Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: In God there is no passive power. Second conclusion: In God there is the greatest active power. The reason of both conclusions is: because God is pure act, and most perfect.

COMMENTARY.

ON this matter the Scholastics dispute in 1, d. 42 and 43; and St. Thomas published special questions On Power among the disputed questions. See him, 2 Cont. Gent., ch. 7 and 10.

It must be noted in this article that St. Thomas here does not take power for the power of dominion, but for the virtue and connatural force for the production of effects. Second, it must be noted that just as act is twofold — the one second, which is the operation of a thing, which is most properly called act; the other the first act, which is the form giving being to the thing, and is more properly called form than act — so likewise power is twofold: the one in order to the second act, and this is active power; the other, however, in order to the first act, and this is called passive power. St. Thomas is to be seen, in the first question On Power, art. 1. It must be noted third that it belongs to the account of active power that it be a principle of something, whether of the second act itself, namely of the operation, or of some effect which is produced through the operation. But it belongs to the account of a principle that it be distinguished from that of which it is the principle, which is produced through that power itself: so St. Thomas below, q. 41, art. 4, ad 3. From which it follows first that in God, properly speaking, the intellect and the will are not called powers in order to intellection and volition: since those operations are not really distinguished from the intellect and the will. Second, it follows that in God there properly is active power in order to creatures, which He produces: because they are really distinguished from it. But whether in God there is properly active power in order to the production of the Divine Persons will be examined below, q. 41. The conclusion of St. Thomas must therefore be held as most certain with the same certitude with which we hold that God is pure act, on which matter see above, q. 3. The second conclusion, however, is also most certain, and to be held as a matter of faith. It is clear from Ps. 88: Thou art powerful, O Lord, etc. Finally, the whole Sacred Page is full of testimonies asserting that there is power, indeed omnipotence, in God.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning the reason by which St. Thomas proves the second conclusion, which reason is of this kind: God is most of all a being in act, therefore He most of all has active power. Against this reason it is argued: a stone is a being in act, and yet it does not have any active power; therefore from the fact that something is a being in act it cannot be gathered that it has active power; and so from the fact that God is most of all a being in act it is not permissible to gather that He most of all has active power. The minor is proved: weight, which is in a stone, is a passive power and not an active one, therefore. Second. Dryness, moisture, whiteness, blackness, etc. are qualities in act, and yet they do not have active power, since they are passive qualities, therefore. It is answered that St. Thomas did not base his reason on this alone, that God is most of all in act, but also on this, that God is most perfect. From which it is well gathered that He most of all has active power: for active power follows the perfection of a thing; nor can any thing be called supremely perfect if there be wanting to it that perfection which is to have active power. According to this explanation of St. Thomas the arguments made do not go through. Second, it is answered by admitting that proposition on which the whole reason of St. Thomas seems to rest, namely, that any thing whatsoever, according as it is in act, has active power. To the first it is answered that the weight of a stone, in order to downward motion, has in some way the account of active power, because that motion follows the weight by a certain natural resultancy, which is a certain efficiency, although not a perfect one. Second, it is answered that weight is without qualification an active power, for moving another extrinsic thing. To the second it is said that those qualities also have active power, for whiteness and blackness can emit visible likenesses into the seeing power, while others can produce taste, touch, etc. See other reasons for this conclusion, 2 Contra Gentes, ch. 7. The solution of the second argument is to be noted, in which St. Thomas teaches that, when the act is other than the power, it is more perfect than the power itself: which proposition must be understood with a qualification, for if the act be considered according as it is the effect of the power itself, it is more perfect than the power itself, just as universally every cause is more perfect than its effect. The sentence of St. Thomas is therefore understood if the act be considered according as it is the end and complement of the power. Moreover St. Thomas can be understood not of any particular act whatever; for, since any act easily passes away, while the power is something permanent, and contains within its virtue not only one act but many, the power appears more perfect than any singular act of it. Hence the sentence of St. Thomas is to be understood either of an act which is contingent together with the power, which cannot be separated from it — of which sort is the cognition by which an angel knows itself — or, better, it can be understood that St. Thomas speaks of the operation of the power in common, so that he compares every act possible to some power to that power itself. And in this sense the act and operation of the power is more perfect than the power itself. Note the solution to the third, and the difference which St. Thomas there assigns between created and divine power.

