Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative and certain according to faith, as is clear from Mal. 1: «I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated». But the reason of the conclusion not only proves it, but also shows what reprobation is, and what are the effects of reprobation per se. And so the reason of the conclusion is: because it pertains to providence to permit some defect in things which are subject to providence, as was said above, q. 22, a. 2: therefore, since by divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it pertains to the same providence that it permit some to fail from this end; and this, he says, is to reprobate.

Second conclusion: Reprobation does not name foreknowledge only, but adds something according to account. The reason is: because reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fall away from this end, just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation.

Third conclusion: Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. This he proves in no other way than by comparison with predestination, which includes the will of conferring grace and glory.

Fourth conclusion, to the second: Reprobation stands otherwise in causing than predestination; for predestination is the cause of future glory and of present grace, but reprobation is not the cause of present guilt, but is the cause of abandonment by God and of that which is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. This he proves, because guilt comes from the free choice of him who is reprobated and is deserted by grace. Likewise he confirms it from that of Hos. 13: «Thy destruction, Israel, is from thee; only in me is thy help».

Fifth conclusion, to the third: When it is said that the reprobate cannot obtain the grace of God, it is not to be understood according to absolute impossibility, but according to conditional impossibility. The reason is: because the reprobation of God does not take away anything from the power of the reprobate, nor does it take away the freedom of free choice.

COMMENTARY.

ON the first conclusion there is no doubt among Catholics, but it is certain according to faith, according to which we confess that very many are to be condemned forever on account of their sins. We confess also that God knew from eternity what would come to be concerning such as are not predestined, and willed to permit them to fail from the end of eternal life; and this is what we say, that God reprobates some men, whether that reprobation itself be an act of the intellect or of the will; whether it be explained by a positive act of divine providence or will with respect to all the effects of reprobation, or be explained by a negation of divine providence or will with respect to the permission of sin: for all these points are disputed among theologians. In this sense, therefore, thus defined, there are very many testimonies of Scripture in which mention is made of the predestined and the reprobate, although not often under this name of reprobation, or of the reprobated or reprobate: this manner of speaking, however, has its foundation in Scripture: for example, 1 Cor. 9: «I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway»; and 2 Cor. 13: «Do you not know yourselves, that Christ Jesus is in you? unless perhaps you are reprobates. But I hope that you shall know that we are not reprobates». Such reprobates are also called vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, Rom. 9; they are also called vessels unto dishonour, 2 Tim. 2. They are also said not to be known with the cognition of approbation, just as the predestined are said to be known to God: The Lord knows who are his; but others he is said not to know, Mt. 7: «I know you not, and then I will profess to them, that I never knew you».

IT IS DOUBTED first, concerning the very name of reprobation: whether it signifies an act of the divine intellect, or of the will, concerning those who are to be condemned?

And I prove first, that it is not an act of the intellect, nor of the will of God. For if it were of the intellect, it would regard the false as the object of reprobation: for thus doctors are said to reprobate some opinion. But if it is an act of the will, it would regard the evil as the object which is reprobated: but neither of these can be verified of the reprobation of which we speak: therefore. The minor is proved: because, as St. Thomas says in the article, reprobation includes the will of permitting some to fail from the end of eternal life; but that permission is neither false nor evil: therefore reprobation in God cannot be called or be such an act of intellect or of will. It is confirmed: because to reprobate properly seems to be either to reject or to refute something which is presupposed to be false or evil, according to that of Heb. 6: «The earth that bringeth forth thorns and briers is accursed and reprobate, whose end is to be burned». But the Apostle understands by the name of earth the sinners who abuse the goodness of God. But the reprobation of which we speak does not presuppose the future sin; indeed the first effect of reprobation is the permission of sin; but permission is prior to sin: therefore reprobation does not regard sin immediately, therefore the will of God or the judgment of permitting some to fall into guilt is improperly called reprobation. Second. Granted that predestination is an act of the intellect, inasmuch as it is the account of the order of the means and of the attainment of eternal beatitude, nevertheless reprobation cannot be an account in God pre-existing of the deordination and defect from such an end; therefore it is not an act of the intellect. The minor is proved: because deordination from the end is sin; but in God there is no practical account of sin; therefore reprobation is not an act of the intellect. For the solution of this difficulty it must be noted that if we follow the etymology of the name, reprobation is not properly said except with respect to an evil or false object, just as approbation is said with respect to the good or the true; but nevertheless the name has been transferred by theologians to signify the act of divine providence or will concerning those men who on account of their sins are to be condemned and reprobated. And because concerning such as are to be condemned there is not only divine foreknowledge, but also providence and the will of permitting their sin, such an act takes its name not from the permission, which is good and ordered to a good end, but from the last effect of this providence and will, which is damnation on account of guilt, on account of which they are properly held in hatred and are worthy of reprobation. Whence they are even sometimes called foreknown, inasmuch as God foreknew their sins, on account of which they were to be condemned, with respect to which sins foreknowledge and not providence is said to be in God. We therefore, like the Scholastic theologians, use the name reprobation to signify that divine act whose first effect is the permission of falling into sin even unto death, whether that act be of the intellect or of the will.

Nevertheless, to speak consequentially, we set down a single conclusion: Reprobation signifies an act of the intellect formally, but presupposes an act of the will. It is proved: because reprobation stands to the reprobate as predestination stands to the predestined: but predestination is an account pre-existing in God of the order to the end: therefore reprobation is the account of the order of the reprobate to the end intended by God, namely that he show forth vindictive justice, for which end the permission of sin is necessary, and is ordered by God and willed to such an end. Whence reprobation is called by St. Thomas a part of providence, just as predestination. But that it presupposes an act of the will according to our mode of understanding, as predestination also does, is manifest. For the will of the end is prior to the account of the means to the end. It must be noted also here that when predestination or reprobation is called a part of providence, no act distinct from divine providence is understood; nor is it understood that it is a subjective or integral part with respect to divine providence; but the account of part is to be considered on the part of the things provided, in that some are predestined by divine providence, while others are reprobated by the same act of divine providence.

To the first argument we have already said that reprobation, as it is employed by theologians, does not regard immediately the false or the evil, but the permission of guilt, against which punishment is ordered for the showing forth of divine justice. With this, nevertheless, it stands that the name reprobation was imposed by the Scholastic theologians, especially the Thomists, having regard to the evil of guilt, which follows from the divine permission by necessity of the consequent, not as from a cause. To the confirmation, it is clear from these things.

To the second it is answered that reprobation is not so contrary to predestination as to be the account of deordination from the end of beatitude: but it is the account of the order in the divine mind with respect to the means which are ordered by God to this end, namely that he show forth vindictive justice in the punishment of sins. And again: the showing forth of justice of this kind is ordered to the greater showing forth of mercy in the predestined, which is Catholic doctrine and is confirmed from the Sacred Letters, as is clear from Rom. 9: But if God, willing to show... etc. And it is confirmed from Ps. 149: That they may execute upon them the judgment that is written; this glory is to all his saints. Likewise 1 Cor. 3: For all things are yours, whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come: for all are yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's. Where the Apostle briefly described the whole order of divine providence concerning the whole universe, both in the to-be of nature and in the to-be of grace. In which let the theologian learn to assert unity in divine providence on the part of the one order provided with respect to the supernatural end. For the natural end, which is called ultimate, is not ultimate simply, but in a certain respect with respect to divine providence, through which it is still ordered to the supernatural end, so certainly that although God is known by us first as the author of nature than of grace, since grace presupposes nature, by way of generation: yet in the genus of final cause God must be understood by the theologian first as the author of grace than as the author of nature: because he willed to create the world for this, that he might raise it up and dignify it through this, that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us: and this too, before the sin of Adam, in the formation of the woman from the rib of the sleeping man, God prefigured. For according to the common understanding of the Fathers that divine operation signified that from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Church was to be built. And the Apostle teaches this very thing in Eph. 5, explaining the words of the first parent: This now is bone of my bones etc., this is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church, that that figure was fulfilled.

From what has been said we can gather that the reason of St. Thomas's first conclusion, although it is not that demonstration showing that it necessarily pertains to divine providence that sin be permitted, nevertheless proves more than that such a permission of sin could have pertained to divine providence. But to us that reason seems to conclude that it most befitted divine providence to permit sin to this end, that the omnipotence, wisdom, justice, and mercy of God might the more appear in its effects, God who is so good and powerful that even from the permission of sin, which by its nature is a deordination from the divine goodness, he has nevertheless effected much greater goods than if there had been no sin.

IT IS DOUBTED second, concerning the second and third conclusion of the article.

Whether divine reprobation is some positive act of the divine intellect or of the divine will with respect to the reprobate, insofar as they are reprobate? For the negative side it is argued first from this, that St. Thomas to the first says, "insofar, therefore, as he does not will this good for certain ones, which is eternal life, God is said to hold them in hatred, or to reprobate them": therefore reprobation does not name a positive act of the divine will. It is confirmed from that of Mt. 18: It is not the will before your Father that one of these little ones should perish, who believe in me: therefore in God there is no will concerning the damnation of the faithful, of whom many are reprobate.

Secondly. It is not lawful to attribute to God anything that savors of cruelty: but to have a positive will from eternity concerning some men, willing on purpose to exclude them from his Kingdom, permitting them to sin, and to punish them for their sins, seems to be a matter of cruelty, and not of divine benignity: therefore such an act is not to be posited in God.

Thirdly. For for those things which are to be asserted and explained concerning the faith regarding the difference between the good and the evil, it suffices that with respect to the damned we say that God stood from eternity merely negatively, not willing to bring help to certain ones that they might not sin, although, the foreknowledge of future sin being supposed, he willed to punish them forever; therefore it is not necessary to assert that God on purpose willed to exclude certain ones from eternal life, and willed to permit them to sin, in order to punish them forever.

