Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

IT IS DOUBTED in this article whether the number of the predestined is so certain formally and materially that it can in no way be increased or diminished. For if it can be increased or diminished, it is well gathered that it is not certain or determined.

Argument is made for the negative side. Speaking without qualification, one who is predestined can be condemned, and one who is reprobate can be saved: therefore, speaking without qualification, the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished. The consequence is proved: for if one who is predestined can be damned, it is possible that one who is predestined fall short, and consequently that that number be diminished. Similarly, if one who is reprobate can be saved, he can therefore be added to the number of those to be saved, and consequently of the predestined: therefore that number can be increased.

Second. Speaking without qualification, God can fail to confer grace on those on whom He confers it, and if He does not confer it, they will be damned: therefore, speaking without qualification, these predestined can be condemned, and consequently the number of the predestined can be diminished.

Third. When Peter is justified through contrition, he is freely disposed to grace, and cooperates with God operating: therefore, however much efficacious aid of God he receives, he can fail to consent, indeed even resist God calling and arousing him. Let it be supposed, then, that it is the case that he always resists God calling; then it follows well: therefore Peter will be condemned; therefore it is possible that the number of the predestined be smaller than it is. But if someone replies that all these arguments proceed in the divided sense, and not in the composite, that is, that they do not prove these two to be compossible at once — namely, that someone be predestined and be damned, and that someone be reprobate and be saved — although they prove that this man, of whom we say that he is predestined, absolutely speaking, no supposition being made, can be damned; and similarly that this one, who is reprobate, speaking without qualification, can do penance and be saved: the rejoinder stands against that solution which the Master of the Sentences makes, bk. 1, dist. 40, § 3. Both of these cannot be at once, namely that someone be predestined and be damned; but the one of these cannot not be, namely that this one be predestined; therefore the other is impossible, namely that he be damned. The consequence is clear; the minor is proved: for this one has been predestined from eternity, therefore now he cannot not be predestined; therefore the same account holds of possibility or impossibility in the composite and divided sense, as regards the present question. For we ask whether, speaking without qualification, it is now possible that Antichrist be saved, or that John, predestined, be condemned. The Master says that he would rather be taught the solution of this argument by another than teach it.

Fourth, from the teaching of St. Thomas in this article: the number of the reprobate is not certain nor predefined by God: therefore neither is that of the predestined. The consequence is proved: for every man is either reprobate or predestined: therefore if the number of the reprobate is not certain formally and materially, nor defined by God, it will be able to be increased and diminished, and accordingly the other number, of the predestined, will not be able to be predefined; for whoever is not of the number of the reprobate will pass over to the number of the predestined. The antecedent is proved from the difference which St. Thomas assigns in the article between the number of the predestined and the number of the reprobate: that the former is chosen and certain with God by way of a certain predefinition, but not so with the number of the reprobate. Just as a craftsman does not of himself choose some number of stones for constructing the building which he has principally predefined. On account of this argument, some of the moderns hold that, speaking without qualification, the number of the reprobate is neither foreseen nor predefined by God.

Fifth, argument is made with the argument of Ambrosius Catharinus, who published three little books On Predestination, in which there is nothing of learning, but very much of error. God does not will the death of the sinner and wills all men to be saved, therefore He has predefined no one to reprobate.

Sixth, argument is made with the argument of the same author. For if the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is predetermined by God, many absurdities follow. The first, that the force of preaching, of exhortation, of fraternal correction would be taken away, all of which would indeed be done in vain if it has already been predefined from eternity what is to be. The second absurdity is that God would exhort men in vain by good inspirations and promptings. The third, that if the number of the predestined is certain, it follows that the preaching of this matter would cause a certain despair in the faithful, and human effort in the attainment of eternal life would be undermined: which inconvenience is amplified in the Epistle of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, which is set out in the book On Predestination and Grace.

On account of these two arguments and others like them, Catharinus, in the passage cited, first asserts that it is against the Sacred Scriptures to affirm that only the predestined are saved, and that only the reprobate are condemned. Then he adds that the opinion asserted in this matter by Augustine and by St. Thomas is cruel and savage, and drives men into despair, and that the authority of these doctors is not to be held in such esteem that, oppressed by it, we embrace a manifest lie with closed eyes. Finally he distributes men into three classes. In the first he places the Saints who are confirmed in grace, of the sort the Apostles were, and these he calls predestined; and he thinks that what is said in Scripture about the predestination of the Saints is to be understood of these. In the second he places men who were notable in crimes and sins, such as the Pharisees and Judas; and these he calls reprobate, saying that what is contained in Scripture about the reprobation of man is to be taken and interpreted of them. In the third class, however, he establishes the remaining multitude of the rest of men; and these, with a certain audacious boldness, he affirms to be neither predestined nor reprobate, but that they will be saved or damned according to the capacity of their free will. Wherefore, the number of the predestined or of the reprobate is not certain, as the common opinion of the Theologians asserts.