Concerning the reply to the second and third, Cajetan disputes: Whether transient action is in the agent, or rather in the thing acted upon? But since this question is physical, it must be deliberately passed over by us.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The CONCLUSION is affirmative. The reason is, because the to-be of God is infinite.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE that, although this conclusion is not had expressly in the Sacred Scriptures, it is nevertheless to be held as most certain faith. And it is proved. According to the faith, God is omnipotent, as will be proved in art. 3; but if God does not have infinite power, He is not omnipotent, for a finite power cannot do all things, but some things in a finite way: therefore. Second, according to the faith the power of God is God Himself, for whatever is in God is God, as was said in q. 3; but God is infinite: therefore. It is confirmed: for Christ the Lord is called in Sacred Scripture the Virtue and power of God: but Christ is infinite: therefore the power of God is infinite, and so this truth is reduced to the article in which we confess God to be omnipotent.

IT IS DOUBTED whether this conclusion can be proved by natural reason? Marsilius, in 1 Quaest., 42, ar. 2, says that by no efficacious reason can it be shown that God has infinite power. And he proves it: for if the infinity of the divine power could be gathered by some natural reason, it would be most of all from creation; but from that it cannot be proved: therefore. The minor is clear: since creation is not known by the light of nature: therefore. Second, from the created effects which we know by natural light we can only gather that the divine power is infinite syncategorematically: therefore. The antecedent is proved: for all the effects which God produces are without qualification finite, nor can it be that God produce effects that are without qualification infinite, except only syncategorematically: therefore. It is confirmed: for from the fact that our intellect can know not so many that there are not more, it is not gathered that it has a virtue infinite without qualification, but only syncategorematically: therefore, from the fact that God can produce effects not so many that there are not more, it is only gathered that the power is infinite syncategorematically. To the first it is answered that since creation is the action of the first cause of all nature, it is also knowable by the light of nature; indeed I consider that by natural reason it is demonstrated that the universe could not have proceeded from God otherwise than through creation. Some, even from the school of St. Thomas, think that creation is a supernatural action, and not knowable by the light of nature. For which opinion there can be no other reason than that creation exceeds the powers of any other cause apart from God Himself, and requires an infinite virtue in its cause. But that reason is altogether ineffective: for although creation does not belong to particular causes, yet since it belongs to the first natural cause, namely God, as He is the author of nature, it must of necessity be reckoned natural; and this appears clearly in the creation of the rational soul: for who can say that the creation of the rational soul, which is necessary for the generation of any man whatever, is a supernatural action going outside the whole order of nature? Therefore to the argument I say that from creation it can evidently be gathered by natural light that God has infinite power. To the second it is answered that, from the fact that God can produce infinite perfections formally distinct — infinite, indeed, syncategorematically, that is, not so many that there are not more — in the intention of production, it is evidently gathered that the power of God is infinite without qualification, since for God to have power to produce infinite perfections in this way it is necessary that no perfection be wanting to Him: for if God lacked some perfection, then I could point out some perfection which God could not create nor communicate to creatures, since He did not have it beforehand in Himself: from which it comes about that for producing infinite effects syncategorematically there is required without qualification an infinite virtue. To the confirmation it is answered that our intellect can have infinite intellections syncategorematically from its natural virtue, but those do not differ except numerically and materially: but from a numerical and material multiplication of effects an infinite perfection in the power cannot be gathered; for fire, through the finite heat which it has, can burn infinite combustible things, if they be applied to it; the infinity, therefore, of any power must be weighed from infinite effects formally diverse — infinite at least syncategorematically. But our intellect cannot have infinite intellections, even syncategorematically, which differ formally: therefore. But you will say: Our intellect can know one divine perfection and another, and so on to infinity; but these perfections, in order to our intellect, differ not only materially, but also in account, and consequently the intellections by which it understands these perfections, if they be considered separately, differ formally: therefore it has infinite virtue. It is answered that our intellect, if it be considered only according to the powers connatural to it, cannot know the infinite perfections of God, even syncategorematically, but only the limited perfections which it can gather through created effects. But if it can know the infinite perfections of God, that is through the supernatural light of faith added to its nature. Second, it is answered that from the fact that an effective power can produce infinite effects syncategorematically it is well gathered that it is infinite without qualification: for that it does not produce one effect infinite without qualification, that comes about because it is repugnant on the part of the thing that there be any infinite effect; but from the sole fact that the intellect can know infinite perfections syncategorematically, an infinite perfection without qualification is not gathered from that, unless it know infinite things at once: for since a cognition of this kind is not repugnant in itself, as is clear in God, who has it by comprehending Himself, if the intellect cannot have a cognition of this kind, that comes about from the fact that it is not a power infinite without qualification. But how in the soul of Christ the Lord there is power to cause grace, without limit of intension in the gratification and justification of infinite men, if they existed, and whether this argues an infinite power, is not for the present place to dispute, but belongs to the third part.

