XI: Utrum aliquis in hac vita possit videre Deum per Essentiam
Articulus XII: Utrum per rationem naturalem Deum in hac vita cognoscere possimus
Articulus XIII: Utrum per gratiam habeatur altior cognitio Dei quam ea, quae habetur per rationem naturalem
Quaestio XIII: De nominibus Dei
Articulus I: Utrum aliquod nomen Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter
Articulus III: Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo proprie
Articulus IV: Utrum nomina dicta de Deo sint nomina synonyma
Articulus V: Utrum nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis, univoce dicantur de ipsis
Articulus VI: Utrum nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo
Articulus VII: Utrum nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, dicantur de Deo ex tempore
Articulus VIII: Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen naturae
Articulus IX: Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit incommunicabile
Articulus X: Utrum hoc nomen Deus dictum de Deo per participationem, secundum naturam, et secundum opinionem
Articulus XI: Utrum hoc nomen Qui est sit maxime Dei proprium
Articulus XII: Utrum propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo
Quaestio XIV: De scientia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit scientia
Articulus II: Utrum Deus intelligat se
Articulus III: Utrum Deus comprehendat seipsum
Articulus IV: Utrum ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius substantia
Articulus V: Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se
Articulus VI: Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se propria cognitione
Articulus VII: Utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva
Articulus VIII: Utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum
Articulus IX: Utrum Deus habeat scientiam non entium
Articulus X: Utrum Deus cognoscat mala
Articulus XI: Utrum Deus cognoscat singularia
Articulus XII: Utrum Deus possit cognoscere infinita
Articulus XIII: Utrum scientia Dei sit futurorum contingentium
Articulus XIV: Utrum Deus cognoscat enuntiabilia
Articulus XV: Utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis
Articulus XVI: Utrum Deus habeat de rebus scientiam speculativam
Quaestio XV: De Ideis
Articulus I: Utrum ideae sint
Articulus II: Utrum sint plures ideae
Articulus III: Utrum omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae
Quaestio XVI: De Veritate
Articulus I: Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu
Articulus II: Utrum veritas sit in intellectu componente et dividente
Articulus III: Utrum verum et ens convertantur
Articulus IV: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum
Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit veritas
Articulus VI: Utrum sit una sola veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera
Articulus VII: Utrum veritas creata sit aeterna
Articulus VIII: Utrum veritas sit immutabilis
Quaestio XVII: De Falsitate
Articulus I: Utrum falsitas sit in rebus
Articulus II: Utrum in sensu sit falsitas
Articulus III: Utrum falsitas sit in intellectu
Articulus IV: Utrum verum et falsum sint contraria
Quaestio XVIII: De vita Dei
Articulus I: Utrum omnium naturalium rerum sit vivere
Articulus II: Utrum vita sit quaedam operatio
Articulus III: Utrum Deo conveniat vita
Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sint vita in Deo
Quaestio XIX: De voluntate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit voluntas
Articulus II: Utrum Deus velit alia a se
Articulus III: Utrum quicquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit
Articulus IV: Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum
Articulus V: Utrum voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam
Articulus VI: Utrum voluntas Dei semper impleatur
Articulus VII: Utrum voluntas Dei sit mutabilis
Articulus VIII: Utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis imponat
Articulus IX: Utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum
Articulus X: Utrum Deus habeat liberum arbitrium
Articulus XI: Utrum sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi
Articulus XII: Utrum convenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa
Quaestio XX: De amore Dei
Articulus I: Utrum amor sit in Deo
Articulus II: Utrum Deus omnia amet
Articulus III: Utrum Deus aequaliter diligat omnia
Articulus IV: Utrum Deus semper magis diligat meliora
Quaestio XXI: De iustitia et misericordia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit iustitia
Articulus II: Utrum iustitia Dei sit veritas
Articulus III: Utrum misericordia competat Deo
Articulus IV: Utrum in omnibus operibus Dei sit misericordia et iustitia
Quaestio XXII: De Providentia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum providentia Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum omnia sint subiecta divinae providentiae
Articulus III: Utrum Deus immediate omnibus provideat
Articulus IV: Utrum providentia rebus provisis necessitatem imponat
Quaestio XXIII: De Praedestinatione
Articulus I: Utrum homines praedestinentur a Deo
Articulus II: Utrum praedestinatio aliquid ponat in praedestinato
Articulus III: Utrum Deus aliquem hominem reprobet
Articulus IV: Utrum praedestinati eligantur a Deo
Articulus V: Utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis
Articulus VI: Utrum praedestinatio sit certa
Articulus VII: Utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus
Articulus VIII: Utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus sanctorum
Quaestio XXIV: De Libro vitae
Articulus I: Utrum liber vitae sit idem quod praedestinatio
Articulus II: Utrum liber vitae sit solum respectu vitae gloriae praedestinatorum
Articulus III: Utrum aliquis deleatur de libro vitae
Quaestio XXV: De potentia Dei
Articulus I: Utrum in Deo sit potentia
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.