Let the first conclusion be, for the resolution of this question: It must most certainly be asserted, according to the faith, that the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is certain to God from eternity, and both formally and materially. And so God certainly knows and has predefined from eternity that these persons in this number are to be saved, and that such persons are to be damned eternally. The conclusion is proved from the judgment of all the Saints and scholastic Doctors. For before Catharinus introduced this fabricated opinion, it never occurred to anyone to hold the opposite of our conclusion. And the conclusion is proved. If the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is not certain, it follows that the divine foreknowledge is deceived; the consequent is against the faith, therefore. The sequel is proved. Some will be saved whom God did not foreknow as to be saved, and some will be damned whom God did not foreknow as to be damned; therefore either God does not have foreknowledge of future things, or He is deceived in it.

Second, it follows from that opinion that the will of God is mutable; the consequent is against the faith, as was clear above, q. 19, artic. 7: therefore. The sequel is manifestly proved: those who are to be saved or condemned attain eternal salvation, or the punishment of hell, on account of the will of God; but this will was not in God from eternity, since these are neither predestined nor reprobate: therefore there is a change in the divine will. Third, it follows from the opposite opinion that two contradictories are true, namely, this number is certain, this number is not certain. The negative is asserted by this author. The affirmative is proved: The knowledge of God is neither fallible nor mutable; but this number of those to be saved and damned is certain to God in time, since they are really saved and condemned; therefore it was also certain from eternity, otherwise the knowledge of God would be caused by things, and would not be immutable.

Second conclusion: The number of the reprobate is not as certain as that of the predestined. This conclusion is explained by St. Thomas here: although the number of the reprobate is certain, even materially, infallibly, according to the divine cognition, it is not predefined through itself first, according to the principal predefinition. St. Thomas means to say that God through Himself first wills that there be predestined in so great a number; yet He orders that there be as many reprobate as are necessary for the good of the predestined and for their glory, according to that text of Rom. 9: He endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory. See how the Apostle says that the reprobate are ordered to the predestined; and accordingly the number of the reprobate themselves is not intended through itself first, but for the sake of another, and hence is not predefined by the principal predefinition.

Third conclusion: It is most certain according to the faith that whoever attain eternal life are without qualification predestined. And so it is a manifest heresy that only men of outstanding holiness, and confirmed in grace, are predestined. This conclusion is proved first from that text of Matth. 25: Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For that preparation is nothing other than predestination, according to that text of Rom. 9: upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, that is, predestined. And so the Doctors are accustomed to say that predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God: therefore whoever attain eternal life, since they receive the kingdom prepared for them, are without qualification predestined. Second, I argue thus from that text of Rom. 8: «Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son»; but whoever are saved are made conformed to Christ in justifying grace, and in the attainment of eternal life: therefore they are predestined. Third, it is most effectively proved from that text of Rom. 9: That he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, whom he called not only from among the Jews, but also from among the Gentiles: therefore whoever from the whole multitude of men, whether they be Jews or Gentiles, are called to grace and at length attain glory, are without qualification predestined; and accordingly it is a manifestly heretical fabrication to say that what is said in Scripture about the predestination of the Saints is to be understood precisely of men of outstanding holiness and confirmed in grace. Fourth, St. Paul, Ephes. 1, when at the beginning of the Epistle he had said that God is blessed, that is, to be praised, because He has blessed men with every spiritual blessing in Christ — and by the name of blessing are understood the spiritual benefits of grace and glory — afterwards affirms that the same men, whom Paul calls blessed in the present, are predestined in Christ, and predestined by a certain happy and most great lot: therefore whoever are saved are without qualification predestined. Fifth, St. Paul in this ch. 1 of the Epistle to the Ephesians says further on that God works all things in these blessed ones according to the counsel of his will: but the counsel of the divine will is nothing other than divine predestination: therefore those in whom God works grace and glory are predestined.