The CONCLUSION is affirmative.

COMMENTARY.

THIS conclusion is of faith. It is clear from Exod. 15: Almighty is his name. And Ecclesiasticus 43: He himself is almighty over all his works. The same is had in Job 22, Apocalypse 1, Matth. 19: With God all things are possible. To the Ephesians 1: What is the exceeding greatness of his power, that is, of His omnipotence. Likewise Luke 1: No word shall be impossible with God. Moreover, from the Apostles' and the Nicene creed, where we confess God to be omnipotent. Note that from the teaching of St. Thomas here, gathered from the whole body of the article, it follows that what is called impossible in itself must necessarily involve a contradiction in itself, in such a way that, that being given, two contradictories follow.

Other Theologians, among whom is Soto, 5 Physic., say that for something to be impossible to God it is not necessary that two contradictories follow from it: but it is enough that so many and such great absurdities follow that the intellect cannot grasp them. But for that opinion to be true and not to conflict with St. Thomas here, it must be understood in this way: that when so many absurdities of this kind appear, we ought to judge that, although we do not know how to gather two contradictories, nevertheless in reality they are given on the part of the thing.

For certainly if there is no contradiction of this kind, it is altogether improbable that what is said to be impossible to God is impossible. It is proved from the nature of the divine power, whatever absurdities follow. For if two contradictories do not follow, that thing has the account of a being, and consequently is possible.

Third, it must be noted that when St. Thomas teaches that what involves a contradiction cannot be conceived by the intellect, St. Thomas is not speaking of apprehensive conception, but of judicative: for it is certain that I can conceive two contradictories at once by simple apprehension; but St. Thomas speaks of judicative conception. And so he says that I cannot assent at once to two contradictories. See St. Thomas, Quodlibet 9, artic. 1, ad the last.

The CONCLUSION is negative. The reason is, because that past things have not been involves a contradiction.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE that this conclusion is most acceptable to all, both to the ancient philosophers and to the Theologians, with one exception, Gregory of Rimini, in 1, dist. 42, q. 1, art. 2. The conclusion of St. Thomas is that of St. Augustine, bk. 26 Against Faustus, ch. 5, and of St. Jerome, the Epistle to Eustochium, whose judgment is reported in the Decretum 52, q. 5, ch. Si Paulus. Gregory of Rimini argues against this conclusion, and certain of his arguments try to show that God can not have known and not have willed future contingents which He willed and knew, for instance Antichrist. But on this matter it was said above, q. 14, art. 13, and q. 19, art. 8. Other arguments are taken from this: the power of God has not been diminished; and consequently, if God could bring it about, before Adam existed, that he should not have been, so also, after Adam existed, He could bring it about that he should not have been. But on this we have said enough in the article 18 cited, in the reply to the second.