For the solution of this difficulty it must be noted that the sense of this question is no other than if we ask how divine providence with respect to the reprobate may be more fittingly explained by us, since it is in itself pure act, nor does it stand in itself otherwise according to the thing with respect to the variety of all things, even of the predestined and the reprobate. From which it follows that that mode of explaining the divine will will be more fitting which will be more befitting to divine providence and the other divine attributes.

Let this be the first conclusion, certain according to faith: God, with respect to the guilt which was to be in the reprobate, did not have an affirmative act of the will, by which he willed sins to be, or them to sin. This is proved in no other way than because the divine will is not the cause of sin: which is certain according to the Catholic faith, nor is it for the present place to confirm this truth by many reasons or testimonies. Since, therefore, whatever the divine will wills outside itself must needs effect: it is plain that it cannot will sin, which cannot be the efficient cause of sin.

Second conclusion: The act of the divine will concerning the permission of the sin of the reprobate and concerning the subtraction of efficacious help, which being posited they would not sin, or if they sinned would do penance, must be explained affirmatively, and not only negatively. And so God had this act from eternity, I will to permit these sins, I will not to give certain ones the helps which, if they received them, they would not sin. This conclusion is proved first, because the permission of sin is good and is ordered to a good end: therefore the divine will wills to permit sin. It is confirmed, because God on purpose wills to confer supernatural helps on certain men, by which helps they will efficaciously attain the ultimate end: therefore if he denies such helps to certain ones, he on purpose wills not to give them. The consequence is proved: since from such a denial of help a greater good follows, namely that the divine mercy may shine forth the more in the predestined. Secondly it is proved, because if the divine will concerning the permission of sin were explained purely negatively, the difference between the predestined and the reprobate would not pertain to divine providence; as regards this, that God willed the predestined to remain in good, but permitted others to fall into sin, and to remain in it. The sequel is proved: because God, not knowing and prudent, would have willed such a distinction, but would have accepted the predestined for himself: and concerning the others he would not have applied any care, but would have stood toward them just as toward those whom he was never to create, as regards that which pertains to obtaining or not obtaining eternal life. It is proved thirdly, because unless we posit the permission of sin to be provided by God, as it is willed, it would follow, as we argued above in q. 22, a. 2, that sin would be by chance with respect to divine foreknowledge. The sequel is proved: because again it would follow that divine foreknowledge with respect to future sin would not be measured by something intrinsic in God himself, but rather its truth would be measured by the future contingent. Again the sequel is proved: because God would not foreknow a sin infallibly future, except only in a contingent cause, such as is the free choice of creatures.

Nor is it of any avail to answer that God knows sin by knowing his own goodness, in which he knows not only all possible things ordainable to himself, but also all the possible modes by which the free choice of creatures can be deordinated from the ultimate end; I say this solution does not suffice, because in that way God would not know future sins otherwise than as possible, nor would he distinguish between future sins and possible ones. Whence neither could he be a just judge, rendering to each according to his works.

But some answer that God foreknows future sins by intuitive cognition, and distinguishes them from possible things, because future sins coexist with the eternity of God. But this solution rather runs counter to the opinion of those who deny that the divine will and providence are the cause of the permission of sin. For we confess that it is indeed true that God knows sins future, past, and present, insofar as they coexist with eternity; but from this is taken a most strong argument for confirming our conclusion: for if future sins are known by God by intuitive cognition insofar as they coexist with eternity: therefore the eternal knower, as God, is the cause of the entity of the act of sin, although he is not the cause of the sin. The consequence is proved: because sin is knowable insofar as it is a being: therefore God knows, by intuitive cognition, sin insofar as the will of God is the cause of the entity of the act of sin, and at the same time permitting that the free choice failing from the rule concur to the same act; and so the infallibility of divine providence is not measured by anything extrinsic, but it is from providence and the will of permitting sin that God foreknows, by intuitive cognition, the future sin. It is confirmed, because the intuitive cognition of God, with respect to sin, regards the coexistence of sin with the eternity of God, which belongs to the evil of guilt insofar as it is in the good and in being, of which God is the cause: therefore the intuitive cognition of God regards that per se of which God is the cause; and thus it knows sin. Moreover, the doctrine of the second conclusion is expressly that of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 100, where, explaining that of Ps. 100, The works of the Lord are great, sought out according to all his wills, etc., he says that in a wondrous and infallible manner that does not come about apart from his will which even comes about against his will: because it would not come about if he did not allow it, nor does he allow it being unwilling, but willing; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done unless he were omnipotent, and could make good out of evil. Behold, where Augustine expressly says that God wills to permit evil to be done: and this from providence, on account of a greater good. And immediately, in the following chapter, he adds the difference between the will of God and of man with respect to the same material object. For sometimes the good will of a man wills something which God does not will, for example, if a good son wills that his father live, whom God with a good will wills to die. And again it can happen that a man wills with an evil will what God wills with a good will, as if a wicked son wills that his father die, and God also wills this. So much (he says) does it matter what it befits man to will, what it befits God, and to what end each one refers his will, so that it is either approved or disapproved.

From this doctrine it can be understood how, not only with respect to the same material object and one extrinsic to the will itself, but also with respect to the same interior act of the will, as regards its entity, the will of a man can be evil, and the will of God good, as the efficient cause of that act; for example, God is the willing and efficient cause of the act of hating God, and the human will is the voluntary and efficient cause of the same act. But the will of a man is evil, because it exercises such an act without the rule of reason, indeed against the rule and law of God: but God with a good will elicits that act, permitting the defect of the second cause in it, so that from this he may make some greater good, namely that he show forth his goodness by punishing justly, and the more by showing mercy with respect to others, or even with respect to the same one, if he has been predestined.

Furthermore the second conclusion is proved: because it falls under divine providence that this man abstain from sin: therefore it falls under the same that another be permitted to fall and to sin. The consequence is proved: because otherwise that detestable act of sin would not be discerned by divine providence from the other, but rather such a discernment would be by chance with respect to divine providence: therefore it falls under the same providence that another be permitted to sin. It is confirmed: because otherwise there would not be providence concerning the motion of free choice, but only concerning the conferring of free choice: according to which God established man in the hand of his counsel, as is said in Eccles. 15, as the fourth argument of St. Thomas intended, above, q. 22, a. 2; to which it seemed to St. Thomas that it must necessarily be said that by the conferring of free choice man is discerned from natural things, which are only acted upon, as it were directed by another to the end. Nevertheless, the act of free choice is reduced to God as to a cause, whence it is necessary that it be subjected to divine providence: therefore under divine providence falls every operation of free choice, even of sin: directly indeed, insofar as it is an operation; permissively however, insofar as it fails from the rule of reason. And so that of Prov. 16 is verified: The Lord has made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day; namely, in that he created some man whom he willed to permit to be wicked, that on the day of judgment he might show forth his justice in his just condemnation. Moreover it is proved by testimonies of Scripture. When the Lord said to Moses: I will still harden the heart of Pharaoh; what more did he will to signify than this: I have given Pharaoh free choice by which he can be hardened, if he wills, and I know that he will will it. Nay rather he signified, according to the common understanding of the Fathers, that by a just judgment he willed to withdraw gratuitous help, which withdrawn, the voluntary hardening of Pharaoh would infallibly follow. For neither does this necessity of the consequence destroy the freedom of free choice, necessary for sin, as St. Thomas excellently teaches in the solution to the third. Likewise it is proved from that of Rom. 1: Wherefore God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, etc., where according to the common understanding it is signified that God on account of the sin of idolatry permitted those men to commit the worst sins, overturning the whole order of nature: therefore that permission, which is a punishment of sin, was willed and chosen by God. To this view St. Augustine gives support, for in book 5 against Julian — which passage M. Cano both cites and eruditely explains, book 2 of De Locis, ch. 4, to 7 — he says that the permission of falling into guilt pertains not only to the will of God, but to his omnipotence; from which I thus infer: therefore even that permission which is not the punishment of another sin pertains to a positive act of the divine will. The consequence is proved: because the account is altogether the same concerning both permissions; for just as the one pertains to vindictive justice, so the other also looks to the universal providence which God has concerning the whole rational nature with respect to the supernatural end; nor do greater inconveniences follow from one permission than from the other. But the conclusion is proved by a theological reason. The permission of which the present discourse is, is nothing other than the privation of efficacious help, which being posited, every evil of guilt would be impeded: but the cause of such a privation of efficacious help is divine providence: therefore also of the permission of sin. The minor is proved: God decreed from eternity not to give that help to certain ones; otherwise how would he foreknow that it was not to be conferred, unless by his will he had willed not to give it? And it is confirmed first: God chose certain ones before others to whom he would confer these efficacious helps: therefore by his will and providence he discerned those to whom he confers these helps from those to whom he does not confer them: therefore divine providence is the cause of this effect of discernment, because the effect is nothing other than to leave on purpose certain ones destitute of efficacious help, but to help others efficaciously to the attainment of eternal life.

It is confirmed secondly: Predestination in Scripture is very often called election, according to that of Eph. 1: As he chose us in Christ, before the foundation of the world; but election, if we speak properly, is a certain collative operation of the will, through which, certain means being despised, other means are accepted for the end: therefore in divine predestination all this is found, that God by his will chose certain men for the efficacious attainment of eternal life, but despised and spurned certain others. But this contempt is nothing other than the will of permitting them to fail from the ultimate end. And this contempt the Scriptures insinuate to us, when they call reprobation hatred, Mal. 1 and Rom. 9: I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated. Finally, the conclusion is proved: for from the opposite opinion it follows that God stands toward the reprobate by order to eternal life no otherwise than he stands toward a brute animal and a stone; the consequent detracts very greatly from the divine providence which God has concerning the rational nature with respect to the supernatural end. The sequel is proved: toward a stone and a brute animal God stands merely negatively, concerning the attainment of the ultimate supernatural end; but according to the opposite opinion he also stands merely negatively toward reprobate men: therefore he stands in the same way.