But Catharinus says that these testimonies are to be understood of the predestination of the Saints who are of outstanding holiness. Against this there is an irrefragable argument: that the testimonies cited, if they are inspected according to the plain context of the letter, and are not twisted by violence, must be understood of whatever Saints are saved. And it is confirmed, since in these places this understanding is applied by all the Saints and Doctors, with Catharinus alone excepted; and that common consensus in this kind of explanation is a testimony of tradition and of the faith. And in mysteries of this kind, revealed by supernatural testimonies, we must act according to that saying of Augustine, 1st vol., book On the Morals of the Church, ch. 7: Let us hear the oracles, and submit our little reasonings to the divine utterances. And Hilary, bk. 1 On the Trinity: when the discourse has been about divine things, let us concede to God what befits the knowledge of Himself, and let us serve His words with pious veneration: for He is a fit witness to Himself, who is known to Himself through Himself.

Fourth conclusion. It is also certain according to the faith that whoever incur eternal damnation are without qualification reprobate.

It is proved from that text of Matth. 25: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels. This preparation is nothing other than the divine preordination, which is reprobation. Second, it is proved from that text of Romans 9: He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches, etc. But that fitting for destruction, or preparation, is nothing other than preordination to destruction, which is reprobation to condemnation: therefore. Last, the conclusion is proved from that text of Apoc. 20: Death and hell were sent into the pool of fire, which is the second death, and he who was not written in the book of life was sent into the pool of fire. For those who are not written in the book of life are reprobate: therefore those who are really condemned belong without qualification to that reprobation of which Scripture speaks.

TO the arguments. To the first it is answered that that consequence does not hold — one who is predestined can be damned, and one who is reprobate can be saved, therefore the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished — since in the antecedent there is a divided modal, and in the consequent the composite sense is implied. For in this that I say, that one predestined can be damned, I explain that this person can be predestined and can be damned. But in that assertion I do not conjoin or connect the damnation in fact with the predestination as existing; but when I infer, therefore the number of the predestined is diminished, I intimate that to a number already pre-existing, certain and determined, a diminution supervenes. And so a composite sense is involved there: that these cohere at once — that a certain number pre-existed, and that the same was diminished: which cannot happen unless we posit a change in divine providence. There is a similar fallacy in this argument: what is white is possibly black, therefore to a body existing under whiteness blackness can supervene together with the whiteness, which is false.

To the second it is answered that although God can, absolutely and without qualification, fail to give grace to a man: yet these two cannot stand, nor come about — that God in fact not give grace to one predestined in his own time, and that the number of the predestined be diminished — since that one who is predestined be justified and saved has a certain necessity of the consequence.

To the third it is said that however freely Peter acts while he is being disposed to grace, it nevertheless involves a contradiction that, with the same efficacious aid of God standing at once, he not consent to God calling and preparing him. And yet he freely consents: and speaking without qualification, in the divided sense, he can fail to consent to God calling and urging him. But it is impossible that God propose to prepare this man for grace here and now, and that this man is not here and now prepared. Otherwise the purpose of God would be uncertain and powerless and ineffective and dependent on the will of man. But to say that a man is indeed prepared, helped by divine aid, but not from the purpose of God willing and preparing that man himself — that would be a manifest error against the faith, as is clear from what was said in article 3. But if it is so, that the divine purpose effects that preparation, then this copulative proposition must be impossible: God purposed to prepare this man for grace, and this man is not prepared. But if you say: how is the use of free will not destroyed in that preparation for grace, since by necessity of the consequence it follows from that divine purpose that that man be prepared? — it is answered that so far is the use of free will from being destroyed by the divine purpose that rather that man is freely disposed and acts: namely, because God freely willed and purposed to bring it about that a man be freely disposed, that man is freely disposed. To the rejoinder against that solution which proceeds by the composite and divided sense, it is said that that argument could easily be dissolved by distinguishing the minor, namely: the one of these is necessary, therefore it cannot not be, namely that this man be predestined. This minor is true in the composite sense, and false in the divided. And to the proof, when it is said, this man has been predestined from eternity, therefore now he cannot not be predestined — I concede the whole, if the consequent be taken in the composite sense and with the supposition at once made that he be predestined: but, speaking absolutely, there is now and always in God a power to not predestine any man whatever. On which matter see what we said above, q. 19, art. 10, doubt 2.

