Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Predestination is not something in the predestined. The reason is, because predestination is a part of providence; but providence is not in the things provided, but is a certain account existing in the intellect of the provider: therefore etc.

Second conclusion: The passive execution of predestination is in the predestined, but the active is in God.

Third conclusion, in the solution to the fourth: Predestination imports a respect to grace, as of a cause to an effect, and of an act to an object.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED, for the understanding of St. Thomas in these two articles: Whether predestination formally imports an act of the divine intellect, or rather of the divine will? And it is argued first, that it is an act of the divine will. For in Scripture the predestined are called elect, beloved; but election and love are acts of the will, therefore predestination too. The major is clear, Matt. 22: «Many are called, but few are chosen». And Eph. 1: «He chose us in him before the foundation of the world»; Rom. 9: «Not of works, but of him that calls, it was said, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated»; Rom. 8: «To them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as according to his purpose are called to be saints». But by the name of purpose the Apostle understands predestination, according to the common explanation; but purpose is an act of the will: therefore predestination too.

The second argument is from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4. Where he says that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things: therefore it is an act of the will. The consequence is proved: because otherwise predestination would presuppose itself, for if it is posited in the intellect it must be the foreknowledge of certain future things.

Scotus, in 1 Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, says that predestination principally and properly imports the purpose and good-pleasure of God willing to give glory to certain ones, and the means necessary for such an end; but because nothing is willed unless foreknown, he says that predestination presupposes an act of the intellect; and therefore it is sometimes taken for an act of the intellect, but improperly and less principally. The same opinion St. Bonaventure follows, in the same place, q. 2. But other Scholastic Doctors say that by the name of predestination there is understood at once and equally an act of the intellect and of the will of God; and they prove it from the definition which the Master of the Sentences lays down in the same place: for he says «predestination is the preparation of grace», which cannot be without foreknowledge. Likewise from Augustine, book On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 14: «predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God». See, where foreknowledge and preparation are placed in the definition of predestination, of which the one, namely foreknowledge, is intellectual, the other, namely preparation, is an act of the will. St. Thomas here, and in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 1, holds that, if by the name of Predestination we principally and formally understand an act of the divine intellect, some act of the will necessarily precedes it, in our mode of understanding. For although it is true, absolutely speaking, that the action of the intellect is prior to the action of the will, nevertheless not every intellectual action is prior to every action of the will, as a prudential act is posterior to the right intention of the end: so therefore it must be said that predestination is a special act of providence, which presupposes the intention and love of God with respect to those who are predestined, as will be more fully explained in art. 4. But for a greater understanding of St. Thomas and of the things which are to be said on this matter, we must lay down a necessary foundation, namely that in divine things all things are together, and nothing is prior or posterior in any genus of cause, nor is anything really distinct from another, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. Concerning which foundation some things are to be noted: First, that according to our mode of conceiving, we who know a most simple and infinite thing not by a simple concept but by many, and imperfectly, it is necessary to distinguish certain divine attributes pertaining to the unity of the Divine Essence: in each of which we know the Divine Essence imperfectly according to one account, not knowing, but neither denying, that other perfections are essentially contained in the same: for example, we distinguish the attribute of wisdom from the attribute of omnipotence, justice and mercy. And indeed in these very attributes, just as we make a distinction insofar as we attribute them to God, so also we find certain priorities among the divine attributes themselves, so that we say some are prior, others posterior: which priority and posteriority nevertheless arises from the imperfection of our intellect and is terminated in it, and is not transferred to the thing signified: otherwise we would be blasphemers, attributing to God what does not belong to him. In this manner, then, theologians piously and religiously say that the attribute of immutability is prior to the attribute of eternity: and that the reason why God is eternal is conveniently rendered by this, that he is altogether immutable. But they do not assert that in God himself there is a distinction of immutability and eternity, but the whole distinction is in our mode of understanding. With this nevertheless it stands in truth that the foundation of such a distinction, which our reason has devised, is really in God, on account of the eminence and infinity of the divine to-be itself. And this suffices for a distinction of reasoned reason, that is, one having a foundation in the thing, and not only in the reason reasoning, in the way that the same is distinguished from itself, as when we say Peter is the same as himself, we distinguish the subject from the predicate by a reason reasoning.

Note secondly, that we are similarly accustomed to speak of the divine actions with respect to creatures, so that we say that God understands or wills this before that, that is, we understand first that God wills or understands this, before we understand that he understands or wills another. Hence it follows that, because in our mode of understanding the same thing is accustomed to be prior and posterior with respect to the same thing in different genera of causes, so also we are accustomed and able to affirm that God understands or wills something prior and posterior with respect to the same thing; for example, God wills the end before the means, namely to confer eternal salvation on men, before the means to such an end, that is, we do not understand the end to be referred to the divine will before the means themselves: but again in another genus of cause, as it were material and dispositive to the end, we say that God wills merits to be before rewards; which priority and posteriority nevertheless is wholly terminated and completed in the effects themselves, and in our mode of understanding: because in God there is only a single act of will, by which he wills at once all things which he wills, although he wills one to be on account of another, and he wills to confer glory on account of merits, and confers merits on account of glory, in different genera of causes.