Third conclusion: With respect to the damnation and punishment of the reprobate, a positive act is found in the divine will, by which God wills to punish the reprobate forever on account of their sins foreseen by God himself. It is proved: the punishment and condemnation of the reprobate, on account of their offenses, is an effect of vindictive justice; but God is a just and most upright judge: therefore he wills to inflict this punishment on the reprobate. It is confirmed first from that of Rom. 9: But if God, willing to show his wrath, etc., that is, his vindictive justice, as all the Doctors interpret. It is confirmed secondly: The punishment and condemnation of the reprobate is good and just: therefore it is the object of a positive act of the divine will.

TO the arguments. To the first it is answered that St. Thomas sufficiently explains himself in the body of the article, saying that reprobation intrinsically encloses the will of permitting the reprobate to fall into guilt and to fail from the end. But from the fact that in the solution to the first he explains this permission by a negation, it is not lawful to infer that it is not also verified affirmatively, in such a way that God willed to permit that the reprobate sin and fail from eternal life. For although it follows well, Peter wills not to give alms: therefore he does not will to give alms, yet conversely it does not follow.

Therefore St. Thomas in the body of the article explained the permission by a positive act; but in the solution to the third, by a negation, which followed from the affirmation. To the confirmation it is said that in those words of Mt. 18: It is not the will before your Father, etc., there can be a twofold interpretation. One, that "to perish" be understood of the spiritual death of sin; and thus it is most certain that God does not positively will anyone to perish, that is, to sin. The other is, that "to perish" be understood of the death of eternal damnation in hell: and in this understanding those words of Mt. have still a twofold sense. The first is that it be understood of the antecedent will, as that of 2 Pet. 3 is understood: The Lord does not delay his promise, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that some should perish, but that all should be converted to penance. For by an antecedent will God wills all men to be saved, as Paul testifies, 1 Tim. 2. The second sense is that it be understood of the will which regards immediately the punishment and damnation of the reprobate and their exclusion from eternal life, no guilt being presupposed; and this will is not found in God, as will be explained in a. 5. To the second it is answered that the will of which we have just spoken, which, no guilt being foreseen, immediately wills the damnation of the reprobate, savors somewhat of cruelty, and therefore is not posited by us in God. But the will of permitting that some men fail from the rectitude of justice, and consequently from eternal life, savors of no cruelty, but rather looks to the sweet disposition and governance of the universe, according to which it is highly consonant that a nature which is of itself defectible be permitted to fail in certain individuals: indeed from this is taken a most efficacious reason for the second conclusion set down above, in this manner: Everything which by its nature is ordainable to a good end, if it in fact exists in the nature of things, is ordained and willed by God; but the permission that some fall and fail from the end is ordainable to the good and sweet governance of the universe, and is also ordainable to the manifestation of the vindictive justice of God: therefore since this permission in fact occurs, it is willed and ordained by God to such an end. To the third it is answered that for explaining the things which are of faith, and for the perfection of the universal divine providence, it would not have sufficed to assert that, concerning the difference between good and evil men, and concerning the permission that some fail from the end, God stood merely negatively, as is clear from what has been said about the second conclusion.

But some theologians still contend to prove that permission is not an effect of divine providence, and they prove it from this, that permission is not something positive, but a mere negation, namely the subtraction of efficacious help: therefore it is not an effect of divine providence. But it is answered, and I say first, that permission is not a pure negation, but rather a privation, and so it is presupposed in the subject which is permitted to fail from the end that it have an aptitude for that end, which the whole human nature has, even in the reprobate. From which it follows that they would say most improperly that God permits a stone not to attain eternal life, because in a stone there is no aptitude for eternal life. I say the second and I answer the argument, that we do not assert permission to be so much an effect of divine providence that it is something produced by divine providence; but we speak morally, and we say that permission is an object willed by the divine will and ordered to the good of the universe and to the manifestation of divine justice; just as blindness, and any other defect of nature, is an object of natural providence and an effect of it. Other theologians admit permission in the divine will; but they say that that permission is nothing other than that God has left man in the hand of his counsel, and has set before him life and death, that he himself might choose good and evil at his own judgment. From which they infer that God equally permits all to commit any sin whatever; but that some do not commit any sin whatever proceeds from their free will. But this doctrine of these theologians has a very great equivocation; for it can be understood first in this sense, that God permits some moral defect in men in two ways: in one way by giving them liberty toward either part, that they may choose good or evil at their own judgment: such that he permits some in fact to fail and to use their liberty for evil; but holds certain others in his hand and does not permit them in fact to use their liberty for evil. This sense is without doubt most true as to the thing, yet it is defective in two respects. First as regards the liberty which man has toward good and evil, and toward either part of the permission by which God permits man to fail in any sin: for most improperly, and against every manner of speaking of the theologians and the saints, indeed of all the faithful, this liberty is called a permission to evil. For all the just faithful assiduously beseech God that he not permit them to fail: for this is the sense of that which we ask in the Lord's Prayer, and lead us not into temptation, that is, do not permit us to succumb to temptations; but the faithful do not ask of God that he not give them liberty to be able to fail, but that he not permit them in fact to use their liberty wickedly: therefore liberty to evil, according to the sense of the faithful, is not a permission of sinning. It is confirmed: No one of the faithful would willingly listen to him who said that God permitted John the Baptist to be a murderer, and — what is absurd — permitted the Blessed Virgin to be an adulteress: which manner of speaking nevertheless most manifestly follows from that opinion, because John the Baptist and the B. Virgin had a liberty, from the nature of the thing, flexible to any sin whatever: therefore the permission of falling into sin is to be taken only in the second way set forth by us. Secondly that opinion is defective in this, that it does not explain whether the permission, taken in the second way, which alone, as I said, is properly a permission, is a positive act in God, or a pure negation.

The second sense of that doctrine is, that God confers on all men, both predestined and reprobate, a sufficient help by which they can do well in every event, if they will: but does not determine or apply their wills to the good or evil use, but the actual operation depends solely on the liberty of choice, of one willing to determine himself to a good or to an evil operation. That doctrine, taken in this sense, pleases certain learned theologians, among whom is Ruardus Tapper, in a. 7, On Free Choice, conclusions 9 and 10. Capreolus, in 2 Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, to 12, reports the opinion of Gregory of Rimini, who in part agrees with this doctrine, and Capreolus follows Gregory. But below, by us in this question, it will be shown most clearly how false this opinion is and how little consonant with Catholic truth. For now we argue briefly against this doctrine. For from it there follows manifestly that God does not have providence of the actual use of free choice: which is contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas and St. Augustine in the places cited above, indeed also to manifest truth; therefore. The sequel is proved: since the whole providence of God is terminated at this, that he confer on free choice a sufficient help by which it can do well if it will; but that it do well or ill would pertain wholly to free choice itself, because God would not determine it to do well or ill. Secondly it is argued: If God stands thus toward the operations of actual free choice as that opinion thinks, it follows that from the fact that God permits some man to sin, it does not follow infallibly that that man in fact sins; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: for, according to that opinion, God equally permits that all men, whether predestined or reprobate, sin, and yet not all in fact sin mortally:

therefore sin does not infallibly follow the divine permission. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for from the Scriptures it is most openly clear that by the very fact that God permits someone to sin, withdrawing from him efficacious help, it immediately follows that he sins. Ps. 80: He let them go according to the desires of their heart: they shall walk in their own inventions, that is, in their sins. Isa. 57: I struck him, and I turned away my face, and he went wandering in the ways of his heart; and Eccles. 7: Consider the works of God, that no man can correct him whom he himself has despised, that is, whom he has permitted to work according to his own desires. But someone will say that in these testimonies the discourse is only about the permission of falling into sin as a punishment of a preceding sin, not about the permission of falling into the first sin, which is not a punishment of another. Against this it is argued thus. That permission of sinning which is the punishment of a preceding sin does not bring a greater necessity to sinning than the other permission which is not a punishment. For although we say that the permission which is a punishment is a positive act of the divine will, as it truly is, because it is an act of vindictive justice, while the other permission, which is not a punishment, is a pure negation; nevertheless from this it is not lawful to infer that the first permission brings another greater necessity to sinning than the second: because if we said so, it would consequently have to be said that such a permission is repugnant to God, against the testimonies cited above. For God can bring no necessity to sinning. I gather, therefore, from what has been said that we must speak in the same way about both permissions.