But because the aforesaid rejoinder gave the Master of the Sentences great difficulty in the place cited, he therefore reports the solution of certain others, which itself also has great difficulty: namely, that just as God could from eternity not predestine this man, so it is conceded by some, says the Master, that even now God can not have predestined this man, and consequently that this man can not have been predestined. And they speak similarly about foreknowledge and about things foreknown, namely that God can now not foreknow what He foreknew from eternity: yet this they by no means concede in the operations or actions of God and of men. For from the moment something has been done or said, now it cannot not have been: indeed it is impossible that what has been done or said not be or not have been. And the reason for this difference is that in actions which are purely of God Himself — as foreknowledge and predestination, etc. — the possibility or impossibility is referred to the power of God, which is always the same and was the same; and therefore in actions of this kind He could do nothing that He cannot do now. But in actions to which God concurs, either together with the creature acting, or terminating an action of God — which action posits something real in the creature itself — the possibility or impossibility is referred to the nature of the thing existing. And this St. Thomas explains in his exposition of the Master's text: because, he says, on the part of the creature actions of this kind are measured by time, and therefore they pass into the past and acquire necessity, and so now it cannot not have been what has been done or said.

But against that solution I argue thus. For as regards the present dispute there seems to be no difference between the actions of God alone and the actions of God which are done through the mediation of a creature, or which are done in a creature: for if we speak in the composite sense or on supposition, it is not less impossible that He be able not to predestine whom He predestined, than that He be able not to have created the world which He created: for each involves a contradiction. But if we speak of both kinds of actions in the divided sense, with no supposition made, each is true: namely both that God can not have predestined this man, and that He can not have created the world. It is answered that the difference lies in this: that propositions which convey an action of God and of the creature in the creature through a verb of the past — such as God created the world, Adam was — convey in their signification something which is measured by past time, or by a past instant, and thus those propositions make a composite sense; whereas propositions which convey a pure action of God, even if they signify it in the manner of the past, nevertheless in reality that action is not measured by any past, but that action is always present and eternal, and measured by eternity. And therefore, just as God freely predestines a man, so He can freely not predestine. And so a proposition of this kind, God has predestined Peter, does not make a composite sense, any more than that one, God predestines Peter. Nevertheless, if someone wishes to conjoin this proposition, God predestines Peter, which is equivalent to that one, God has predestined Peter, with this one, God does not predestine Peter, the conjunction will be incompossible; and consequently the distinction will still have a place in this proposition, God can not predestine Peter, whom He has predestined: for in the composite sense it is false, but in the divided sense true. From which it follows that it is safer and clearer that propositions of this kind be distinguished than that they simply be denied or conceded. And so St. Thomas, in artic. 6, in the reply to the third, said: it is not necessary to say that God can not predestine whom He has predestined, taking it in the composite sense.

To the fourth argument it is answered that on the occasion of the teaching of St. Thomas in this artic. 7, some, not fully considering the words of St. Thomas, say that the number of the reprobate is not predefined by God, although it is foreknown and foreseen. And they use the example of St. Thomas here to prove this. For every agent intends to make something finite in its effect, and so it devises some finite number in the essential parts of that effect, which parts are required through themselves for the perfection of the whole. For it does not choose through itself some number in those things which are not principally required, but only for the sake of another. But in truth, St. Thomas does not deny that the number of the reprobate is predefined by God, just as he does not deny that the number of the drops of rain and of the sand of the sea is predefined by God. And it is proved: for the knowledge of God is practical with respect to all things, according as it has the will conjoined, as He himself teaches above, q. 14, artic. 8: therefore God predefined and purposed from eternity to make as many creatures as He makes in time. And it is confirmed by induction. For God made this ant, therefore He purposed from eternity to make it: for He works all things according to the counsel of his will, and so of each one: therefore God purposed from eternity to make all ants in this number in which they are and will be. The Evangelical teaching confirms this doctrine. For Christ the Lord taught us that even the hairs of our head are numbered, and that not one little sparrow falls to the earth without our Father, that is, without the providence of God the Father. But the teaching of St. Thomas here is manifest to those who consider it: namely, that the election of the predestined is by way of a certain principal definition, as he expressly says; and it is established that this principality of predefinition is not in the divine act itself according to itself. For by a single predefinition He predefined all things that He was going to do. But this is considered principally in the effects of the whole universe, according as certain things pertain through themselves to the perfection of the universe, while certain others, not through themselves but for the sake of another thing which through itself pertains to the perfection of the universe, are predefined. And so St. Thomas gave the example in the individuals of corruptible species, which individuals are ordered to the conservation of the species, which pertain through themselves to the conservation of the universe; and nevertheless he immediately said that individuals of this kind are produced by divine Providence in as many as suffice for the conservation of the species: therefore these corruptible individuals, although not through themselves first, are nevertheless in the second way chosen as means to the end, and are predefined by God.

