Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, and certain according to faith, as is clear from Rom. 8: Whom he predestinated etc. The reason of the conclusion is: because it is necessary that there pre-exist in the divine mind the account of the order of those who are to be sent into the end of supernatural beatitude: just as in God there is the account of the order of all things to the end, which we have said to be providence. Since therefore predestination is nothing other than the providence of certain ones who are ordered to a supernatural end, it is necessary that the account of this order pre-exist in God, and this is divine predestination, which, as to the objects which it regards, is called a part of providence, insofar as those objects are a part, with respect to all things provided by God.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE in the solution to the third, where St. Thomas says that to be predestined belongs to angels as also to men, although they were not wretched. Where St. Thomas says that predestination belongs univocally to angels and to men. From which we can gather that reprobation too belongs univocally to men and to angels, since the discipline of contraries is the same. Which teaching let it be observed up to art. 5, where with St. Thomas we shall show that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of reprobate men, more than of Angels.

Concerning the solution to the fourth, take note that St. Thomas says that, if their predestination were revealed to all the predestined according to the ordinary law, then those to whom it has not been revealed would despair. Concerning which teaching a doubt could be raised, whether that man to whom the revelation of his own reprobation were made would be bound, or could hope, or rather would despair by necessity of consequence, and by despairing would not sin? Which indeed will have to be defined in 2. 2., q. 22, art. 1. In the meantime, however, we say briefly that that man would not be bound to hope for beatitude, nor could he hope for it. The reason is: because by the certainty of the judgment that he was not going to attain beatitude, the application of the object of hope to the estimation was necessarily impeded, since the object of hope must be judged to be practically possible, here and now. I say secondly that it did not follow by necessity of consequence that that man would despair with a despair directly contrary to the theological virtue of hope. And the reason is: because such despair is concerning the divine mercy, as though it were insufficient for saving; but this judgment neither speculatively nor practically necessarily followed from such a revelation. I say thirdly that that man would not sin by despairing negatively, either on the part of the act, by not hoping, or on the part of the object, namely voluntarily desisting from the pursuit of beatitude. The reason is: because such despair is not directly opposed to the theological virtue of hope, but rather necessarily follows upon that certain judgment which the man would have from the revelation made to him.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Predestination is not something in the predestined. The reason is, because predestination is a part of providence; but providence is not in the things provided, but is a certain account existing in the intellect of the provider: therefore etc.

Second conclusion: The passive execution of predestination is in the predestined, but the active is in God.

Third conclusion, in the solution to the fourth: Predestination imports a respect to grace, as of a cause to an effect, and of an act to an object.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED, for the understanding of St. Thomas in these two articles: Whether predestination formally imports an act of the divine intellect, or rather of the divine will? And it is argued first, that it is an act of the divine will. For in Scripture the predestined are called elect, beloved; but election and love are acts of the will, therefore predestination too. The major is clear, Matt. 22: «Many are called, but few are chosen». And Eph. 1: «He chose us in him before the foundation of the world»; Rom. 9: «Not of works, but of him that calls, it was said, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated»; Rom. 8: «To them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as according to his purpose are called to be saints». But by the name of purpose the Apostle understands predestination, according to the common explanation; but purpose is an act of the will: therefore predestination too.

The second argument is from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4. Where he says that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things: therefore it is an act of the will. The consequence is proved: because otherwise predestination would presuppose itself, for if it is posited in the intellect it must be the foreknowledge of certain future things.

Scotus, in 1 Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, says that predestination principally and properly imports the purpose and good-pleasure of God willing to give glory to certain ones, and the means necessary for such an end; but because nothing is willed unless foreknown, he says that predestination presupposes an act of the intellect; and therefore it is sometimes taken for an act of the intellect, but improperly and less principally. The same opinion St. Bonaventure follows, in the same place, q. 2. But other Scholastic Doctors say that by the name of predestination there is understood at once and equally an act of the intellect and of the will of God; and they prove it from the definition which the Master of the Sentences lays down in the same place: for he says «predestination is the preparation of grace», which cannot be without foreknowledge. Likewise from Augustine, book On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 14: «predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God». See, where foreknowledge and preparation are placed in the definition of predestination, of which the one, namely foreknowledge, is intellectual, the other, namely preparation, is an act of the will. St. Thomas here, and in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 1, holds that, if by the name of Predestination we principally and formally understand an act of the divine intellect, some act of the will necessarily precedes it, in our mode of understanding. For although it is true, absolutely speaking, that the action of the intellect is prior to the action of the will, nevertheless not every intellectual action is prior to every action of the will, as a prudential act is posterior to the right intention of the end: so therefore it must be said that predestination is a special act of providence, which presupposes the intention and love of God with respect to those who are predestined, as will be more fully explained in art. 4. But for a greater understanding of St. Thomas and of the things which are to be said on this matter, we must lay down a necessary foundation, namely that in divine things all things are together, and nothing is prior or posterior in any genus of cause, nor is anything really distinct from another, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. Concerning which foundation some things are to be noted: First, that according to our mode of conceiving, we who know a most simple and infinite thing not by a simple concept but by many, and imperfectly, it is necessary to distinguish certain divine attributes pertaining to the unity of the Divine Essence: in each of which we know the Divine Essence imperfectly according to one account, not knowing, but neither denying, that other perfections are essentially contained in the same: for example, we distinguish the attribute of wisdom from the attribute of omnipotence, justice and mercy. And indeed in these very attributes, just as we make a distinction insofar as we attribute them to God, so also we find certain priorities among the divine attributes themselves, so that we say some are prior, others posterior: which priority and posteriority nevertheless arises from the imperfection of our intellect and is terminated in it, and is not transferred to the thing signified: otherwise we would be blasphemers, attributing to God what does not belong to him. In this manner, then, theologians piously and religiously say that the attribute of immutability is prior to the attribute of eternity: and that the reason why God is eternal is conveniently rendered by this, that he is altogether immutable. But they do not assert that in God himself there is a distinction of immutability and eternity, but the whole distinction is in our mode of understanding. With this nevertheless it stands in truth that the foundation of such a distinction, which our reason has devised, is really in God, on account of the eminence and infinity of the divine to-be itself. And this suffices for a distinction of reasoned reason, that is, one having a foundation in the thing, and not only in the reason reasoning, in the way that the same is distinguished from itself, as when we say Peter is the same as himself, we distinguish the subject from the predicate by a reason reasoning.

Note secondly, that we are similarly accustomed to speak of the divine actions with respect to creatures, so that we say that God understands or wills this before that, that is, we understand first that God wills or understands this, before we understand that he understands or wills another. Hence it follows that, because in our mode of understanding the same thing is accustomed to be prior and posterior with respect to the same thing in different genera of causes, so also we are accustomed and able to affirm that God understands or wills something prior and posterior with respect to the same thing; for example, God wills the end before the means, namely to confer eternal salvation on men, before the means to such an end, that is, we do not understand the end to be referred to the divine will before the means themselves: but again in another genus of cause, as it were material and dispositive to the end, we say that God wills merits to be before rewards; which priority and posteriority nevertheless is wholly terminated and completed in the effects themselves, and in our mode of understanding: because in God there is only a single act of will, by which he wills at once all things which he wills, although he wills one to be on account of another, and he wills to confer glory on account of merits, and confers merits on account of glory, in different genera of causes.

Note thirdly, that by this teaching an answer must be given when it is asked whether God willed things first in the to-be of nature than in the to-be of grace? And whether he willed the Incarnation of his Son before permitting the sin of Adam? For it must be answered that, if these effects be considered according to the account of the priority of the final cause, then the to-be of grace is priorly willed by God as the end of the whole to-be of nature; but again, because the to-be of nature is presupposed in the genus of material and subjective cause, hence it is that we understand that God willed to create the universe before we understand that he so willed to love the world as to give his Only-begotten Son. Proportionally, the permission of sin is priorly willed in the genus of quasi-material cause than the Incarnation of Christ, and than the most high sacrifice which he offered on the Cross, which is a certain good most excellent in the world, and therefore in the genus of final cause it is priorly willed than the permission of sin itself: on the contrary, the permission of sin is not willed of itself, but on account of another good, which God intends to do through it. «So good indeed is God, says Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 11, and book 11 of The City of God, ch. 18, that he would in no way allow any evil to be in his works, unless that from that evil itself he might do good». From which teaching let us gather against some of the moderns that the permission of sin, even of angels, is directly provided and willed by God as a means, not indeed from its own nature, but divinely ordered to a good greater than the good whose privation the sin imports. Just as God also orders poverty to the Kingdom of heaven, not from its own nature. But some think that the permission of sin has only the account of an occasion, as also sin itself. Against whose opinion we shall speak more widely in art. 3. For now, however, let this argument suffice, because what is done in time in an ordered way by God was so ordained and willed from eternity; but in time the permission of sin has the account of a good, from nowhere else than because it is ordered to such a good: therefore God from eternity so provided and ordained that permission to every good to which it is ordered in time.

Note fourthly, that from what has been said it follows how frivolous is that consequence of Scotus, which is frequently made in the School, namely: God knew Christ as predestined before the sin of Adam: therefore even if Adam had not sinned, the divine Word would have assumed human flesh; for by a like account this consequence would be good: God knew the order of nature before that of grace; therefore if the order of grace were not to be, God would create the order of nature: or, conversely: God knew the order of grace in the genus of final cause before the order of nature; therefore even if the order of nature were not to be, the order of grace would come about. The reason is: because in these consequences, from the priority of our reason, as to the mode of understanding in one genus of cause or another, there is gathered, without any appearance, a real priority in the things themselves, or the independence of one thing from another according to the order established by God. As if you were to say, the form is understood before the matter, and is willed before it, since it has a greater account of good; therefore even if the matter were not to be, the form would come about.

Lastly note that that distinction of Cajetan, 3rd part, q. 1, art. 3, ad quartum, is not very necessary; where, in order to solve the arguments of Scotus and explain the saying of St. Thomas, who says in the solution to the fourth that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, he distinguishes among the effects of predestination. For some are not only ordered but constituted through predestination, as grace and glory; but some are only ordered through predestination, as that Peter be according to natural existence and the rest pertaining to the natural order of the universe, all of which have the account of future things from eternity, from divine providence, and not from predestination; on the contrary, predestination itself, as it were supervening, orders the soul of Peter to supernatural beatitude, by the mediation of grace, just as the order of grace supervenes on the order of nature. Likewise Cajetan reduces to the order of nature all defects, both in natural things, as monsters and diseases, and also in rational things, as ignorance and moral evil, which is sin, which indeed is a defect of the rational nature, and not pertaining to the order of grace, but rather to the order of nature (but Cajetan would have said better, to the deordination of the rational nature). Hence Cajetan gathers that Scotus's imagination is false, namely that Peter is predestined to glory before he is foreseen as about to sin: on the contrary, says Cajetan, just as Peter is foreseen according to those things which pertain to the order of nature before he is predestined, so he is foreseen as about to sin before he is predestined; because that Peter sin pertains to the order of nature, upon which the order of predestination or reprobation supervenes. Whence Cajetan distinguishes three orders in things, so that God first ordained the universe according to the order of nature; and because the universe, according to such an order, does not attain to the divine fruition, it was elevated through a superadded order of grace: and because even such an order did not attain to the union possible in the highest way with God, God preordained the creature to a personal union with God. Whence Cajetan well infers that the predestination of Christ presupposes indeed the foreknowledge of sins, but does not presuppose the foreknowledge of all future things. And so he explains St. Thomas when he said that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, namely of certain ones, and not of all. We have said therefore that Cajetan's discourse is not very necessary for the solution of Scotus's arguments, because it is easy to invert these three orders, if the discourse be about priority in the genus of final cause, which priority indeed holds the first place with respect to divine providence. So therefore we understand that the order of creatures to a personal union with God falls first under divine providence: for all things are ordered to this end. From which order Christ results, who is the head and fount of the second order of grace, through which the rational creature is ordered to glory. And lastly this second order, because it is better and more excellent, is prior in the intention of God, the first agent and the ultimate end, than the order of nature, which is only presupposed and pre-understood in the genus of material cause: which will yet appear more widely in what follows. Then, what Cajetan says, that sin foreknown by God pertains to the pure order of nature, seems to us false, both in the Angels and also in Adam. Because both the Angels and Adam sinned immediately against a supernatural precept: therefore such a sin already presupposes the order of nature to God as to a supernatural end; and consequently it pertains to the order, or rather to the deordination from the supernatural end.

THESE things being thus established, let this be the first conclusion: The acts which we can imagine to be in the divine mind, both common and proper, concerning the predestined, are these: God knew all men as possible, of whom he loved some as to the to-be of nature, and these he willed to create; of whom he further loved some to a supernatural end, which divine love is called election, insofar as out of the others whom he willed to create he separated these for himself; and lastly, these elect he predestined, that is, he provided and ordained that, through certain supernatural means, they efficaciously attain the supernatural end. This conclusion is not proved otherwise than from the natural mode of conceiving and proceeding of our intellect, and from the nature of the one knowing and of the thing known: for first of all there must be attributed to God what is natural to him, namely the cognition of all possible things, both those pertaining to the order of grace and those pertaining to the order of nature. Then we attribute to God those things which belong to him not from necessity of nature, as is to love men; then, those which belong to God as he is the author of grace, insofar as it is his special love to a supernatural end, which love does not extend to all men, whom he loved as to the to-be of nature: for that reason such love is called election, as St. Thomas excellently teaches in art. 4. And lastly he orders these elect through certain means to such an end.

Second conclusion: From these aforesaid acts, which we have enumerated, we say that the account pre-existing in the divine mind concerning the efficacious means for attaining the end is properly called predestination, which presupposes, in our mode of understanding, election and love. To this opinion is consonant what Augustine says in the book On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 17, that to predestinate is to dispose and order future things in foreknowledge: but to dispose and to order pertains intrinsically to the action of the intellect. Jerome says the same, in the place above, on ch. 1 of Ephesians. Likewise the Apostle, Rom. 11: «Has God cast away his people which he foreknew?», that is, which he predestined. And Acts 13: «As many as were ordained to life everlasting believed»; but to preordain names an act of the intellect; therefore to predestinate too. And lastly, predestination is called the Book of life, in which the names of the predestined are written; but a Book in spiritual things pertains to the intellect, and indeed it fits better with the primitive signification of predestination, according to the Latin tongue. I confess nevertheless that it matters not much for solving the graver questions, namely whether there is a cause of predestination on our part, and of reprobation? and whether there is a certain number of the predestined? It matters little, I say, whether by the name of predestination we understand divine election or love or providence: for if a cause of any of these were given outside God, it would be the same also of the other acts which we posit in God. And by this the arguments are clear.

To the first it is answered that, because the predestined are also elect and beloved, for that reason they are so called in Scripture; but for this it is not required that predestination be an act of the will.

To the second, from the teaching of St. Thomas it is answered that he did not understand predestination to presuppose the foreknowledge of all future things, but of certain ones, and in a certain genus of cause, as we explained above.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly, especially concerning the second and third conclusions: Which and how many are the effects which are included in the execution of predestination. For the understanding of which question note first that effects of this sort can be considered by us in many ways. For some are common to the predestined and the reprobate, others are special to the predestined themselves. For some are remote effects from their own nature, but presupposed and ordered by God under the order of predestination or reprobation, as is the creation of souls and of Angels: but some are from their own nature of the same order as predestination and reprobation, as for example the merit of Christ and his sacrifice, which he offered for us, is, as to sufficiency, of the order of predestination. Similarly the permission of the sin of Adam, so that in him the whole nature fell, is of the order of reprobation, as much as is on its part, but from divine mercy the permission of that sin is ordered to the salvation of certain ones; just as, conversely, the Passion of Christ itself, which of itself is of the order of predestination, nevertheless, on account of the malice of man, is turned into a greater condemnation for him. Again, the special effects of all the predestined are justification with perseverance, and glorification: for what the Apostle says, Rom. 8: «Whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified»; it must be understood collectively, so that it belongs only to the predestined; for otherwise the calling, which is through faith, and true justification through the grace of God, is common even to certain reprobate. For although of itself the calling and justification is not of the order of reprobation, but rather of predestination, nevertheless man, on account of his sin, is the cause of losing justification; and consequently he turns the preceding justification into a greater and more just condemnation for himself, according to that of 2 Pet., ch. 2: «It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them». Then, the special effects of the predestined: some regard the singular predestination of each one, as for example the miraculous conversion of Paul, and of the thief on the cross, and singular inspirations of God, greater or lesser with respect to each predestined person. But others are common to all the predestined, as we have said. There are besides certain effects similar and equal considered in themselves, which belong indifferently to the predestined and the reprobate; but considered with respect to divine providence they are very dissimilar, of which sort are a man's temperament prone to certain studies or to different states of life. Likewise sharpness of mind or dullness, a good or bad disposition of body, the vice or virtue of parents, riches and poverty, health and sickness, persecutions, or temporal peace, all of which to certain theologians do not seem to be effects of predestination or reprobation, because of themselves they have no proportion with the supernatural end, and happen without distinction to the good and the wicked.

But to us it seems that judgment must be made otherwise, insofar as all these things are subjected to the order of divine providence. For so they are to some effects of predestination, but to others of reprobation. And it is proved from that of Rom. 8: «And we know that to them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as according to his purpose are called to be saints». Which place St. Augustine explains in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 9, tome 7, concerning the predestined; and therefore the Apostle said, to those who according to his purpose are called to be saints, that is, according to the election of the will of God they are called that they be saints even unto the end. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 17, in the same tome, he says: «What is it, all things work together unto good, unless even the most savage persecutions themselves?» Nay, moreover Augustine himself, in the book On Correction and Grace, in the place above, says that all things work together unto good for those who love God to such an extent that if at some time they stray and go out of the way, even this itself he makes to profit them unto good, insofar as being more humbled they return through penance. So Bernard teaches on the Psalm, He that dwelleth, in Sermon 2. Moreover there is added what the Apostle says in Rom. 14: «He that eats, eats to the Lord, for he gives thanks to God, and he that eats not, eats not to the Lord; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord». Whence a theological reason can be gathered. All temporal things, whether good or evil, can be means and instruments of charity, and its material object, which is ordainable to the glory of God: therefore they can be effects of predestination. And proportionally, if, God permitting, all these things are ordered through the malice of free choice to the evil of guilt even unto the end, they will be effects of reprobation. It is confirmed: because the Church asks in the Litanies for many temporal goods: therefore they can be effects of predestination. And lastly goods of this sort fall under the object of the hope of the theological virtue, as St. Thomas says, 2. 2., q. 17, art. 2, ad 2. They fall also under merit, as he teaches, 1. 2., last question, last article: therefore they can be effects of predestination, insofar as they are ordered by divine grace to the end of eternal life.

It is to be noted lastly that the effects of predestination can be considered in two ways. In one way, with respect to the predestination of the whole mystical body of the predestined; and with respect to the predestination of each one in particular. If they be considered in the first way, not only the goods, but also every permission of the sins of all is an effect of the predestination of the whole mystical body: for all things are ordered to the greater perfection and beauty of the heavenly Jerusalem. And so not only the permission of the sin of Adam, but of all men and Angels is an effect of the predestination of all the elect, for Augustine says, book 11 of The City of God, ch. 18: For God would not create any one, I do not say of the Angels, but even of men, whom he had foreknown to be evil, unless he equally knew to what uses of goods he would accommodate them; and so he would adorn the order of the ages, like a most beautiful poem, even out of certain antitheses, as it were. This is what the Apostle teaches in Rom. 6: «He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared unto glory». And ch. 11: «For I would not have you ignorant, brethren, he says, of this mystery, that you be not wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part has happened in Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles should come in». And again, speaking in the same place of the ruin of the Jews, he says: «Have they so stumbled, that they should fall? God forbid». As if he were to say, was their fall the end intended by God? God forbid. But, he says, their offense is the salvation of the Gentiles, that they may emulate them: that is, that they may have an example, lest they be proud, as they were proud and fell. And again in the same place he says to the Gentiles: But now you have obtained mercy because of their unbelief. And this is the mystery which the Apostle, admiring, says in Rom. 11: O the depth of the riches, etc. All these things we have reported lest the theologian fear to assert that the permission of the sin of Adam was an effect of the predestination of Christ. For that permission was necessary, that the Word might assume flesh, and be the Redeemer of the human race. We have said the permission necessary, according to the order of divine providence revealed to us concerning the salvation of the human race, and concerning Christ, who was predestined to be a Priest for ever, and through the Victim of his Body to be the Savior of sinful men; whence also he obtained a proper name and was called Jesus: all which things, if certain modern theologians would attentively consider, they would not so easily assert that, even with Adam not sinning, the Son of God was going to assume human nature.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative and certain according to faith, as is clear from Mal. 1: «I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated». But the reason of the conclusion not only proves it, but also shows what reprobation is, and what are the effects of reprobation per se. And so the reason of the conclusion is: because it pertains to providence to permit some defect in things which are subject to providence, as was said above, q. 22, a. 2: therefore, since by divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it pertains to the same providence that it permit some to fail from this end; and this, he says, is to reprobate.

Second conclusion: Reprobation does not name foreknowledge only, but adds something according to account. The reason is: because reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fall away from this end, just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation.

Third conclusion: Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. This he proves in no other way than by comparison with predestination, which includes the will of conferring grace and glory.

Fourth conclusion, to the second: Reprobation stands otherwise in causing than predestination; for predestination is the cause of future glory and of present grace, but reprobation is not the cause of present guilt, but is the cause of abandonment by God and of that which is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. This he proves, because guilt comes from the free choice of him who is reprobated and is deserted by grace. Likewise he confirms it from that of Hos. 13: «Thy destruction, Israel, is from thee; only in me is thy help».

Fifth conclusion, to the third: When it is said that the reprobate cannot obtain the grace of God, it is not to be understood according to absolute impossibility, but according to conditional impossibility. The reason is: because the reprobation of God does not take away anything from the power of the reprobate, nor does it take away the freedom of free choice.

COMMENTARY.

ON the first conclusion there is no doubt among Catholics, but it is certain according to faith, according to which we confess that very many are to be condemned forever on account of their sins. We confess also that God knew from eternity what would come to be concerning such as are not predestined, and willed to permit them to fail from the end of eternal life; and this is what we say, that God reprobates some men, whether that reprobation itself be an act of the intellect or of the will; whether it be explained by a positive act of divine providence or will with respect to all the effects of reprobation, or be explained by a negation of divine providence or will with respect to the permission of sin: for all these points are disputed among theologians. In this sense, therefore, thus defined, there are very many testimonies of Scripture in which mention is made of the predestined and the reprobate, although not often under this name of reprobation, or of the reprobated or reprobate: this manner of speaking, however, has its foundation in Scripture: for example, 1 Cor. 9: «I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway»; and 2 Cor. 13: «Do you not know yourselves, that Christ Jesus is in you? unless perhaps you are reprobates. But I hope that you shall know that we are not reprobates». Such reprobates are also called vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, Rom. 9; they are also called vessels unto dishonour, 2 Tim. 2. They are also said not to be known with the cognition of approbation, just as the predestined are said to be known to God: The Lord knows who are his; but others he is said not to know, Mt. 7: «I know you not, and then I will profess to them, that I never knew you».

IT IS DOUBTED first, concerning the very name of reprobation: whether it signifies an act of the divine intellect, or of the will, concerning those who are to be condemned?

And I prove first, that it is not an act of the intellect, nor of the will of God. For if it were of the intellect, it would regard the false as the object of reprobation: for thus doctors are said to reprobate some opinion. But if it is an act of the will, it would regard the evil as the object which is reprobated: but neither of these can be verified of the reprobation of which we speak: therefore. The minor is proved: because, as St. Thomas says in the article, reprobation includes the will of permitting some to fail from the end of eternal life; but that permission is neither false nor evil: therefore reprobation in God cannot be called or be such an act of intellect or of will. It is confirmed: because to reprobate properly seems to be either to reject or to refute something which is presupposed to be false or evil, according to that of Heb. 6: «The earth that bringeth forth thorns and briers is accursed and reprobate, whose end is to be burned». But the Apostle understands by the name of earth the sinners who abuse the goodness of God. But the reprobation of which we speak does not presuppose the future sin; indeed the first effect of reprobation is the permission of sin; but permission is prior to sin: therefore reprobation does not regard sin immediately, therefore the will of God or the judgment of permitting some to fall into guilt is improperly called reprobation. Second. Granted that predestination is an act of the intellect, inasmuch as it is the account of the order of the means and of the attainment of eternal beatitude, nevertheless reprobation cannot be an account in God pre-existing of the deordination and defect from such an end; therefore it is not an act of the intellect. The minor is proved: because deordination from the end is sin; but in God there is no practical account of sin; therefore reprobation is not an act of the intellect. For the solution of this difficulty it must be noted that if we follow the etymology of the name, reprobation is not properly said except with respect to an evil or false object, just as approbation is said with respect to the good or the true; but nevertheless the name has been transferred by theologians to signify the act of divine providence or will concerning those men who on account of their sins are to be condemned and reprobated. And because concerning such as are to be condemned there is not only divine foreknowledge, but also providence and the will of permitting their sin, such an act takes its name not from the permission, which is good and ordered to a good end, but from the last effect of this providence and will, which is damnation on account of guilt, on account of which they are properly held in hatred and are worthy of reprobation. Whence they are even sometimes called foreknown, inasmuch as God foreknew their sins, on account of which they were to be condemned, with respect to which sins foreknowledge and not providence is said to be in God. We therefore, like the Scholastic theologians, use the name reprobation to signify that divine act whose first effect is the permission of falling into sin even unto death, whether that act be of the intellect or of the will.

Nevertheless, to speak consequentially, we set down a single conclusion: Reprobation signifies an act of the intellect formally, but presupposes an act of the will. It is proved: because reprobation stands to the reprobate as predestination stands to the predestined: but predestination is an account pre-existing in God of the order to the end: therefore reprobation is the account of the order of the reprobate to the end intended by God, namely that he show forth vindictive justice, for which end the permission of sin is necessary, and is ordered by God and willed to such an end. Whence reprobation is called by St. Thomas a part of providence, just as predestination. But that it presupposes an act of the will according to our mode of understanding, as predestination also does, is manifest. For the will of the end is prior to the account of the means to the end. It must be noted also here that when predestination or reprobation is called a part of providence, no act distinct from divine providence is understood; nor is it understood that it is a subjective or integral part with respect to divine providence; but the account of part is to be considered on the part of the things provided, in that some are predestined by divine providence, while others are reprobated by the same act of divine providence.

To the first argument we have already said that reprobation, as it is employed by theologians, does not regard immediately the false or the evil, but the permission of guilt, against which punishment is ordered for the showing forth of divine justice. With this, nevertheless, it stands that the name reprobation was imposed by the Scholastic theologians, especially the Thomists, having regard to the evil of guilt, which follows from the divine permission by necessity of the consequent, not as from a cause. To the confirmation, it is clear from these things.