But some theologians insist: If permission is a positive act of the divine will, it follows that God is the cause of sin, at least indirectly; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved. This consequence is good, God permits Peter to sin, therefore he will sin infallibly. But that which is the cause of the antecedent in a good consequence is the cause of the consequent: therefore if God by a positive act is the cause of the permission of sin in Peter, he will also be the cause of his sin. And it is confirmed: God by a positive act withdraws from Peter efficacious help, which standing, his sin would be impeded: therefore he is an indirect cause of sin. The consequence is proved, for he who removes a hindrance is an indirect cause of the effect that follows: for example, he who takes away the column by which a stone is held up is an indirect cause of the descent of the stone, which follows upon the removal of the column. To these arguments I say first, that they proceed equally concerning both permissions: namely concerning that which is the punishment of sin, and concerning that which does not have the account of punishment. Whence, just as they do not convince concerning the prior permission, so neither concerning the latter. Then, to the argument an answer is given in form; I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that that rule, "whatever is the cause of the antecedent, etc.", is not true everywhere. For this consequence is good: I see Peter writing; therefore Peter writes; and yet although I am the cause of the antecedent, I am nevertheless not the cause of the consequent: for Peter does not depend on me in the act of writing. That rule therefore has place only when the antecedent is the cause of the consequent, as happens in demonstrations a priori. For then that rule is reduced to another well-known one, namely, whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused: but in the present case that antecedent, God permits Peter to sin, is not the cause of that consequent, namely Peter sins. To the confirmation, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that when from the removal of a hindrance the effect follows immediately and necessarily, as the downward motion of the stone follows the taking away of the column, the cause removing the hindrance concurs indirectly to that effect; but when the effect does not follow immediately and necessarily upon the removal of the hindrance, but through the free will of another, then the cause removing a hindrance is not always said to concur to that effect, neither in the to-be of nature nor in the to-be of morals, even indirectly. And so in our proposal it must be said that upon the subtraction of efficacious help sin does not follow immediately and necessarily, but through the free will of him from whom such help is withdrawn. For just as St. Thomas, in the solution to the third of this article, says that reprobation does not take anything away from the power of the will of the reprobate, nor diminish his liberty, so we also say that the permission by which God permits anyone to sin takes nothing away from his power and liberty: whence he sins freely, in that he was able not to sin, if he willed. On purpose I said in the solution that a cause is not always deemed the cause of the effect that follows: because if that cause which removes a hindrance was bound to impede that effect, although such an effect follows the removal of the hindrance not necessarily, but through the free will of another, nevertheless that effect will be imputed to the cause itself that removes the hindrance, and it will be deemed the moral cause of such an effect. For example, if the Praetor of this city, who is bound to prevent thefts from being committed, permits that someone steal my goods from me, that theft, although it does not follow necessarily from the permission of the Praetor, but through the will of the thief, is nevertheless imputed to the Praetor as its moral cause, and he is bound to restore to me. But when the cause removing a hindrance was not bound by office to impede that effect, it is not imputed to it. Just as the sins with which prostitutes are defiled in a brothel, being permitted, are not imputed to the Praetor permitting them, because he was not bound to prevent them; so, in our proposal, the sins which the reprobate commit are in no way imputed to God permitting them, because he is not bound to impede them, since rather the sweet disposition of the universe demands that God permit some men to fail and to sin.

The third doubt is concerning the fifth conclusion, noted in the solution to the third, and concerning its reason: Whether God destitutes certain men of every supernatural help, so that they are left in the powers of nature alone? For the negative side it is argued first from that of Jn. 1: Who enlightens every man that comes into this world; which place the Saints expound both of the supernatural and of the natural light of the universe: therefore if God enlightens every man, no one excepted, so we must confess that he illumines every man with supernatural revelation and illumination. Secondly, from that of Prov. 1, where divine Wisdom is introduced speaking in this form to all men: Wisdom cries aloud without, she gives her voice in the streets, she cries in the head of the crowds, at the entrance of the city gates she utters her words, saying: How long, ye little ones, do ye love infancy, etc. And she adds: Turn ye to my reproof, and I will pour out my spirit to you, and I will show you my words. By which words the Holy Spirit most openly shows that there is no nation or people to which supernatural inspiration and illumination does not come, so that if they will be converted, God is ready to confer greater helps: and so to those who will not use such inspiration and illumination the Holy Spirit appends a terrible commination in that place, saying: because I have called and you have refused, etc., up to that, when sudden calamity has rushed in. In which testimony it is worth noting that, where the Latin interpreter said, "Wisdom cries aloud without", in the Hebrew it is read, "Wisdoms cry aloud without, in the streets they give their voice", not because the divine Wisdom is manifold, but on account of the manifold mode of teaching by which men are instructed, namely, insofar as we are illumined by means of natural light, and by means of supernatural. According to which it is said in Heb. 1: In many ways and in many manners, etc. We have, therefore, that there is no one to whom the ray of divine Wisdom does not shine. Thirdly. From that of Job 21: Who said to God, depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways; and ch. 24: They were rebels against the light; but these testimonies cannot be verified unless God has spoken to them, and touched their minds with the ray of his light: therefore. Fourthly. From that of Rom. 2: Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to penance? But thou, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath; where the Apostle seems to direct his discourse to any man whatever, whether Jew or Gentile: therefore every man is led by the goodness of God to do penance. Fifthly. From St. Chrysostom, homily 7 on John, where he himself raises such a question: If he enlightens every man that comes into this world, how did so many remain without light? For not all came to know the worship of Christ. And he answers: He therefore enlightens every man, as far as pertains to him: but if certain ones, closing the eyes of the mind, were unwilling to receive the rays of this light, the darkness comes not from the nature of the light, for those who voluntarily deprive themselves of the gift of grace. It is confirmed from Dionysius, ch. 4 of De Divinis Nominibus, where he says that just as the bodily sun, without choosing, sends light into all bodies, so God casts the rays of his whole goodness into all who are, according to each one's capacity. Sixthly. For if God withdrew every supernatural help from some man, it would follow that God were the cause that that man did not convert, nor do penance. The sequel is proved, for if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation, as Aristotle teaches, 1 Posterior Analytics, ch. 3. But God, by offering supernatural help, is the cause of conversion to himself, and of the penance of the sinner: therefore he who offers no such help will be the cause of the non-conversion of the sinner to himself. Seventhly. Every man after sin is bound to do penance: but without special help he cannot do it, any more than walk without feet: therefore, if God by his eternal providence determined not to confer that help, it will not be imputed to man as guilt if he does not do penance. The consequence is proved: because God does not oblige to the impossible. Therefore it must be said that God denies to no one a supernatural help by which he can convert and do penance. Eighthly. For any wayfarer man can convert to God and be saved: therefore anyone has in this life the help of grace, without which he cannot be saved. The antecedent is of faith; and the consequence seems good, because otherwise no man could be saved: therefore the conclusion is most certain.

To this difficulty Soto, book 1 of On Nature and Grace, ch. 15, says three things. The first is that to blind man is to withdraw the light of grace; and to harden is nothing other than to take away the help without which man cannot improve his heart for good. The second is that we can think of God withdrawing this help in two ways. In one way, that in punishment of a preceding sin God so destitutes a man of his favor and help, as having, as it were, pronounced sentence, that he will never again succor him, but will forever abandon him, so that it is due to himself that he does not rise from his past guilt and avoid new crimes. In the other way, "to permit" has the same force as to allow someone freely to act according to his own will, so that God is always most ready to stretch out his hand, unless it depends on the man. The third is that in that first way no one was ever abandoned by God, and in the second way many are abandoned by God. But this opinion needs a careful explanation. Whence it follows:

FIRST conclusion: It can be piously believed that to all who come to the use of reason God brings some help, by a certain secret supernatural assistance instigating them to do good. And note that we do not say in this conclusion that God enlightens every one who comes to the use of reason concerning a supernatural object, otherwise every one who comes to the use of reason and is not converted to God as a supernatural end would sin against the supernatural precept of faith, hope, and charity, as will be clear below. The conclusion is proved. Especially, in the opinion of St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 89, a. 6, where he says that every one who comes to the use of reason is bound at that time to convert himself to God; and if he does so, he will be justified. Whence we gather: therefore, in order to do what in him lies, so that a man be converted to God, so as to be justified at once, it is necessary that he have received from the beginning some supernatural help. For God does not infallibly confer grace on him who does what in him lies from the powers of nature alone; but on him who does what in him lies, while he is prevented by supernatural help, God infallibly confers grace. We said in the conclusion, "it can be piously believed", because such doctrine does not disagree with those things which are held by faith, although it is not of Catholic faith. I said also "by a secret instigation", because not all understand that illumination to be supernatural, or of a supernatural object; and perhaps that help which we say is universally conferred on all who come to the use of reason is not always on the part of the intellect; but on the part of the will it will be a certain instigation above the nature infirm and wounded by sin, inclining to the doing of good, which, otherwise, it knows by the natural light. We do not, however, say that by such cognition and help, without supernatural faith, a man can be justified: but we say that perhaps every one who comes to the use of reason receives from the author of nature that help above the nature infirm, so that he may have no excuse, if he has sinned against the law of nature, by not converting himself to the good naturally known.

SECOND conclusion: If the opinion of St. Thomas is true, that every one who comes to the use of reason satisfies the natural precept by converting himself to the good, and is also at the same time justified, it must consequently be said that every one who is justified has received a preparing grace, at least prior by nature to his fulfillment of the natural precept. It is proved: because otherwise, according to the ordinary law, justification would be owed to every one who prepares himself from the powers of nature alone, willing a good connatural to himself; which is the error of the Pelagians, asserting that the beginning of justification is from us, although its consummation is from God, as will be more fully explained in a. 5, against whom it is defined in the express decree of the Second Council of Orange, can. 4: «If anyone contends that we should await from God the will by which we are cleansed from sin, but does not confess that it comes to us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit that we also will to be cleansed, he resists the Holy Spirit, who says through Solomon, The will is prepared by the Lord»; and in can. 6 and 7 this very thing is expressly defined.