Therefore according to the judgment of St. Thomas, the predefined number of the predestined is to be understood as by way of principality, insofar as these are ordered to the most powerful supernatural end. But the number of the reprobate is also predefined secondarily, for the sake of that ultimate end: namely, for the greater showing forth of the mercy of God in the predestined.

To the fifth argument of Catharinus it is sufficiently clear from what was said at q. 19, artic. 6, how it is to be understood that God wills all men to be saved, and that He does not will the death of the sinner. For these are verified of the antecedent will: for God does not will to punish the sinner before the sin foreknown. And similarly, according to the judgment of St. Thomas, that God wills to reprobate certain ones includes the will of permitting sin: but this will does not conflict with the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved. And the reason is that the will of permitting sin is considered before the foreknowledge of the sin, just as also the antecedent will itself by which God wills all men to be saved.

To the sixth it is answered that it is the greatest ignorance to infer those absurdities from the fact that the number of the predestined and of those to be saved is predefined by God. Therefore to the first absurdity Augustine replies, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, from ch. 14 to ch. 20. And Catharinus could have been convinced by the example which Augustine brings: that Christ the Lord exhorted the Apostles to do good, and to prepare themselves for temptation, and to love one another: and yet Christ knew that they were predestined; indeed He had already said to them, Luke 10: But rejoice that your names are written in heaven. See the argument ad hominem: those disciples were in the first class, namely of the predestined, and yet Christ preached to them: therefore the certitude of predestination does not destroy the force of preaching. It must therefore be said to the first absurdity that these means of exhortation and preaching and prayer, and the works of any virtue whatever, are so applied by men that they are nevertheless effects of the divine predefinition: for God provides that these very things be done for the end of the predestination of certain ones; and also with respect to others they are sometimes done for the greater showing forth of the divine justice, in that those men, on account of their malice, turn these very things into wrath, God permitting it; and this is what the Apostle says, 2 Corinth. 2: We are the good odour of Christ to God, to some indeed the odour of death unto death, but to others the odour of life unto life. And similarly Actorum 15, as the Apostle preaches, it is said: They believed, as many as were foreordained to eternal life. See, that preaching was a means and an effect of their predestination, and a means unto salvation.

To the second absurdity it is said that it is astonishing how great is the ignorance of this author in this matter, that he does not see that the same absurdity would follow if only the divine foreknowledge of future things were posited, which no one, unless he be openly a heretic, will dare to deny. And what we say is proved: for we shall make an argument altogether similar about foreknowledge to the one he makes about predestination: namely, if God most certainly foreknew for whom His inspirations will be profitable and for whom not, He would seem to exhort in vain those whom He foreknew would resist God calling. Hence to arguments of this kind it must be said that nevertheless God works in these men wisely, justly and mercifully. For in some, the divine mercy, on account of their hardness, is turned into wrath, God permitting it, so that His justice may afterwards be shown; in others, however, it comes about from a more abundant mercy that they will to make good use of the divine inspirations.

To the third absurdity it is answered from St. Augustine, in the place cited, ch. 20 and following, where he says two things: the first is that this truth about predestination and its certitude is not to be preached in bare words to the rude populace, lest perhaps the populace, incapable of so great a doctrine, despair. Nevertheless sometimes it will be necessary, when necessity presses — for instance, to cut away some heresy which is already held by the common people — to teach the people the truth of this doctrine in open words. But if the people, having heard this doctrine, feel a difficulty in believing how the free use of will remains, if it has already been predestined what we are going to do, it must be said to them that they should believe, just as they believe that God is Three and One, because this is the doctrine of the Church. Second, he says that it is rather to be preached to the people that all good things are from God, that without His grace we can do nothing unto eternal life, that it is good, and that one must always pray and not faint, and ask of God abundance in grace and perseverance in good; and that those who do these things can have confidence that they are of the number of the predestined, and nevertheless always persist in good works. Therefore, to that third absurdity of Catharinus it must be said that the truth of predestination does not lead prudent and humble men into despair, but rather into greater humility. Nor is it a cause or occasion of sloth, but rather of solicitude, according to that text of 2 Pet. 1: Give diligence that by good works you may make your calling and election certain, that is, that by the testimony of a good conscience, which arises from good works, you may have confidence that you are elect. It must be noted, however, that no one, as long as he lives in this mortality, can have that certitude absolutely, unless he be made certain by a special revelation, as has been defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 12.