Note thirdly, that by this teaching an answer must be given when it is asked whether God willed things first in the to-be of nature than in the to-be of grace? And whether he willed the Incarnation of his Son before permitting the sin of Adam? For it must be answered that, if these effects be considered according to the account of the priority of the final cause, then the to-be of grace is priorly willed by God as the end of the whole to-be of nature; but again, because the to-be of nature is presupposed in the genus of material and subjective cause, hence it is that we understand that God willed to create the universe before we understand that he so willed to love the world as to give his Only-begotten Son. Proportionally, the permission of sin is priorly willed in the genus of quasi-material cause than the Incarnation of Christ, and than the most high sacrifice which he offered on the Cross, which is a certain good most excellent in the world, and therefore in the genus of final cause it is priorly willed than the permission of sin itself: on the contrary, the permission of sin is not willed of itself, but on account of another good, which God intends to do through it. «So good indeed is God, says Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 11, and book 11 of The City of God, ch. 18, that he would in no way allow any evil to be in his works, unless that from that evil itself he might do good». From which teaching let us gather against some of the moderns that the permission of sin, even of angels, is directly provided and willed by God as a means, not indeed from its own nature, but divinely ordered to a good greater than the good whose privation the sin imports. Just as God also orders poverty to the Kingdom of heaven, not from its own nature. But some think that the permission of sin has only the account of an occasion, as also sin itself. Against whose opinion we shall speak more widely in art. 3. For now, however, let this argument suffice, because what is done in time in an ordered way by God was so ordained and willed from eternity; but in time the permission of sin has the account of a good, from nowhere else than because it is ordered to such a good: therefore God from eternity so provided and ordained that permission to every good to which it is ordered in time.

Note fourthly, that from what has been said it follows how frivolous is that consequence of Scotus, which is frequently made in the School, namely: God knew Christ as predestined before the sin of Adam: therefore even if Adam had not sinned, the divine Word would have assumed human flesh; for by a like account this consequence would be good: God knew the order of nature before that of grace; therefore if the order of grace were not to be, God would create the order of nature: or, conversely: God knew the order of grace in the genus of final cause before the order of nature; therefore even if the order of nature were not to be, the order of grace would come about. The reason is: because in these consequences, from the priority of our reason, as to the mode of understanding in one genus of cause or another, there is gathered, without any appearance, a real priority in the things themselves, or the independence of one thing from another according to the order established by God. As if you were to say, the form is understood before the matter, and is willed before it, since it has a greater account of good; therefore even if the matter were not to be, the form would come about.

Lastly note that that distinction of Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 1, art. 3, ad quartum, is not very necessary; where, in order to solve the arguments of Scotus and explain the saying of St. Thomas, who says in the solution to the fourth that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, he distinguishes among the effects of predestination. For some are not only ordered but constituted through predestination, as grace and glory; but some are only ordered through predestination, as that Peter be according to natural existence and the rest pertaining to the natural order of the universe, all of which have the account of future things from eternity, from divine providence, and not from predestination; on the contrary, predestination itself, as it were supervening, orders the soul of Peter to supernatural beatitude, by the mediation of grace, just as the order of grace supervenes on the order of nature. Likewise Cajetan reduces to the order of nature all defects, both in natural things, as monsters and diseases, and also in rational things, as ignorance and moral evil, which is sin, which indeed is a defect of the rational nature, and not pertaining to the order of grace, but rather to the order of nature (but Cajetan would have said better, to the deordination of the rational nature). Hence Cajetan gathers that Scotus's imagination is false, namely that Peter is predestined to glory before he is foreseen as about to sin: on the contrary, says Cajetan, just as Peter is foreseen according to those things which pertain to the order of nature before he is predestined, so he is foreseen as about to sin before he is predestined; because that Peter sin pertains to the order of nature, upon which the order of predestination or reprobation supervenes. Whence Cajetan distinguishes three orders in things, so that God first ordained the universe according to the order of nature; and because the universe, according to such an order, does not attain to the divine fruition, it was elevated through a superadded order of grace: and because even such an order did not attain to the union possible in the highest way with God, God preordained the creature to a personal union with God. Whence Cajetan well infers that the predestination of Christ presupposes indeed the foreknowledge of sins, but does not presuppose the foreknowledge of all future things. And so he explains St. Thomas when he said that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, namely of certain ones, and not of all. We have said therefore that Cajetan's discourse is not very necessary for the solution of Scotus's arguments, because it is easy to invert these three orders, if the discourse be about priority in the genus of final cause, which priority indeed holds the first place with respect to divine providence. So therefore we understand that the order of creatures to a personal union with God falls first under divine providence: for all things are ordered to this end. From which order Christ results, who is the head and fount of the second order of grace, through which the rational creature is ordered to glory. And lastly this second order, because it is better and more excellent, is prior in the intention of God, the first agent and the ultimate end, than the order of nature, which is only presupposed and pre-understood in the genus of material cause: which will yet appear more widely in what follows. Then, what Cajetan says, that sin foreknown by God pertains to the pure order of nature, seems to us false, both in the Angels and also in Adam. Because both the Angels and Adam sinned immediately against a supernatural precept: therefore such a sin already presupposes the order of nature to God as to a supernatural end; and consequently it pertains to the order, or rather to the deordination from the supernatural end.