THIRD conclusion: Whenever someone commits a special sin against a supernatural precept, whether of faith or of penance or of another supernatural virtue, it is necessary that he have in fact received some divine inspiration of God enlightening, or calling, or inciting to faith or penance, etc. This conclusion is asserted by us as certain according to faith. And it is proved from that of Jn. 15: «If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin». Which place all the Doctors, especially St. Augustine, interpret of the sin of unbelief, which the Jews committed by not receiving Jesus as the true Christ and the Messiah promised in the Law; and Christ the Lord says that they would not have committed that sin, unless he had sufficiently set before them doctrine and supernatural miracles, by which they were then bound to believe; therefore, by the same reason, in order that someone commit the sin of unbelief, it is necessary that he have received some supernatural cognition; otherwise he will be excused by invincible ignorance through his whole nature. It is proved secondly: because no one sins for the reason that he does not do what he cannot do, as is certain according to faith; but a man to whom nothing else has been given than what pertains to human nature, does not have

whence it can know or work above nature; therefore it does not sin by not doing something supernatural. And it is confirmed: for promulgation is necessary to the account of law not only in general, so that the law be called obligatory, but also in particular, so that someone be not excused by invincible ignorance of the law; but the man to whom nothing supernatural has been revealed has an invincible ignorance of the supernatural law of faith: therefore he is excused from the sin of unbelief. But some answer, with Adrian, Quodlib. 4, q. 1, that in this, that man has received the natural light, he is not excused by invincible ignorance from the sin of unbelief: because if he did what is in him, from the powers of nature, God would enlighten him supernaturally. But this answer does not seem to us consonant with Catholic doctrine. First, because there is no divine law that grace be given at once to one doing what is in him, from the powers of nature; otherwise, according to the debt of the law, justification would answer to a natural disposition, which is against the definition of the Council cited above. Then, because even if there were such a law out of divine clemency, that whoever did what is in him, from the powers of nature, would be at once justified by God, nevertheless that man, in the case proposed, would have an invincible ignorance of the supernatural precept, and of that law sanctioned out of divine clemency, therefore he would be excused from the sin of unbelief. I prove the antecedent: for the virtue of natural studiousness does not oblige beyond its natural object: therefore that man could not be obliged by any special precept to do what is in him, from the powers of nature, by ordaining such a disposition to the end of justification. Finally, if there were such a law, that God would confer grace on one doing what is in him, from the powers of nature, we who knew such a law could be certain that we are in grace, just as we can be certain that we do what is in us, from the powers of nature. But whether it be necessary that a man receive some interior and supernatural instinct, for this, that he be obliged for that time to fulfill the supernatural precept, it is answered; and let it be,

FOURTH conclusion.

It must necessarily be said, as it seems to me, that a man must be touched interiorly by some supernatural inspiration. This conclusion is proved: because otherwise it would follow that a man would not sin a new sin by not converting himself to God supernaturally. The sequel is proved: because by outward miracles alone and external preaching a man is not made more able to believe than he was before, while he labored under invincible ignorance: therefore it is necessary, in order that he have no excuse, that he be touched interiorly by some divine inspiration, inviting and exciting him to supernatural conversion. It is proved secondly from that text of Acts 7: «You always resist the Holy Spirit»; therefore it is necessary that resistance to the Holy Spirit be verified properly, because He inspires within in some way to supernatural conversion.

FIFTH conclusion: Little children, who die in their mothers' wombs, or before they come to the use of reason, unbaptized with original sin alone, received nothing of supernatural aid in themselves. I say in themselves, because in Adam, as in the head of the whole human nature, they received original justice, which they also lost when he sinned; and on that account they contracted original sin, for which they are justly damned with the punishment of loss, which is called the privation of the beatific vision for eternity. This conclusion, thus explained, ought to be manifest among learned theologians, for it would be utter folly to say that infants of this sort, before they come to the use of reason, had any cognition of a supernatural object.

The whole difficulty, therefore, of our question concerns adults, who have come to the use of reason: Whether it be altogether certain that some gratuitous supernatural aid, disposing them to justification in some way, be given to all without exception. To which question certain theologians among the moderns easily assert the affirmative side on account of the arguments made at the beginning of the doubt. And they think they demonstrate this theologically, especially on account of the eighth argument. Others, however, deny that it is necessary that, no exception being made, every man who has come to the use of reason receive a supernatural aid in himself, by which he can believe and be justified, unless he has resisted the Holy Spirit calling. Nay rather they assert that, just as little children are condemned on account of original sin alone, so very many of adults are condemned on account of the actual sins which they committed against the natural law alone, and not on account of the sin which they committed by resisting the Holy Spirit calling and exciting, in that they did not have such an inspiration. And this opinion is beyond doubt that of St. Thomas and St. Augustine, as I shall presently show. But before we settle this dispute, it must be noted first, that this word dare, in the common manner of speaking, is wont to be equivocal, so that in one way it is taken as it is a correlative with the word recipere, as e.g. if someone says that he gave money to another, we at once infer that the other received the money. In the other way dare is taken for this, which is to offer something to someone, inviting him to receive; as if Peter says to Paul, I give you my daughter in marriage, that is, I invite you to take her as wife. Note secondly that 'possible', as far as pertains to the present matter, can be said in three ways. In the first way, it is possible through the absolute power of God, and thus everything that does not imply a contradiction God can do of absolute power, that is, no ordered and contingent cause, or cause voluntary as to its being, being supposed which would conflict with the effect. In the second way 'possible' is said according to the ordinary power, which indeed does not confine itself solely to those things which in fact come to be from the divine providence and will. For thus things could not come to be otherwise than they come to be of ordinary power, because, the divine providence being presupposed, in the composite sense, effects cannot come about otherwise. Let us say, then, that 'possible' of ordinary power is defined in order to the common law, given by God in common, according to which it is possible for something to come to be or not to come to be, or also according to the common course of natural or moral things. In the third way possible is wont to be taken for this, that it is to have in oneself the power through some intrinsic principle, and in some way proportioned to acquiring or doing something. And in this way, when someone out of purely natural forgetfulness does not do what he was otherwise bound by law to do, we say that he is excused from sin, because although he was bound, e.g., to recite the divine office, he was not able to recite it, in that he did not have that principle of memory which was necessary for reciting. And yet it is certain that he was able to recite, not only in the first way, but also in the second; for it was possible according to the common course that he would not forget, but because it was not in his power to remember, he is therefore excused because he was not able to recite. These things being thus supposed, let it be:

SIXTH conclusion: If dare be taken in the second way, for this which is to offer or propose, or to invite in common, then God gives to all men a supernatural aid, sufficient for the salvation of all. This conclusion is certain according to faith. And it is proved from that text of John 3: «God so loved the world as to give His Only-begotten Son». See where the Only-begotten Son of God is said to be given to the whole world, although He was not received by the whole world through faith in Him. Likewise from that text of 1 John 2: «He is the propitiation for our sins, not for ours only, but also for the whole world»: therefore Christ was given to satisfy for the whole world. Which is understood as to the sufficiency of merit and satisfaction, but not as to efficiency, according to that text of 1 Tim. 4: «Who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful»: namely of all as to sufficiency, but of the faithful as to the efficacy of those, that is, who persevere in living faith unto the end. And finally the conclusion is proved: for God gave the Sacraments, that is, proposed them to the whole world to be preached, according to that text of the last chapter of Mark: «Going, preach the Gospel to every creature»; and the last chapter of Matthew: «Teach all nations, baptizing them etc.»; He gave also the common law of grace for all men, no exception being made in the law itself. And it is confirmed from that text of Luke 2: Which thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples.

SEVENTH conclusion: According to the ordinary law it is possible for any man, while he is in this life, to be saved. This conclusion is defined in the Council of Nicaea, canon 8, and in the Roman Council, which was gathered from 60 bishops under the Pontiff Cornelius, against Novatus, as Eusebius relates, in lib. 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, cap. 8. And it is proved from that text of Ezekiel 33: «As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live»: therefore, according to the ordinary law, every wicked man, while he is in this life, can be saved. And it is confirmed: because in Genesis 4 the Lord invited Cain himself to repentance, saying, If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? Therefore according to the law of grace Cain could do penance. Likewise it is proved from the doctrine which is held according to the Catholic faith, which St. Thomas teaches in 5. p., q. 8, that Christ the Lord is the head of all men, at least in potency while they are, were, or will be in this life: which potency is founded, as St. Thomas says in the same place, in the power of the head, and in the freedom of the will: therefore since the power of the head is sufficient to unite to itself any man, and the freedom of the will, as long as a man lives, is not yet obstinate in evil, as it is in hell; it follows that as long as a man is in this life, he can be justified and saved according to the ordinary law.

EIGHTH conclusion: If we use the word dare as it is the correlative of the word accipere, God does not give to all men, even to those coming to the use of reason, the supernatural aid of preparing grace, either for believing, or for doing penance. It is proved first, because not all receive in themselves this supernatural aid: therefore it is not given by God to all. The consequence is clear, from the negation of one correlative to the negation of the other. The antecedent is proved: because if the opposite be granted, that all receive in themselves that aid, it follows that everyone who is not converted resists God supernaturally calling to faith or to penance; and consequently, everyone who is not converted to the faith sins