It is argued, however, against the conclusion, first. If there were no power in God with respect to the past, it would be because the past and the not-past have repugnant conditions; but even the future and the not-future have repugnant conditions, and yet God can bring it about that future things are not future: therefore also that the past not be past. It is answered with St. Thomas, above, q. 10, art. 5, ad 3, by denying the consequence; and the difference is that the past is supposed as posited in the nature of things, and as to the material and as to the formal: for instance, if Adam existed, and it is posited that he existed and in past time, hence from the intrinsic connection of the terms — not absolutely, but because the material subject has already passed away — it is repugnant that the past have not been. But as for the future and the not-future, although they formally convey repugnant conditions, yet because the material element of the future is not posited in the nature of things, it is therefore not repugnant that the future, as to its material element, not come about. Yet it must be conceded that, formally speaking, it involves a contradiction that the future not be future, but materially nothing is repugnant.

Second, it is argued: by the same reasoning it would follow that there is no power in God with respect to this, that what is present not be; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: for there is a similar contradiction, for it follows that the thing be and not be. To this it is answered that it is said with sufficient probability that there is no power as regards the present that it not be. For a thing, while it is, must be; and consequently, while it is, it is impossible that it not be. It is answered second that there is a distinction between the past and the present: that what is in the present by a free and contingent cause is freely and contingently produced, since the free cause then uses its liberty and pours it back into the effect when it produces that act; and so in that instant in which the cause produces the effect, it could fail to produce it; but the past, since it is posited in being, does not depend in any way on the liberty or contingency of the cause. Hence to the argument the sequel is denied. And to the proof I say that there is a repugnance that the thing be and not be, and for this there is no power in God; but there is no implication that the effect which is produced in this instant not be produced in the same instant; for then it is not to be conceded that the effect is and is not, but it is only conceded that it is not.

The CONCLUSION of the article is affirmative.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: God can make other things better both substantially and accidentally than the things made by Him are.

Second conclusion: God can make the things which He makes better accidentally.

Third conclusion: God cannot make the things which He makes better essentially.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE that the heretic Wycliffe held this error, that the divine power is equalled to these effects which He made, so that it could neither make other effects, nor better ones. Petrus Abaylardus followed this error, against which error Thomas Waldensis disputes in the Doctrinal of the ancient faith, from ch. 10 to ch. 19. Note second, that the conclusion of St. Thomas in art. 5, and in the first part of the summary of this article, is of faith; and the conclusion of art. 5 is so certain that the opposite is a manifest heresy. St. Augustine proves it in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 1, where in confirmation of it he brings to bear the testimony of Scripture, Matth. 19: With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible; likewise Matth. 26, which is the passage adduced by St. Thomas in the argument On the contrary of article 5. It is proved by reason: since otherwise it would follow that God is not omnipotent, and that His power is not infinite. The consequent is contrary to the faith: therefore. This argument proves the conclusion of the 3rd article. For if God could not produce more perfect effects, His power would be limited, for there would be given most perfect effects, more perfect than which God could not produce. Moreover, it is absurd to say that God cannot save all men, and that He cannot snatch damned men from the punishments of hell; therefore it must be confessed that God can make other effects besides those made, more perfect even in the order of Grace. The foundation of Wycliffe's error was that he thought that God did not operate freely, but by necessity of nature. And so he gathered that He was determined to produce the effects which He produced. That foundation, however, is heretical. But it must be noted, concerning the solution to the first, that Theologians are accustomed to distinguish in God a twofold power, the one absolute, the other ordinary or ordered: absolute is that according to which God can do whatever does not involve a contradiction. There is a doubt, however, as to what ordinary power is? For St. Thomas in this reply seems to call ordered power that which is in respect only of those things which God knew, willed and ordained: which opinion seems false, for I could in the ordinary way not read, and yet God knew and willed the opposite, therefore. Moreover, according to ordered power any sinner can do penance while he is in this life; and yet God knew the opposite of many sinners, therefore. It is answered to this that that power is called ordinary which is according to the divine order, fixed by some law. And so it must be said that, according to ordinary power, a damned man cannot be saved, because the divine law has established that. But wayfarers, as regards all their works, even in the matter of salvation, are free to opposites, according to ordinary power. And so, although God foreknew the sin of Judas, and determined his damnation, he could nevertheless, according to ordinary power, both not sin and not be damned: because there was no common divine law decreeing the opposite.