To the second it is answered that reprobation is not so contrary to predestination as to be the account of deordination from the end of beatitude: but it is the account of the order in the divine mind with respect to the means which are ordered by God to this end, namely that he show forth vindictive justice in the punishment of sins. And again: the showing forth of justice of this kind is ordered to the greater showing forth of mercy in the predestined, which is Catholic doctrine and is confirmed from the Sacred Letters, as is clear from Rom. 9: But if God, willing to show... etc. And it is confirmed from Ps. 149: That they may execute upon them the judgment that is written; this glory is to all his saints. Likewise 1 Cor. 3: For all things are yours, whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come: for all are yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's. Where the Apostle briefly described the whole order of divine providence concerning the whole universe, both in the to-be of nature and in the to-be of grace. In which let the theologian learn to assert unity in divine providence on the part of the one order provided with respect to the supernatural end. For the natural end, which is called ultimate, is not ultimate simply, but in a certain respect with respect to divine providence, through which it is still ordered to the supernatural end, so certainly that although God is known by us first as the author of nature than of grace, since grace presupposes nature, by way of generation: yet in the genus of final cause God must be understood by the theologian first as the author of grace than as the author of nature: because he willed to create the world for this, that he might raise it up and dignify it through this, that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us: and this too, before the sin of Adam, in the formation of the woman from the rib of the sleeping man, God prefigured. For according to the common understanding of the Fathers that divine operation signified that from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Church was to be built. And the Apostle teaches this very thing in Eph. 5, explaining the words of the first parent: This now is bone of my bones etc., this is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church, that that figure was fulfilled.

From what has been said we can gather that the reason of St. Thomas's first conclusion, although it is not that demonstration showing that it necessarily pertains to divine providence that sin be permitted, nevertheless proves more than that such a permission of sin could have pertained to divine providence. But to us that reason seems to conclude that it most befitted divine providence to permit sin to this end, that the omnipotence, wisdom, justice, and mercy of God might the more appear in its effects, God who is so good and powerful that even from the permission of sin, which by its nature is a deordination from the divine goodness, he has nevertheless effected much greater goods than if there had been no sin.

IT IS DOUBTED second, concerning the second and third conclusion of the article.

Whether divine reprobation is some positive act of the divine intellect or of the divine will with respect to the reprobate, insofar as they are reprobate? For the negative side it is argued first from this, that St. Thomas to the first says, "insofar, therefore, as he does not will this good for certain ones, which is eternal life, God is said to hold them in hatred, or to reprobate them": therefore reprobation does not name a positive act of the divine will. It is confirmed from that of Mt. 18: It is not the will before your Father that one of these little ones should perish, who believe in me: therefore in God there is no will concerning the damnation of the faithful, of whom many are reprobate.

Secondly. It is not lawful to attribute to God anything that savors of cruelty: but to have a positive will from eternity concerning some men, willing on purpose to exclude them from his Kingdom, permitting them to sin, and to punish them for their sins, seems to be a matter of cruelty, and not of divine benignity: therefore such an act is not to be posited in God.

Thirdly. For for those things which are to be asserted and explained concerning the faith regarding the difference between the good and the evil, it suffices that with respect to the damned we say that God stood from eternity merely negatively, not willing to bring help to certain ones that they might not sin, although, the foreknowledge of future sin being supposed, he willed to punish them forever; therefore it is not necessary to assert that God on purpose willed to exclude certain ones from eternal life, and willed to permit them to sin, in order to punish them forever.

For the solution of this difficulty it must be noted that the sense of this question is no other than if we ask how divine providence with respect to the reprobate may be more fittingly explained by us, since it is in itself pure act, nor does it stand in itself otherwise according to the thing with respect to the variety of all things, even of the predestined and the reprobate. From which it follows that that mode of explaining the divine will will be more fitting which will be more befitting to divine providence and the other divine attributes.

Let this be the first conclusion, certain according to faith: God, with respect to the guilt which was to be in the reprobate, did not have an affirmative act of the will, by which he willed sins to be, or them to sin. This is proved in no other way than because the divine will is not the cause of sin: which is certain according to the Catholic faith, nor is it for the present place to confirm this truth by many reasons or testimonies. Since, therefore, whatever the divine will wills outside itself must needs effect: it is plain that it cannot will sin, which cannot be the efficient cause of sin.

Second conclusion: The act of the divine will concerning the permission of the sin of the reprobate and concerning the subtraction of efficacious help, which being posited they would not sin, or if they sinned would do penance, must be explained affirmatively, and not only negatively. And so God had this act from eternity, I will to permit these sins, I will not to give certain ones the helps which, if they received them, they would not sin. This conclusion is proved first, because the permission of sin is good and is ordered to a good end: therefore the divine will wills to permit sin. It is confirmed, because God on purpose wills to confer supernatural helps on certain men, by which helps they will efficaciously attain the ultimate end: therefore if he denies such helps to certain ones, he on purpose wills not to give them. The consequence is proved: since from such a denial of help a greater good follows, namely that the divine mercy may shine forth the more in the predestined. Secondly it is proved, because if the divine will concerning the permission of sin were explained purely negatively, the difference between the predestined and the reprobate would not pertain to divine providence; as regards this, that God willed the predestined to remain in good, but permitted others to fall into sin, and to remain in it. The sequel is proved: because God, not knowing and prudent, would have willed such a distinction, but would have accepted the predestined for himself: and concerning the others he would not have applied any care, but would have stood toward them just as toward those whom he was never to create, as regards that which pertains to obtaining or not obtaining eternal life. It is proved thirdly, because unless we posit the permission of sin to be provided by God, as it is willed, it would follow, as we argued above in q. 22, a. 2, that sin would be by chance with respect to divine foreknowledge. The sequel is proved: because again it would follow that divine foreknowledge with respect to future sin would not be measured by something intrinsic in God himself, but rather its truth would be measured by the future contingent. Again the sequel is proved: because God would not foreknow a sin infallibly future, except only in a contingent cause, such as is the free choice of creatures.

Nor is it of any avail to answer that God knows sin by knowing his own goodness, in which he knows not only all possible things ordainable to himself, but also all the possible modes by which the free choice of creatures can be deordinated from the ultimate end; I say this solution does not suffice, because in that way God would not know future sins otherwise than as possible, nor would he distinguish between future sins and possible ones. Whence neither could he be a just judge, rendering to each according to his works.

But some answer that God foreknows future sins by intuitive cognition, and distinguishes them from possible things, because future sins coexist with the eternity of God. But this solution rather runs counter to the opinion of those who deny that the divine will and providence are the cause of the permission of sin. For we confess that it is indeed true that God knows sins future, past, and present, insofar as they coexist with eternity; but from this is taken a most strong argument for confirming our conclusion: for if future sins are known by God by intuitive cognition insofar as they coexist with eternity: therefore the eternal knower, as God, is the cause of the entity of the act of sin, although he is not the cause of the sin. The consequence is proved: because sin is knowable insofar as it is a being: therefore God knows, by intuitive cognition, sin insofar as the will of God is the cause of the entity of the act of sin, and at the same time permitting that the free choice failing from the rule concur to the same act; and so the infallibility of divine providence is not measured by anything extrinsic, but it is from providence and the will of permitting sin that God foreknows, by intuitive cognition, the future sin. It is confirmed, because the intuitive cognition of God, with respect to sin, regards the coexistence of sin with the eternity of God, which belongs to the evil of guilt insofar as it is in the good and in being, of which God is the cause: therefore the intuitive cognition of God regards that per se of which God is the cause; and thus it knows sin. Moreover, the doctrine of the second conclusion is expressly that of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 100, where, explaining that of Ps. 100, The works of the Lord are great, sought out according to all his wills, etc., he says that in a wondrous and infallible manner that does not come about apart from his will which even comes about against his will: because it would not come about if he did not allow it, nor does he allow it being unwilling, but willing; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done unless he were omnipotent, and could make good out of evil. Behold, where Augustine expressly says that God wills to permit evil to be done: and this from providence, on account of a greater good. And immediately, in the following chapter, he adds the difference between the will of God and of man with respect to the same material object. For sometimes the good will of a man wills something which God does not will, for example, if a good son wills that his father live, whom God with a good will wills to die. And again it can happen that a man wills with an evil will what God wills with a good will, as if a wicked son wills that his father die, and God also wills this. So much (he says) does it matter what it befits man to will, what it befits God, and to what end each one refers his will, so that it is either approved or disapproved.

From this doctrine it can be understood how, not only with respect to the same material object and one extrinsic to the will itself, but also with respect to the same interior act of the will, as regards its entity, the will of a man can be evil, and the will of God good, as the efficient cause of that act; for example, God is the willing and efficient cause of the act of hating God, and the human will is the voluntary and efficient cause of the same act. But the will of a man is evil, because it exercises such an act without the rule of reason, indeed against the rule and law of God: but God with a good will elicits that act, permitting the defect of the second cause in it, so that from this he may make some greater good, namely that he show forth his goodness by punishing justly, and the more by showing mercy with respect to others, or even with respect to the same one, if he has been predestined.

Furthermore the second conclusion is proved: because it falls under divine providence that this man abstain from sin: therefore it falls under the same that another be permitted to fall and to sin. The consequence is proved: because otherwise that detestable act of sin would not be discerned by divine providence from the other, but rather such a discernment would be by chance with respect to divine providence: therefore it falls under the same providence that another be permitted to sin. It is confirmed: because otherwise there would not be providence concerning the motion of free choice, but only concerning the conferring of free choice: according to which God established man in the hand of his counsel, as is said in Eccles. 15, as the fourth argument of St. Thomas intended, above, q. 22, a. 2; to which it seemed to St. Thomas that it must necessarily be said that by the conferring of free choice man is discerned from natural things, which are only acted upon, as it were directed by another to the end. Nevertheless, the act of free choice is reduced to God as to a cause, whence it is necessary that it be subjected to divine providence: therefore under divine providence falls every operation of free choice, even of sin: directly indeed, insofar as it is an operation; permissively however, insofar as it fails from the rule of reason. And so that of Prov. 16 is verified: The Lord has made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day; namely, in that he created some man whom he willed to permit to be wicked, that on the day of judgment he might show forth his justice in his just condemnation. Moreover it is proved by testimonies of Scripture. When the Lord said to Moses: I will still harden the heart of Pharaoh; what more did he will to signify than this: I have given Pharaoh free choice by which he can be hardened, if he wills, and I know that he will will it. Nay rather he signified, according to the common understanding of the Fathers, that by a just judgment he willed to withdraw gratuitous help, which withdrawn, the voluntary hardening of Pharaoh would infallibly follow. For neither does this necessity of the consequence destroy the freedom of free choice, necessary for sin, as St. Thomas excellently teaches in the solution to the third. Likewise it is proved from that of Rom. 1: Wherefore God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, etc., where according to the common understanding it is signified that God on account of the sin of idolatry permitted those men to commit the worst sins, overturning the whole order of nature: therefore that permission, which is a punishment of sin, was willed and chosen by God. To this view St. Augustine gives support, for in book 5 against Julian — which passage M. Cano both cites and eruditely explains, book 2 of De Locis, ch. 4, to 7 — he says that the permission of falling into guilt pertains not only to the will of God, but to his omnipotence; from which I thus infer: therefore even that permission which is not the punishment of another sin pertains to a positive act of the divine will. The consequence is proved: because the account is altogether the same concerning both permissions; for just as the one pertains to vindictive justice, so the other also looks to the universal providence which God has concerning the whole rational nature with respect to the supernatural end; nor do greater inconveniences follow from one permission than from the other. But the conclusion is proved by a theological reason. The permission of which the present discourse is, is nothing other than the privation of efficacious help, which being posited, every evil of guilt would be impeded: but the cause of such a privation of efficacious help is divine providence: therefore also of the permission of sin. The minor is proved: God decreed from eternity not to give that help to certain ones; otherwise how would he foreknow that it was not to be conferred, unless by his will he had willed not to give it? And it is confirmed first: God chose certain ones before others to whom he would confer these efficacious helps: therefore by his will and providence he discerned those to whom he confers these helps from those to whom he does not confer them: therefore divine providence is the cause of this effect of discernment, because the effect is nothing other than to leave on purpose certain ones destitute of efficacious help, but to help others efficaciously to the attainment of eternal life.

It is confirmed secondly: Predestination in Scripture is very often called election, according to that of Eph. 1: As he chose us in Christ, before the foundation of the world; but election, if we speak properly, is a certain collative operation of the will, through which, certain means being despised, other means are accepted for the end: therefore in divine predestination all this is found, that God by his will chose certain men for the efficacious attainment of eternal life, but despised and spurned certain others. But this contempt is nothing other than the will of permitting them to fail from the ultimate end. And this contempt the Scriptures insinuate to us, when they call reprobation hatred, Mal. 1 and Rom. 9: I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated. Finally, the conclusion is proved: for from the opposite opinion it follows that God stands toward the reprobate by order to eternal life no otherwise than he stands toward a brute animal and a stone; the consequent detracts very greatly from the divine providence which God has concerning the rational nature with respect to the supernatural end. The sequel is proved: toward a stone and a brute animal God stands merely negatively, concerning the attainment of the ultimate supernatural end; but according to the opposite opinion he also stands merely negatively toward reprobate men: therefore he stands in the same way.

Third conclusion: With respect to the damnation and punishment of the reprobate, a positive act is found in the divine will, by which God wills to punish the reprobate forever on account of their sins foreseen by God himself. It is proved: the punishment and condemnation of the reprobate, on account of their offenses, is an effect of vindictive justice; but God is a just and most upright judge: therefore he wills to inflict this punishment on the reprobate. It is confirmed first from that of Rom. 9: But if God, willing to show his wrath, etc., that is, his vindictive justice, as all the Doctors interpret. It is confirmed secondly: The punishment and condemnation of the reprobate is good and just: therefore it is the object of a positive act of the divine will.

TO the arguments. To the first it is answered that St. Thomas sufficiently explains himself in the body of the article, saying that reprobation intrinsically encloses the will of permitting the reprobate to fall into guilt and to fail from the end. But from the fact that in the solution to the first he explains this permission by a negation, it is not lawful to infer that it is not also verified affirmatively, in such a way that God willed to permit that the reprobate sin and fail from eternal life. For although it follows well, Peter wills not to give alms: therefore he does not will to give alms, yet conversely it does not follow.

Therefore St. Thomas in the body of the article explained the permission by a positive act; but in the solution to the third, by a negation, which followed from the affirmation. To the confirmation it is said that in those words of Mt. 18: It is not the will before your Father, etc., there can be a twofold interpretation. One, that "to perish" be understood of the spiritual death of sin; and thus it is most certain that God does not positively will anyone to perish, that is, to sin. The other is, that "to perish" be understood of the death of eternal damnation in hell: and in this understanding those words of Mt. have still a twofold sense. The first is that it be understood of the antecedent will, as that of 2 Pet. 3 is understood: The Lord does not delay his promise, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that some should perish, but that all should be converted to penance. For by an antecedent will God wills all men to be saved, as Paul testifies, 1 Tim. 2. The second sense is that it be understood of the will which regards immediately the punishment and damnation of the reprobate and their exclusion from eternal life, no guilt being presupposed; and this will is not found in God, as will be explained in a. 5. To the second it is answered that the will of which we have just spoken, which, no guilt being foreseen, immediately wills the damnation of the reprobate, savors somewhat of cruelty, and therefore is not posited by us in God. But the will of permitting that some men fail from the rectitude of justice, and consequently from eternal life, savors of no cruelty, but rather looks to the sweet disposition and governance of the universe, according to which it is highly consonant that a nature which is of itself defectible be permitted to fail in certain individuals: indeed from this is taken a most efficacious reason for the second conclusion set down above, in this manner: Everything which by its nature is ordainable to a good end, if it in fact exists in the nature of things, is ordained and willed by God; but the permission that some fall and fail from the end is ordainable to the good and sweet governance of the universe, and is also ordainable to the manifestation of the vindictive justice of God: therefore since this permission in fact occurs, it is willed and ordained by God to such an end. To the third it is answered that for explaining the things which are of faith, and for the perfection of the universal divine providence, it would not have sufficed to assert that, concerning the difference between good and evil men, and concerning the permission that some fail from the end, God stood merely negatively, as is clear from what has been said about the second conclusion.

But some theologians still contend to prove that permission is not an effect of divine providence, and they prove it from this, that permission is not something positive, but a mere negation, namely the subtraction of efficacious help: therefore it is not an effect of divine providence. But it is answered, and I say first, that permission is not a pure negation, but rather a privation, and so it is presupposed in the subject which is permitted to fail from the end that it have an aptitude for that end, which the whole human nature has, even in the reprobate. From which it follows that they would say most improperly that God permits a stone not to attain eternal life, because in a stone there is no aptitude for eternal life. I say the second and I answer the argument, that we do not assert permission to be so much an effect of divine providence that it is something produced by divine providence; but we speak morally, and we say that permission is an object willed by the divine will and ordered to the good of the universe and to the manifestation of divine justice; just as blindness, and any other defect of nature, is an object of natural providence and an effect of it. Other theologians admit permission in the divine will; but they say that that permission is nothing other than that God has left man in the hand of his counsel, and has set before him life and death, that he himself might choose good and evil at his own judgment. From which they infer that God equally permits all to commit any sin whatever; but that some do not commit any sin whatever proceeds from their free will. But this doctrine of these theologians has a very great equivocation; for it can be understood first in this sense, that God permits some moral defect in men in two ways: in one way by giving them liberty toward either part, that they may choose good or evil at their own judgment: such that he permits some in fact to fail and to use their liberty for evil; but holds certain others in his hand and does not permit them in fact to use their liberty for evil. This sense is without doubt most true as to the thing, yet it is defective in two respects. First as regards the liberty which man has toward good and evil, and toward either part of the permission by which God permits man to fail in any sin: for most improperly, and against every manner of speaking of the theologians and the saints, indeed of all the faithful, this liberty is called a permission to evil. For all the just faithful assiduously beseech God that he not permit them to fail: for this is the sense of that which we ask in the Lord's Prayer, and lead us not into temptation, that is, do not permit us to succumb to temptations; but the faithful do not ask of God that he not give them liberty to be able to fail, but that he not permit them in fact to use their liberty wickedly: therefore liberty to evil, according to the sense of the faithful, is not a permission of sinning. It is confirmed: No one of the faithful would willingly listen to him who said that God permitted John the Baptist to be a murderer, and — what is absurd — permitted the Blessed Virgin to be an adulteress: which manner of speaking nevertheless most manifestly follows from that opinion, because John the Baptist and the B. Virgin had a liberty, from the nature of the thing, flexible to any sin whatever: therefore the permission of falling into sin is to be taken only in the second way set forth by us. Secondly that opinion is defective in this, that it does not explain whether the permission, taken in the second way, which alone, as I said, is properly a permission, is a positive act in God, or a pure negation.

The second sense of that doctrine is, that God confers on all men, both predestined and reprobate, a sufficient help by which they can do well in every event, if they will: but does not determine or apply their wills to the good or evil use, but the actual operation depends solely on the liberty of choice, of one willing to determine himself to a good or to an evil operation. That doctrine, taken in this sense, pleases certain learned theologians, among whom is Ruardus Tapper, in a. 7, On Free Choice, conclusions 9 and 10. Capreolus, in 2 Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, to 12, reports the opinion of Gregory of Rimini, who in part agrees with this doctrine, and Capreolus follows Gregory. But below, by us in this question, it will be shown most clearly how false this opinion is and how little consonant with Catholic truth. For now we argue briefly against this doctrine. For from it there follows manifestly that God does not have providence of the actual use of free choice: which is contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas and St. Augustine in the places cited above, indeed also to manifest truth; therefore. The sequel is proved: since the whole providence of God is terminated at this, that he confer on free choice a sufficient help by which it can do well if it will; but that it do well or ill would pertain wholly to free choice itself, because God would not determine it to do well or ill. Secondly it is argued: If God stands thus toward the operations of actual free choice as that opinion thinks, it follows that from the fact that God permits some man to sin, it does not follow infallibly that that man in fact sins; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: for, according to that opinion, God equally permits that all men, whether predestined or reprobate, sin, and yet not all in fact sin mortally:

therefore sin does not infallibly follow the divine permission. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for from the Scriptures it is most openly clear that by the very fact that God permits someone to sin, withdrawing from him efficacious help, it immediately follows that he sins. Ps. 80: He let them go according to the desires of their heart: they shall walk in their own inventions, that is, in their sins. Isa. 57: I struck him, and I turned away my face, and he went wandering in the ways of his heart; and Eccles. 7: Consider the works of God, that no man can correct him whom he himself has despised, that is, whom he has permitted to work according to his own desires. But someone will say that in these testimonies the discourse is only about the permission of falling into sin as a punishment of a preceding sin, not about the permission of falling into the first sin, which is not a punishment of another. Against this it is argued thus. That permission of sinning which is the punishment of a preceding sin does not bring a greater necessity to sinning than the other permission which is not a punishment. For although we say that the permission which is a punishment is a positive act of the divine will, as it truly is, because it is an act of vindictive justice, while the other permission, which is not a punishment, is a pure negation; nevertheless from this it is not lawful to infer that the first permission brings another greater necessity to sinning than the second: because if we said so, it would consequently have to be said that such a permission is repugnant to God, against the testimonies cited above. For God can bring no necessity to sinning. I gather, therefore, from what has been said that we must speak in the same way about both permissions.

But some theologians insist: If permission is a positive act of the divine will, it follows that God is the cause of sin, at least indirectly; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved. This consequence is good, God permits Peter to sin, therefore he will sin infallibly. But that which is the cause of the antecedent in a good consequence is the cause of the consequent: therefore if God by a positive act is the cause of the permission of sin in Peter, he will also be the cause of his sin. And it is confirmed: God by a positive act withdraws from Peter efficacious help, which standing, his sin would be impeded: therefore he is an indirect cause of sin. The consequence is proved, for he who removes a hindrance is an indirect cause of the effect that follows: for example, he who takes away the column by which a stone is held up is an indirect cause of the descent of the stone, which follows upon the removal of the column. To these arguments I say first, that they proceed equally concerning both permissions: namely concerning that which is the punishment of sin, and concerning that which does not have the account of punishment. Whence, just as they do not convince concerning the prior permission, so neither concerning the latter. Then, to the argument an answer is given in form; I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that that rule, "whatever is the cause of the antecedent, etc.", is not true everywhere. For this consequence is good: I see Peter writing; therefore Peter writes; and yet although I am the cause of the antecedent, I am nevertheless not the cause of the consequent: for Peter does not depend on me in the act of writing. That rule therefore has place only when the antecedent is the cause of the consequent, as happens in demonstrations a priori. For then that rule is reduced to another well-known one, namely, whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused: but in the present case that antecedent, God permits Peter to sin, is not the cause of that consequent, namely Peter sins. To the confirmation, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that when from the removal of a hindrance the effect follows immediately and necessarily, as the downward motion of the stone follows the taking away of the column, the cause removing the hindrance concurs indirectly to that effect; but when the effect does not follow immediately and necessarily upon the removal of the hindrance, but through the free will of another, then the cause removing a hindrance is not always said to concur to that effect, neither in the to-be of nature nor in the to-be of morals, even indirectly. And so in our proposal it must be said that upon the subtraction of efficacious help sin does not follow immediately and necessarily, but through the free will of him from whom such help is withdrawn. For just as St. Thomas, in the solution to the third of this article, says that reprobation does not take anything away from the power of the will of the reprobate, nor diminish his liberty, so we also say that the permission by which God permits anyone to sin takes nothing away from his power and liberty: whence he sins freely, in that he was able not to sin, if he willed. On purpose I said in the solution that a cause is not always deemed the cause of the effect that follows: because if that cause which removes a hindrance was bound to impede that effect, although such an effect follows the removal of the hindrance not necessarily, but through the free will of another, nevertheless that effect will be imputed to the cause itself that removes the hindrance, and it will be deemed the moral cause of such an effect. For example, if the Praetor of this city, who is bound to prevent thefts from being committed, permits that someone steal my goods from me, that theft, although it does not follow necessarily from the permission of the Praetor, but through the will of the thief, is nevertheless imputed to the Praetor as its moral cause, and he is bound to restore to me. But when the cause removing a hindrance was not bound by office to impede that effect, it is not imputed to it. Just as the sins with which prostitutes are defiled in a brothel, being permitted, are not imputed to the Praetor permitting them, because he was not bound to prevent them; so, in our proposal, the sins which the reprobate commit are in no way imputed to God permitting them, because he is not bound to impede them, since rather the sweet disposition of the universe demands that God permit some men to fail and to sin.

The third doubt is concerning the fifth conclusion, noted in the solution to the third, and concerning its reason: Whether God destitutes certain men of every supernatural help, so that they are left in the powers of nature alone? For the negative side it is argued first from that of Jn. 1: Who enlightens every man that comes into this world; which place the Saints expound both of the supernatural and of the natural light of the universe: therefore if God enlightens every man, no one excepted, so we must confess that he illumines every man with supernatural revelation and illumination. Secondly, from that of Prov. 1, where divine Wisdom is introduced speaking in this form to all men: Wisdom cries aloud without, she gives her voice in the streets, she cries in the head of the crowds, at the entrance of the city gates she utters her words, saying: How long, ye little ones, do ye love infancy, etc. And she adds: Turn ye to my reproof, and I will pour out my spirit to you, and I will show you my words. By which words the Holy Spirit most openly shows that there is no nation or people to which supernatural inspiration and illumination does not come, so that if they will be converted, God is ready to confer greater helps: and so to those who will not use such inspiration and illumination the Holy Spirit appends a terrible commination in that place, saying: because I have called and you have refused, etc., up to that, when sudden calamity has rushed in. In which testimony it is worth noting that, where the Latin interpreter said, "Wisdom cries aloud without", in the Hebrew it is read, "Wisdoms cry aloud without, in the streets they give their voice", not because the divine Wisdom is manifold, but on account of the manifold mode of teaching by which men are instructed, namely, insofar as we are illumined by means of natural light, and by means of supernatural. According to which it is said in Heb. 1: In many ways and in many manners, etc. We have, therefore, that there is no one to whom the ray of divine Wisdom does not shine. Thirdly. From that of Job 21: Who said to God, depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways; and ch. 24: They were rebels against the light; but these testimonies cannot be verified unless God has spoken to them, and touched their minds with the ray of his light: therefore. Fourthly. From that of Rom. 2: Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to penance? But thou, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath; where the Apostle seems to direct his discourse to any man whatever, whether Jew or Gentile: therefore every man is led by the goodness of God to do penance. Fifthly. From St. Chrysostom, homily 7 on John, where he himself raises such a question: If he enlightens every man that comes into this world, how did so many remain without light? For not all came to know the worship of Christ. And he answers: He therefore enlightens every man, as far as pertains to him: but if certain ones, closing the eyes of the mind, were unwilling to receive the rays of this light, the darkness comes not from the nature of the light, for those who voluntarily deprive themselves of the gift of grace. It is confirmed from Dionysius, ch. 4 of De Divinis Nominibus, where he says that just as the bodily sun, without choosing, sends light into all bodies, so God casts the rays of his whole goodness into all who are, according to each one's capacity. Sixthly. For if God withdrew every supernatural help from some man, it would follow that God were the cause that that man did not convert, nor do penance. The sequel is proved, for if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation, as Aristotle teaches, 1 Posterior Analytics, ch. 3. But God, by offering supernatural help, is the cause of conversion to himself, and of the penance of the sinner: therefore he who offers no such help will be the cause of the non-conversion of the sinner to himself. Seventhly. Every man after sin is bound to do penance: but without special help he cannot do it, any more than walk without feet: therefore, if God by his eternal providence determined not to confer that help, it will not be imputed to man as guilt if he does not do penance. The consequence is proved: because God does not oblige to the impossible. Therefore it must be said that God denies to no one a supernatural help by which he can convert and do penance. Eighthly. For any wayfarer man can convert to God and be saved: therefore anyone has in this life the help of grace, without which he cannot be saved. The antecedent is of faith; and the consequence seems good, because otherwise no man could be saved: therefore the conclusion is most certain.