a special sin of unbelief or impenitence. I prove the sequel, because every man, without exception, is bound by the divine precept to receive the faith; but everyone who has received the supernatural aid of the preparing and disposing grace of God is not excused by ignorance or impotence: therefore everyone who is not converted to the faith sins a special sin of unbelief. But the falsity of the consequent is asserted by all the theologians of our time, especially the Thomists; indeed expressly by St. Thomas himself, 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, against Adrian, Quodlibet 4, q. 1, and against Gabriel, in 2, d. 22, q. 2, who assert that no one of those who do not believe is excused by invincible ignorance, because they think it to be the ordinary law of God that, if they did what is in them, from the powers of nature, God would enlighten them supernaturally. But in truth a reasoning of this sort is worse than the opinion itself, as we shall show more fully in art. 5. For it falls into the error of the Pelagians. But in the meantime, let us show from St. Thomas the truth of our conclusion, in 2. 2., q. 2, art. 5, to the first, which was of this sort: no one is bound to that which is not in his power; but to believe something explicitly is not in a man's power: therefore not all are bound to believe. To which St. Thomas answers that if something be said to be in a man's power, with the aid of grace excluded, then a man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace, such as to believe, to love God above all things: yet he can do this with the aid of grace, which aid indeed, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given out of justice but in punishment of preceding sin, at least of original sin, as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace, cap. 5 and 6. Thus far St. Thomas. See where he expressly says that that aid of preparing grace is not given to all. Where let the theologian observe that the aid by which they can believe the articles of faith is not given to all, but it must be understood of 'possibility' taken in the third way. Moreover, as regards 'possibility' according to the ordinary law, all can believe the Gospel; but this potency is not founded in a supernatural aid received, but in the possibility of receiving, and in the freedom of the will. Note secondly, in the same words, that the withdrawal of divine aid is a punishment of preceding sin, at least original; as happens in him who has come to the use of reason, in whom no other sin has preceded besides original, and the aid of preparing grace is not given him, but he is left to his natural powers. From which it follows that the actual sin which he then commits, by not converting himself to the good proportioned to him, is a sin against the natural law alone, written in the minds of men, and he does not then sin against the precept of faith, hope and charity, or any other: not because the law of faith itself does not oblige all men in common, but because that man is excused by invincible ignorance and the impotence of nature for exercising supernatural acts about supernatural objects; yet with this it well stands in truth that the withdrawal of that aid is just as a punishment of preceding sin. And this is the express doctrine of St. Augustine, tractate 19 on John, tome 9, and Letter 105, tome 2. Where he says that in those who have not heard nor been able, not to believe is a punishment of sin, and is not a sin. But you ask, how were they not able; since according to the ordinary law they were able to believe, just as they were able to be saved. It is answered that St. Augustine speaks of those who were not able with the potency taken in the third way, as we have already sufficiently explained. And finally St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 10, says in this manner: «What I have said, that the salvation of this religion was never lacking to anyone who was worthy, and that he was not worthy to whom it was lacking, if it be discussed and asked whence each one is worthy, there are not lacking those who say by human will: we, however, say by grace or divine predestination». See where Augustine expressly confesses that not all are given to be partakers of the Christian religion. But he speaks correlatively to recipere, because not all receive.

NINTH conclusion: Nevertheless God is truly said to be ready to give to all men, as long as they are in this life, the aid by which they may become able to be converted, indeed also a more special aid by which they may be converted, if they will. This conclusion is very common in the manner of theologians; but certain ones do not rightly understand this truth: for they think that God, in His eternal providence and predestination, as far as is on His part, is indifferent and as it were awaiting the determination of the lower cause for producing the future effect of grace of the lower cause. But that this conflicts most greatly with the divine perfection has been sufficiently explained by us in question 19, art. 5. And its most powerful reason is, that since the divine will is the most efficacious cause of all goods, as it efficaciously wills the end, so also it efficaciously wills and determines all the means to the end; so truly that the active concurrence of God can be determined by nothing extrinsic. Moreover, that explanation of this conclusion contradicts the Council of Orange, Can. 4, where it is defined that God does not await our will that we wish to be cleansed, but rather He Himself prepares and disposes the will that we may will; but if God were thus

said to be ready to give aids of this sort as properly awaiting that we will to receive, just as a merchant is ready to sell his wares, if someone wishes to buy them, but that he wishes to buy the merchant himself does not bring about; it would follow that the definition of the Council is altogether false; nay, this opinion would be against that text of the Apostle, Philippians 2: «For it is He who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for good will», that is, for His free and gratuitous will. And against that text of 2 Cor. 3: «Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God». If therefore the very thought of our salvation is from God, much more the will, which is more efficaciously disposed to conversion out of charity, which is the bond of Christian perfection. We must not, then, think of the divine will and providence as we philosophize about created universal causes; which indeed always presuppose something of which they themselves are not the causes, and therefore their universality in causing is determined by lower causes to determinate effects, so that it is verified that causes are causes to one another in a different genus of causing. But God, since He is the cause of all being, presupposes nothing made by another of which He Himself is not the cause, and thus He determines all things, and is determined by none. Let us say, then, with the Apostle, Rom. 11: «Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, and to whom be glory for ever». The Catholic sense of our conclusion, then, is, when God is said to be ready to bring help to all for eternal salvation, that He is understood to be ready to confer according to the will, not indeed the absolute will, which is always fulfilled, but according to the antecedent will or the will of the sign, inasmuch as God Himself has proposed to the whole world a means most sufficient for the salvation of all, through which any man can be saved according to the ordinary law, by which He obliges all to be converted to Himself, although some can be excused by invincible ignorance. And according to this interpretation the Apostle says, 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved». Which testimony St. Thomas cites, 3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 159|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.159, to prove that God is ready to give aid to all. Moreover, that not all attain saving faith is not from any defect of God's power, although it is a punishment of sin, in some.

TENTH and last conclusion: God from eternity determined by His will, whether absolute or consequent, not to give supernatural aids to all, namely, to those who in fact will not be going to receive them. This is proved: because, whatever God Himself does or does not do, it is necessary that He determined from eternity to do or not to do it; but in time the matter stands thus, that to some the supernatural aid is not given, as we said in the eighth conclusion, whether in punishment of original or of actual sin; therefore God so determined from eternity not to give them such aid. But we speak of the action of giving, correlatively to receiving. If someone asks, why does He confer these gifts on some in particular, and deny them to others? St. Thomas answers, 3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 161|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.161, that it depends on the simple will of God. St. Augustine teaches the same very often. But more especially, in the single book On Rebuke and Grace, cap. 8, tome 7: «If it be asked of me, he says, why that one does not receive this gift, I answer that I do not know». And in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, cap. 10, he says: «Since it was not given them to believe, and the means of believing was denied them». And in cap. 8 he says: «Of two little children, then, alike bound by original sin, why the one is taken up and the other left; and of two already grown in years and wicked, why this one is so called that he follows the one calling, while that one is not called, or not so called that he follows the one calling, the judgments of God are unsearchable. But of two pious men, why perseverance unto the end is given to this one and not given to that one, the judgments of God are more unsearchable»: thus Augustine. But we can add, that of two wicked men God converts the more wicked, and of two just men He grants the gift of perseverance to the less just, leaving the more just, the judgments of God are most unsearchable. Let the Christian and humble theologian therefore learn, with St. Thomas and Augustine, to be ignorant, rather than with the curious to know more than it is fitting to know, lest he fall into the Pelagian heresy, by referring a difference of this sort to the free will, as to its first cause and root: namely, because this one willed to be converted, that one did not will, and because this one willed to persevere, and that one did not will. For although it be most true that no one is converted unless willing, and no one is not converted so as to sin unless unwilling: nay, it is even true that because he wills to be converted, this one is converted; and that one is not converted, because he does not will, nevertheless that particle because, which expresses causality, when it is applied to the one who is converted, does not express the radical and first cause of his conversion, but expresses the cause by way of a free disposition, which as disposing he freely receives from God, efficaciously moving as the first and radical cause, to which the reason must ultimately be referred, if it be asked why this one wills to be converted, namely, because God moves him efficaciously so that he be converted. Moreover, when that particle because is applied to the one who is not converted, so that we say he is not converted because he does not will, if that man sins in this, that he is not converted, then the particle because expresses the first and radical cause of the non-conversion insofar as it is a sin, so that there is no need to proceed further, when it is asked why this one does not will to be converted; for then the defectible free will is the efficient, or rather the deficient, cause of the sin of non-conversion. But if 'not to be converted' expresses the pure negation of an act, we shall say in the solutions of the arguments how God is the cause of non-conversion. With this doctrine is consonant what is said in Hosea 13: «Thy destruction, Israel; only in me is thy help»; as if he said, You are the total cause of your destruction through sin: but I am the efficacious cause of your salvation through my aid, yet in such a way that my aid helps your free will to work effectively well.

BUT concerning this doctrine it must be most especially noted, that it cannot be said by a Catholic theologian except one ignorant in this matter, that, an equal aid on God's part merely standing, Peter is converted from sin, Paul is not converted, Peter receives the faith, Paul does not receive the faith. Those, however, who think so are moved to assert it, first, from that text of Matthew 11: «Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida, for if the mighty works which have been done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes». From which testimony they argue thus: If the miracles themselves and the preaching of Christ, with an equal aid furnished to the Jews, were not sufficient for the men of Tyre and Sidon to do penance, but there was need, as we assert, of a greater aid, that the men of Tyre and Sidon might be efficaciously converted, the conditional uttered by Christ the Lord would not be verified; nay indeed the men of Tyre and Sidon would not have done penance, any more than those cities which the Lord upbraided: therefore, for that conditional to be true, it must be said that with an equal aid, and equal miracles, and equal preaching, the men of Tyre and Sidon would be converted: which aids being posited, the Jews were not converted: otherwise the Jews themselves could have truly answered Christ: If thou hadst given to Tyre and Sidon no more than to us, neither would they have done penance. Secondly they are moved by a certain testimony of St. Augustine in the book On Predestination and Grace, cap. 15, where he seems to persuade this doctrine by the example of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, who seem to have been equally aided and scourged by God, that they might be converted. And Augustine says: As to nature, both were men; as to dignity, both kings; as to the cause, both possessing the captive people of God; as to the punishment, both mercifully admonished with scourges. What then made their ends different, but that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the recollection of his own iniquity; while the other with free will fought against the most merciful truth of God? Thus Augustine. Thirdly they are moved by the words of St. Gregory in the homily On Those Invited to the Wedding, where he refers the difference why some came to the wedding and some did not, to the diversity of the affections of those who were invited, not to a difference of vocation. Which Augustine seems to confirm in Book 83 of Questions, q. 68, near the end, where, speaking of those called to the supper according to the parable which is had in Luke 15, he says thus: «For to that supper which the Lord says is prepared in the Gospel, neither did all who were called wish to come, nor could those who came have come unless they had been called. And so neither ought those who came to attribute it to themselves, because they came as called; nor ought those who were unwilling to come to attribute it to another, but only to themselves, because, to come, being called, was in their free will». Thus Augustine. By which words he seems to think that the vocation of God was equal; but the difference of those willing to come or not to come was on the part of the free will, because the will of some, aided by the grace of vocation, was unwilling to come; while the will of others refused an equal grace of vocation. And finally they are moved because they say that they cannot understand how a man freely uses the grace and aid of God, unless, with an entirely same aid standing, one man is converted and another is not converted.