FIRST conclusion: In God there is no passive power. Second conclusion: In God there is the greatest active power. The reason of both conclusions is: because God is pure act, and most perfect.
COMMENTARY.
ON this matter the Scholastics dispute in 1, d. 42 and 43; and St. Thomas published special questions On Power among the disputed questions. See him, 2 Cont. Gent., ch. 7 and 10.
It must be noted in this article that St. Thomas here does not take power for the power of dominion, but for the virtue and connatural force for the production of effects. Second, it must be noted that just as act is twofold — the one second, which is the operation of a thing, which is most properly called act; the other the first act, which is the form giving being to the thing, and is more properly called form than act — so likewise power is twofold: the one in order to the second act, and this is active power; the other, however, in order to the first act, and this is called passive power. St. Thomas is to be seen, in the first question On Power, art. 1. It must be noted third that it belongs to the account of active power that it be a principle of something, whether of the second act itself, namely of the operation, or of some effect which is produced through the operation. But it belongs to the account of a principle that it be distinguished from that of which it is the principle, which is produced through that power itself: so St. Thomas below, q. 41, art. 4, ad 3. From which it follows first that in God, properly speaking, the intellect and the will are not called powers in order to intellection and volition: since those operations are not really distinguished from the intellect and the will. Second, it follows that in God there properly is active power in order to creatures, which He produces: because they are really distinguished from it. But whether in God there is properly active power in order to the production of the Divine Persons will be examined below, q. 41. The conclusion of St. Thomas must therefore be held as most certain with the same certitude with which we hold that God is pure act, on which matter see above, q. 3. The second conclusion, however, is also most certain, and to be held as a matter of faith. It is clear from Ps. 88: Thou art powerful, O Lord, etc. Finally, the whole Sacred Page is full of testimonies asserting that there is power, indeed omnipotence, in God.
IT IS DOUBTED concerning the reason by which St. Thomas proves the second conclusion, which reason is of this kind: God is most of all a being in act, therefore He most of all has active power. Against this reason it is argued: a stone is a being in act, and yet it does not have any active power; therefore from the fact that something is a being in act it cannot be gathered that it has active power; and so from the fact that God is most of all a being in act it is not permissible to gather that He most of all has active power. The minor is proved: weight, which is in a stone, is a passive power and not an active one, therefore. Second. Dryness, moisture, whiteness, blackness, etc. are qualities in act, and yet they do not have active power, since they are passive qualities, therefore. It is answered that St. Thomas did not base his reason on this alone, that God is most of all in act, but also on this, that God is most perfect. From which it is well gathered that He most of all has active power: for active power follows the perfection of a thing; nor can any thing be called supremely perfect if there be wanting to it that perfection which is to have active power. According to this explanation of St. Thomas the arguments made do not go through. Second, it is answered by admitting that proposition on which the whole reason of St. Thomas seems to rest, namely, that any thing whatsoever, according as it is in act, has active power. To the first it is answered that the weight of a stone, in order to downward motion, has in some way the account of active power, because that motion follows the weight by a certain natural resultancy, which is a certain efficiency, although not a perfect one. Second, it is answered that weight is without qualification an active power, for moving another extrinsic thing. To the second it is said that those qualities also have active power, for whiteness and blackness can emit visible likenesses into the seeing power, while others can produce taste, touch, etc. See other reasons for this conclusion, 2 Contra Gentes, ch. 7. The solution of the second argument is to be noted, in which St. Thomas teaches that, when the act is other than the power, it is more perfect than the power itself: which proposition must be understood with a qualification, for if the act be considered according as it is the effect of the power itself, it is more perfect than the power itself, just as universally every cause is more perfect than its effect. The sentence of St. Thomas is therefore understood if the act be considered according as it is the end and complement of the power. Moreover St. Thomas can be understood not of any particular act whatever; for, since any act easily passes away, while the power is something permanent, and contains within its virtue not only one act but many, the power appears more perfect than any singular act of it. Hence the sentence of St. Thomas is to be understood either of an act which is contingent together with the power, which cannot be separated from it — of which sort is the cognition by which an angel knows itself — or, better, it can be understood that St. Thomas speaks of the operation of the power in common, so that he compares every act possible to some power to that power itself. And in this sense the act and operation of the power is more perfect than the power itself. Note the solution to the third, and the difference which St. Thomas there assigns between created and divine power.
Concerning the reply to the second and third, Cajetan disputes: Whether transient action is in the agent, or rather in the thing acted upon? But since this question is physical, it must be deliberately passed over by us.