To this difficulty Soto, book 1 of On Nature and Grace, ch. 15, says three things. The first is that to blind man is to withdraw the light of grace; and to harden is nothing other than to take away the help without which man cannot improve his heart for good. The second is that we can think of God withdrawing this help in two ways. In one way, that in punishment of a preceding sin God so destitutes a man of his favor and help, as having, as it were, pronounced sentence, that he will never again succor him, but will forever abandon him, so that it is due to himself that he does not rise from his past guilt and avoid new crimes. In the other way, "to permit" has the same force as to allow someone freely to act according to his own will, so that God is always most ready to stretch out his hand, unless it depends on the man. The third is that in that first way no one was ever abandoned by God, and in the second way many are abandoned by God. But this opinion needs a careful explanation. Whence it follows:

FIRST conclusion: It can be piously believed that to all who come to the use of reason God brings some help, by a certain secret supernatural assistance instigating them to do good. And note that we do not say in this conclusion that God enlightens every one who comes to the use of reason concerning a supernatural object, otherwise every one who comes to the use of reason and is not converted to God as a supernatural end would sin against the supernatural precept of faith, hope, and charity, as will be clear below. The conclusion is proved. Especially, in the opinion of St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 89, a. 6, where he says that every one who comes to the use of reason is bound at that time to convert himself to God; and if he does so, he will be justified. Whence we gather: therefore, in order to do what in him lies, so that a man be converted to God, so as to be justified at once, it is necessary that he have received from the beginning some supernatural help. For God does not infallibly confer grace on him who does what in him lies from the powers of nature alone; but on him who does what in him lies, while he is prevented by supernatural help, God infallibly confers grace. We said in the conclusion, "it can be piously believed", because such doctrine does not disagree with those things which are held by faith, although it is not of Catholic faith. I said also "by a secret instigation", because not all understand that illumination to be supernatural, or of a supernatural object; and perhaps that help which we say is universally conferred on all who come to the use of reason is not always on the part of the intellect; but on the part of the will it will be a certain instigation above the nature infirm and wounded by sin, inclining to the doing of good, which, otherwise, it knows by the natural light. We do not, however, say that by such cognition and help, without supernatural faith, a man can be justified: but we say that perhaps every one who comes to the use of reason receives from the author of nature that help above the nature infirm, so that he may have no excuse, if he has sinned against the law of nature, by not converting himself to the good naturally known.

SECOND conclusion: If the opinion of St. Thomas is true, that every one who comes to the use of reason satisfies the natural precept by converting himself to the good, and is also at the same time justified, it must consequently be said that every one who is justified has received a preparing grace, at least prior by nature to his fulfillment of the natural precept. It is proved: because otherwise, according to the ordinary law, justification would be owed to every one who prepares himself from the powers of nature alone, willing a good connatural to himself; which is the error of the Pelagians, asserting that the beginning of justification is from us, although its consummation is from God, as will be more fully explained in a. 5, against whom it is defined in the express decree of the Second Council of Orange, can. 4: «If anyone contends that we should await from God the will by which we are cleansed from sin, but does not confess that it comes to us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit that we also will to be cleansed, he resists the Holy Spirit, who says through Solomon, The will is prepared by the Lord»; and in can. 6 and 7 this very thing is expressly defined.

THIRD conclusion: Whenever someone commits a special sin against a supernatural precept, whether of faith or of penance or of another supernatural virtue, it is necessary that he have in fact received some divine inspiration of God enlightening, or calling, or inciting to faith or penance, etc. This conclusion is asserted by us as certain according to faith. And it is proved from that of Jn. 15: «If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin». Which place all the Doctors, especially St. Augustine, interpret of the sin of unbelief, which the Jews committed by not receiving Jesus as the true Christ and the Messiah promised in the Law; and Christ the Lord says that they would not have committed that sin, unless he had sufficiently set before them doctrine and supernatural miracles, by which they were then bound to believe; therefore, by the same reason, in order that someone commit the sin of unbelief, it is necessary that he have received some supernatural cognition; otherwise he will be excused by invincible ignorance through his whole nature. It is proved secondly: because no one sins for the reason that he does not do what he cannot do, as is certain according to faith; but a man to whom nothing else has been given than what pertains to human nature, does not have

whence it can know or work above nature; therefore it does not sin by not doing something supernatural. And it is confirmed: for promulgation is necessary to the account of law not only in general, so that the law be called obligatory, but also in particular, so that someone be not excused by invincible ignorance of the law; but the man to whom nothing supernatural has been revealed has an invincible ignorance of the supernatural law of faith: therefore he is excused from the sin of unbelief. But some answer, with Adrian, Quodlib. 4, q. 1, that in this, that man has received the natural light, he is not excused by invincible ignorance from the sin of unbelief: because if he did what is in him, from the powers of nature, God would enlighten him supernaturally. But this answer does not seem to us consonant with Catholic doctrine. First, because there is no divine law that grace be given at once to one doing what is in him, from the powers of nature; otherwise, according to the debt of the law, justification would answer to a natural disposition, which is against the definition of the Council cited above. Then, because even if there were such a law out of divine clemency, that whoever did what is in him, from the powers of nature, would be at once justified by God, nevertheless that man, in the case proposed, would have an invincible ignorance of the supernatural precept, and of that law sanctioned out of divine clemency, therefore he would be excused from the sin of unbelief. I prove the antecedent: for the virtue of natural studiousness does not oblige beyond its natural object: therefore that man could not be obliged by any special precept to do what is in him, from the powers of nature, by ordaining such a disposition to the end of justification. Finally, if there were such a law, that God would confer grace on one doing what is in him, from the powers of nature, we who knew such a law could be certain that we are in grace, just as we can be certain that we do what is in us, from the powers of nature. But whether it be necessary that a man receive some interior and supernatural instinct, for this, that he be obliged for that time to fulfill the supernatural precept, it is answered; and let it be,

FOURTH conclusion.

It must necessarily be said, as it seems to me, that a man must be touched interiorly by some supernatural inspiration. This conclusion is proved: because otherwise it would follow that a man would not sin a new sin by not converting himself to God supernaturally. The sequel is proved: because by outward miracles alone and external preaching a man is not made more able to believe than he was before, while he labored under invincible ignorance: therefore it is necessary, in order that he have no excuse, that he be touched interiorly by some divine inspiration, inviting and exciting him to supernatural conversion. It is proved secondly from that text of Acts 7: «You always resist the Holy Spirit»; therefore it is necessary that resistance to the Holy Spirit be verified properly, because He inspires within in some way to supernatural conversion.

FIFTH conclusion: Little children, who die in their mothers' wombs, or before they come to the use of reason, unbaptized with original sin alone, received nothing of supernatural aid in themselves. I say in themselves, because in Adam, as in the head of the whole human nature, they received original justice, which they also lost when he sinned; and on that account they contracted original sin, for which they are justly damned with the punishment of loss, which is called the privation of the beatific vision for eternity. This conclusion, thus explained, ought to be manifest among learned theologians, for it would be utter folly to say that infants of this sort, before they come to the use of reason, had any cognition of a supernatural object.

The whole difficulty, therefore, of our question concerns adults, who have come to the use of reason: Whether it be altogether certain that some gratuitous supernatural aid, disposing them to justification in some way, be given to all without exception. To which question certain theologians among the moderns easily assert the affirmative side on account of the arguments made at the beginning of the doubt. And they think they demonstrate this theologically, especially on account of the eighth argument. Others, however, deny that it is necessary that, no exception being made, every man who has come to the use of reason receive a supernatural aid in himself, by which he can believe and be justified, unless he has resisted the Holy Spirit calling. Nay rather they assert that, just as little children are condemned on account of original sin alone, so very many of adults are condemned on account of the actual sins which they committed against the natural law alone, and not on account of the sin which they committed by resisting the Holy Spirit calling and exciting, in that they did not have such an inspiration. And this opinion is beyond doubt that of St. Thomas and St. Augustine, as I shall presently show. But before we settle this dispute, it must be noted first, that this word dare, in the common manner of speaking, is wont to be equivocal, so that in one way it is taken as it is a correlative with the word recipere, as e.g. if someone says that he gave money to another, we at once infer that the other received the money. In the other way dare is taken for this, which is to offer something to someone, inviting him to receive; as if Peter says to Paul, I give you my daughter in marriage, that is, I invite you to take her as wife. Note secondly that 'possible', as far as pertains to the present matter, can be said in three ways. In the first way, it is possible through the absolute power of God, and thus everything that does not imply a contradiction God can do of absolute power, that is, no ordered and contingent cause, or cause voluntary as to its being, being supposed which would conflict with the effect. In the second way 'possible' is said according to the ordinary power, which indeed does not confine itself solely to those things which in fact come to be from the divine providence and will. For thus things could not come to be otherwise than they come to be of ordinary power, because, the divine providence being presupposed, in the composite sense, effects cannot come about otherwise. Let us say, then, that 'possible' of ordinary power is defined in order to the common law, given by God in common, according to which it is possible for something to come to be or not to come to be, or also according to the common course of natural or moral things. In the third way possible is wont to be taken for this, that it is to have in oneself the power through some intrinsic principle, and in some way proportioned to acquiring or doing something. And in this way, when someone out of purely natural forgetfulness does not do what he was otherwise bound by law to do, we say that he is excused from sin, because although he was bound, e.g., to recite the divine office, he was not able to recite it, in that he did not have that principle of memory which was necessary for reciting. And yet it is certain that he was able to recite, not only in the first way, but also in the second; for it was possible according to the common course that he would not forget, but because it was not in his power to remember, he is therefore excused because he was not able to recite. These things being thus supposed, let it be:

SIXTH conclusion: If dare be taken in the second way, for this which is to offer or propose, or to invite in common, then God gives to all men a supernatural aid, sufficient for the salvation of all. This conclusion is certain according to faith. And it is proved from that text of John 3: «God so loved the world as to give His Only-begotten Son». See where the Only-begotten Son of God is said to be given to the whole world, although He was not received by the whole world through faith in Him. Likewise from that text of 1 John 2: «He is the propitiation for our sins, not for ours only, but also for the whole world»: therefore Christ was given to satisfy for the whole world. Which is understood as to the sufficiency of merit and satisfaction, but not as to efficiency, according to that text of 1 Tim. 4: «Who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful»: namely of all as to sufficiency, but of the faithful as to the efficacy of those, that is, who persevere in living faith unto the end. And finally the conclusion is proved: for God gave the Sacraments, that is, proposed them to the whole world to be preached, according to that text of the last chapter of Mark: «Going, preach the Gospel to every creature»; and the last chapter of Matthew: «Teach all nations, baptizing them etc.»; He gave also the common law of grace for all men, no exception being made in the law itself. And it is confirmed from that text of Luke 2: Which thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples.

SEVENTH conclusion: According to the ordinary law it is possible for any man, while he is in this life, to be saved. This conclusion is defined in the Council of Nicaea, canon 8, and in the Roman Council, which was gathered from 60 bishops under the Pontiff Cornelius, against Novatus, as Eusebius relates, in lib. 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, cap. 8. And it is proved from that text of Ezekiel 33: «As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live»: therefore, according to the ordinary law, every wicked man, while he is in this life, can be saved. And it is confirmed: because in Genesis 4 the Lord invited Cain himself to repentance, saying, If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? Therefore according to the law of grace Cain could do penance. Likewise it is proved from the doctrine which is held according to the Catholic faith, which St. Thomas teaches in 5. p., q. 8, that Christ the Lord is the head of all men, at least in potency while they are, were, or will be in this life: which potency is founded, as St. Thomas says in the same place, in the power of the head, and in the freedom of the will: therefore since the power of the head is sufficient to unite to itself any man, and the freedom of the will, as long as a man lives, is not yet obstinate in evil, as it is in hell; it follows that as long as a man is in this life, he can be justified and saved according to the ordinary law.

EIGHTH conclusion: If we use the word dare as it is the correlative of the word accipere, God does not give to all men, even to those coming to the use of reason, the supernatural aid of preparing grace, either for believing, or for doing penance. It is proved first, because not all receive in themselves this supernatural aid: therefore it is not given by God to all. The consequence is clear, from the negation of one correlative to the negation of the other. The antecedent is proved: because if the opposite be granted, that all receive in themselves that aid, it follows that everyone who is not converted resists God supernaturally calling to faith or to penance; and consequently, everyone who is not converted to the faith sins

a special sin of unbelief or impenitence. I prove the sequel, because every man, without exception, is bound by the divine precept to receive the faith; but everyone who has received the supernatural aid of the preparing and disposing grace of God is not excused by ignorance or impotence: therefore everyone who is not converted to the faith sins a special sin of unbelief. But the falsity of the consequent is asserted by all the theologians of our time, especially the Thomists; indeed expressly by St. Thomas himself, 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, against Adrian, Quodlibet 4, q. 1, and against Gabriel, in 2, d. 22, q. 2, who assert that no one of those who do not believe is excused by invincible ignorance, because they think it to be the ordinary law of God that, if they did what is in them, from the powers of nature, God would enlighten them supernaturally. But in truth a reasoning of this sort is worse than the opinion itself, as we shall show more fully in art. 5. For it falls into the error of the Pelagians. But in the meantime, let us show from St. Thomas the truth of our conclusion, in 2. 2., q. 2, art. 5, to the first, which was of this sort: no one is bound to that which is not in his power; but to believe something explicitly is not in a man's power: therefore not all are bound to believe. To which St. Thomas answers that if something be said to be in a man's power, with the aid of grace excluded, then a man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace, such as to believe, to love God above all things: yet he can do this with the aid of grace, which aid indeed, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given out of justice but in punishment of preceding sin, at least of original sin, as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace, cap. 5 and 6. Thus far St. Thomas. See where he expressly says that that aid of preparing grace is not given to all. Where let the theologian observe that the aid by which they can believe the articles of faith is not given to all, but it must be understood of 'possibility' taken in the third way. Moreover, as regards 'possibility' according to the ordinary law, all can believe the Gospel; but this potency is not founded in a supernatural aid received, but in the possibility of receiving, and in the freedom of the will. Note secondly, in the same words, that the withdrawal of divine aid is a punishment of preceding sin, at least original; as happens in him who has come to the use of reason, in whom no other sin has preceded besides original, and the aid of preparing grace is not given him, but he is left to his natural powers. From which it follows that the actual sin which he then commits, by not converting himself to the good proportioned to him, is a sin against the natural law alone, written in the minds of men, and he does not then sin against the precept of faith, hope and charity, or any other: not because the law of faith itself does not oblige all men in common, but because that man is excused by invincible ignorance and the impotence of nature for exercising supernatural acts about supernatural objects; yet with this it well stands in truth that the withdrawal of that aid is just as a punishment of preceding sin. And this is the express doctrine of St. Augustine, tractate 19 on John, tome 9, and Letter 105, tome 2. Where he says that in those who have not heard nor been able, not to believe is a punishment of sin, and is not a sin. But you ask, how were they not able; since according to the ordinary law they were able to believe, just as they were able to be saved. It is answered that St. Augustine speaks of those who were not able with the potency taken in the third way, as we have already sufficiently explained. And finally St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 10, says in this manner: «What I have said, that the salvation of this religion was never lacking to anyone who was worthy, and that he was not worthy to whom it was lacking, if it be discussed and asked whence each one is worthy, there are not lacking those who say by human will: we, however, say by grace or divine predestination». See where Augustine expressly confesses that not all are given to be partakers of the Christian religion. But he speaks correlatively to recipere, because not all receive.

NINTH conclusion: Nevertheless God is truly said to be ready to give to all men, as long as they are in this life, the aid by which they may become able to be converted, indeed also a more special aid by which they may be converted, if they will. This conclusion is very common in the manner of theologians; but certain ones do not rightly understand this truth: for they think that God, in His eternal providence and predestination, as far as is on His part, is indifferent and as it were awaiting the determination of the lower cause for producing the future effect of grace of the lower cause. But that this conflicts most greatly with the divine perfection has been sufficiently explained by us in question 19, art. 5. And its most powerful reason is, that since the divine will is the most efficacious cause of all goods, as it efficaciously wills the end, so also it efficaciously wills and determines all the means to the end; so truly that the active concurrence of God can be determined by nothing extrinsic. Moreover, that explanation of this conclusion contradicts the Council of Orange, Can. 4, where it is defined that God does not await our will that we wish to be cleansed, but rather He Himself prepares and disposes the will that we may will; but if God were thus

said to be ready to give aids of this sort as properly awaiting that we will to receive, just as a merchant is ready to sell his wares, if someone wishes to buy them, but that he wishes to buy the merchant himself does not bring about; it would follow that the definition of the Council is altogether false; nay, this opinion would be against that text of the Apostle, Philippians 2: «For it is He who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for good will», that is, for His free and gratuitous will. And against that text of 2 Cor. 3: «Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God». If therefore the very thought of our salvation is from God, much more the will, which is more efficaciously disposed to conversion out of charity, which is the bond of Christian perfection. We must not, then, think of the divine will and providence as we philosophize about created universal causes; which indeed always presuppose something of which they themselves are not the causes, and therefore their universality in causing is determined by lower causes to determinate effects, so that it is verified that causes are causes to one another in a different genus of causing. But God, since He is the cause of all being, presupposes nothing made by another of which He Himself is not the cause, and thus He determines all things, and is determined by none. Let us say, then, with the Apostle, Rom. 11: «Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, and to whom be glory for ever». The Catholic sense of our conclusion, then, is, when God is said to be ready to bring help to all for eternal salvation, that He is understood to be ready to confer according to the will, not indeed the absolute will, which is always fulfilled, but according to the antecedent will or the will of the sign, inasmuch as God Himself has proposed to the whole world a means most sufficient for the salvation of all, through which any man can be saved according to the ordinary law, by which He obliges all to be converted to Himself, although some can be excused by invincible ignorance. And according to this interpretation the Apostle says, 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved». Which testimony St. Thomas cites, 3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 159|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.159, to prove that God is ready to give aid to all. Moreover, that not all attain saving faith is not from any defect of God's power, although it is a punishment of sin, in some.

TENTH and last conclusion: God from eternity determined by His will, whether absolute or consequent, not to give supernatural aids to all, namely, to those who in fact will not be going to receive them. This is proved: because, whatever God Himself does or does not do, it is necessary that He determined from eternity to do or not to do it; but in time the matter stands thus, that to some the supernatural aid is not given, as we said in the eighth conclusion, whether in punishment of original or of actual sin; therefore God so determined from eternity not to give them such aid. But we speak of the action of giving, correlatively to receiving. If someone asks, why does He confer these gifts on some in particular, and deny them to others? St. Thomas answers, 3 Contra Gentiles, cap. 161|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.161, that it depends on the simple will of God. St. Augustine teaches the same very often. But more especially, in the single book On Rebuke and Grace, cap. 8, tome 7: «If it be asked of me, he says, why that one does not receive this gift, I answer that I do not know». And in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, cap. 10, he says: «Since it was not given them to believe, and the means of believing was denied them». And in cap. 8 he says: «Of two little children, then, alike bound by original sin, why the one is taken up and the other left; and of two already grown in years and wicked, why this one is so called that he follows the one calling, while that one is not called, or not so called that he follows the one calling, the judgments of God are unsearchable. But of two pious men, why perseverance unto the end is given to this one and not given to that one, the judgments of God are more unsearchable»: thus Augustine. But we can add, that of two wicked men God converts the more wicked, and of two just men He grants the gift of perseverance to the less just, leaving the more just, the judgments of God are most unsearchable. Let the Christian and humble theologian therefore learn, with St. Thomas and Augustine, to be ignorant, rather than with the curious to know more than it is fitting to know, lest he fall into the Pelagian heresy, by referring a difference of this sort to the free will, as to its first cause and root: namely, because this one willed to be converted, that one did not will, and because this one willed to persevere, and that one did not will. For although it be most true that no one is converted unless willing, and no one is not converted so as to sin unless unwilling: nay, it is even true that because he wills to be converted, this one is converted; and that one is not converted, because he does not will, nevertheless that particle because, which expresses causality, when it is applied to the one who is converted, does not express the radical and first cause of his conversion, but expresses the cause by way of a free disposition, which as disposing he freely receives from God, efficaciously moving as the first and radical cause, to which the reason must ultimately be referred, if it be asked why this one wills to be converted, namely, because God moves him efficaciously so that he be converted. Moreover, when that particle because is applied to the one who is not converted, so that we say he is not converted because he does not will, if that man sins in this, that he is not converted, then the particle because expresses the first and radical cause of the non-conversion insofar as it is a sin, so that there is no need to proceed further, when it is asked why this one does not will to be converted; for then the defectible free will is the efficient, or rather the deficient, cause of the sin of non-conversion. But if 'not to be converted' expresses the pure negation of an act, we shall say in the solutions of the arguments how God is the cause of non-conversion. With this doctrine is consonant what is said in Hosea 13: «Thy destruction, Israel; only in me is thy help»; as if he said, You are the total cause of your destruction through sin: but I am the efficacious cause of your salvation through my aid, yet in such a way that my aid helps your free will to work effectively well.

BUT concerning this doctrine it must be most especially noted, that it cannot be said by a Catholic theologian except one ignorant in this matter, that, an equal aid on God's part merely standing, Peter is converted from sin, Paul is not converted, Peter receives the faith, Paul does not receive the faith. Those, however, who think so are moved to assert it, first, from that text of Matthew 11: «Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida, for if the mighty works which have been done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes». From which testimony they argue thus: If the miracles themselves and the preaching of Christ, with an equal aid furnished to the Jews, were not sufficient for the men of Tyre and Sidon to do penance, but there was need, as we assert, of a greater aid, that the men of Tyre and Sidon might be efficaciously converted, the conditional uttered by Christ the Lord would not be verified; nay indeed the men of Tyre and Sidon would not have done penance, any more than those cities which the Lord upbraided: therefore, for that conditional to be true, it must be said that with an equal aid, and equal miracles, and equal preaching, the men of Tyre and Sidon would be converted: which aids being posited, the Jews were not converted: otherwise the Jews themselves could have truly answered Christ: If thou hadst given to Tyre and Sidon no more than to us, neither would they have done penance. Secondly they are moved by a certain testimony of St. Augustine in the book On Predestination and Grace, cap. 15, where he seems to persuade this doctrine by the example of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, who seem to have been equally aided and scourged by God, that they might be converted. And Augustine says: As to nature, both were men; as to dignity, both kings; as to the cause, both possessing the captive people of God; as to the punishment, both mercifully admonished with scourges. What then made their ends different, but that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the recollection of his own iniquity; while the other with free will fought against the most merciful truth of God? Thus Augustine. Thirdly they are moved by the words of St. Gregory in the homily On Those Invited to the Wedding, where he refers the difference why some came to the wedding and some did not, to the diversity of the affections of those who were invited, not to a difference of vocation. Which Augustine seems to confirm in Book 83 of Questions, q. 68, near the end, where, speaking of those called to the supper according to the parable which is had in Luke 15, he says thus: «For to that supper which the Lord says is prepared in the Gospel, neither did all who were called wish to come, nor could those who came have come unless they had been called. And so neither ought those who came to attribute it to themselves, because they came as called; nor ought those who were unwilling to come to attribute it to another, but only to themselves, because, to come, being called, was in their free will». Thus Augustine. By which words he seems to think that the vocation of God was equal; but the difference of those willing to come or not to come was on the part of the free will, because the will of some, aided by the grace of vocation, was unwilling to come; while the will of others refused an equal grace of vocation. And finally they are moved because they say that they cannot understand how a man freely uses the grace and aid of God, unless, with an entirely same aid standing, one man is converted and another is not converted.

ON this difficulty I have said more in 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, doubt 2, document 3. Wherefore here I shall briefly dispatch it. For I constantly assert that it is a dogma from the remnants of the Pelagians to assert that, with an entirely equal aid on God's part standing, it can be verified that Peter, aided, is converted, and Paul, similarly aided by an equal grace, is not converted. And the theological reason is evident: because then the reason of the ultimate difference, why Peter is distinguished from Paul, cannot be assigned on God's part: because He aided both entirely equally: therefore it would have to be assigned on the part of the free will, because Peter willed to use that aid well, but Paul did not will to use it; but the consequent is against that text of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 1: He who glories, let him glory in the Lord. But if the matter stood thus, as some have ignorantly said, that with an equal aid of God one wills to be converted and another does not will to be converted, then he who is converted could truly glory in himself on the day of judgment, and say to God: Lord, Thou hast conferred on me no more grace than on him who perished; but I, by the powers of my nature, made good use

by Thy aid and have saved myself; which indeed would be intolerable blasphemy, and the Pelagian heresy. And again it is against that text of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4: «For who distinguishes thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?» In which place the Apostle speaks most evidently against human pride, that no one glory in a man, and consequently neither in himself, but in the Lord, as St. Augustine excellently explains in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 5, tome 7, whose words must be written in the heart; for he says: «Are men, then, distinguished from men by these gifts which are common to all men?» as if he said, by no means; and he adds: «For the Apostle said, who distinguishes thee?» And because a puffed-up man could say, I am distinguished by my justice, my faith, or whatever else, the good doctor, meeting such thoughts, added, what hast thou that thou hast not received? From whom, if not from Him who distinguishes thee from another, to whom He did not give what He gave to thee? And in cap. 7 he says: «Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. These, then, will to believe, but those do not. Who would not know this? Who would deny it? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, and for others it is not prepared, it must certainly be discerned what comes from His mercy and what from judgment». Thus far Augustine. But he understands it of the preparation of the will through the efficacious aid of conversion. And read many other things, but especially see him in the Enchiridion, cap. 52, where he explains that text of the Apostle, Rom. 9: «So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy». Where he himself raises the question: How does the Apostle say that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, when beyond doubt, if a man is of that age that he already uses reason, he cannot believe, hope and love unless he wills; nor attain to the palm of God's heavenly vocation, unless he has run by his will? And he answers that it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, because the will itself is prepared by God. And to explain this solution of the question more fully, he refutes a certain false solution, namely, that it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy: because it comes about from both, that is, from the will of man and the mercy of God, so that the sense is: it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, that is, the will of man alone does not suffice, unless there be also the mercy of God. But Augustine replies against this solution: «If it was said for this reason, it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, because the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not, on the contrary, also rightly said, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, because the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it?» Augustine therefore concludes that, just as no Christian will dare to say, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills: so it must be understood that it was rightly said, it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, so that the whole be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it once prepared. And indeed, that the good will be counted among the gifts of God's mercy, according to that text of Ps. 58: His mercy shall prevent me. Moreover, St. Augustine calls the good will the very good act of the will, by which it uses the aid of God well. Let the theologian therefore understand, when it is said that both are necessary for the salvation and justification of a man, namely both the good use of free will and the aid of divine mercy, that these two are not so to be distinguished as two partial agents, but as one subordinate to the other. Nor again let him understand such a subordination as we understand when we say that fire is subordinate to the sun for generating fire, as it were determining the universal concurrence of the sun to the generating of this fire, here and now. For a doctrine of this sort declines into the Pelagian heresy: for if a man were thus subordinated to the aid of divine mercy, as fire is subordinated to the sun, which of itself is indifferent, and is determined by the fire, it follows that the man himself distinguishes himself here and now, when he works well. The sequel is clear: because he himself determines the divine aid to working well, which of itself was not yet determined. It must be said, therefore, according to Catholic doctrine, that divine mercy so furnishes aid, when a man is converted and works well, that it also by its aid determines the free will, which of itself is indifferent, to work well, efficaciously and freely; and not conversely, that the free will determine the mercy of God and its aid to working efficaciously, as certain of the modern theologians, otherwise Catholic, but less versed in the doctrine of Augustine and of the Councils of Orange and Mileve, have opined. Of whose number was in our times the Catholic man Ruard Tapper, in the book Articles concerning Ecclesiastical Dogmas, art. 7, proposition 10. Finally it must be noted how with the aforesaid Catholic doctrine there is consonant what was defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 4, where it is said: «If anyone shall say that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, has itself merely passively like a certain inanimate thing, and cooperates in nothing as it disposes itself to receive grace, and cannot dissent if it wishes, let him be anathema». In which Canon observe two things. The first is, that that cooperation of the free will is an effect of divine mercy. The second is, that this proposition, the free will can dissent if it wishes, must be understood simply speaking, and not in the composite sense, so that these two could stand together, namely that this efficacious aid exists in a man, and the man resists by dissenting. And the reason is evident: For who shall resist His will? namely His efficacious and absolute will.