ON this difficulty I have said more in 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, doubt 2, document 3. Wherefore here I shall briefly dispatch it. For I constantly assert that it is a dogma from the remnants of the Pelagians to assert that, with an entirely equal aid on God's part standing, it can be verified that Peter, aided, is converted, and Paul, similarly aided by an equal grace, is not converted. And the theological reason is evident: because then the reason of the ultimate difference, why Peter is distinguished from Paul, cannot be assigned on God's part: because He aided both entirely equally: therefore it would have to be assigned on the part of the free will, because Peter willed to use that aid well, but Paul did not will to use it; but the consequent is against that text of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 1: He who glories, let him glory in the Lord. But if the matter stood thus, as some have ignorantly said, that with an equal aid of God one wills to be converted and another does not will to be converted, then he who is converted could truly glory in himself on the day of judgment, and say to God: Lord, Thou hast conferred on me no more grace than on him who perished; but I, by the powers of my nature, made good use

by Thy aid and have saved myself; which indeed would be intolerable blasphemy, and the Pelagian heresy. And again it is against that text of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4: «For who distinguishes thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?» In which place the Apostle speaks most evidently against human pride, that no one glory in a man, and consequently neither in himself, but in the Lord, as St. Augustine excellently explains in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 5, tome 7, whose words must be written in the heart; for he says: «Are men, then, distinguished from men by these gifts which are common to all men?» as if he said, by no means; and he adds: «For the Apostle said, who distinguishes thee?» And because a puffed-up man could say, I am distinguished by my justice, my faith, or whatever else, the good doctor, meeting such thoughts, added, what hast thou that thou hast not received? From whom, if not from Him who distinguishes thee from another, to whom He did not give what He gave to thee? And in cap. 7 he says: «Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. These, then, will to believe, but those do not. Who would not know this? Who would deny it? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, and for others it is not prepared, it must certainly be discerned what comes from His mercy and what from judgment». Thus far Augustine. But he understands it of the preparation of the will through the efficacious aid of conversion. And read many other things, but especially see him in the Enchiridion, cap. 52, where he explains that text of the Apostle, Rom. 9: «So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy». Where he himself raises the question: How does the Apostle say that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, when beyond doubt, if a man is of that age that he already uses reason, he cannot believe, hope and love unless he wills; nor attain to the palm of God's heavenly vocation, unless he has run by his will? And he answers that it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, because the will itself is prepared by God. And to explain this solution of the question more fully, he refutes a certain false solution, namely, that it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy: because it comes about from both, that is, from the will of man and the mercy of God, so that the sense is: it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, that is, the will of man alone does not suffice, unless there be also the mercy of God. But Augustine replies against this solution: «If it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, because the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not, on the contrary, also rightly said, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, because the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it?» Augustine therefore concludes that, just as no Christian will dare to say, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills: so it must be understood that it was rightly said, it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, so that the whole be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it once prepared. And indeed, that the good will be counted among the gifts of God's mercy, according to that text of Ps. 58: His mercy shall prevent me. Moreover, St. Augustine calls the good will the very good act of the will, by which it uses the aid of God well. Let the theologian therefore understand, when it is said that both are necessary for the salvation and justification of a man, namely both the good use of free will and the aid of divine mercy, that these two are not so to be distinguished as two partial agents, but as one subordinate to the other. Nor again let him understand such a subordination as we understand when we say that fire is subordinate to the sun for generating fire, as it were determining the universal concurrence of the sun to the generating of this fire, here and now. For a doctrine of this sort declines into the Pelagian heresy: for if a man were thus subordinated to the aid of divine mercy, as fire is subordinated to the sun, which of itself is indifferent, and is determined by the fire, it follows that the man himself distinguishes himself here and now, when he works well. The sequel is clear: because he himself determines the divine aid to working well, which of itself was not yet determined. It must be said, therefore, according to Catholic doctrine, that divine mercy so furnishes aid, when a man is converted and works well, that it also by its aid determines the free will, which of itself is indifferent, to work well, efficaciously and freely; and not conversely, that the free will determine the mercy of God and its aid to working efficaciously, as certain of the modern theologians, otherwise Catholic, but less versed in the doctrine of Augustine and of the Councils of Orange and Mileve, have opined. Of whose number was in our times the Catholic man Ruard Tapper, in the book Articles concerning Ecclesiastical Dogmas, art. 7, proposition 10. Finally it must be noted how with the aforesaid Catholic doctrine there is consonant what was defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 4, where it is said: «If anyone shall say that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, has itself merely passively like a certain inanimate thing, and cooperates in nothing as it disposes itself to receive grace, and cannot dissent if it wishes, let him be anathema». In which Canon observe two things. The first is, that that cooperation of the free will is an effect of divine mercy. The second is, that this proposition, the free will can dissent if it wishes, must be understood simply speaking, and not in the composite sense, so that these two could stand together, namely that this efficacious aid exists in a man, and the man resists by dissenting. And the reason is evident: For who shall resist His will? namely His efficacious and absolute will.

TO the motives, however, of the aforesaid false opinion it would be easy to answer, if we referred those who thus object against the truth to the treatises of St. Augustine, in which he defends and sets forth the Catholic truth against the Pelagians. Let what I have brought forward in 2. 2., where above, be seen. But now, to that first motive, which is taken from the words of Matthew 11: Woe to thee, Corozain, etc. St. Gregory and St. Jerome on that passage say that to know the secrets of God is not man's. Nevertheless, to satisfy the scholastic theologians, it is answered as to the form of the argument which is drawn from that passage, by denying those consequences, when it is inferred: therefore, with an equal aid existing on God's part, the Jews were not converted, and the men of Tyre and Sidon would be converted. And the reason is, that for the truth of that conditional, namely, in Tyre, etc., it is not necessary that the men of Tyre and Sidon would have done penance in such a way that their doing penance itself would not be a gift of God which was not given to the Jews; but it must be understood that it is the same to say they would have done penance and to say, God would have given them penance. For it is certain that to do penance is a gift of God, which he who does not do penance does not receive. But if you ask, why does Christ say that, those miracles being posited, God would give penance to the men of Tyre and Sidon, which He did not give to the Jews, efficaciously, by softening their hearts that they might be converted? It is answered that in this Christ the Lord wished to signify that the Jews were worse than the men of Tyre and Sidon, since on account of their greater sins and demerits that efficacious aid of saving penance was justly denied them: of which aid the men of Tyre and Sidon were less unworthy, to whom, if Christ had come preaching and working miracles, God would mercifully have softened their less unworthy hearts, and therefore it will be more tolerable for them on the day of judgment than for the perfidious Jews. To this mode of speaking that one which the Lord uses in Matthew 12 is nearly similar: «The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: because they did penance at the preaching of Jonah, and behold, more than Jonah is here». For Christ the Lord does not intend to signify that the men of Nineveh did penance by lesser internal aids mercifully received from God; but that the Jews, to whom greater external aids were proposed and offered, were more unworthy that God should pursue them with more efficacious inspirations, exciting them interiorly to penance; of which inspirations the men of Nineveh were less unworthy; and so God mercifully conferred penance on them at the preaching of Jonah. The mind and intention of Christ the Lord, therefore, is to object to the Jews greater sins and a heavier hardness of heart than to the men of Tyre and Sidon, than to the Ninevites and Sodomites, according to that text of Jeremiah, Lamentations 4: «And the iniquity of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom»; for it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the judgment than for those perfidious Jews who rejected Christ. But there still remains a scruple against the aforesaid explanation. For the men of Tyre and Sidon of whom the Lord speaks were not predestined: therefore, even if Christ had preached to them and worked miracles before them, they would not have believed. It is answered first: I deny the consequence, since even if they had believed they would not have persevered, and so predestination would not have been fulfilled in them. The solution is the one which St. Augustine reports in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ca. 10, from a certain Catholic disputant, not as his own, for he himself judges it better to reduce the question to divine predestination, for he says that it was not given them to believe, and the means of believing was denied them. Nor was any injury done to them in this, who were justly forsaken by God for their sins. It is answered secondly, that for the truth of that conditional it is not required that it was so disposed in the divine providence that they would have been predestined if Christ had preached to them; nay, in fact it was so disposed in the divine providence that neither would Christ preach to them, and that they would be left in their sins. But if it be posited that they would have done penance if Christ had preached to them, it should also at once be posited, according to the rules of dialectic, that in the divine providence it would have been disposed otherwise than in fact it happened, just as this conditional is true: If Judas had done penance unto death, he would have been saved; and yet if the antecedent be posited as existing, for the sake of disputation, we must also posit the divine predestination and the efficacious aid of the conversion of Judas. To the second motive, from the testimony of Augustine, it is answered that those who cite it in favor of the aforesaid opinion have not read St. Augustine, but bring forward a truncated testimony, not attending to what precedes and follows. Read, I beseech you, that testimony, and you will see how St. Augustine proceeds in arguing against him who judges the divine counsel too high for a wise heart; and he asks of him the cause of the difference, where the remedy is equal. And although St. Augustine in that discussion brings forward that particular difference on the part of the recipients; since the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the recollection of his own iniquity; while the other with free will fought against the most merciful truth of God: yet observe what follows afterwards. St. Augustine admonishes him that we understand that all those things (namely which happened in Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, and in similar sinners) are either accomplished with the Lord helping, or permitted with the Lord forsaking, so that we may know that, even with the Lord unwilling, nothing at all is admitted. Let the theologian therefore understand, who in questions of this sort, most lofty, intends to proceed in a Catholic way, that although the proximate cause of this difference, that one sinner is converted and another is not converted, can be assigned, because the one uses the aid of God well, while the other resists God calling; yet this is not the first cause and root, but one must have recourse to the divine will, whose gift is the good use of free will in him who is converted; which gift indeed is justly not given to him who is not converted, who would in no way sin unless God permitted him to sin. And so all things happen either with God willing or with God permitting. But why He draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to investigate if you do not wish to err; as the same Father Augustine admonishes on that text of John 6: «No one can come to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him». We have, then, that a greater aid was given to Nebuchadnezzar doing penance than to Pharaoh impenitent, a greater aid, I say, not external but internal. To the third motive, it is already clear from what has been said, that when the proximate cause of the difference is assigned, the first is not excluded, but is rather understood in it. And so St. Augustine explains himself, in lib. 2 of On the Gift of Perseverance, ca. 9, where he asserts that the matter of Tyre and Sidon pertains to the causes of predestination, and says: «Without prejudging those hidden causes, I said I then answered these things». As if Augustine said that, if anywhere he has referred the reason of the aforesaid difference to the use of free will, it is always to be understood without prejudice to divine predestination. And in this manner St. Gregory and all the holy Fathers are to be explained, when from the diversity of the affection of those called they say that different ends proceed, namely that some come to the supper and some do not; for the holy Fathers do not intend to deny that the good affection of him who uses the vocation well is a gift of His, and proceeding principally from His eternal will. To the last motive it is answered, that I am less able to understand (and in truth it is less intelligible) how the divine will is the most efficacious cause of all things and of all moral and natural goodness, and yet is not the efficacious cause of my deliberation, not only as to the naturalness which the act has, as certain ones say, but also as to the morality, which is good. Wherefore it is necessary that we believe things hidden which we cannot comprehend. But also each of these two seems to be demonstrated separately: for that we act freely is established by experience. But that God Himself is the most efficacious cause of all created good is demonstrated from this, that He is the first and supreme good. But how these two agree with one another, that I deliberate, and that God efficaciously makes me deliberate what He Himself deliberated from eternity, let him who has not been able to understand believe, as he believes that God is three and one. And let him not, on account of the incapacity of his own mind, take away from the divine jurisdiction the greatest good which is found in a creature, such as is the good work of free will. But concerning these things we have said more than enough above, in question 19, art. 10, where we showed in what the formal freedom of our operations consists. See also in 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, document 3, at the end; and elsewhere often.