THESE things being thus established, let this be the first conclusion: The acts which we can imagine to be in the divine mind, both common and proper, concerning the predestined, are these: God knew all men as possible, of whom he loved some as to the to-be of nature, and these he willed to create; of whom he further loved some to a supernatural end, which divine love is called election, insofar as out of the others whom he willed to create he separated these for himself; and lastly, these elect he predestined, that is, he provided and ordained that, through certain supernatural means, they efficaciously attain the supernatural end. This conclusion is not proved otherwise than from the natural mode of conceiving and proceeding of our intellect, and from the nature of the one knowing and of the thing known: for first of all there must be attributed to God what is natural to him, namely the cognition of all possible things, both those pertaining to the order of grace and those pertaining to the order of nature. Then we attribute to God those things which belong to him not from necessity of nature, as is to love men; then, those which belong to God as he is the author of grace, insofar as it is his special love to a supernatural end, which love does not extend to all men, whom he loved as to the to-be of nature: for that reason such love is called election, as St. Thomas excellently teaches in art. 4. And lastly he orders these elect through certain means to such an end.

Second conclusion: From these aforesaid acts, which we have enumerated, we say that the account pre-existing in the divine mind concerning the efficacious means for attaining the end is properly called predestination, which presupposes, in our mode of understanding, election and love. To this opinion is consonant what Augustine says in the book On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 17, that to predestinate is to dispose and order future things in foreknowledge: but to dispose and to order pertains intrinsically to the action of the intellect. Jerome says the same, in the place above, on ch. 1 of Ephesians. Likewise the Apostle, Rom. 11: «Has God cast away his people which he foreknew?», that is, which he predestined. And Acts 13: «As many as were ordained to life everlasting believed»; but to preordain names an act of the intellect; therefore to predestinate too. And lastly, predestination is called the Book of life, in which the names of the predestined are written; but a Book in spiritual things pertains to the intellect, and indeed it fits better with the primitive signification of predestination, according to the Latin tongue. I confess nevertheless that it matters not much for solving the graver questions, namely whether there is a cause of predestination on our part, and of reprobation? and whether there is a certain number of the predestined? It matters little, I say, whether by the name of predestination we understand divine election or love or providence: for if a cause of any of these were given outside God, it would be the same also of the other acts which we posit in God. And by this the arguments are clear.

To the first it is answered that, because the predestined are also elect and beloved, for that reason they are so called in Scripture; but for this it is not required that predestination be an act of the will.

To the second, from the teaching of St. Thomas it is answered that he did not understand predestination to presuppose the foreknowledge of all future things, but of certain ones, and in a certain genus of cause, as we explained above.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly, especially concerning the second and third conclusions: Which and how many are the effects which are included in the execution of predestination. For the understanding of which question note first that effects of this sort can be considered by us in many ways. For some are common to the predestined and the reprobate, others are special to the predestined themselves. For some are remote effects from their own nature, but presupposed and ordered by God under the order of predestination or reprobation, as is the creation of souls and of Angels: but some are from their own nature of the same order as predestination and reprobation, as for example the merit of Christ and his sacrifice, which he offered for us, is, as to sufficiency, of the order of predestination. Similarly the permission of the sin of Adam, so that in him the whole nature fell, is of the order of reprobation, as much as is on its part, but from divine mercy the permission of that sin is ordered to the salvation of certain ones; just as, conversely, the Passion of Christ itself, which of itself is of the order of predestination, nevertheless, on account of the malice of man, is turned into a greater condemnation for him. Again, the special effects of all the predestined are justification with perseverance, and glorification: for what the Apostle says, Rom. 8: «Whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified»; it must be understood collectively, so that it belongs only to the predestined; for otherwise the calling, which is through faith, and true justification through the grace of God, is common even to certain reprobate. For although of itself the calling and justification is not of the order of reprobation, but rather of predestination, nevertheless man, on account of his sin, is the cause of losing justification; and consequently he turns the preceding justification into a greater and more just condemnation for himself, according to that of 2 Pet., ch. 2: «It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them». Then, the special effects of the predestined: some regard the singular predestination of each one, as for example the miraculous conversion of Paul, and of the thief on the cross, and singular inspirations of God, greater or lesser with respect to each predestined person. But others are common to all the predestined, as we have said. There are besides certain effects similar and equal considered in themselves, which belong indifferently to the predestined and the reprobate; but considered with respect to divine providence they are very dissimilar, of which sort are a man's temperament prone to certain studies or to different states of life. Likewise sharpness of mind or dullness, a good or bad disposition of body, the vice or virtue of parents, riches and poverty, health and sickness, persecutions, or temporal peace, all of which to certain theologians do not seem to be effects of predestination or reprobation, because of themselves they have no proportion with the supernatural end, and happen without distinction to the good and the wicked.