TO the motives, however, of the aforesaid false opinion it would be easy to answer, if we referred those who thus object against the truth to the treatises of St. Augustine, in which he defends and sets forth the Catholic truth against the Pelagians. Let what I have brought forward in 2. 2., where above, be seen. But now, to that first motive, which is taken from the words of Matthew 11: Woe to thee, Corozain, etc. St. Gregory and St. Jerome on that passage say that to know the secrets of God is not man's. Nevertheless, to satisfy the scholastic theologians, it is answered as to the form of the argument which is drawn from that passage, by denying those consequences, when it is inferred: therefore, with an equal aid existing on God's part, the Jews were not converted, and the men of Tyre and Sidon would be converted. And the reason is, that for the truth of that conditional, namely, in Tyre, etc., it is not necessary that the men of Tyre and Sidon would have done penance in such a way that their doing penance itself would not be a gift of God which was not given to the Jews; but it must be understood that it is the same to say they would have done penance and to say, God would have given them penance. For it is certain that to do penance is a gift of God, which he who does not do penance does not receive. But if you ask, why does Christ say that, those miracles being posited, God would give penance to the men of Tyre and Sidon, which He did not give to the Jews, efficaciously, by softening their hearts that they might be converted? It is answered that in this Christ the Lord wished to signify that the Jews were worse than the men of Tyre and Sidon, since on account of their greater sins and demerits that efficacious aid of saving penance was justly denied them: of which aid the men of Tyre and Sidon were less unworthy, to whom, if Christ had come preaching and working miracles, God would mercifully have softened their less unworthy hearts, and therefore it will be more tolerable for them on the day of judgment than for the perfidious Jews. To this mode of speaking that one which the Lord uses in Matthew 12 is nearly similar: «The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: because they did penance at the preaching of Jonah, and behold, more than Jonah is here». For Christ the Lord does not intend to signify that the men of Nineveh did penance by lesser internal aids mercifully received from God; but that the Jews, to whom greater external aids were proposed and offered, were more unworthy that God should pursue them with more efficacious inspirations, exciting them interiorly to penance; of which inspirations the men of Nineveh were less unworthy; and so God mercifully conferred penance on them at the preaching of Jonah. The mind and intention of Christ the Lord, therefore, is to object to the Jews greater sins and a heavier hardness of heart than to the men of Tyre and Sidon, than to the Ninevites and Sodomites, according to that text of Jeremiah, Lamentations 4: «And the iniquity of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom»; for it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the judgment than for those perfidious Jews who rejected Christ. But there still remains a scruple against the aforesaid explanation. For the men of Tyre and Sidon of whom the Lord speaks were not predestined: therefore, even if Christ had preached to them and worked miracles before them, they would not have believed. It is answered first: I deny the consequence, since even if they had believed they would not have persevered, and so predestination would not have been fulfilled in them. The solution is the one which St. Augustine reports in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ca. 10, from a certain Catholic disputant, not as his own, for he himself judges it better to reduce the question to divine predestination, for he says that it was not given them to believe, and the means of believing was denied them. Nor was any injury done to them in this, who were justly forsaken by God for their sins. It is answered secondly, that for the truth of that conditional it is not required that it was so disposed in the divine providence that they would have been predestined if Christ had preached to them; nay, in fact it was so disposed in the divine providence that neither would Christ preach to them, and that they would be left in their sins. But if it be posited that they would have done penance if Christ had preached to them, it should also at once be posited, according to the rules of dialectic, that in the divine providence it would have been disposed otherwise than in fact it happened, just as this conditional is true: If Judas had done penance unto death, he would have been saved; and yet if the antecedent be posited as existing, for the sake of disputation, we must also posit the divine predestination and the efficacious aid of the conversion of Judas. To the second motive, from the testimony of Augustine, it is answered that those who cite it in favor of the aforesaid opinion have not read St. Augustine, but bring forward a truncated testimony, not attending to what precedes and follows. Read, I beseech you, that testimony, and you will see how St. Augustine proceeds in arguing against him who judges the divine counsel too high for a wise heart; and he asks of him the cause of the difference, where the remedy is equal. And although St. Augustine in that discussion brings forward that particular difference on the part of the recipients; since the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the recollection of his own iniquity; while the other with free will fought against the most merciful truth of God: yet observe what follows afterwards. St. Augustine admonishes him that we understand that all those things (namely which happened in Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, and in similar sinners) are either accomplished with the Lord helping, or permitted with the Lord forsaking, so that we may know that, even with the Lord unwilling, nothing at all is admitted. Let the theologian therefore understand, who in questions of this sort, most lofty, intends to proceed in a Catholic way, that although the proximate cause of this difference, that one sinner is converted and another is not converted, can be assigned, because the one uses the aid of God well, while the other resists God calling; yet this is not the first cause and root, but one must have recourse to the divine will, whose gift is the good use of free will in him who is converted; which gift indeed is justly not given to him who is not converted, who would in no way sin unless God permitted him to sin. And so all things happen either with God willing or with God permitting. But why He draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to investigate if you do not wish to err; as the same Father Augustine admonishes on that text of John 6: «No one can come to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him». We have, then, that a greater aid was given to Nebuchadnezzar doing penance than to Pharaoh impenitent, a greater aid, I say, not external but internal. To the third motive, it is already clear from what has been said, that when the proximate cause of the difference is assigned, the first is not excluded, but is rather understood in it. And so St. Augustine explains himself, in lib. 2 of On the Gift of Perseverance, ca. 9, where he asserts that the matter of Tyre and Sidon pertains to the causes of predestination, and says: «Without prejudging those hidden causes, I said I then answered these things». As if Augustine said that, if anywhere he has referred the reason of the aforesaid difference to the use of free will, it is always to be understood without prejudice to divine predestination. And in this manner St. Gregory and all the holy Fathers are to be explained, when from the diversity of the affection of those called they say that different ends proceed, namely that some come to the supper and some do not; for the holy Fathers do not intend to deny that the good affection of him who uses the vocation well is a gift of His, and proceeding principally from His eternal will. To the last motive it is answered, that I am less able to understand (and in truth it is less intelligible) how the divine will is the most efficacious cause of all things and of all moral and natural goodness, and yet is not the efficacious cause of my deliberation, not only as to the naturalness which the act has, as certain ones say, but also as to the morality, which is good. Wherefore it is necessary that we believe things hidden which we cannot comprehend. But also each of these two seems to be demonstrated separately: for that we act freely is established by experience. But that God Himself is the most efficacious cause of all created good is demonstrated from this, that He is the first and supreme good. But how these two agree with one another, that I deliberate, and that God efficaciously makes me deliberate what He Himself deliberated from eternity, let him who has not been able to understand believe, as he believes that God is three and one. And let him not, on account of the incapacity of his own mind, take away from the divine jurisdiction the greatest good which is found in a creature, such as is the good work of free will. But concerning these things we have said more than enough above, in question 19, art. 10, where we showed in what the formal freedom of our operations consists. See also in 2. 2., q. 10, art. 1, document 3, at the end; and elsewhere often.

TO the arguments, therefore, which at the beginning of this doubt we objected to the opposite side, it is answered.

To the first, from that text of John 1, it is answered that if that passage be understood of the natural light, it is clear that every man is enlightened by God, at least according to the habit of the natural light: for actually there are many who are not enlightened, such as those who depart from this world before the use of reason, or the insane from their mother's womb. But if it be understood of the supernatural light, then that distribution, He enlightens every man, is explained in two ways by the holy Fathers. In one way, as by Chrysostom, Homily 7 on John, where he says «that He enlightens every man as far as pertains to Him»; which explanation is to be understood according to the doctrine of our conclusion, inasmuch as God is ready to enlighten all. The other explanation, which pleases us more, is from St. Augustine in the book On the Merits of Sins, tome 7, cap. 25, where he says that we understand 'He enlightens every man' thus, not because there is no man who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by Him. Nor is the account the same for natural and supernatural illumination, because the natural is due to nature itself; but the illumination of grace is not due to nature, especially when already corrupted by sin, but is conferred out of grace.

To the second it is answered, from Cajetan on that passage, that it can be understood of natural illumination, and thus the distribution will be universal without exception. But if it be understood of supernatural illumination, it can be explained according to the doctrine of the eighth and ninth conclusions.

To the third, from the testimonies of Job, it is answered, from St. Thomas there, that those testimonies are understood of the light of natural reason.

To the fourth, from the testimony of Romans 2, it is answered that that reproof of the Apostle is chiefly directed to the Jews, who had received the cognition of the Gospel and resisted the Holy Spirit; or if it be directed to the Gentiles, yet he speaks to those to whom the preaching of the Gospel had come. And hence it was a special sin for them not to believe the Gospel, not to do penance: because they could not be excused by ignorance. And therefore the Apostle says: Thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath.

To the fifth argument, from Chrysostom, the solution is already clear from the ninth conclusion: for that testimony is to be explained like that of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved». Of whose explanation we have said enough, question 19, art. 6. To the confirmation, from St. Dionysius, it is answered that he speaks openly of illumination from the efficiency of God as He is the author of all nature, inasmuch as God communicates His goodness to all things, giving to all being and operation and all things.

To the sixth it is answered thus: that that maxim if the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, etc., is most true, but is to be understood of the adequate cause of the effect. As e.g. if because something is rational it is risible, it is well inferred, because if something is not rational it is not risible. But some think that the conferring of efficacious divine aid is not the adequate cause of conversion to God, because it is not the sole cause, in that the free will concurs together with the divine aid. And this solution pleases certain theologians greatly, yet it cannot please us: because in a solution of this sort the free will is considered by them as a partial cause, which, joined with the divine concurrence, produces the effect of conversion: whereas the matter stands otherwise: because the very concurrence of the free will is an effect necessarily consequent, by necessity of the consequence, upon the efficacious divine aid, so that that text of the Apostle is verified, that that conversion is not of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, not because a man can convert himself unless he wills, but because God Himself by His mercy efficaciously converts the will of man to Himself, so that the actual conversion itself is an effect of divine mercy, and not only the ability to be converted. Moreover, that maxim of Aristotle, if it were so understood of an adequate cause that no other cause concurred, could never be verified in natural causes, since in no genus of cause is there found any cause that so concurs that no other concurs in another genus of cause: for causes are causes to one another, except the first cause, of which in no genus of cause is there a cause to assign, although one effect of it can be the cause of another effect. It is necessary, therefore, to explain that maxim of Aristotle otherwise. For whose understanding note that the absence of grace in some subject, or the absence of conversion to God, can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it is the pure negation of being; so that that absence is considered not as the privation of something due in being; in another way, as the privation of grace or of an action due in being, here and now, which nevertheless is not present on account of a defect of the free will. If therefore the negation of conversion be taken in the former way, there is nothing to fear in conceding that, just as divine aid is the efficacious cause of grace and of conversion to God, so the negation of efficacious aid is the cause of non-conversion to God, inasmuch as it is the pure negation of being: nay, in this way God is said to blind and to harden, by denying that efficacious aid, from which negation it immediately follows, by necessity of the consequence, that someone is not converted. This doctrine is explained. The theologians concede that God is the cause of the act of sin, insofar as it is a certain being: therefore it is no wonder that God is asserted to be the cause of non-conversion, insofar as non-conversion is the pure negation of being, but not insofar as in the one not converted it is a moral omission: for in this way only the created free will is the cause of non-conversion. Whence God most justly wills to punish him who by free will wills not to be converted, and of a defect of this sort St. Thomas is to be understood, 1. 2., q. 112, art. 3, to the second, when he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from ourselves, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that text of Hosea 13: Thy destruction, Israel, etc. To the seventh it is answered, as to the major, that every man after sin is bound to do penance in a time of necessity, since it is an affirmative precept, and does not oblige forever: and so in this sense the major is conceded by all theologians. As to the minor, I grant in the composite sense that he cannot do penance without a special aid; but then I deny the consequence, when it is inferred: therefore, if God determined by His providence not to confer that special aid, it will not be imputed to the man if he does not do penance. That consequence is worth nothing. The reason is: because it suffices that that man has received the supernatural aid and the cognition of the divine mercy, inviting him to penance, for the man to be obliged for that time, and to be said simply to be able to do penance. For it is one gift to be able to do penance, and another to do it; and therefore, for a man to be unwilling to do penance, he has no need of a greater aid than that

by which he is said to be able to do penance. Moreover, if that man had received no supernatural aid, he could not sin against a supernatural precept, but well against the law of nature, and on account of such a sin he will be condemned: according to that text of Romans 2: «Whoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law; and whoever have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law». Where the Apostle teaches that no one will be condemned except by a law whose cognition he had. To the last, the consequence is denied. But what has been solved follows: therefore any man can have in this life the aid of grace according to the ordinary law. And in truth, the defect of this consequence is known to novice dialecticians: for it is argued from the broad to the non-broad, or from 'can be' to 'is'. For who does not see that this consequence is similar: a piece of wood can be white, and it cannot be white without whiteness, therefore it has whiteness? For it would have to be inferred, therefore it can have whiteness; and it is a wonder that the most learned Medina, 1. 2., q. 109, art. 10, was convinced by that consequence to assert that every man has supernatural aid in fact. For in truth the same consequence would prove that every man has efficacious aid, nay also the gift of perseverance. It is proved: because every man can persevere, just as he can be saved; but to be saved without the gift of perseverance is impossible: therefore every man has the gift of perseverance; and the consequent is heretical: therefore a consequence of this sort is frivolous. Likewise, this too is worth nothing: Every man can believe the Gospel, since every man is bound to, and no man can believe without the light of faith: therefore every man has the light of faith. But it only follows from those premises that every man can have the light of faith; which potency is founded, remotely indeed, in the power of the free will, but proximately in the power and grace of God, who according to the ordinary law is ready, by His antecedent will of salvation, to bring help to all: as He wills all men to be saved. From what has been said it is gathered how that is to be understood which we reported above from M. Soto, when he said that God denies to no one supernatural and special aid, as if the pronouncement had laid down that He does not give a man further supernatural aid, so that it comes about through God that he does not rise from sin and avoid new crimes: which in truth, with such an addition, is most true, but taken without that addition is false, as we have sufficiently explained in the last conclusion.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative and certain, according to faith. It is clear from that text of Eph. 1: «He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world».

And the theological reason is: because predestination is providence, but providence, according to its proper account in our mode of understanding, presupposes the will of the end, namely of eternal salvation; but to will eternal salvation for certain ones is not only to love, but also to choose them: to love indeed insofar as He wills for them the good of beatitude, but to choose insofar as He wills such a good for some in preference to others.

The second conclusion, explanatory of the preceding: Love is presupposed to election, according to our mode of understanding; and election, to predestination.

This St. Thomas proves from a certain difference which lies between the love of God and election on the one hand, and between our love and election on the other: namely, that in us the will, by loving, does not cause the good in the beloved, but from a good that pre-exists we are stirred to love. And therefore we choose someone whom we may love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, because His will, by which He wills a good to someone, is the cause that that good is had from Him rather than from them: therefore the love of God is understood prior to election.

THIS article is clear; but only concerning this difference must it be noted, with Cajetan, that the aforesaid difference is to be understood with respect to one object; for otherwise we love health before we choose medicine, and God loves Himself before He chooses us. And the reason is manifest: because the first movement of anyone's appetite is love. Likewise, there is to be understood a difference concerning the primary account of election: for this always precedes the love of the same beloved object which we choose: for example, from the love of certain preceding circumstances, Peter chooses Mary as wife; then Peter loves beauty, or wealth, etc., before he chooses Mary as wife. Again, he chooses Mary as wife before he loves her as wife, and thus it is verified that with respect to the same object, as such, election is prior to love.

St. Thomas does three things in this article. First he explains the sense of the question. Second he rejects three errors. Third he answers the question directly. As to the first, what the sense of this article is, it is explained through two conclusions.

FIRST conclusion: By no one is it brought into doubt whether, on the part of the very act of predestinating, the merits of a creature can be the cause of predestination: that is, if predestination is taken for the very action of the predestinator, by no one of sound mind can it be brought into doubt whether there is given any cause or account, outside God, of predestination itself. This conclusion is proved: because the account of predestination must be inquired into just as the account of the divine will is inquired into: therefore, just as it was said above, q. 19, a. 5, that it is most manifest that there is no cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing, so it must be most manifest that of divine predestination, as it is a divine act, there can be no cause or account outside God, inasmuch as He is purest act.

Second conclusion: Under question is brought whether, on the part of the effect, predestination itself has any cause and account.

This conclusion is explained: for, as was said above, q. 19, an account can be assigned on the part of the things willed, that is, among the things willed themselves, which are effects of the divine will, insofar as God wills something to be on account of another, or from another; thus therefore it is reasonably brought into doubt whether there is any cause of the effect of predestination itself on the part of merits, for it can be that one effect of divine providence is the effect of another flowing from the same providence. Rightly therefore is it asked whether the effect of predestination itself, which is the supernatural providence of the order of things to a supernatural end, can be the cause of other effects of divine providence: namely, whether the good works of free choice, whether those which proceed from natural powers, or those which fall in any way under divine foreknowledge or providence, are the cause and account of the very effect of predestination. So much for the first. As to the second, let us set down three other conclusions; whence it follows,

Third conclusion, in order: It cannot be said that on account of merits pre-existing in another life, before souls were united to bodies, the effect of predestination is given to certain ones.

This was the error of Origen, who held that the souls of men, created from the beginning, and afterwards, according to the diversity of the merits which they had from the beginning, obtained diverse states in this world once united to bodies. But this error is refuted by St. Thomas from that of Rom. 9: «When as yet they were not born, or had done anything good or evil, it was said to her, not of works, but of him that calleth, that the elder shall serve the younger».

Fourth conclusion: It cannot be said that merits pre-existing in this life are the account or cause of the effect of predestination.

This conclusion is to be understood of merits pre-existing in this life which are not themselves effects of predestination. This was the error of the Pelagians, asserting that the beginning of doing well and of meriting is from us, but the consummation is from God; and so they assigned the difference why to one the effect of predestination is given and not to another: namely because one gave the beginning by preparing himself, and by using free choice well, while the other did not likewise. This error is refuted by St. Thomas from that of 2 Cor. 3: «We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God»; but no principle prior to thought itself can be thought; therefore it cannot be said that there exists in us any beginning which is the account and cause of predestination. In which testimony of the Apostle take note that, when he says we are not sufficient, etc., it is certain that he does not speak of something in whatever way it be something, but he says something which pertains to supernatural beatitude. And according to this manner of speaking, Christ says, Jn. 15: «Without me you can do nothing»; and Paul, 1 Cor. 23: he always ends those praises of charity by saying: If I have not charity, I am nothing: for nothing is judged to be in Christian Philosophy which does not conduce to eternal salvation.

Fifth conclusion: It cannot be said that merits following the effect of predestination are the account of predestination, that is, that God is understood to give grace to someone, and to have predestined himself to give him grace, for this reason, because He foreknew that he would use grace well.

It is explained by an example: as if a king should give someone a horse which he knows he will use well. This error, in our judgment, is also reduced [to it] and pertains to Pelagius, who attributed too much to free choice, as it is distinguished from grace and from the supernatural gift of God. But St. Thomas attacks this error in no other way than by showing their ignorance: because they so distinguished between what is from grace and what is from free choice, as though the same thing could not be from both. As if St. Thomas were saying that the good use of free choice cannot also be from grace as an effect of grace itself most efficacious; but they thought that the good use of free choice was so distinguished from the concurrence of grace, as though two partial causes accompany one another about the same effect, of which neither affords concurrence to the other for the effect, even if it happens that the one is more powerful than the other. But St. Thomas, as a Catholic and well versed in the doctrine of Augustine and of the Councils, considers the good use of free choice, by which one freely uses God's help, as an effect of divine grace and predestination preordained and predefined by God. Whence he necessarily gathers that that good use cannot be the account of predestination, since it is itself an effect of predestination and of God's predefinition. So much for the second point. Concerning the third, he sets down two conclusions of St. Thomas. Whence it follows,

Sixth conclusion: Nothing prevents some effect of predestination, in particular, from being the cause and account of another effect of the same predestination; indeed they can be causes of one another.

For example, glory is the final cause of merits, and merits are the cause of glory, which is reduced to the material cause, as a disposition of the subject. Where take note that merits can also be reduced to the efficient cause, in the genus of morality, with respect to the reward, inasmuch as the reward is the fruit of good works which are done from grace; and therefore it is said, Rom. 6: «The grace of God, life everlasting», that is, the root of eternal life is grace, from which root good works arise, and from good works the fruit of eternal life. With this doctrine agrees that of Ps. 125: «Who sow in tears, in exultation shall reap». Where good works are signified as seeds, and glory as the ear of grain. This being supposed, the conclusion of St. Thomas is proved by a similar reason as was proved above in q. 22, a. 3, where he taught that divine providence, as to the execution of the order, effects certain things through the mediation of others, so we also say that divine predestination, although according to itself it is the account of the whole order of all the means to the attainment of the end, nevertheless orders certain particular means so that they can be the cause or effect of others.

Seventh conclusion: It is impossible that the effect of predestination, in common, that is, the whole effect and not according to some part, have any cause or account on our part.

This conclusion is an explanation of the 5th conclusion. And its reason is: because whatever is in man ordering him to eternal salvation is wholly comprehended under the effect of predestination, even the very preparation for grace, according to that of Thren., last: «Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted». From what has been said St. Thomas gathers, by way of a corollary, that predestination, on the part of the whole effect, has for its account the divine will, to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which it proceeds as from a first moving principle, we can add also as from the first, immediate, and total principle of the whole effect of predestination. Thus far concerning the body of the article. But also in the solutions of the arguments, especially to the 1st and 3rd, three other conclusions are to be noted, of which the first is noted for the first; and let it be, in order,

Eighth conclusion: The use of grace foreknown is the account of the conferring of grace in the genus of final cause, that is, to this end is grace given and ordered, that the just man use it well.

But take note that each is a gift of God: both the conferring of grace and the good use of grace. For it is said in the Council of Orange, canon 20: «Many goods are done in man which man does not do; but man does no good which God does not grant that man do»; therefore to use the grace of God well is a gift of God, and from another more efficacious help than to be able to use it well.

Ninth conclusion, in the solution to the third: From the divine goodness itself an account can be taken in common why God has predestined certain ones and reprobated others.

That is, an account is given of this difference, namely that in the universe there are predestined and reprobate; and the account is such: because God made all things so that the divine goodness might be represented in things; but this goodness, which is the highest perfection, is not only mercy, but also distributive and vindictive justice: but if there were only predestined, that goodness of God which is vindictive justice would not be fully represented in effects, insofar as it is vindictive justice, because God would punish no one. And this is the reason why God willed this difference of predestined and reprobate to exist: and this the Apostle insinuates, Rom. 9, saying: «But if God, willing to show wrath and to make known his power, etc.»; which testimony St. Thomas here explains as we explained it above.

Tenth conclusion, in the same place: No account can be assigned on the part of creatures, or of the whole universe, why in the singular God has chosen these men unto glory, but has reprobated those; but the divine will alone is the cause of this difference in the singular.

This St. Thomas proves from the testimony of Augustine, Tract. 26 on that of Jn. 6: «No one can come to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him»; where Augustine says «why he draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to investigate, if you do not wish to err».

Eleventh conclusion, in the same place. There is not, however, therefore iniquity with God, if he prepares unequal things for those who are not unequal.

The reason is: because the whole effect of predestination is not rendered out of a debt of nature, but out of grace: but in those things which are given from grace and liberality, one can, at his pleasure, give more or less to whom he will. And this is what the Father of the household said, Mt. 20: «Friend, I do thee no wrong; take what is thine and go». Thus far concerning the letter of St. Thomas.

NOW, however, in order that we may follow the aforesaid order in the commentary on this letter, it is necessary that, concerning each of the conclusions designated by us, we note those things which are conducive to the understanding of so great a mystery.

Concerning the first conclusion, note that not only is no cause given of the divine act of predestination itself, but neither is any account or motive outside God Himself, on the part of creatures. Which is proved: because, just as divine knowledge cannot be measured by any extrinsic account of the object, so neither can divine providence have a cause or account outside God. Nevertheless, just as in our mode of understanding one divine attribute is said to be the account of another attribute, as immutability is the account of eternity; so the divine love, by which God loved certain ones unto eternal life, is the account of divine predestination, so that we may affirm that God predestined certain ones for this reason, because He loved them. For the rest, the account of this love cannot be other than the infinite goodness of God.

Concerning the second conclusion, someone could object that the title of the article ought not to be: Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For such a title cannot have the sense which the 2nd conclusion expresses, inasmuch as by the name of foreknowledge the divine act is understood. But it is answered that, just as predestination is taken in the present [article] for the whole effect of predestination, so foreknowledge is taken for the things foreknown, so that the sense of the question is: Whether merits foreknown by God are the cause of the whole effect of predestination. But here it is very much to be observed that certain Scholastics, although they agree with St. Thomas in the 1st conclusion, nevertheless differ in this, concerning the 2nd, that not only on the part of the effects do they assign a cause, so that some effect of God is the cause of other effects, but they also say that a cause and account is given of the divine act of predestinating or electing, not according as it is in itself pure act, but insofar as it falls upon this man rather than upon that one; and from this sense we must beware, as will be clear in what follows.

Concerning the third conclusion, in which was contained the refutation of the error of Origen, take note that Origen asserted that error, Periarchon bk. 1, ch. 8 and bk. 2, ch. 1, and Commentary on Ephesians bk. 1, explaining that, He chose us in him before the foundation of the world; Origen said that souls were created before this visible world, and then on account of their own sins were thrust into bodies as into a prison. Which error, with Origen's name suppressed, Jerome reports on the same passage; and certain testimonies of Scripture which Origen adduced in confirmation of his error, such as that of Ps. 119: «Woe is me, that my sojourning is prolonged»; likewise from that of Rom. 7: «Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?» and to Phil. 1: «It is better to return and be with Christ»; likewise that of Ps. 118: «Before I was humbled, I sinned»; and other similar passages which contribute nothing at all to the confirmation of so great an error.