TO the arguments, therefore, which at the beginning of this doubt we objected to the opposite side, it is answered.

To the first, from that text of John 1, it is answered that if that passage be understood of the natural light, it is clear that every man is enlightened by God, at least according to the habit of the natural light: for actually there are many who are not enlightened, such as those who depart from this world before the use of reason, or the insane from their mother's womb. But if it be understood of the supernatural light, then that distribution, He enlightens every man, is explained in two ways by the holy Fathers. In one way, as by Chrysostom, Homily 7 on John, where he says «that He enlightens every man as far as pertains to Him»; which explanation is to be understood according to the doctrine of our conclusion, inasmuch as God is ready to enlighten all. The other explanation, which pleases us more, is from St. Augustine in the book On the Merits of Sins, tome 7, cap. 25, where he says that we understand 'He enlightens every man' thus, not because there is no man who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by Him. Nor is the account the same for natural and supernatural illumination, because the natural is due to nature itself; but the illumination of grace is not due to nature, especially when already corrupted by sin, but is conferred out of grace.

To the second it is answered, from Cajetan on that passage, that it can be understood of natural illumination, and thus the distribution will be universal without exception. But if it be understood of supernatural illumination, it can be explained according to the doctrine of the eighth and ninth conclusions.

To the third, from the testimonies of Job, it is answered, from St. Thomas there, that those testimonies are understood of the light of natural reason.

To the fourth, from the testimony of Romans 2, it is answered that that reproof of the Apostle is chiefly directed to the Jews, who had received the cognition of the Gospel and resisted the Holy Spirit; or if it be directed to the Gentiles, yet he speaks to those to whom the preaching of the Gospel had come. And hence it was a special sin for them not to believe the Gospel, not to do penance: because they could not be excused by ignorance. And therefore the Apostle says: Thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath.

To the fifth argument, from Chrysostom, the solution is already clear from the ninth conclusion: for that testimony is to be explained like that of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved». Of whose explanation we have said enough, question 19, art. 6. To the confirmation, from St. Dionysius, it is answered that he speaks openly of illumination from the efficiency of God as He is the author of all nature, inasmuch as God communicates His goodness to all things, giving to all being and operation and all things.

To the sixth it is answered thus: that that maxim if the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, etc., is most true, but is to be understood of the adequate cause of the effect. As e.g. if because something is rational it is risible, it is well inferred, because if something is not rational it is not risible. But some think that the conferring of efficacious divine aid is not the adequate cause of conversion to God, because it is not the sole cause, in that the free will concurs together with the divine aid. And this solution pleases certain theologians greatly, yet it cannot please us: because in a solution of this sort the free will is considered by them as a partial cause, which, joined with the divine concurrence, produces the effect of conversion: whereas the matter stands otherwise: because the very concurrence of the free will is an effect necessarily consequent, by necessity of the consequence, upon the efficacious divine aid, so that that text of the Apostle is verified, that that conversion is not of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, not because a man can convert himself unless he wills, but because God Himself by His mercy efficaciously converts the will of man to Himself, so that the actual conversion itself is an effect of divine mercy, and not only the ability to be converted. Moreover, that maxim of Aristotle, if it were so understood of an adequate cause that no other cause concurred, could never be verified in natural causes, since in no genus of cause is there found any cause that so concurs that no other concurs in another genus of cause: for causes are causes to one another, except the first cause, of which in no genus of cause is there a cause to assign, although one effect of it can be the cause of another effect. It is necessary, therefore, to explain that maxim of Aristotle otherwise. For whose understanding note that the absence of grace in some subject, or the absence of conversion to God, can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it is the pure negation of being; so that that absence is considered not as the privation of something due in being; in another way, as the privation of grace or of an action due in being, here and now, which nevertheless is not present on account of a defect of the free will. If therefore the negation of conversion be taken in the former way, there is nothing to fear in conceding that, just as divine aid is the efficacious cause of grace and of conversion to God, so the negation of efficacious aid is the cause of non-conversion to God, inasmuch as it is the pure negation of being: nay, in this way God is said to blind and to harden, by denying that efficacious aid, from which negation it immediately follows, by necessity of the consequence, that someone is not converted. This doctrine is explained. The theologians concede that God is the cause of the act of sin, insofar as it is a certain being: therefore it is no wonder that God is asserted to be the cause of non-conversion, insofar as non-conversion is the pure negation of being, but not insofar as in the one not converted it is a moral omission: for in this way only the created free will is the cause of non-conversion. Whence God most justly wills to punish him who by free will wills not to be converted, and of a defect of this sort St. Thomas is to be understood, 1. 2., q. 112, art. 3, to the second, when he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from ourselves, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that text of Hosea 13: Thy destruction, Israel, etc. To the seventh it is answered, as to the major, that every man after sin is bound to do penance in a time of necessity, since it is an affirmative precept, and does not oblige forever: and so in this sense the major is conceded by all theologians. As to the minor, I grant in the composite sense that he cannot do penance without a special aid; but then I deny the consequence, when it is inferred: therefore, if God determined by His providence not to confer that special aid, it will not be imputed to the man if he does not do penance. That consequence is worth nothing. The reason is: because it suffices that that man has received the supernatural aid and the cognition of the divine mercy, inviting him to penance, for the man to be obliged for that time, and to be said simply to be able to do penance. For it is one gift to be able to do penance, and another to do it; and therefore, for a man to be unwilling to do penance, he has no need of a greater aid than that

by which he is said to be able to do penance. Moreover, if that man had received no supernatural aid, he could not sin against a supernatural precept, but well against the law of nature, and on account of such a sin he will be condemned: according to that text of Romans 2: «Whoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law; and whoever have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law». Where the Apostle teaches that no one will be condemned except by a law whose cognition he had. To the last, the consequence is denied. But what has been solved follows: therefore any man can have in this life the aid of grace according to the ordinary law. And in truth, the defect of this consequence is known to novice dialecticians: for it is argued from the broad to the non-broad, or from 'can be' to 'is'. For who does not see that this consequence is similar: a piece of wood can be white, and it cannot be white without whiteness, therefore it has whiteness? For it would have to be inferred, therefore it can have whiteness; and it is a wonder that the most learned Medina, 1. 2., q. 109, art. 10, was convinced by that consequence to assert that every man has supernatural aid in fact. For in truth the same consequence would prove that every man has efficacious aid, nay also the gift of perseverance. It is proved: because every man can persevere, just as he can be saved; but to be saved without the gift of perseverance is impossible: therefore every man has the gift of perseverance; and the consequent is heretical: therefore a consequence of this sort is frivolous. Likewise, this too is worth nothing: Every man can believe the Gospel, since every man is bound to, and no man can believe without the light of faith: therefore every man has the light of faith. But it only follows from those premises that every man can have the light of faith; which potency is founded, remotely indeed, in the power of the free will, but proximately in the power and grace of God, who according to the ordinary law is ready, by His antecedent will of salvation, to bring help to all: as He wills all men to be saved. From what has been said it is gathered how that is to be understood which we reported above from M. Soto, when he said that God denies to no one supernatural and special aid, as if the pronouncement had laid down that He does not give a man further supernatural aid, so that it comes about through God that he does not rise from sin and avoid new crimes: which in truth, with such an addition, is most true, but taken without that addition is false, as we have sufficiently explained in the last conclusion.