But to us it seems that judgment must be made otherwise, insofar as all these things are subjected to the order of divine providence. For so they are to some effects of predestination, but to others of reprobation. And it is proved from that of Rom. 8: «And we know that to them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as according to his purpose are called to be saints». Which place St. Augustine explains in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 9, tome 7, concerning the predestined; and therefore the Apostle said, to those who according to his purpose are called to be saints, that is, according to the election of the will of God they are called that they be saints even unto the end. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 17, in the same tome, he says: «What is it, all things work together unto good, unless even the most savage persecutions themselves?» Nay, moreover Augustine himself, in the book On Correction and Grace, in the place above, says that all things work together unto good for those who love God to such an extent that if at some time they stray and go out of the way, even this itself he makes to profit them unto good, insofar as being more humbled they return through penance. So Bernard teaches on the Psalm, He that dwelleth, in Sermon 2. Moreover there is added what the Apostle says in Rom. 14: «He that eats, eats to the Lord, for he gives thanks to God, and he that eats not, eats not to the Lord; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord». Whence a theological reason can be gathered. All temporal things, whether good or evil, can be means and instruments of charity, and its material object, which is ordainable to the glory of God: therefore they can be effects of predestination. And proportionally, if, God permitting, all these things are ordered through the malice of free choice to the evil of guilt even unto the end, they will be effects of reprobation. It is confirmed: because the Church asks in the Litanies for many temporal goods: therefore they can be effects of predestination. And lastly goods of this sort fall under the object of the hope of the theological virtue, as St. Thomas says, 2. 2., q. 17, art. 2, ad 2. They fall also under merit, as he teaches, 1. 2., last question, last article: therefore they can be effects of predestination, insofar as they are ordered by divine grace to the end of eternal life.

It is to be noted lastly that the effects of predestination can be considered in two ways. In one way, with respect to the predestination of the whole mystical body of the predestined; and with respect to the predestination of each one in particular. If they be considered in the first way, not only the goods, but also every permission of the sins of all is an effect of the predestination of the whole mystical body: for all things are ordered to the greater perfection and beauty of the heavenly Jerusalem. And so not only the permission of the sin of Adam, but of all men and Angels is an effect of the predestination of all the elect, for Augustine says, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 18: For God would not create any one, I do not say of the Angels, but even of men, whom he had foreknown to be evil, unless he equally knew to what uses of goods he would accommodate them; and so he would adorn the order of the ages, like a most beautiful poem, even out of certain antitheses, as it were. This is what the Apostle teaches in Rom. 6: «He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared unto glory». And ch. 11: «For I would not have you ignorant, brethren, he says, of this mystery, that you be not wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part has happened in Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles should come in». And again, speaking in the same place of the ruin of the Jews, he says: «Have they so stumbled, that they should fall? God forbid». As if he were to say, was their fall the end intended by God? God forbid. But, he says, their offense is the salvation of the Gentiles, that they may emulate them: that is, that they may have an example, lest they be proud, as they were proud and fell. And again in the same place he says to the Gentiles: But now you have obtained mercy because of their unbelief. And this is the mystery which the Apostle, admiring, says in Rom. 11: O the depth of the riches, etc. All these things we have reported lest the theologian fear to assert that the permission of the sin of Adam was an effect of the predestination of Christ. For that permission was necessary, that the Word might assume flesh, and be the Redeemer of the human race. We have said the permission necessary, according to the order of divine providence revealed to us concerning the salvation of the human race, and concerning Christ, who was predestined to be a Priest for ever, and through the Victim of his Body to be the Savior of sinful men; whence also he obtained a proper name and was called Jesus: all which things, if certain modern theologians would attentively consider, they would not so easily assert that, even with Adam not sinning, the Son of God was going to assume human nature.