Against this error, at length, among all, St. Cyril disputes, Commentary on John bk. 1, ch. 4, refuting it with no fewer than 23 excellent reasons, which Sixtus of Siena diligently collects in Bibliotheca Sancta, bk. 5, annotation 185. Which error Ruffinus also strives to attribute to St. Jerome; but Jerome himself, in Apologia adversus Ruffinum bk. 1, shows himself alien to this error: rather he explains that of Eph. 1: «He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted»; where he notes that the Apostle did not say that we were holy. On account of which testimony he rejects Origen's errors which were condemned in the Fifth General Council of Constantinople, can. 11; and by Pope Gelasius, ch. Sancta Romana, dist. 15, in the Decree Ubi dicitur. Likewise certain other opuscula of Origen which the blessed Jerome does not refute, we receive as to be read; all the rest, however, we say must be rejected together with their author. And a little after, he severely reproves Eusebius of Caesarea, because in Ecclesiastical History bk. 1 he praises and excuses Origen the schismatic. Especially, however, this error is condemned in the Third Lateran Council, session 8, and in the Clementine De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, § porro. And this error is refuted from that of Rom. 9: «When as yet they were not born, or had done anything good or evil, it was said, not of works, but of him that calleth, etc.» Likewise from that of 2 Tim. 1: «He called us with his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus». For the rest, whoever desires to know the life of Origen and his wonderful erudition, and nevertheless his unhappy outcome and the end of his life, let him read Nicephorus, Ecclesiastical History bk. 5; and Sixtus of Siena, Bibliothecae Sanctae bk. 4, under the word Origen. But Origen flourished around the year of the Lord 207.

Concerning the fourth conclusion, note that there was once a solemn and pestilent heretic Pelagius, a monk by profession, and a most bitter assailant of the grace of God. He flourished around the year of the Lord 405, in the times of the Emperor Arcadius and of Innocent I. This heretic, as is gathered from the writings of St. Thomas and Augustine, among very many other errors, held two contrary to the truths of this matter: The first was that the beginning of doing well is from us, and not from divine grace; but the consummation of justification is from divine grace. The second error was that man can persevere in good from the powers of nature, without the help of divine grace. Whence he said that the divine help was not necessary for simply acting, but that man might act better. From these errors the Pelagians gave the account of certain questions. For when they were asked why this one is justified and not that one, they answered: because this one disposed himself by free choice, but that one did not, speaking of free choice from the powers of nature. Likewise, why does this one receive the effect of predestination and that one not? They answered: because the beginning of justification and of doing good is from the powers of nature. And so when they were asked why this one perseveres and that one does not, they said: not because this one perseveres by a special gift of God and that one does not, but because this one wills to persevere from the faculty of free choice and that one does not.

This error is attacked by many testimonies of Scripture, Jn. 6: «No one can come to me, unless my Father who sent me draw him». On which testimony see Augustine in the place cited above; in which testimony we are reminded of free choice, when it is said, No one can come. For we do not come to Christ compelled, but prevented by efficacious divine help, which prevents so that we will, which Augustine says is signified in that word, he draw. For the efficacy of the divine help is prior, simply speaking, to the movement of free choice toward God, or toward sin through penance. And to this purpose Christ the Lord adduces that of Isa. 54: «They shall be all taught of God». With which also agrees that of Isa. 65: «I was found by them that did not seek me, I appeared openly to them that asked not after me». Which passage is adduced by Paul, Rom. 10, where all prevention of free choice is excluded. Likewise Jn. 15: Without me you can do nothing. In which testimony it is certain that Christ does not speak of works done from the powers of nature, even those which have moral goodness, such as a Turk can do; but of those works which conduce to eternal life, which cannot be done without divine help. With which agrees the testimony which St. Thomas adduces here, 2 Cor. 3: «We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God». Likewise, to Phil. 2: «With fear and trembling work out your salvation: for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, for his good will». If our justification were from the powers of nature, and man could render to God, from the faculty of nature, all that He requires, to what purpose would he say, with fear and trembling? For the rest, St. Paul most elegantly gives the reason: For it is God, etc. For from the fact that God helps us by his will, and by his help brings it about that we persevere in good, and by his grace that we work out our salvation, therefore we ought to work it out with humility and fear, lest perhaps someone fail the grace of God, and arrogate to himself what he has from the divine gift.

This error is condemned in many Councils, in the Council of Orange, canon 9, where it is thus defined: «It is of the divine gift that we think rightly, and that we hold our feet back from falsehood and injustice. For as often as we do good, God works in us that we may work»; and canon 20: «Many goods are in man which man does not do: yet man does no good which God does not make him do». And in canon 25: in every good work man does not begin, but afterwards we are helped by the mercy of God, and He begins. Yet it must be noted, concerning canon 20, that when the Council says that there are many good works in us which man does not work, it is understood of the impulses and excitations which prevent our counsel and stir up freedom. See also Conciliorum vol. 1, in the First Council of Carthage and the Milevitan, in which the Pelagian heresy is condemned, and especially the Letters 25 and 26 of Innocent I in the same volume, in which councils of this kind are confirmed, and Pelagius is condemned. This error is condemned also by Celestine I in that Letter to all the Bishops of Gaul, where he says: «O goodness of God, which wills those things to be our merits which are its own gifts, and for those things which it has lavished on us is about to confer eternal rewards». Concerning which see Augustine on Ps. 102, on those words, Who crowneth thee in mercy and compassion. And in the same letter, Celestine praises Augustine as the most bitter assailant of this heresy. But the treatises of Augustine in which he attacks this error are very many and most copious, vol. 7. The treatise On Nature and Grace against the Pelagians is to be seen, and the four books against the two letters of the Pelagians to Boniface; and bk. 6, Hyponosticon against the Pelagians, one book On the Predestination of the Saints, and another On the Good of Perseverance, and Epistle 3, which are had in vol. 2, 105, 106, 107. See also St. Thomas, 3 Cont. Gent., from ch. 155 to the end; St. Jerome, Epistle 24, which is had among the letters of Augustine, in vol. 2, in which he praises Augustine and Alypius, by whose works the Celestinian heresy, so called from Celestius the disciple of Pelagius, was strangled. But concerning this matter the disputation is more prolix in the material On Grace, in 1-2, q. 109.

Concerning the fifth conclusion, this alone is to be noted: that the error which is attacked by St. Thomas in this conclusion is attacked by nearly the same testimonies as the Pelagian heresy. It is condemned also by the testimonies adduced, a. 5, dub. 5, in the confirmation of the last conclusion. The reason is: for to assert that the good use of grace foreknown by God is not an effect of predestination, and consequently of grace, but is from free choice alone, is manifestly condemned by those testimonies, of which we shall speak below.

CONCERNING the sixth and seventh conclusion, the principal contestation is against certain Theologians, Catholic indeed, but in this part philosophizing too curiously and dangerously, among whom is Gabriel in 1, dist., q. unica. This author says three things: first, that predestination regards only, as its effect, the ultimate end, namely the attainment of glory, but not the means, which he does not reckon to be effects of predestination. He says second, which follows from the first, that a cause of predestination is given: for the merits which are had after grace has been received are the cause of glory, and consequently of predestination: and although he admits that merits are from divine grace, he nevertheless says that they are not effects of predestination. He says third that in some a cause of predestination is given, namely the good use of free choice preceding grace: but he says in some, because not all have the use of free choice before grace, as is clear in little children. Likewise, not all have the good use of free choice before grace: for Saul was seized by Christ in the very act of sin, and is justified; and yet he did not have the good use of free choice before grace.

This opinion can scarcely be defended from error: for the first thing he says, that predestination regards only, as its effect, the attainment of glory, but not the means, besides that he does not know his own word, for predestination is the preparation of God's benefits for the attainment of eternal life, is against Augustine in the places cited above; indeed it seems to be against St. Paul, Rom. 8, when he says: «Whom he predestinated, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified». In which testimony all the Saints say that calling and justification are effects of predestination. It is also against reason: for whether predestination be an act of the will or of the intellect, it always regards the end and the means. Which is manifestly proved: for predestination is either a part of providence or election: but whatever it be, it always regards the means to the end, for men are chosen and predestinated through means to the end: therefore. Likewise this opinion is against that of Eph. 1: «He chose us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in charity»; where holiness and charity are posited as effects of election. But if someone should say, in defense of Gabriel, that Paul speaks of election, while Gabriel does not say that predestination is election: this solution is frivolous, for election, even in our mode of understanding, is intrinsically included in predestination, for all the predestined are elect; indeed, in our mode of understanding, election is prior to predestination: therefore if election regards the end and the means, predestination regards the end and the means. And although this solution could be adapted to the words already spoken, it nevertheless cannot be accommodated to the words which follow, he predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ, in himself, where Paul posits adoptive sonship, which comes about through regenerating grace and through the virtues, as an effect of predestination: therefore grace and the virtues, which are means to the attainment of glory, are regarded by predestination as effects. For neither can we say that those who have grace in this life, especially if they are predestined, are not adoptive sons. For it is said in 1 Jn. 3: Now we are the sons of God, etc. up to that, as he is. And it is confirmed from that of Rom. 8: «You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption».

The second dictum of Gabriel speaks consequentially and does not err in the matter according to his understanding, yet he errs in the manner of speaking. The first is clear, because he himself says that a cause of predestination is given, that is, of glory; but it is most certain in Theology that merits are the cause of glory. But that he errs in the manner of speaking is clear: for when the Saints and Theologians, and especially Augustine, ask whether a cause of predestination is given, they do not speak of glory nor of any particular effect, for it is a certain thing that one effect of predestination can be the cause of another, but they speak of all things taken together.

The third dictum of Gabriel is unreasonable: for he does not posit a common cause in all the predestined, because in some he says it is the good use of free choice preceding justification; but in Paul and in others who did not have a good use before justification, he posits no cause: in some he posits merits, in others not. Behold how he does not posit a common cause of predestination. But this is not the greatest error; yet he errs in this, that he says that the good use of free choice preceding grace is the cause of predestination, that is, of glory: for this is against that of Rom. 6: «The wages of sin is death; but the grace of God is life everlasting»; where the Apostle posits grace as the root of glory. Likewise, ch. 8: «The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory that shall be revealed in us». In which place all the Saints say that it is understood of our works, as they proceed from free choice; and 1 Corinth. 13: «If I have not charity, it profiteth me nothing»; where St. Paul says that works which precede charity, however good morally, are of no value, and are dead and are not quickened. Likewise, otherwise it follows that if two men equally disposed are justified, and one has more morally good works before justification, he receives greater grace and glory, which is against the Apostle.

HENRY in Quodlib. 4, q. 19 and Quodlib. 5, q. 5, as Scotus reports in 1, dist. 41, q. 1, says that the movement of free choice from grace can be considered in two ways: in the first way, as it is from grace; in the other way, as it is from free choice. This being supposed, he says first that if that movement is considered as it is from grace, it is not the cause of predestination, but its effect. He says second that that movement, as it is from free choice, is the cause of predestination. In the first dictum he agrees with St. Thomas, in the 6th and 7th conclusion; but in the second dictum he errs no less than Gabriel; and all the arguments which we have made, and the testimonies adduced against Gabriel, can be adduced against him. Likewise all the arguments made above, a. 3, doubt 3, in confirmation of the last conclusion, to prove that a justified man is not discerned from a non-justified man, nor a predestined man from a non-predestined man, by anything pertaining to the faculty of free choice: all these prove that Gabriel and Henry erred; for Henry thinks, as Scotus reports, that through the action of free choice something is worked which is not to be attributed to grace. The reason of which is: for that which is helped works something of itself: but free choice in justification is helped by divine grace: therefore it works something of itself; whence this author infers that when grace is offered to someone, and he receives it through the disposition of free choice, the cooperation of free choice merits a further degree of grace. Whence it is evident that, according to this author, some degree of grace corresponds to the use of free choice, in that it is not an effect of grace. From which it is inferred that, of two men equally prepared for grace through divine help, the one who cooperates more from the disposition of free choice will receive a greater degree of grace. And these authors have fallen into this, that they do not understand that the good use of free choice is an effect of preparing grace, and these two are consequent to one another, such help and such good use of free choice; nor ought we to attribute one degree to preparing grace, and another to the cooperation of free choice, as it is distinguished from the effect of grace: for, as St. Paul says, What hast thou that thou hast not received? Therefore the whole grace which is in justification is an effect of preparing grace; but the good use of free choice, which is a disposition to grace, is an effect of preparing grace, so that there be a proportion between the form which is introduced and the disposition. And thus the Council of Trent is understood, session 6, Decree On justification, ch. 7, when it says, each one receives righteousness according to his own measure, which the Holy Spirit divides to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation: for it is not to be understood of the disposition and cooperation as it is from free choice, but as it is from the Holy Spirit, who distributes the disposition as he wills. Which words of the Council are taken from St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 24, a. 3, to the first, where he says that God does not infuse charity according to natural capacity, but according to the effort and disposition of the recipient, which disposition the Holy Spirit prevents and grants according to his will; for the disposition to grace cannot be the good use of free choice as it is from me, but as it is from God: for in good philosophy, the disposition to some form, as a disposition, is effectively from the agent as it introduces the form. For fire, which generates its like, produces the disposition to the form of fire: so God, who produces grace, through which we are sons of God, also produces the disposition to grace, as it is a disposition. Whence St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2, in the body, says that the disposition to grace is an effect of operating grace, when man acts moved and not moving: for when someone begins to will good, it is attributed to grace operating; and thus the good use of free choice, as it is from man, is not a disposition to grace. This opinion of Henry is attacked from that of Jn. 15: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you: but if the use of free choice, as it is from me, were the cause of predestination, men would first choose God: therefore. And it is confirmed from that of Rom. 11: Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him? By the same arguments the opinion of Scotus is attacked, in 4, dist. 14, q. 2, where he says that morally good works from the faculty of nature have the account of congruous merit for the deletion of sin; against whom Soto disputes, On Nature and Grace bk. 2, ch. 4, and in the material On Penance it is said that attrition, which is had from the faculty of nature, even with the Sacrament, does not suffice to justify a man and to make a contrite one out of an attrite one.

HITHERTO it has been said how great the danger is in these opinions of Gabriel and Henry. But now a third opinion is to be refuted, which is ascribed to brother Chrysostom Javelli, of the Order of Preachers, after whose death certain questions were published under his name and joined to the First Part of St. Thomas, in the Lyons edition of the year 1581. It is therefore worth our while in this place to review and refute the opinion of this doctor.

There are therefore two dicta of this opinion. The first is that this question, whether any account is to be assigned for which Jacob is predestined and Esau reprobated, has as yet been decided by no one. And he proves it: for if it were decided by anyone, it would be by St. Paul in the epistle to the Romans, from ch. 9 through 11; but he left it all inscrutable, saying, O the depth of the riches, etc. In confirmation of which the Apostle adduced that of Isa. 40: Who hath known the mind of the Lord? Furthermore, neither has Augustine determined this question, nor St. Thomas, nor Scotus, nor anyone else, but each of them followed that sense which seemed to him more reasonable. From which he infers that we ought to follow that opinion which appears more reasonable, and more openly preserves divine rectitude, sustains the hope of the faithful, removes the occasions of despair, defends the certitude of predestination with free choice.

The second principal dictum of his is: On the part of the predestined and the reprobate, a cause and account is given of predestination and reprobation; but this account, on the part of the predestined, is the good moral use of free choice preceding grace, as a congruous disposition, yet not condign, to grace, and elicited by free choice moved by God, not only as universal mover but also as infusing into man a particular help, by which he is sufficient, even with grace removed, to produce good moral acts, such as to live temperately, to do just things, to defend one's country. And so this good use, as foreseen by God in Jacob, is the account of why Jacob is predestined; and conversely the evil moral use of free choice moved by God as universal mover, rendering a man unworthy of grace, is the account of why Esau is reprobated. But that he may prove this dictum, so prolix and perplexed, he first explains the five particles which are contained in it. The first particle is, good moral use: since the use of free choice can be considered in one way as it is the act of the power itself, and thus it has natural goodness; in another way as it is an act proceeding from a free power, according as it operates through the rule of right reason, or falls short of it, and thus it is the good or evil moral use of free choice. The second particle is, preceding grace; this is posited as distinct from that act which proceeds from grace, which, since it is an effect of predestination, cannot be its cause; and in this he thinks himself to differ from Henry: but the good moral use of free choice preceding grace does not follow but precedes the predestination of Jacob, as a certain congruity. The third particle is, as a congruous disposition, yet not condign, to grace. For such acts dispose the soul to grace not condignly, because these acts do not exceed the order of natural things, and therefore are not proportioned to grace, which is supernatural. The fourth particle is, And elicited by free choice moved by God, not only as universal mover but also as infusing a particular help. For the explanation of which he notes from St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 109, a. 2, that which St. Thomas says neither there nor elsewhere, namely that God, with respect to a good act to be elicited by free choice, can infuse a threefold help: first, as the first cause universally influences the second, which influx is modified by the second cause itself, according to the nature of that second cause. But we do not find such a modification with respect to the first cause in St. Thomas, but rather the contrary, namely that God Himself, through His providence, modifies and determines all things, and governs them sweetly according to the mode of each one's nature. We do not, however, deny that the divine influx, passively accepted and received in the creature, can be modified by another effect of God; but we utterly deny that the influx of God, as it is His action, is modified by anything, inasmuch as God Himself, by His providence and active governance, attains, modifies, effects, and governs all things. The author therefore says that this first universal help is necessary for every act of free choice, both good and evil, inasmuch as the second mover presupposes the motion of the first mover. The second help is special and necessary for acting well in the state of corrupted nature, inasmuch as from original guilt the natural powers are deordinated; and this help he calls natural and particular, although it could be called in a certain way supernatural, namely above infirm nature, of which we said above, in article 3, that it can be piously believed that it is given to all when they come to the use of reason. The third help is special and supernatural, for eliciting an act meritorious and condign of felicity, and this is sanctifying grace or charity. He therefore speaks in the fourth particle of the special help in the second way. The fifth particle is that we are sufficient, even without grace, to produce good moral acts, for the producing of which he says the first universal help and the second particular help suffice. This being supposed, he notes second for the explanation of his opinion that, although the divine intellect is in itself one, nevertheless in it we can consider, according to our mode of understanding, a certain plurality; and so he distinguishes five instants in the operation of the divine intellect and will: in the first instant, the intellect of God apprehends Jacob and Esau as they are equal, both of intellectual nature and capable of felicity, and thus the divine will equally wills felicity for them. In the second instant, the intellect of God apprehends them as they are of a free and defectible nature, and hence as needing precepts by which they may be moved to good, and prohibitions by which they may be kept from evil: and thus He gave them the light of natural reason, and the law and natural precepts. In the third instant, He considers them as unable for good unless they be moved by God Himself. And then the divine will determines to move them by that first universal help, that they act as they please, and also by the special help, taken in the second way, that they act well morally: and indeed, in these three instants, all those things are uniform with respect to Jacob and Esau, inasmuch as there is as yet no inequality in them: and up to this point God is not predestinating nor reprobating, and those three assigned things are not under predestination, but are preparatory to it. Then, in the fourth instant, God foresees that Jacob will accept both of the aforesaid helps, whereby he becomes sufficient to produce good moral acts; but Esau he foresees will accept only the first universal help, which he will use not for good but for evil, declining from the law and the commandments: and then, in the same instant, God wills felicity for Jacob with a consequent will, which He had earlier willed for him in the first instant with an antecedent will. But for Esau He does not will felicity with a consequent will, but rather wills that His punitive justice be manifested in him. And since in this fourth instant Jacob and Esau are now foreseen as unequal, therefore then begins the election of God electing Jacob, and reprobating Esau. In the fifth instant the divine intellect apprehends that those moral acts are not condign to felicity; and therefore He preconceives that that third supernatural help, namely grace, is to be given, by which Jacob may produce acts meritorious and condign of beatitude: and the divine will prepares to confer such help, inasmuch as Jacob, from the second help, renders himself fit, and there the predestination of Jacob is completed by an efficacious and infallible will. Whence that fitness is the account without which he would not be predestined. But because Esau did not accept the second help, God predetermines not to give him the third, namely grace. From which follows hardening and blinding, which are effects of reprobation. And there the reprobation of Esau is completed by a consequent will, which would not have fallen upon Esau, if he had not rendered himself indisposed from the evil use of free choice.

This second dictum, thus explained, Javelli proves thus: first, because election cannot be in two equals; but there is no inequality before men are moved by that second help: therefore, since predestination and reprobation presuppose good and evil moral use, insofar as men use that particular help well or badly, it is necessary that they also presuppose some inequality in the predestined and the reprobate; and consequently predestination is not to be reduced to the absolute and bare will of God.

Second, because in all the works of God's mercy justice also concurs, therefore some convenance and congruity must be posited on the part of the predestined which is not on the part of the reprobate: therefore the bare will of God is not the cause of predestination.

Third, it is proved from that of Eccl. 15: «God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel; he added his commandments and precepts, if thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee, and to keep faithful good-pleasing forever». And again, in the same place: «Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him». Behold, says Javelli, where it is declared not only that good moral use is in our faculty, but also that God complies with the good-pleasure of our will.

Fourth, because otherwise, if nothing is ours, to what purpose do the exhortations and counsels of preachers and prophets contribute? And he confirms it, because often in the Gospel it is required of us that we will to serve God, and eternal life is promised, for example: If anyone shall minister to me, my Father will honor him. If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; and Mal. 3: Return to me, and I will return to you. And in the same place: Return, and you shall know what is just.

Fifth, he strives to prove his opinion from St. Thomas, in 1 Sent., dist. 41, q. 1, a. 3. But we shall show in the solution of this argument how St. Thomas there says the contrary.

Sixth, he also strives, which is more to be wondered at, to prove his opinion from Augustine, on that of Mal. 3: Return to me, etc. and from bk. 83 of Quaestionum, q. 68, where he says: «The will of God cannot be unjust: for it comes from most hidden merits. For although sinners themselves have by reason of general sin become one mass, there is nevertheless some diversity among them: for something precedes in these sinners, whereby, although they are not justified, they are nevertheless made worthy of justification; just as something precedes in other sinners, whereby they are worthy of being blunted». And Javelli contends that Augustine did not retract this opinion, which is against the Master of the Sentences, in 1, dist. 41. He also cites in his favor St. Bonaventure, asserting in the same place that the account must be assigned why divine election falls upon this one and not upon that one; but what that is is not wholly known, nor wholly unknown. He also cites Thomas of Argentina, and John Bacon.

Seventh, he proves it by reason. For if predestination is reduced to the will of God absolutely, the hope of the faithful is weakened, and many withdraw themselves, saying: if God wills to save me, however I act I shall be saved; but if He wills to damn me, I shall not escape.

Lastly, he proves that his opinion is worthy to be accepted by all, because from it all inconveniences are avoided. Of which the first is that otherwise God would be an accepter of persons and unjust, if He had reprobated me, equal to Peter in all things, and chosen Peter by His mere will. The second is that He would seem cruel; for if a father, in human affairs, is not permitted to beget a son and nourish him in order to kill him, much less reasonable does it seem that God, the Father of mercies, should create a soul in order to punish it forever. Thus far concerning the opinion of Javelli.

BUT against this opinion many most efficacious arguments present themselves, by which it will be reckoned no less than the Pelagian error. And before all, who does not see in that first dictum the greatest temerity of this author, joined with arrogance? For the question which neither Paul nor Augustine nor St. Thomas defines, this author wishes to define and to assign us a sufficient account of this difference, why God predestined this one and not that one, from certain merits of little moment foreknown by God, whereas the Apostle assigned only a certain congruous account of this difference in common, on the part of God's omnipotence, who willed to show forth His mercy and His vindictive justice above all. For the rest, in the particular, why He chose these men, this people, and reprobated another, he wholly throws it back into the abyss of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God. Following the same doctrine, Augustine, an illustrious witness and preacher of the grace of God, said to us, why he draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to investigate, if you do not wish to err. St. Thomas followed the same doctrine, and all follow it who proceed with humility in the way of God.

Then against the second principal dictum I argue in many ways.

First, against the distinction of the threefold help, in which this author does not mention the supernatural disposition by which free choice is prevented so that it be justified through sanctifying grace; but he passes immediately from that preparation with a natural particular help to sanctifying grace, and this he calls the third supernatural help. But if he so holds, he falls into the error of Pelagius, when he asserts that preparation from the powers of nature suffices for grace.

Second, I argue against the explanation of the fifth particle, where he says that we are sufficient by that particular help, without grace, to produce good moral acts. For if he understands it of all acts and over a long time, it is an error, because the grace of God alone through Jesus Christ heals nature, that it may fulfill the whole natural law, which it is not for the present place to define precisely. But if he understands it of certain moral acts, and over a short time, there is no danger; indeed, we said above in a. 3 that it can be piously believed that help of this kind is given to all; but nevertheless this is not necessary, because, although nature is infirm after sin, yet with the general help of God, by which He moves each thing according to its nature, it can exercise some good moral acts.

Third, I argue, and I show that that distinction of the five instants is most vain. Where we must recall that foundation which we posited above for the understanding of the opinion of St. Thomas, in a. 2, where we taught in what way the posteriorities and priorities which we posit concerning the divine actions, both within and without, must be understood and moderated, which we posit, I say, in our mode of understanding. Similarly also now we say that from this distinction of instants, according to prior and posterior in our intellect, it is not inferred that what we understand first is the account and cause of what is understood afterwards; for example, if we first understand the operations of God and His effects, insofar as He is the author of nature, it is not thereby gathered that natural things are the account of supernatural effects, on account of which it is given to this one or to that one; but nature can only be capable, with its operations however good, according to the obediential power of supernatural effects; and among the supernatural things themselves, God orders certain ones to other supernatural things, to which they are of themselves ordainable. Hence therefore the account and cause cannot be gathered why supernatural effects are given to certain ones and not to others, any more than the account is assigned why the potter out of the same mass makes one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor, which example is the Apostle's, Rom. 9,

Fourthly I argue and show that these five instants are distinguished at will: for, in like manner, the first instant could be distinguished into three instants, or even into more: as, for example, I might say that in the first instant God understands and knows Jacob and Esau with the cognition of simple intelligence; and in the second he determines to give them to-be, and knows them with intuitive cognition, insofar as they coexist with eternity; in the third he understands that they are capable of happiness through an obediential power equal in himself; and in the fourth how God by antecedent will wills happiness for them. Then too we could easily multiply other instants, so that we should distinguish more than twenty, if we proceeded as Javelli distinguishes the second instant from the first - namely, if we consider nature as weak and defectible and in need of precepts, and so God gives it the light of natural reason, as though all this could not have been placed in the first instant, in which human nature is considered wholly equal in individuals: to which instant the third also could have been referred, in which he considers that human nature is not the first mover, but needs a universal mover. For all this belongs intrinsically to the natural property of human nature. Away, then, with distinctions of instants of this kind, which profit nothing but for the confusion of the intellect and the palliation of falsehood concerning the divine mysteries. He speaks so as to appear to withdraw from divine providence the fact that Jacob accepts both those helps which Javelli posits, namely the general and the particular; but this would be an error: therefore so would that from which it follows. The major is proved: for Javelli, in regard to the acceptance of both helps, posits only the foreknowledge of God, but not providence, from which, as from a divine cause and preordination, that free act of the one accepting and the good use of free choice would follow. The minor in turn I prove from that of Eph. 1: «Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will»; but, as is said in Phil. 2: «It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish»: therefore God works the willing itself according to the counsel of his will: therefore according to divine predestination he works in us every good use of free choice. But some say that they cannot understand how a human act is free if it is predetermined and predefined by divine providence, from which that act follows necessarily; we, however, with St. Thomas, understand well how that act follows necessarily from such a cause, by necessity of the consequence and not of the consequent - indeed, rather, that act which follows, as from a cause so most efficacious and of infinite power, receives liberty, a liberty participated indeed from the divine free choice, moving the free choice of the creature strongly and sweetly, according to the mode of its nature. Moreover, just as divine providence is understood to be efficacious and infallible without destroying the contingency of things, but rather to effect it, why should not the predefinition of that same divine providence be likewise understood - such that it causes the moral act efficaciously through a free cause as its means, and nevertheless does not destroy but rather intimately confers liberty? On this matter we have spoken at length in q. 19, a. 10, and in this question, a. 5. Wherefore, if anyone does not understand how the use of free choice is free and nevertheless is an effect already predefined by divine providence, he must believe it.

Sixthly, against what he says, that in the fifth instant the divine intellect apprehends that those moral acts are not condign for happiness, and therefore preconceives that that third supernatural help is to be given. For the argument runs thus: because already in the third instant God had chosen Jacob on account of the good moral act, as that author says: therefore that act had a proportion to the end of happiness which in that same third instant God had willed for Jacob himself. The consequence is proved: because the means which fall under election as such must be proportioned to the end, otherwise the election would be imperfect.

Seventhly, against the same: for if the reason why the divine election falls upon Jacob, and the divine will by which he wills happiness for him, is absolutely the foreseen good use of free choice: the same would also be the reason of all the other effects that follow, which are necessary for the attainment of happiness. The consequence is proved: both because what ought to be the cause of predestination must needs be the reason and cause of all the effects of predestination, and also because what is the reason or cause for the divine will to be borne toward Jacob, willing happiness for him, must needs be the cause and reason why the divine will falls upon the means suited to happiness. The consequence is clear, because the reason for willing the end is the reason for willing the means to the end.

Eighthly it is argued: for the manner of speaking of this opinion and its assertion destroys that foundation which we laid down above in the 1st and 2nd conclusion, a. 5 - namely, that here we do not call into question whether a cause and reason is given of the very act of the will or intellect of God predestining, but it is called into question whether a cause and reason is given, on the part of the predestined, of all the effects of predestination: but this author and those who follow him do not assign the cause of the whole effect of predestination: therefore neither do they set forth the cause of predestination, since that good use of free choice is not the infallible cause of justification. And even granting that it be a cause and a certain congruity for justification, nevertheless it cannot be the cause of perseverance in grace; as we shall presently show in the last argument that it is an error to assert that the gift of perseverance is given on account of the good use of free choice which precedes grace. It is confirmed: because although these Doctors do not assert that of the divine act itself, insofar as in itself it is God himself and pure act, any cause or reason is given on the part of the predestined, nevertheless they assign a cause and reason of the divine act itself, insofar as it is borne and tends toward this man rather than that one. St. Thomas, however, and those who follow him, assign a cause and reason only among the effects themselves of the divine will, and they do not posit any extrinsic motive of the divine will besides the goodness of God itself. And what is worse, these doctors deny that the good moral use of free choice is an effect predefined by divine providence itself; and consequently the reason on account of which God himself is moved to give this effect of predestination and not another is not from God himself providing and defining, but only as from a universal mover, who confers nothing else on his part on him who uses free choice well than on him who uses it ill. Which is assuredly contrary to that of Rom. 11: «Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?»; as if the Apostle were saying: it is impossible that a man should give anything to God which was not given by him. Nor does it suffice to answer that God had already given him help; for he had given this very thing to him who does not use it well: but he who uses it well gives more to God than he who does not use it well: therefore God gave him more.

Ninthly it is argued: for many are predestined who are justified by the grace of God before any good moral use has preceded in them: therefore that good use of free choice cannot be the cause and reason why grace is given to all the predestined. The antecedent is proved evidently in two little children who are baptized together, of whom one dies and is saved, while the other, living and sinning of himself, is condemned. Then too, when Christ converted Saul in the midst of his crime, no good use of free choice preceded, but a bad one. Nor is it of any avail to answer that Paul was justified and predestined on account of the future good use of free choice. For the future good use of free choice in Paul was an effect of predestination and from the special help of God, according to that of Acts 9: «He is a chosen vessel unto me, to bear my name, etc.»: therefore these doctors do not assign the good moral use of free choice, from the natural help of God, as the cause of predestination. Moreover, in the predestined angels, how will it be verified that the good use of free choice, from the general help of God, was the cause of the predestination of some, and the evil moral use of certain ones with the same help was the cause of reprobation: when nevertheless it is certain that all the angels were created in grace - indeed, many of those who fell were created in a habitual grace greater than some who persevered? Then, because the reason why certain ones persevered cannot be assigned as a good use of free choice in regard to natural things, since none of them failed, nor could immediately fail, in regard to the natural law, inasmuch as it could not appear to him as good to fail from natural rectitude. One must say, therefore, that the good use of the grace of God, by which certain of them pursued God himself as the author of grace, was from the special and supernatural help of God, by which it was efficaciously brought about that they persevered in good: which help, assuredly, if all had received it, all would have persevered, and all would have received it if it had been given to all by God with an absolute will: yet that help was offered by God to all in the first instant, and some turned themselves away from it, while others accepted and said, we will to be subject to his mercy, and so they persevered by the special help of God, by which they willed to remain.

Tenthly I argue thus: If it is an ordinary law that, the good use of free choice from the general or particular but natural help being posited, justifying grace immediately follows, it follows that grace is owed to that disposition, which would be Pelagian. The sequel is proved: because, although this man does not merit justifying grace, even when he is disposed by God supernaturally through charity and contrition, but is still justified purely gratuitously, nevertheless it cannot be denied that to such a disposition, insofar as it is from God, the infusion of grace is owed, inasmuch as according to the law the infusion of grace itself is proportioned to contrition: therefore similarly, if justifying grace answers to a good disposition, which is the good use of free choice, it follows that such grace is owed to that disposition. The antecedent of this argument is that of St. Thomas above, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1, where he says that in the justification of the impious justice appears, while God remits sins on account of the love which he himself mercifully infuses; and 1-2, q. 112, a. 3, he defines that grace is necessarily given to him who prepares himself for it, insofar as that preparation is from God moving. And the same he asserts in the same place, in the solution to the 3rd, by the example of natural things, in which the disposition of the matter, through the power of the agent, follows the form by necessity, but not by reason of the matter. Behold, then, how, just as in natural things the substantial form is owed to such a disposition insofar as it is from the agent, so grace will be owed to such a disposition of free choice insofar as it is from God according to the ordinary law.

Lastly I argue thus: Either that good use of free choice, which the aforesaid opinion posits as the reason of predestination, is that unique one which precedes justification, or it is a manifold good use which follows justification. To assert the first would be more than rash, for it would follow that no foreknown person could have that good use. And furthermore it follows that everyone who had that good use would both be infallibly justified and be infallibly predestined. But that it is not a manifold use which follows justification is proved: for that manifold use is either determined to a certain number, so as to be the reason of predestination, or it has no determination at all. The second cannot be said, because the reason of anything must be determinate and fixed. But that the first is not to be said is proved: for according to the faith, for attaining final salvation it sufficed to keep the commandments by persevering for the whole time of life. According to that: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: but it could happen that someone by a single act of penance and love keeps the commandments with perseverance to the end, as happens in one who, immediately after penance, departs from life; whereas another requires many good works, so as to keep the commandments with perseverance to the end of life, as happens in one who lives a long time after receiving justification: therefore it cannot be said that that manifold use which follows justification is determined to a certain number. You will say to this that that use which follows justification is the reason of predestination, which is the last good use, to which glory immediately corresponds. Against this it is argued first: for this solution is not according to the mind of Javelli. Secondly, because it follows from it that predestination is not with respect to grace but with respect to glory, so that grace is not an effect of predestination; but the consequent is dangerous and perhaps erroneous, as was shown above against Gabriel: therefore. The sequel is proved: for after the last good use of free choice, glory alone follows. And let us suppose that that last good use is an act of penance, by which the sinner is justified: for that good use is meritorious of glory and not of grace: therefore it is the reason of predestination in respect of grace to be conferred, and not only in respect of glory. It is confirmed: either that good use which is after justification is from the power of grace, or from the powers of nature alone; if from the power of grace, then it is not the reason of all the effects of predestination, because it is not the reason of the grace from which it proceeds, and consequently it is not the reason of predestination; but if it is from the powers of nature alone, then neither is it the reason of the effect of predestination that precedes that use itself: because, as we suppose, justifying grace conferred through baptism precedes that use, and of that grace that use is not the reason. Likewise neither is it the reason of the further effect of predestination, namely perseverance, because it would be contrary to faith to reduce perseverance to a good use proceeding from the powers of nature, since in the Council of Trent, Sess. 6, can. 22, it is defined under anathema that no justified man can persevere in the justice he has received except by the special help of God. Likewise many reprobates have a good use after receiving justice, who nevertheless do not persevere.

From what has been said it follows that the opinion which we have impugned is not only perplexed and entangled, but very rash and erroneous.

To the arguments for that opinion it is answered. To the first it is denied that the divine election cannot be between two unequal men: nay rather, I say that it happens that God has elected to eternal life a man whom he foreknew would be involved in more and graver sins. And on the contrary, a man whom he foresaw would commit fewer and lighter crimes he has not elected, but permits to fall away in his sins. And indeed the divine will does not love the better ones in the sense that it loves those who are presupposed to be better, but because it is the cause of perfection and goodness in those whom it loves: and thus those whom it loves more it makes better: as St. Thomas well explains above, q. 20, a. 4. From this it follows that the election of the divine will is not to be referred to any goodness preceding that election in man. And so St. Augustine: Ser. 11 On the words of the Apostle, says: «Those who are not are elected by God, and yet he who elects does not err, nor does he elect in vain». He means to say that God elects those in whom no good precedes that might be the reason of election: but nevertheless the election itself makes them good, and efficaciously proportioned to eternal life.

To the second, the consequence is denied: because although some account of justice is found in justification, nevertheless it is not to be admitted that that justice holds itself first on the part of him who is justified, but the whole must be reduced to the divine mercy as to the first root. And indeed the account of justice which is found in the justification of a sinner consists in this, that God remits sins on account of the act of charity and contrition which he himself mercifully infuses into the sinner. According to that of Luke 7: «Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much»; this St. Thomas explained in q. 21, a. 4, ad 1, and we have explained it at length there.

To the third it is answered with St. Thomas, above, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4, that from the fact that it is said that God left man in the hand of his counsel, it is designated that no operative power is prefixed to man by which he would be determined to one thing, as happens in brute animals - whence it comes about that brute animals do not move themselves, nor direct themselves to their proper ends, but are directed by the author of nature: whereas rational creatures deliberate concerning themselves, and choose the means to the end toward which they freely direct themselves: but nevertheless all their consultation and election concerning the supernatural end, and all that which produces in them any proportion to the supernatural end, proceeds from the divine mercy; for otherwise we should be sufficient not only to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but also to consult and choose: nor would our whole sufficiency in order to the end of grace be from God, contrary to that of 2 Cor. 3: We are not, etc. But what Javelli adds, speaking of our will as operating well from the powers of nature, that God complies with the pleasure of our will, is intolerable. For God works in us every good will of ours, whether natural or supernatural, according to the counsel of his will, which is the efficacious cause for working every good counsel of our will. And therefore Augustine, in Epistle 106, says that our will is the handmaid of grace, and not its forerunner, the contrary of which Javelli teaches. And in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 8, Augustine says that the will does not by liberty attain grace, but grace liberty. The Dean of Louvain, in the place cited above, thus cites this testimony: «The will does not by liberty follow grace, but grace liberty», and perversely expounds these words of Augustine in favor of his opinion; but nevertheless these words have this legitimate sense, that the will does not by its own liberty first seek grace, so that that word follows has the same force as seeks and pursues, as we are wont to say that a dog follows a hare, and in the same sense it is said in Ps. 35: Seek peace and pursue it. Thus, liberty does not first seek grace, before grace seeks and lays hold of the liberty of our will, sweetly and efficaciously moving the will freely to will to follow grace itself, according to that of Song 1: Draw me after thee, and we will run; and John 6: «No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him». Whence that of Luke 9: «If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and follow me». It is not so to be understood that man first wills to follow Christ before he is prevented by the grace of Christ; but on the contrary, he wills freely to follow Christ because he is prevented by the grace of Christ - which understanding is gathered from the Council of Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 5, speaking thus: «When in the Sacred Letters it is said, Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you, Mal. 3, we are admonished of our liberty; when we answer, Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, Lam. last, we confess that we are prevented by the grace of God». From these things the fourth argument is solved.

To the fifth it is answered that St. Thomas in that place favors the opinion of Javelli in nothing, but rather destroys it: for he says there, in the solution to the first, that God proposes to give grace to that man whom he foreknows will prepare himself for it, but not on account of the preparation, which is not a sufficient cause of grace, but on account of his own goodness. Where note that the word on account of designates only the final cause. For, as St. Thomas says in the same place, God confers grace on the penitent man on account of his penance, as on account of a dispositive material cause.

To the sixth it is answered: it is astonishing that this author tries to prove his opinion from Augustine, when nothing is clearer in the doctrine of Augustine than that no cause of justification or of predestination is to be assigned on the part of free choice. For otherwise, to what purpose does he say on John 6, why he draws this one and does not draw that one, etc., and in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 8, and in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 8, refer the reason of this difference to the alone hidden and inscrutable judgments of God? Wherefore that passage from the book of 83 Questions, which Javelli cites in favor of his opinion, was retracted by Augustine, and if not formally, yet virtually, when he retracted similar passages, as the Master of the Sentences notes in 1 Sent., dist. 41. But as to what Javelli says, that St. Bonaventure, Thomas of Argentina, and Baius taught his opinion, I say first that St. Bonaventure, although he did not attain the truth in this matter, nevertheless did not precipitately assert his opinion, but says that the cause of our predestination which is found on our part is unknown to us. But the other authors cited are not of great authority, nor is it unfitting to say that they, out of ignorance, were already infected with the remnants of the Pelagians, as certain more recent theologians were also infected, of whose number was Ambrosius Catharinus, from whose doctrine perhaps certain modern theologians have drawn certain dogmas, dangerous enough in the matter of justification and predestination; but of this matter in the following article.

To the seventh, I say first that its force is blunted by Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 11, in these words: «I wonder that men prefer to commit themselves to their own weakness rather than to the firmness of God's promise: It is uncertain to me, he says, the will of God concerning me. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear? Why then, since both wills are uncertain to man, does he prefer to commit his faith, hope, and charity to his own weakness rather than to the firmer will of God?» Then, to the argument I say that the hope of the faithful is not weakened but rather strengthened when they believe that every good use of free choice must be reduced, as to its first cause, to the most efficacious will of God, which reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly; strongly for himself, sweetly for me, as Bernard says; and so God moves our will sweetly indeed, but efficaciously, nor can the effect of the divine will be impeded by our will, but it is necessary by necessity of the consequence and of supposition that our will follow the efficacious direction and concurrence of God. See Augustine in the Enchiridion, chs. 95, 96, where he teaches that if we say the divine will can be impeded by the will of any creature, and that it does not rather do whatever it will, whether in heaven or on earth, the beginning of our faith is endangered, by which we confess that God is omnipotent. But to that of the Council of Trent, that the will of the man who is justified can dissent from God calling and stirring him by special help, it is answered, first, that the Council speaks of the divine help which precedes justification; and it speaks of help, abstracting from efficacious or inefficacious, which in him who has consented will be efficacious, but in him who has dissented will be inefficacious; and so, from the consent or dissent of free choice, the efficacy or inefficacy of the help is known a posteriori. It is answered secondly, that if the Council speaks of efficacious help, by which a man is justified, it must be said that free choice, simply and in the divided sense, can dissent if it wills, but not in the composite sense.

To that, moreover, which Javelli adds, that many men are drawn back from the office of virtue because they say, if I am predestined, whatever I do I shall ultimately be saved; but if I am reprobate, I shall ultimately be condemned, whatever I do. It is answered, and first I say that complaints of this sort belong to the remnants of the Pelagians, as is openly clear from the epistles of Prosper and Hilary, which are found in the 7th tome of Augustine before the book On the Predestination of the Saints, in which book Augustine teaches that they are to be extirpated from the hearts of the faithful, although in other respects they differ very much from the Pelagians. Moreover I say that these complaints take their origin from proud souls, which are not fully subject to divine grace, nor humbled under the mighty hand of God, but rather wish to be exalted by themselves. This solution is not any doctor's own, but is openly gathered from Paul, Rom. 9, where he raises two difficulties which arise from proud souls, and resolves them. The first is: Is there injustice with God? - namely, if according to election the purpose of God remains. Paul answers: «God forbid. For he saith to Moses, Exod. 33, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will be merciful to whom I will be merciful». And Paul adds: therefore it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God alone that showeth mercy. In which place Paul so often repeats the mercy of God, in order to teach that every good will of ours, every good use of free choice in order to the supernatural end, is an effect of the divine mercy which God bestows on whom he pleases. The other question is: What then is sought? Who shall resist his will? as if he were saying, in the person of a proud soul: what does God seek from us if we do not perform the offices of virtue, since his will has already decreed from eternity what will come to be concerning us. The Apostle answers: «O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?» By which words Paul teaches that the human mind must be subjected to divine grace, and humbled under the mighty hand of God. And to this pertains also what he adds in the same chapter: But if God, willing to show his wrath, etc. Concerning which words note that Paul calls the predestined vessels of mercy, which God hath prepared, to designate that all good works, all the means by which the predestined attain eternal life, they have not from themselves, but from the preparation of eternal predestination; and this without detriment to the liberty of the human will, but rather from this the liberty of the human will is established and confirmed the more - but nevertheless in regard to good. Furthermore, the reprobate Paul calls vessels fitted for destruction, to designate that the reprobate themselves, by their own will and malice, make themselves worthy and fitted for eternal punishment, so that that of Hos. 13 is true: «Thy destruction, Israel, is from thee; only in me is thy help». Thus far we have refuted the opinion of Javelli with so many arguments, so that certain opinions of more recent theologians, which have a great affinity with this opinion of Javelli, may at the same time stand refuted.

Meanwhile, concerning this difficulty, it pleases me to report the opinion of Scotus, who among the scholastic doctors, outside the School of St. Thomas, speaks more modestly, in 1 Sent., d. 41, q. 1, where he lays down this conclusion: Of predestination there is no reason on the part of the predestined that is prior to predestination itself; yet a cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate. He proves the first part thus. The volition of the end is prior to the volition of the means: but the end of grace, and any good use of free choice, have the character of means in respect of the end of predestination: therefore God predestined men to the supernatural end before he foresaw and ordained all those means which hold themselves on the part of the predestined. He proves the second part of the conclusion. To reprobate is nothing other than to will to condemn; but the will to condemn someone necessarily presupposes guilt on the part of the one to be condemned: therefore. The major is supposed by Scotus as certain. The minor is proved: condemnation cannot be good unless it is just, and it cannot be just unless guilt is presupposed; and so Augustine says that God is not an avenger unless there is someone a sinner: therefore. And both parts are confirmed. All good things which contribute something to the supernatural end proceed in us from God; but all evils which turn us away from that end are on our part: therefore it is very well understood that on our part no cause is given on account of which we are elected to this end, yet a cause is given on account of which we are excluded from it. It is confirmed secondly: because it is highly fitting to the divine goodness that out of its pure liberality it predestine men to the supernatural end, no cause being presupposed on their part. Yet it does not befit the same goodness to reprobate anyone unless a just cause is presupposed on the part of the reprobate. From these Scotus infers that, Peter and Judas being offered to God from eternity and constituted in pure naturals, he predestined Peter indeed, but did not reprobate Judas except afterwards, his guilt being foreseen.

Scotus, moreover, distinguishes four instants, the better to explain this matter; and he says that in the first, Judas and Peter being offered to God in pure naturals, he held himself merely negatively toward Judas, but willed to give beatitude to Peter. In the second instant too he held himself merely negatively toward Judas, but willed to give grace to Peter. In the third, Judas and Peter were presented to God as equal, infected with the mass of perdition. In the fourth, finally, God predestined Peter, decreeing to exempt him from the mass of perdition, but foresaw Judas as a final sinner, because he had held himself merely negatively toward him in the first two instants; and then he reprobated him, willing to exclude him from the kingdom. Scotus adds, moreover, that since this business of predestination and reprobation seemed to Paul inscrutable, Rom. 9, 10, and 11 - so that at the end of ch. 11 he took refuge in the exclamation, O the depth of the riches, etc. - it is necessary to proceed soberly in this disputation, and to choose that opinion which has pleased one more, provided nevertheless that the liberty of the divine will be preserved without the admixture of any injustice.

Concerning this opinion of Scotus, note two things. The one is that, although Scotus himself in 4 Sent., dist. 14, q. 2, assigns a certain congruous merit, which he calls attrition from pure naturals, which is some reason of the remission of sins and of justification, nevertheless he did not dare to assert that this congruous merit is the reason of predestination - which, however, other theologians who commented on this congruous merit together with Scotus himself did. But certainly Scotus proceeds reasonably enough in this matter, because that congruous merit, if there is any, has a wholly irrelevant bearing on predestination. For many are predestined in whom that congruous merit is not found, as is clear in Paul, who was justified with no regard had to any preceding congruous merit. And moreover, there are many in whom a congruous merit of this sort has been found, who nevertheless were not predestined. The other thing to be noted is how arbitrarily the instants are multiplied by the theologians in the business of predestination and reprobation, and how little they contribute to assigning the reason of the difference between the predestined and the reprobate: for I ask Scotus, since in the first instant Peter and Judas were offered to God as equal, namely in pure naturals, why did he will to confer beatitude on Peter and hold himself merely negatively toward Judas? Likewise I ask, since in the first two instants God willed to confer beatitude and grace on Peter, why in the third instant were Peter and Judas offered as equal, infected with the mass of perdition? Finally, it is a most certain thing that these instants are not multiplied in the eternal operation of God itself, but by our consideration, by which we consider the divine operation according to one account earlier and according to another later. Hence the diversity of instants must be taken wholly on the part of the effects themselves, according as one is the reason of another. Then thus: since Judas in the first and second instant was offered to God with a disposition utterly the same, how can two instants be distinguished there? Finally, since the diversity of instants is to be taken according as one effect is the cause of another, and since there are diverse genera of causes, one effect in one genus of cause can be prior to another and in another genus posterior: by what solid reason, then, can we multiply instants, attending to the causality and priority of one effect in respect of another? Wherefore, for assigning the reason of the difference between the predestined and the reprobate, we have recourse to instants of this sort wholly irrelevantly.

These opinions, then, having been refuted, the true opinion is to be set down according to the mind of Augustine and St. Thomas. Whence let this be the CONCLUSION, responsive to the question: Of predestination no cause is given on our part. By the name of predestination in this conclusion I do not understand the divine act by which he predestined us; for it is a most certain thing with all that of that divine act no cause can be assigned. I understand, therefore, by the appellation predestination every effect of predestination taken collectively; and since among the effects of predestination this order is found, that the first effect is the efficacious cause of the second, the second of the third, and so on up to the last, it is the same thing to assert that no cause of predestination is given, and that no cause of the first effect of predestination is given. The conclusion, thus expounded, is expressly that of St. Augustine, in the places cited above, and in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chs. 17 and 18, and in the book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 19, he cites in favor of this opinion Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen, and in ch. 18 he says «that no one, unless by erring, could dispute against this truth». Whence certain testimonies of Ambrose for this opinion are found in Augustine, book 1 On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius, chs. 44 and 45; this conclusion is also the common opinion among the scholastic doctors who follow the Master of the Sentences, dist. 40 and 41; so teach Scotus in the place cited above, Durandus, dist. 41, q. 2, Marsilius in 1 Sent., q. 14, and St. Thomas in this article, whom his whole School follows. And certainly our conclusion is so true that the opposite is not only dangerous but, in my judgment, erroneous. It is proved first, from that of Rom. 9: «That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, etc.»: this testimony is so efficacious that a certain unknown author, whom Soto cites on ch. 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, could not otherwise escape its force than by saying that St. Paul in that place did not speak from his own opinion, but following the common opinion of the Jews, who thought that the election of Jacob made by God rested not on certain works, but on God's good pleasure alone. But this author speaks most dangerously and most impudently, both because it is most manifestly gathered from the context of that chapter that Paul speaks from his own opinion, and also because there is a common consensus of the holy Fathers and theologians and of nearly all the faithful that the Apostle here explained his own opinion. See Augustine, book 2 Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, ch. 7, and the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 7, where he wonderfully amplifies this testimony; and in this second place cited he says that he who reduces the judgment of the divine discrimination concerning Jacob and Esau to works foreseen by God, makes void the word of the Apostle saying, Not of works: because Paul there excludes not only past works, but all works, even future ones. Secondly it is proved from that of 2 Tim. 1: «God hath called us by his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace»; behold, where the first effect of predestination, which is calling, is not reduced to our works, but to the purpose of God and his grace. And in ch. 1 of Ephesians Paul reduces the whole business of our justification and predestination to the divine good pleasure and to the gratuitous counsel of the divine goodness. It is confirmed: predestination in Scripture is called a lot, Col. 1: «Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints»; and Eph. 1: «We are called by lot in Christ»; and Ps. 15: «The lines, that is the lots, are fallen to me in excellent places»; but it could not be called a lot for any other reason than that, just as lots fall out without any preceding cause or diligence of him upon whom the lot falls, so predestination, in respect of the predestined, is as it were fortuitous and by chance, no regard being had to their works. Thirdly the conclusion is proved by a reason that shows singly, through the four genera of causes, that no cause of predestination is found on our part. And first, concerning the final cause: for it is manifest that the final cause of our justification and predestination is the divine goodness and its glory, and also that of Christ the Lord, as is held in the Council of Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 7. It is true that the proper glory of the predestined has in some way the character of an end in predestination, since from the fact that God chose men for glory, to be efficaciously attained, he predestined them, disposing the means by which they would efficaciously attain that end; but nevertheless the beatitude of the predestined is not the primary and chief end, but a less principal and secondary one. In this place it must be noted that Durandus erred, in the place cited above, in saying that the glory of the predestined is not to be counted among the effects of predestination, because among the effects of predestination it has the character of an end, whereas predestination is not about the end but about the means; Durandus, I say, erred, because St. Paul in Rom. 8 numbers among the effects of predestination the glorification of the predestined: «Whom he predestinated, them he also magnified, them he also glorified». To the argument of Durandus it is said that the end which in the intention of the agent has the character of a cause in respect of the means, when placed in execution has the character of an effect; and the means themselves can have the character of an efficient cause in respect of it. So, then, I say for the present that the beatitude of the predestined, as it is in the intention of God predestining, has the character of a final cause secondarily in order to the effects of predestination - which neither St. Thomas nor our conclusion denies, when it says that no cause of predestination is given on the part of the predestined, because the beatitude of the predestined thus considered does not hold itself on their part, but on the part of him who predestines and elects men to that end. Furthermore, if the beatitude of the predestined is considered as placed in execution, it has the character of the last effect of predestination.

But it must be noted that, whereas with St. Thomas here - indeed, in this whole question, which he repeats rather often - the divine goodness is the final, primary cause of predestination, in this article, at the end of the body, he says that the divine will is the last end of the whole of predestination. In which matter, unless I am mistaken, St. Thomas meant to teach this: that although divine predestination, considered absolutely, has as its last end the manifestation of the divine goodness, nevertheless, insofar as it is the predestination of these men and not of those, it is most of all manifestive of the greatest liberty which the divine will has in regard to the dispensation of supernatural goods. And so, that God elects this one and not that one manifests this liberty very greatly, which is a great divine perfection. Christ insinuated this in Matt. 20, in that parable of the householder hiring laborers for the vineyard, in which it is held that an equal reward was given to those who seemed to have been unequal in labor, and the father of the family says: Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own? Then, if we speak of the efficient cause, it is a most certain thing that the divine will alone is the cause of our whole predestination. Concerning the formal cause, too, there is no doubt among theologians, since the formal cause of the effect of predestination cannot be anything but grace, and perseverance in it, and its consummation in glory. But all these are effects of predestination and presuppose the first effect, which is calling, and consequently they are not the cause of the whole of predestination. Concerning the material cause, therefore, alone can there be doubt. And indeed, if we speak of the remote material cause, which is the natural capacity for eternal life, it is a most certain thing that it is not the cause of predestination, because it is common to the predestined and the reprobate: but if the discourse is about the dispositive material cause, it has already been proved in the preceding that no cause of predestination of this sort is given on our part. Because, if it is a purely natural disposition, it has a wholly irrelevant bearing on the effects of predestination; but if it is supernatural, then it is itself contained within the effects of predestination, and consequently it cannot be the cause of all the effects, otherwise it would be the cause of itself. Thus far we have resolved that no cause of predestination is found on our part. But what is to be judged concerning reprobation will be said below in this article.

But there are two arguments to be dissolved against our conclusion. The first is taken from that of Rom. 8: «Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, etc.»; in which place St. Paul seems manifestly to teach that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, since the plain sense of this testimony seems to be this: Those whom God foreknew would be conformable to the image of his Son, he predestined.

The second argument is taken from various testimonies of the Saints, in which it seems most openly to be laid down that God predestined these men for the reason that he foresaw that they would consent to the divine calling and use his grace well. These testimonies are innumerable; Sixtus of Siena diligently collects them in his Bibliotheca Sancta, book 6, annotation 251. To the first argument it is answered that in that place St. Paul greatly confirms our conclusion. For in the preceding words he ascribes calling, which is the first effect of predestination, not to our works but to the divine purpose. To those, he says, who according to the purpose of God are called saints. The first sense, then, of that testimony is this: those whom God not only foreknew to be capable of divine glory, but also predestined to be made conformable, etc.; and so Paul intends to assign the distinction between the predestined and the reprobate, that these are only foreknown by God but not preordained, while those are not only foreknown to be capable of beatitude, but are also efficaciously preordained to it. The second sense is: Those whom God foreknew to be made conformable to the image of his Son, etc., he predestined, that is, he first efficaciously destined them to have conformity of this kind. And so predestination there denotes an antecedence to the foreknowledge of conformity. This understanding is that of Cajetan on this passage. The third sense is that Paul speaks of the knowledge of approbation, which includes the efficacious will of conferring eternal life. This exposition is also Cajetan's in the place cited. But according to the mind of St. Thomas on this passage, that explanation must be accommodated to this testimony in this way: Those whom he foreknew with the knowledge of approbation, them also he predestined to be made conformable, etc. And so St. Thomas, between the two words foreknew and predestined, understands by implication that word them.

To the second it is answered that the holy Fathers in those expressions have suitable understandings. The first is that by which St. Thomas in this article, in the solution to the first, expounds a certain testimony of St. Ambrose. The second exposition is the one gathered from Augustine, book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 18, where he says that sometimes, among the holy Fathers, foreknowledge has the same force as predestination, for it is common enough in Scripture that to foreknow is taken for to predestine. Whence, when the holy Fathers sometimes say that God foreknew the future good works of predestined men, the sense is that God predestined and preordained that they would have good works of this kind. The third exposition is that they are to be understood by way of concomitance. And so if the holy Fathers sometimes say that God predestined certain ones because he foresaw that they would use his grace well, that particle because does not give a causal sense, but imports an infallible concomitance of good works with predestination; and let this be the sense: that if God did not foresee future good works in the predestined, he would not have predestined them. But these good works are not foreseen as antecedent to predestination, but as infallibly consequent. The fourth explanation is that the holy Fathers do not always employ the name of predestination in the sense in which we, following Augustine, St. Thomas, and the most weighty theologians, employ it. For we designate by the word predestination the eternal preparation of all God's benefits for final salvation: but the Saints sometimes understand by the name predestination the divine will of conferring eternal life as a reward and prize. But predestination taken in this way has without doubt a cause on our part, since eternal life is given on account of our merits. Thus the Dean of Louvain, a. 7 On Free Choice, and Sixtus of Siena in the place cited above interpret the holy Fathers. But here it must be noted that among the holy Fathers Chrysostom is to be read more cautiously. For in homily 65 on Matthew, expounding that parable, The kingdom of heaven is like to a man that is a householder, who went out, etc., he seems to attribute to free choice more than is due. For he says: but why did he not hire all at once? He answers that he indeed willed to hire all at the same hour, but that not all obeyed at the same hour resulted from the will of the called: and therefore they were called at such an hour because they were then going to consent to the calling. And he says that St. Paul and the thief, justified on the Cross, were for that reason called at such a time because they were then going to consent, and if they had been called earlier they would have resisted and not obeyed. These words of Chrysostom have a most difficult explanation, but they can be explained somehow or other in the sense in which Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 9, explains certain words which are found in Augustine himself, in book 6 of Questions against the Pagans, q. 2, which is Epistle 49 and is cited by St. Thomas, 3 part, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. There Augustine says that Christ willed to appear to men and to preach his doctrine at the time and place where he foreknew that there would be those who would believe in him. These words are very similar to the words cited from Chrysostom; but Augustine interprets them, in the place cited, and in book 2 On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 9, as follows: that he indeed in that book 6 of Questions taught against the Pagans that Christ the Lord foresaw that at the time of his preaching many would be believers in him, which is indeed most true. But whether their faith would be from the gift of God and an effect of predestination, or not, he did not explain in that place, because no opportunity for explaining presented itself then. This explanation of the words of Augustine can be accommodated to the words of Chrysostom - indeed, even to all the testimonies of the holy Fathers in which they teach that God predestined those men whom he foreknew would use his grace well. Thus far concerning this question.

IT IS DOUBTED in the second place, for the completion of this difficulty: Whether, on the part of the merits of Christ, who is the head of all the predestined, a reason and cause of the predestination of the members can be assigned. The definition of this question is weighty and difficult.

For the negative side it is argued first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas here, in the body and in the solution to the 3rd, where he reduces the whole effect of our predestination to the will and goodness of God alone: therefore it is not reduced to the merits of Christ the Lord. It is confirmed from that of Eph. 1: «In whom also we are called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will»; therefore our whole predestination is to be reduced to the counsel of the divine will alone.

It is argued secondly, from Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 15, where he speaks thus. By that grace every man whatsoever becomes a Christian from the beginning of his faith, by which grace that man, namely the Lord Jesus, was made Christ from his beginning; but the Lord Jesus was made Christ in the divine foreknowledge without any merits either of his own or of another: therefore we too have been made Christians without any merits either of our own or of another; and consequently, Christ did not merit for us the whole effect of predestination.

It is argued thirdly: If Christ is the efficient and meritorious cause of our predestination, it follows that if Christ were not to be in the world, no man would be predestined: the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is clear, because the cause being removed the effect is removed. The minor is proved: Predestination is certain and infallible, therefore no extrinsic thing being removed can it be taken away or impeded, unless the divine will be taken away: but the merits of Christ have themselves extrinsically to predestination, therefore. It is confirmed: for it follows that if Adam had persevered in original justice and grace he would not have been predestined by God; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is clear, because Adam did not receive original grace and justice from the merit of Christ the Lord. The minor is proved. By that grace he was ordered to eternal life, therefore if he had persevered in it, he would have attained eternal life, and consequently he would have been predestined.

Fourthly. If Christ the Lord is the meritorious cause of our predestination, it is from this, that God foresaw from eternity that Christ by his merits would merit for us the first justification: but this is false, therefore. The minor is proved: If Christ merits for us the first justification, then the first justification does not take place gratuitously, contrary to that of Rom. 3: Justified freely by his grace.

It is argued fifthly. Granted that Christ the Lord merited our justification and all the dispositions to it, it still does not follow that he merited our predestination, that is, every effect of our predestination. It is proved: the merit of Christ the Lord was an effect of our predestination: but this effect he did not merit, therefore. The major is proved: Every benefit conferred on us by God for eternal life is an effect of predestination: for predestination is the preparation of all God's benefits for eternal life; but the merit of Christ is the greatest benefit prepared for us for eternal life: therefore.

On the opposite side is what Paul says in Eph. 1: «He predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ, in himself». This controversy began to be disputed in this School twenty-two years ago; for before that the common opinion of this School was that Christ is the final and exemplary cause of our justification and predestination, but not the efficient or meritorious cause; rather, the divine will alone was reckoned the efficient cause of our predestination. Driedo, in the book On the Redemption and the Captivity of the Human Race, a. 4, teaches that Christ is not the meritorious cause, simply speaking, of our predestination, and explains that testimony of Paul in Eph. 1, he predestined us through Jesus Christ, etc., in such a way that the word through is referred to a particular effect of predestination, namely to grace, and not to all the effects of predestination; since, he says, he did not merit for us faith, which is the beginning of justification, nor the dispositions to grace, nor his own Incarnation, which is the greatest effect of predestination.

And he proves this opinion, first from that of John 6: «No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draw him»; that is, no one can be joined to me through grace and justice, unless the Father has first, by his grace and mercy, without any merits, drawn him to me through faith and the other dispositions necessary for grace.

Secondly he proves it from that of Romans 4: «To him that does not work, but believes in him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is reputed unto justice, etc.»; that is, he says, through faith the justice of Christ is apprehended, by which men are justified; but faith itself is from the mere grace of God, without any merit of Christ.

Thirdly he proves it from Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 15, which passage we cited in the second argument, made for the negative side of the question.

Fourthly he proves it by reason. It does not follow that, if Christ merited our justification, he also merited the dispositions necessary for it, since many things are necessary for justification which Christ nevertheless did not merit, according to the opinion of all, for example intellect and will, temporal goods, the water necessary for baptism, etc.: therefore from the fact that faith and the other supernatural dispositions are necessary for justification, it is not effectively gathered that Christ the Lord merited them. This opinion of Driedo is followed by the Dean of Louvain, art. 6, On Satisfaction, page 243, tome 1, where he cites Capreolus in support of his opinion. However, Capreolus, as may be seen in 3 Sent., dist. 18, q. 1, to the arguments of Scotus against the 4th conclusion, does not deny simply that Christ merited faith for us; he denies, however, that he merited the other dispositions to grace. And he proves this, first, because if Christ merited for us not only grace but also all the dispositions necessary for it, no way remains for us by which we might explain how man is justified freely, since the whole justice is given to us from the merits of Christ. Secondly he proves it from St. Thomas, q. 29 of De Veritate, art. 7, ad 4, where he says that the Passion of Christ, as to sufficiency, stands equally toward all, but as to efficacy not so. And this, St. Thomas says, comes about partly from free choice and partly from divine election, according to which the effects of the Passion of Christ are mercifully conferred on some, but on others are withdrawn by a just judgment: therefore the application of the effect of the Passion of Christ, which is made through the dispositions to grace, must be referred to the gratuitous election of God, and not to the merit of Christ. Thirdly he proves and explains it. Let there be two little ones, of whom one is baptized and the other not: that this baptized one receives regenerating grace is from the merit of Christ; but that the baptismal water is applied to him does not come from the merits of Christ, but from the sole divine election, by which he chose this little one in preference to the other.

FOR the decision, let the first conclusion be: Christ the Lord merited for us not only our justification, but also faith, also the dispositions to grace, also the preaching of the Gospel, also the application of the Sacraments, and, in short, all the means ordained by the grace of God for our salvation: and the opposite of this is erroneous, especially if it is denied that Christ merited faith for us. This conclusion is proved, first, from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 8, throughout, where he teaches that Christ is the Head of the whole Church, and that he inflows into Christians every supernatural movement which they have, even into those who have faith without charity. And there, in art. 3, in the solution to the first, he teaches that although unbelievers are not actually members of Christ, they are nevertheless members of him in potency: which potency, he says, is founded on two things, first indeed and principally on the power of Christ, secondly on the freedom of choice. From which it is gathered that the power of Christ disposes unbelievers that they be brought back to the justice of faith and become actually members of Christ. But if someone replies that Christ is the effective cause of faith and of the dispositions to grace, but not the meritorious cause, this solution is arbitrary, since the common teaching of Theologians holds that Christ effects in us nothing pertaining to our salvation except what he himself merited for us. And indeed St. Thomas in 3 Sent., dist. 19, q. 1, art. 1, question 1, extends the efficiency of Christ no further than the merit, with respect to those effects which he works in us. It is confirmed: whatever Christ confers on us from the Father, he asked for by prayer; but whatever Christ absolutely asked for in prayer, he merited from the Father: therefore whatever he confers on us, he merited. Secondly it is proved from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 49, art. 1, where he says that the Passion of Christ was a universal medicine for curing our infirmities; but it belongs to the account of a medicine not only to confer health, but also to dispose to it: therefore. Thirdly it is proved from Augustine, book 2 of On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 7, where he says that through Christ man has it that he draw near to God, just as that he not withdraw from God; but the first approach to God is made through faith, according to that of Hebrews 11: He that comes to God must believe, etcetera; and Romans 5: Through whom, namely Christ, we have access into this grace: therefore. Likewise in book 1 of Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, ch. 3, where Augustine says: No one can will anything good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil, that is, by the grace of God through Jesus Christ; but to will to believe, to will to be disposed to grace, is to will something good: therefore the grace of God is given to us through Jesus Christ. Lastly Augustine repeatedly asserts that grace is given to us through Christ; but by the name grace, as will be evident to those versed in the reading of Augustine, indeed also of the Councils, there is understood not only justifying grace itself, but faith and all the means which prepare us for justifying grace are called the gratuitous gifts of God, which is especially to be seen in the Epistles of Innocent I, to the Council of Mileve, which are circulated among the Epistles of Augustine, and are Epistles 91, 95, 96 in St. Augustine. Furthermore, it is proved from Celestine I, who in Epistle 1 and 4 to the Bishops of Gaul said that through Christ we use free choice well; and in Epistle 7 and 8 he asserts that, from the tradition of the Apostolic See, all the prayers of the Church resound with the grace of Christ. From which I argue thus: there are many prayers of the Church in which we ask of God the conversion of unbelievers to the faith, and the dispositions to justice of faithful sinners; therefore all these things we obtain from God from the merit and grace of Christ. It is confirmed: for John 17, Christ the Lord asked the Father for the conversion of those who were to believe in him through the preaching of the Apostles: therefore faith is had from the merit and prayer of Christ. Furthermore, from St. Bernard, Sermon 13 on the Canticle, where he says: whatever wisdom, whatever virtue you trust that you have, ascribe it to the power of God and to the wisdom of God, Christ. Moreover the conclusion is proved from Sacred Scripture, Ephesians 1: Blessed be God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in Christ; but faith and the disposition to grace is a spiritual blessing: therefore it is through Christ. And in the same chapter it is said, In whom we also are called by lot. But vocation is made through external preaching and interior inspiration: therefore all these things fall under the merit of Christ. As is had, Philippians 1: to you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him; therefore faith is given to us for Christ. And ch. 2: He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross. For which cause God also exalted him, etc.; and every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father; therefore the faith by which we confess the glory of Christ the Lord is an effect of the humility and obedience of Christ, and consequently of his merit. Hebrews 12: Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, etc.; therefore Christ is the author of our faith. John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, and of his fullness we all have received; or faith pertains to truth: therefore from the fullness of Christ we receive faith. Lastly there is a very good testimony, Isaiah 53: If he shall lay down his soul, he shall see a seed of long life, and the will of the Lord shall be directed in his hand. On which passage Jerome says that the will of the Lord to be directed in the hand of Christ is nothing other than that whatever the Father willed is fulfilled by the virtues of Christ; but the Father wills us to believe, wills us to be disposed to grace justifying from sin: therefore these things are fulfilled in us by the power of Christ. In particular, moreover, it is proved that Christ is the meritorious cause of our faith from the Council of Mileve, ch. 4: It is the gift of God not only to know what we ought to do, but also to love it so that we do it, and both are given to us through Christ. Behold a clear definition of the Council, since through faith we know what we ought to do. And in the Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7, after the Council had explained the mode of the disposition to grace, it says: All these things a man receives from God, infused at once unto the remission of sins through Christ, to whom he is ingrafted by faith, hope, and charity. And in ch. 8 the Council explains that man in that sense is justified through faith, because faith is the first root and beginning of justification. From this I argue thus: if Christ is not the meritorious cause of faith, since faith is the first root of justification, it follows that he is not the meritorious cause of our whole justification; but this seems both to offend pious ears and not altogether to agree with the doctrine of faith, through which we absolutely confess that Christ is the meritorious cause of our justification, as is had in the same Session 6, ch. 6. Lastly the conclusion is proved by reasons. First, because any man existing in grace can merit congruously that God dispose a sinner to penance: therefore something more excellent must be attributed to Christ the Lord, namely that he efficaciously merit that men be disposed to justifying grace. Likewise, from the opposite opinion it would follow that the merit of Christ was only the cause of human salvation as to sufficiency, but not as to efficiency for some men. The consequence is proved: for it pertains to the account of merit and satisfaction, as to actual efficiency, that there fall under that merit those things which, being posited, the effect follows: but if Christ did not merit that this little one be baptized in fact, but only that, if he be baptized, he be justified: surely he would not merit that which, being posited, justification follows. It is confirmed, because otherwise the merit of Christ would not more perfectly be the cause of the salvation of the predestined than of the reprobate. The consequence is proved: because as to the sufficiency of merit, it equally regards all men, both reprobate and predestined: but the difference is in this, that to some that merit is applied, to others not: therefore if that application does not fall under the merit of Christ, it is plainly gathered that the merit of Christ of itself equally regards the predestined and the reprobate.

Second conclusion: If by the name of predestination we understand the whole effect of the predestination of the mystical body, namely of Christ and the members together and collectively, it is certain that Christ did not merit the whole effect of predestination. The reason of which is, because Christ did not merit the hypostatic union of the Word with the humanity, nor habitual grace, nor his own merits, all of which are effects of the predestination of the whole mystical body together with the Head: therefore. This conclusion is common, and Augustine teaches it, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 15, where he says that Christ is the most brilliant radiance of predestination, and that he was predestined not only that that man should be the Son of God, but that he should be the Head and Redeemer of all.

Third conclusion: If the whole effect of our predestination be considered in us, insofar as we are distinguished as members from Christ the Head, it must also be certain that Christ merited our predestination for us, that is, the whole effect of our predestination. This conclusion is proved from the first conclusion, because nothing is given to us by God the Savior which leads to felicity, which does not come from God on account of the merit of Christ: therefore the merits of Christ, or Christ through his merits, merited for us the whole effect of our predestination, and consequently he is truly said to have merited our predestination. Secondly the conclusion is proved and explained, because all the goods which are done in time, ordained to our salvation, were decreed from eternity that they should so be done as they are made in time: but in time it so happens that Christ merited for us all things which we receive from God ordained to our salvation: therefore they were so decreed by God that the whole effect of the predestination of the members should be caused by the merits of Christ the Head, just as he also preordained to give us the effect of glory on account of our merits from his grace. This opinion Durandus holds in 3 Sent., dist. 10, q. 3, where he says that Christ is the efficient cause of predestination as to the effect, because he is the meritorious cause, which in moral matters has the account of an efficient cause. And Bonaventure, in the same distinction, although he does not speak expressly of predestination, but of the adoption of sons; but most especially this conclusion seems to be proved from that of Ephesians 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, who predestined us unto the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ into him. Where what he says, In him, signifies that we are not otherwise to be pleasing to God, except insofar as we were foreknown as united to Christ. But what he says, through him, signifies that he is the efficient and meritorious cause of our union with such a Head. Lastly what he says, into him, signifies the final cause, insofar as we are predestined that we be conformed to Christ the Head, and so in all things God may be glorified through Jesus Christ.

But someone asks whether, simply speaking, it is as certain that Christ merited our predestination for us, as it is certain that he merited all the dispositions to grace? It is answered, and let it be:

Fourth conclusion: There cannot be a difference among Catholics except in the mode of speaking. This conclusion is explained. For there are Theologians who say that by the name our predestination there are to be understood all the means ordained by God for our salvation, whether they be intrinsic in us or in another: and because the most important means ordained by God for the salvation of men was the Incarnation of Christ and the merit of his Passion, they deny that Christ was the cause of our predestination, simply speaking: the reason of whom is, because he did not merit his own Incarnation, nor the merit of his Passion.

Secondly they prove it, because among the effects of the predestination of some man there are also numbered the prayers of others for him; for example the prayers of St. Monica for Augustine, and the prayer of Stephen for those who stoned him, was an effect of the predestination of Paul, who was guarding the garments of those who stoned him: therefore much more the prayer of Christ, which he prayed for Peter that his faith should not fail, was an effect of the predestination of Peter. And the prayer by which Christ prayed for the elect, for whom he prayed efficaciously, was an effect of their predestination. Whence it is said in John 17: I pray for them, not for the world (namely, with an absolute prayer), but for those whom you have given me, because they are yours.

Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 24, art. 3 and 4, where he teaches that God preordained our salvation, by predestining from eternity, that it be accomplished through Jesus Christ. Neither St. Thomas there, nor elsewhere, asserted that Christ is the meritorious or efficient cause of our predestination, but only the exemplar and in a certain way the final cause.

Fourthly they prove it, because we confess in the Creed, Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate; where the particle for signifies the final cause: therefore human salvation is the end of the Incarnation, and hence the Incarnation is the effect of this final cause. Therefore Christ did not merit for us the whole effect of our predestination. It must therefore be said that this opinion can be defended without danger, namely that Christ did not merit our predestination for us, in that he did not merit the whole effect of our predestination, namely his Incarnation and its merits.

Fifth conclusion: Nevertheless the opinion that, simply speaking, it be asserted that Christ merited our predestination is much more probable, and more befitting the dignity of Christ the Lord. It is proved first that this is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the place above: for when in art. 3 he had defined that Christ is the exemplar of our predestination, in art. 4 he defines that he is the cause of our predestination: therefore he understood something more than that he is the exemplar cause, namely that he is the efficient cause; and if he is the efficient cause, therefore the meritorious cause; for whatever Christ effects in us, he merited that it be effected. Secondly it is proved that St. Thomas could not understand that Christ was only the final cause of our predestination, for this was already included in what he had said, that he is the exemplar cause. For every exemplar cause is the immediate end of the thing exemplified: therefore it seems that St. Thomas understood that Christ is the efficient cause, and hence the meritorious cause of our predestination. Thirdly it is proved: because the Incarnation of Christ and the grace of union, indeed even habitual grace, is a much more excellent good than all the other goods of grace and glory conferred on all the predestined; therefore that greater good is not ordained to the effect of the predestination of the members as a middle effect to a final cause. The consequence is proved: because the end is more worthy than those things which are for the end. It is confirmed from that of Romans 8: «Whom he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren»: therefore our justification and glorification is an effect of the power of our Head, not only as an efficient cause, but also in the genus of final cause: therefore the same thing with respect to the same thing cannot be cause and effect in the same genus of final cause; therefore neither Christ the Lord nor his merits are effects of our salvation in the genus of final cause; but on the contrary, all our salvation is an effect of Christ and his merit in the genus of final cause. And both of these, namely that Christ is the efficient and final cause of our salvation, is given to be understood in the cited testimony: for in what he says, To be made conformable to the image of his Son, Christ is signified as the final cause; but in what he says, That he might be the firstborn, etc., Christ is signified as the efficient cause, for it is said in John 1: Of his fullness we all have received; and grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. It is confirmed from a likeness. For as St. Thomas says, 3rd part, q. 7, art. 13, and q. 8, art. 5, the habitual grace of Christ is an effect of the grace of union and is ordained to manifest it: therefore from a likeness all our grace is not only an effect of the grace of Christ in the genus of efficient cause, but is also ordained to manifest it: and so it is understood, That he might be the firstborn among many brethren, that is, that he be shown to be the firstborn, according to that of Psalm 44: God has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your fellows. But by the name of unction and of oil is signified the ineffable union of the hypostasis of the Word with the human nature.

TO the arguments on the opposite side. To the first it is answered that St. Thomas assigns no other cause or reason of our predestination on our part besides the divine will: with which, however, it well stands that on the part of Christ a meritorious cause of our predestination be assigned. To the confirmation it is answered that rather from that testimony our third and fifth conclusion is proved, because there it is said, In whom, that is, in Christ, we also are called by lot, etc.: so that the purpose of God, by which he predestined us, does not exclude, but rather includes Christ and his merits as the cause of the whole effect of our predestination.

To the second it is answered that Augustine there only intends to exclude merits on the part of the man who becomes a Christian, just as merits are excluded on the part of Christ, that he should be Christ. But the merits of Christ are not excluded, that we should be Christians.

To the third it is answered that, if we speak in fact, according to divine predestination, the matter stands thus, that if Christ be removed, no man remains predestined. But if we speak of the absolute power of God, the consequence does not hold. For God could have predestined men without the merit of Christ. To the confirmation it is said, I deny the sequel: because that conditional is false, namely, if Adam had persevered in grace, he would not have been predestined; on the contrary he would have been predestined, but not as in fact he is now predestined through the merits of Christ.

To the fourth, the sequel could absolutely be conceded, namely that God predestined us for the reason that he foreknew the merits of Christ, provided that the causality signified by those particles for the reason and because be not attributed to the divine actions of predestination and foreknowledge among themselves, but that causality be referred to the effect of our predestination, whose cause are the foreknown merits of Christ. But it seems better to distinguish what is said, because he foreknew the merits of Christ. For if it be understood as because he only foreknew the merits of Christ, which God himself did not predestine to effect our salvation, it is false; on the contrary, he foreknew those merits of Christ for the reason that he predestined them. But if it be understood as because God foreknew the merits of Christ which he himself predestined, I concede the sequel. Nor does that of Romans 3 stand in the way: Justified freely by his grace, because there follows, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. We say therefore that we are justified freely, because, as is explained in the Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 8, none of the things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the grace of justification itself. For if it be of grace, it is now not of works, namely our own. See, therefore, how there agree among themselves being justified freely and through redemption. For the whole justification is conferred on us freely, even the disposition to grace itself, as much as is on our part, and the whole is through the redemption and merit of Christ. For Christ merited not only the glory of his own physical body, but also the exaltation of his Name, in this, that men become faithful and just and blessed, nay even that he should be Lord of all, according to that of Psalm 2: «Ask of me and I will give you the Gentiles for your inheritance, etc.»

To the fifth it is answered, from our fifth conclusion, that, although Christ is the mediator of God and men, and is given to us as Redeemer, and as such is an effect of the predestination of God, who predestined the whole mystical body with its Head, nevertheless Christ himself will not properly be called an effect of our predestination, because in no genus of cause can our predestination be prior to the predestination of Christ, since his predestination is the exemplar and the end and the efficient cause of our predestination. It is also evident that the whole effect of our predestination cannot be a disposition to the effect of the predestination of Christ our Head, and thus in no genus of cause can our predestination be prior to the predestination of Christ.

TO the arguments of Driedo it is answered. To the first it is said that in what is said, Unless the Father who sent me draw him, there is not excluded the mediating power of Christ and his merit, by which we are drawn by the Father. Indeed he himself says elsewhere, No one comes to the Father except through me, and No one comes to me unless the Father draw him. To the second it is said that in what is had, according to the purpose of the grace of God, there is included also the merit of Christ, as the most important effect of that purpose; because in Christ God purposed to reconcile all things to himself, as is said in Ephesians 1. To the third, from Augustine, it has been said in the solution to the 2nd main argument. To the fourth it is answered, according to the teaching of the first conclusion, that it is necessary to confess that all supernatural dispositions are given to us through the merit of Christ. Likewise also all temporal and natural means, insofar as they are subordinated to the providence of him who predestines, for the effect of predestination, are conferred on us by God through the merits of Christ; for example, that the water and the minister should not fail for baptizing this child, proceeded from divine predestination through the merit of Christ. See what we have said above, in this question, art. 2, doubt 2, note 1, where we showed that even temporal things themselves can fall under predestination.

FINALLY to the arguments set down in the fourth conclusion it is answered. To the first it is said that not all the means ordained by God for our salvation are effects of our predestination. For there are certain means which, although with respect to the principal agent and its action they are truly effects and means to the end, for example the Incarnation, the merit of Christ, etc., are effects of God the Savior and Justifier, and as such are means ordained to the end which is the action of God, insofar as it is from God acting, and thus the end is more worthy than the means; but nevertheless with respect to our salvation, as it is a certain good of ours and received in us, the Incarnation does not have the account of an effect, but rather of a cause, nor the account of a means to the end, but rather of the end. To the second it is said that there is not the same account of the prayer of one member with respect to another, and of the prayer of Christ for us. For one member can be ordained to another through its own operation as to an end, but not Christ or his meritorious operation. It is answered secondly that, even among the members themselves, certain more excellent ones are said to be for the sake of others, that is, for the sake of their own operation regarding the others; which operation is often better than the effect, so that consequently such an effect cannot have the account of an end. And by these, answer has been made to the third. To the fourth it is said that our salvation can be considered in two ways: first, as our suffering received in us, and as our own good, and so it is not the end of the Incarnation of Christ. In another way, as it is the action of God, and thus it can be understood, when we say for us men, and for, etc., that the particle for expresses the account of the final cause, and the sense is that for the love of men and to save men, he was incarnated, etc. For then the divine love and the divine action of saving can have the account of an end with respect to the Incarnation of Christ, and with respect to his merit.

IT IS NOW DOUBTED principally, in the third place, concerning the second and third conclusions, which we noted concerning the solution to the third of St. Thomas: whether any cause or reason of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate. That is, whether the foreknowledge of demerits is the cause of reprobation. Let this title be understood proportionally, as the title of this fifth article has been explained by us, namely that here we do not inquire about any causality with respect to the divine act which is called reprobation, because that can have no cause; but we inquire about the whole effect of reprobation, whether on the part of the reprobate there is given some demerit foreknown by God, on account of which the whole effect of reprobation falls upon that man?

For the affirmative side it is argued first. Before the foreknowledge of sin, especially of original sin, no effect of reprobation is understood: therefore the foreknowledge of sin, or the foreknown sin, can be the cause and reason of reprobation. The consequence is clear: because every effect of reprobation which supervenes on sin is owed to the demerit of sin: therefore if sin is presupposed before every effect of reprobation, it is necessary that it be a sufficient reason of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: because sin is foreseen together with the foresight of the nature that is defectible and deficient: but the foresight of nature is prior in account than the foresight of the supernatural order, whether of reprobation or of predestination: therefore. It is confirmed from the signification of the name of reprobation. For God never reprobates a good, but rather loves it; but before sin, all things are good: therefore before sin there is no effect of God reprobating: therefore every effect of reprobation presupposes sin, and hence sin can be the cause and reason of reprobation. Secondly, if any effect of reprobation preceded sin, it would most of all be the permission of sin; but the permission of sin is not an effect of reprobation: therefore no effect of reprobation precedes sin. The minor is proved: for if permission were an effect of reprobation, it would either be an effect as a means ordained by God to the last effect of reprobation, or it would be the last effect of reprobation: this second cannot be said, because it is evident that the punishment of vindictive justice itself is posterior to the permission of sin; nor can the first be said, because if the permission of sin is the first effect of reprobation, it follows that it is of itself ordained by God to the end of reprobation, namely to punishing men: which consequence seems too harsh and unbecoming to the divine goodness, and contrary to that of Wisdom 1: God did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the perdition of the living. Likewise there would not be verified what is said by the Theologians, that God, by antecedent will, wills all men to be saved; but if before every foreknown sin God ordains some means to the punishment of many men, then not by antecedent will does he will all men to be saved. The consequence is clear: because to will all men to be saved by antecedent will means that before the foreknowledge of sin God absolutely wills not to reprobate anyone. It is confirmed: because reprobation is called the hatred of God, Romans 9: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; but the hatred of God is not except concerning sin and the sinner, according to that of Wisdom 14: In like manner the ungodly and his ungodliness are both hateful to God: therefore, just as the hatred of God presupposes foreknown sin, so also reprobation. Thirdly. It does not seem reasonable that God should permit sins to be done from a certain providence of his, in order to punish them afterwards: therefore the permission of sin is not an effect of providence, nor of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: because, in human affairs, a good governor permits some sins from providence, because he cannot prevent all: therefore God, who can prevent all, does not permit from providence. It is confirmed: because punitive justice is not of itself intended, but only on the supposition of a punishable fault; but sin is prior to the punishment itself: therefore in no way does it pertain to divine providence to permit sin for the perfection of the universe. It is confirmed secondly. Because, grant that the perfection of the universe be the showing forth of the vindictive justice of God, yet for this end the punishment of the evil angels was sufficient: therefore the punishment of men was not fitting for the perfection of the universe. This argument, with its confirmations, Cajetan here reports from Henry and Aureolus. Fourthly. Reprobation presupposes the predestination of Christ; but the predestination of Christ presupposes the foreknowledge of sin: therefore, from the first to the last, reprobation presupposes the foreknowledge of sin, and consequently the permission of sin, in that it is prior, in account, that God will to permit sin, as we said above, art. 3, than that he foreknow sin as future. The major is proved: because every effect of reprobation is ordained to the glory of Christ, who has been constituted by God the Judge of the living and the dead. The minor is clear from that of St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4, where he most expressly asserts it, and there it is excellently explained by Cajetan. And the reason is manifest: because Christ was predestined to be the Redeemer, as Augustine teaches, tome 7, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 15; but redemption presupposes sinners to be redeemed foreseen by God: therefore the permission of sin is not an effect of reprobation. Lastly. The reprobation of some men is not an operation of divine mercy; therefore it is an operation of divine justice. The antecedent is clear; the consequent is proved from that of the Psalm: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, that is, mercy and justice: and in every work of God there is found the account of justice, as we said above: therefore it seems unjust that God should reprobate men, and not on account of sins.

ON this question there are various opinions. The first is that of St. Augustine: that in men there is given a cause of reprobation on the part of the reprobate, namely original sin, in such a way that God from eternity foresaw the whole mass of the human race infected with the original stain from the sin of Adam. Out of which mass God decreed mercifully to free some, but justly to reprobate others on account of original sin, and to leave them there and damn them, and to exact from them the debt for sin. This opinion Augustine holds in very many places: in Epistle 105, tome 2; and the book To Simplician, q. 2, tome 4; and in the Enchiridion from ch. 94 up to 100, tome 3; and the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 3 and 7, tome 7; and the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8 and 9, tome 7. The most important argument for this opinion is that which Augustine himself makes in the cited places from that of Romans 9: Before they had done anything good or evil, it was said, not of works, but of him that calls, that the elder shall serve the younger. Where the Apostle cites the testimony of Malachi 1: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. Concerning which testimony Augustine says in the cited epistle: For what did God love in Jacob before he was born and had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done anything evil, except original sin? Then in the same place Augustine rejects a certain false response, namely that he hated one of those not yet born and loved the other because he foresaw their future works. And Augustine says that it is wonderful that such a very acute sense, which these men assign, was lacking to the Apostle. For when the Apostle had proposed a stupendous thing, namely how it could rightly be said of those not yet born, and doing nothing good or evil, that God loved one and hated the other, the Apostle himself, with the question objected to himself, expressing the movement of a hearer, says in the same place: What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. Here therefore was the fitting place for the Apostle to reply what these men reply, namely that because God foresaw their future works, he therefore chose Jacob and hated Esau. But the Apostle replied nothing of the sort; rather he cites what was said to Moses, Exodus 33: I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy, and I will be merciful to whom I have been merciful; therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Augustine therefore concludes there that, setting aside all respect to future works, whether good or evil, he loved Jacob, insofar as he purposed mercifully to snatch him out of the mass of original iniquity, but purposed justly to damn Esau in that same mass of iniquity, although he could justly have damned both. And he very often uses, in the cited places, the example of two debtors, of whom the creditor forgives the debt to one and justly demands the debt from the other, and yet does injury to neither, but shows mercy to one. Augustine therefore concludes that actual sin is not posited as the cause of reprobation, but only original sin: as is also expressly clear in the cited book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 7, and book 2 Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, ch. 7. Thus far concerning the opinion of Augustine.

This opinion of Augustine has no small difficulty. It is argued against it. First, because every permission of sin, in which someone dies, whether it be original or actual, is an effect of reprobation: therefore on the part of the reprobate there is not given a cause of reprobation, namely the sin itself, whether original or actual. The consequence is clear, because what ought to be the cause and reason of reprobation must necessarily be the cause of the whole effect of reprobation: but original or actual sin cannot be the cause of the permission of that same sin, otherwise the permission of sin itself would be the punishment of that same sin, as for example the divine permission that Adam should sin, who was the head of the whole nature, and in him the whole nature should fall, would be the punishment of that same sin, which is incredible; for God does not punish a future sin, but a past one. The antecedent is proved: for every permission of sin is an effect of divine providence, as we showed also from Augustine in art. 3 of this question: therefore, since the permission of sin is an effect of divine providence, insofar as God ordains the permission to a supernatural end, namely to the showing forth of his justice and mercy, it is necessary that, with respect to certain ones, the permission of sin itself be an effect of reprobation, namely with respect to those who are permitted to fall and are abandoned in sin even unto the end. Secondly. For many of the men reprobated by God obtain the remission of original sin: therefore they are not reprobated on account of it. The antecedent is clear in many baptized persons who are afterwards condemned. Indeed, in Esau himself, who beyond doubt, since he was the son of Isaac, a faithful and just man, is necessarily believed to have been circumcised on the eighth day, as also Jacob. But the consequence is proved, because it seems impossible and altogether incredible that God should have decreed from eternity mercifully and truly to remit original guilt, and nevertheless on account of that guilt to have reprobated a man. Thirdly. For if original sin is the cause of reprobation, although it be remitted or to be remitted, it is necessary, as we said a little before, that it be the cause of the whole effect of reprobation; but the effect of reprobation is abandonment and damnation on account of sin: therefore original sin already remitted is the cause and reason of eternal condemnation, which none of the faithful will dare to say; therefore the opinion of Augustine is not probable. Fourthly, and it is a confirmation of the preceding. Original sin is equally remitted to all baptized little ones; therefore none of them will be condemned on account of it as on account of a demerit. The consequence is proved, because eternal punishment does not correspond of itself to sin already remitted. But some say, responding for the opinion of Augustine, that a baptized little one will not be damned on account of original sin, but nevertheless has been reprobated by God on account of original sin. This response, however, cannot stand; first, because in the teaching of St. Augustine, in the cited places, it is had not only that men are disapproved or reprobated on account of original sin, or even damned and justly abandoned in the mass of damnation, as is clear in the already cited book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 6, where he says that God forgives that original sin to whom he wills, and from whom he wills justly demands the debt. Where he speaks of original sin, on account of which all reprobate men are reprobated. And in ch. 16 he says that to the damned a just punishment is rendered. But he calls damned those who are infected with original sin, on account of which the just punishment of the privation of eternal beatitude is rendered. Then, because the argument which we were making is not solved: for if the baptized also are reprobated on account of original sin, then they will also be condemned on account of it. The consequence is proved, because, as we were saying, what is the cause of reprobation must be the cause of the whole effect of reprobation; but the last effect of reprobation is eternal damnation: therefore if original sin is the cause of reprobation, it is plainly gathered that it is the cause of eternal damnation. And lastly, against this solution it makes that reprobation pertains to the justice of God, according to the opinion of Augustine, book 2 of On the Good of Perseverance, ch. 8, just as predestination pertains to mercy; but it does not seem to be a work of divine justice that someone be reprobated into hell on account of a sin which has been mercifully remitted to him: therefore, etc.

Fifthly. Original sin having been once remitted through baptism, I ask which is the first effect of the reprobation of this baptized man, who is said to have been reprobated on account of original sin? But if you say, as it seems must necessarily be said, that the divine permission of falling into actual sin and the abandonment in it is the first effect of reprobation, then the argument is: that permission cannot be the punishment of original sin already remitted; therefore God does not, on account of original sin, permit this man to fall into actual sin. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved. Original sin is equally remitted to all little ones both as to guilt and as to the punishment which of itself corresponds and is due to original sin; but the permission of falling into actual sin, in which someone is abandoned, is not a punishment common to all who contract original sin and due to them, and much less is it a punishment common to all the baptized; therefore such a punishment does not correspond of itself to original sin, or certainly original sin is not equally remitted to all the baptized.

Sixthly. If the permission of falling into actual sin is an effect of reprobation, then also the permission of original sin, by which the whole nature was infected, Adam sinning, will be an effect of reprobation. The consequence is proved, because there is no greater reason why the permission of actual sin and the abandonment in it should be an effect of reprobation, than the permission of original sin and the abandonment in it. But if it is so, that in certain ones the permission of the original sin of the whole nature in Adam is an effect of reprobation, it follows that original sin cannot be the cause of reprobation, that is, of the whole effect of reprobation. The sequel is clear: because the first effect is the permission of original sin itself, of which effect original sin cannot be the cause, nor a demeritorious cause, because it is not fitting to divine justice that the punishment of sin be prior to the sin itself; but it is evident that that permission is prior to the sin itself: therefore. Nor is the sin itself the final cause of the divine permission, because God does not ordain the permission to sin, but to the showing forth of his justice in the punishment of sin. Since therefore in the teaching of Augustine, book 1 of The City of God, ch. 8, and in many other places, the permission of sin is an effect of divine providence, there does not seem to be any reason why it should not be an effect of the reprobation of certain ones who are abandoned in sin, if by the name of reprobation we understand the divine providence concerning those who are not predestined, as St. Thomas understands, here, in art. 3. And this concerning the opinion of Augustine.

The OTHER opinion is that of certain Thomist Theologians, who say that a cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate: in certain ones only original sin, in certain ones only actual sin, in others both original and actual together. This opinion Soto held, on the epistle to the Romans, ch. 9. And concerning the reprobation of the Angels he thinks in the same way, and judges it to be the opinion of St. Thomas at the end of the second lecture on that of Romans 9: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated: because St. Thomas says there that the foreknowledge of merits cannot be any reason of predestination, because foreknown merits fall under predestination; but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation. The same opinion Scotus holds, in 1 Sent., dist. 41, q. 1, asserting that final sin foreseen is the reason of reprobation; and he proves it: because to reprobate is nothing other than to will to damn; but God, since he is just, wills to damn no one except on account of sin: therefore. This opinion can be confirmed by the arguments made at the beginning of this doubt. This opinion is also read in this school of Salamanca, and it was held by brother Peter of Sotomayor, once the first professor, and he thought that he proved it from St. Thomas, 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 159, where he teaches that it is not undeservedly imputed to guilt in him who offers an impediment to the reception of grace: and from this he gathered that men are reprobated on account of this impediment which they offer to the grace of God, because he is prepared to help all, and wills all men to be saved. He also thought that, since Augustine always brings forward original sin as the cause of reprobation, from this it follows that much more can actual sin be the cause of reprobation. But in truth, whatever be of this consequence, nevertheless Augustine expressly denies that actual sin is the cause of the reprobation of Esau. Likewise, the aforesaid opinion by the same reason is bound to concede that in the Angels there is given a reason and cause of reprobation, that is, of the whole effect of reprobation, namely the sin which they committed. It is also bound consequently to assert that the permission of the sin on account of which someone is damned eternally is not an effect of reprobation, since the same sin cannot be the cause of the permission of that sin, nor will a cause of the whole effect of reprobation be given.

The THIRD opinion is that of St. Thomas: that, simply speaking, no cause or reason of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate, just as neither is a cause of predestination given on the part of the predestined. And note that this opinion can have a double sense. One is that there cannot be assigned a cause on the part of this reprobate why God reprobated him rather than another, for example why he reprobated Esau rather than Jacob. And in this comparative sense there cannot be given any cause or reason on the part of Esau which could not also have been the cause of the reprobation of Jacob: because on his own part each was equal, and by like reason each could be reprobated in that corrupt mass. And this is true in the opinion of Augustine, in the cited places. The reason of which is, because each was conceived in that original sin, and from the same intercourse of the same parents, and carried in the same womb, and born at the same time; but he alone assigns the cause on the part of the divine will, insofar as he willed to show mercy to Jacob and justly to abandon Esau. And Augustine expressly rejects that reason and cause of the difference which some assign, namely that because God foreknew the future evil works of Esau, he therefore reprobated him: for this, Augustine says, seems to contradict the Apostle saying, Not of works, but of him that calls, etc. Where Augustine says that all works, past, present, and future, are excluded. Likewise Augustine argues against this opinion, because by like reason it would be said that Jacob was elected on account of future good works which God foreknew he would do. But that consequent is judged a Pelagian error by St. Augustine, because those future good works are effects of the election of God. I confess nevertheless that the consequence of this argument is not a demonstration, but could easily be denied by those following the contrary opinion, and a difference assigned in predestination and reprobation, namely that predestination is the cause not only of the attainment of the last end, but also of the means to the last end. But reprobation, although it be the cause of what is rendered in the future, namely

of eternal punishment, nevertheless it is not the cause of what is in the present, namely of sin; on account of which the whole effect of reprobation can fall upon the reprobate, as on account of a demerit. But if someone replies for St. Augustine that this permission of actual sin is an effect of reprobation, of which the actual sin permitted cannot be the cause; then there will be a rejoinder, for by like reason it is said that the permission of the ruin of the whole human nature in Adam was an effect of the reprobation of certain ones, namely those who were abandoned in the mass of damnation; and consequently, neither will original sin be the reason and cause of the damnation of those who are reprobated, since it was not the cause of that permission. Wherefore, as we shall say afterwards, that second opinion is not less probable, indeed perhaps more probable, than the first opinion of St. Augustine.

The other sense is that, simply speaking, that is, not comparatively but absolutely considering the reprobate themselves, no cause or reason is given on their part of their reprobation, that is, of the whole effect of reprobation. And in this sense is the opinion of St. Thomas expressed in art. 3. And it is proved: because it pertains to divine providence not only to order men to eternal life, but also to permit some to fail from that end, and this is called to reprobate. And just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fail from this end. And just as predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. Thus St. Thomas. See, therefore, how, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, there cannot be assigned a cause or reason on the part of the reprobate of the whole effect of reprobation: since of that permission of the sin on account of which someone is damned, whether it be original or actual, the sin itself cannot be the cause, as is clear in little ones who die with only original sin; which indeed, although it can be the cause and reason that the little ones be abandoned in it, nevertheless could not be the cause and reason why God permitted the whole nature to fall in Adam.

For a fuller understanding, however, of this opinion, note that although one effect of predestination can be the cause of another effect, as has been sufficiently explained at the beginning of this article, nevertheless one effect of reprobation cannot be the cause of another effect of reprobation: for example the first effect of reprobation is the permission of sin, the second effect is the abandonment in sin, through this that God justly denies the efficacious help of his mercy by which the sinner would in fact be converted, the last effect is eternal damnation and punishment. Now therefore, if we consider attentively, we do not find the permission to be the cause of the abandonment in sin, but rather the sin itself is the reason and cause why the sinner is most justly abandoned in it, of which sin, however, the divine permission is in no way the cause, and consequently neither of the abandonment in it. Similarly, neither can the abandonment in sin, insofar as it is from God denying the efficacious help of his mercy by which that man would be converted, be the cause of eternal punishment; because the abandonment itself is not demeritorious nor culpable, since it is from God, but rather is a just punishment of the preceding sin, on account of which man merits not only that the efficacious help of preparing grace be denied him, but also eternal punishment. We have therefore that these effects of reprobation are not ordered to each other in the account of cause and effect; but all together are ordained to one end, namely all together and collectively are ordained to this end intended by God, to the showing forth of his justice, and to the showing forth of greater mercy toward the predestined, as we have often confirmed from that of Romans 8: What if God, willing to show, etc.

We have from the teaching of St. Thomas, in art. 3, ad 2, that the divine reprobation, although it is not the cause of guilt, is nevertheless the cause of the abandonment in sin and of eternal punishment; and since he had already said in that same article that reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, it is evident from his opinion that the sole divine will is the efficient cause of the whole effect of reprobation, and the divine goodness is the final cause, as he himself teaches here, ad 3, where the representation of the divine goodness in effects is asserted to be the cause of both predestination and reprobation, absolutely speaking and in common, although in the singular case why he chose these rather than those and reprobated the others, it has no adequate account and no cause except the divine will as efficient, insofar as God freely willed to represent goodness in these by way of justice, in whom he could no less have represented it by way of mercy than in the others, in whom it pleased God to represent his goodness by way of perfect mercy. This opinion of St. Thomas is asserted and confirmed by the same author, book 3 of Against the Gentiles, ch. 161 and 163, and on the epistle to the Romans, 9, lecture 2; and the most important argument for this opinion is that which we placed in the first place against the opinion of Augustine. For St. Thomas understands by the name of reprobation the divine providence of permitting some to fall into guilt and of abandoning them in it, and

of punishing eternally on account of it, and thus it is necessary that, of the whole effect of reprobation taken collectively, there cannot be assigned as cause and reason the sin itself in which someone is abandoned, because that cannot be the cause of the permission of falling into that same sin. Lastly this opinion of St. Thomas is proved, because those holding it do not fall into the straits and incongruities in which the other opinions are involved, but the arguments which are made against the opinion of St. Thomas are easily dissolved, as we shall presently see.

But it will be worth the effort first to note certain things concerning the opinion of Augustine, which are altogether to be avoided by those who wish to defend it; and at the same time to show the way by which this opinion can in some measure be defended. Above all it must be guarded against that it be conceded that someone, on account of original sin already remitted, as on account of a demeritorious cause, is damned with the pain of loss, which consists in the privation of the beatific vision. For this would be an error in faith: because according to faith that pain of loss is remitted together with original guilt in Baptism, through which the Kingdom of heaven is opened; since therefore original guilt does not return, which was once taken away through Baptism, otherwise Baptism would have to be repeated, it is necessary that the pain of loss, insofar as it is due to original sin, never return, otherwise it would not be a just punishment. From which it evidently follows that neither did God from eternity have the purpose of depriving anyone of eternal beatitude on account of original sin to be remitted. Whence the Council of Trent, Session 5, decree 5, defines that original sin is altogether remitted through Baptism, and its guilt, and that nothing of damnation remains to those who have been justified through Baptism. But if the guilt remained as to the pain of loss, that is, the obligation to it on account of original sin already remitted, much of damnation would remain to those who are in Christ Jesus, which is against the Apostle, Romans 8. This being supposed, which no Catholic will deny, the opinion of Augustine is defended in many ways, but always with the greatest difficulty, by some.

The first mode, therefore, of defending it is set down in the first opinion, namely that St. Augustine is to be understood of original sin, in which someone dies finally; but this we have already shown to be against the mind of Augustine, who altogether excludes actual sins foreseen as future from being the cause of the reprobation of Esau.

The second mode is: For someone could say that although original sin does not return according to itself, which was once remitted, it nevertheless returns according to a certain ingratitude for the mercy received in Baptism. For thus the Scholastics concede that sins, once remitted through penance, return through a subsequent sin, according to a certain ingratitude; and thus it will be verified that on account of original sin already remitted a man is both reprobated and damned in some way, namely on account of the ingratitude which is in actual sin. But nevertheless this mode of speaking does not agree with the teaching of Augustine, because that ingratitude, even if it were a special sin, would pertain to actual sin as its circumstance: but St. Augustine altogether excludes actual sins, denying that they are the cause of reprobation: therefore. Then, original sin can be remitted to someone who will afterwards be damned without any circumstance of ingratitude. It is proved: if a baptized infant be seized by pagans, and placed where he cannot have knowledge of his Baptism, but sinning mortally against the law of nature will be damned, in this case the aforesaid response has no place.

The third mode is that which is brought forward by certain ones: that although original sin is remitted in baptism as to guilt and the eternal pain of loss due to it, nevertheless it is not remitted as to temporal punishments, and as to the wounds of nature, which remain according to St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 85, art. 3. For there remains in the intellect the wound of ignorance, which is a certain dullness toward the truth necessary to oneself. There remains in the will the wound of malice; not because it is guilt, but insofar as the will is prone to evil. There remains infirmity in the irascible power, insofar as man with the greatest difficulty undertakes an arduous good. There remains lastly the wound of concupiscence, insofar as the concupiscible power is easily destitute of the due order of reason, because it tends to a delectable good without right moderation: and because wounds of this sort are occasions, and in a certain way causes, that men slip into actual sins through the importunate and frequent assault of the flesh, according to that of Romans 7: I see another law in my members, etc., therefore they say that man is damned on account of original sin, that is, on account of the effects of original sin, insofar as man, drawn and enticed by his own concupiscence, falls into actual sin. But neither does this mode satisfy, nor does it agree with the teaching of Augustine, because God does not hate man on account of the wounds of nature which remain when original sin has been dismissed. But Augustine says that the reprobation and hatred of God are referred to original sin, on account of which someone is reprobated and held in hatred: but those wounds are common to all the reprobate and the predestined: but it is evident that in the predestined God does not hate those wounds: therefore neither in the non-predestined; therefore this mode of speaking is not sufficient; it only

asserts that men are damned occasionally on account of original sin, and on account of its remnants.

The fourth mode is: that after original sin has been remitted in the reprobate as to guilt, it is not remitted as to a certain punishment due according to itself to original sin, which is the permission that that reprobate fall into actual sins and be abandoned in them; and thus he is said to have been reprobated on account of original sin, because it is not remitted as to this most grave punishment, which of itself corresponds to original sin; and so causally original sin merits that punishment, which being posited, it follows by necessity of the consequence that the man be condemned; and thus radically and causally original sin is said to be the cause of the reprobation of any reprobate man. But this mode of speaking does not seem to me sufficiently safe, although it seems in some way to speak consistently with the opinion of St. Augustine. And the reason which moves me is, because the fifth argument made against the opinion of Augustine is not solved by this mode of speaking, by which nevertheless a great incongruity is concluded, namely that the punishment due of itself to original sin is not equally remitted to all baptized children, although the guilt is equally remitted. But that it may appear how great an incongruity this is, note that the punishment due of itself to original sin, the first and principal, is the privation of the vision of God for eternity. Then there was the punishment of the privation of original justice, insofar as it healed nature and subjected the body to the soul, and in punishment of original sin man was left to his own nature as to mortality and the rebellion of the lower appetite against reason, and other temporal penalties: all of which followed from original sin as from a removing cause of an obstacle. For original sin demeritoriously removed original justice, through which the aforesaid evils were prohibited. All infants therefore being baptized, the pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine Vision, is equally remitted, and they equally acquire a right to eternal life through baptismal grace. But the remaining penalties, which followed from the absence of original justice as from a removing cause of an obstacle, can be materially unequal in themselves, according as some man from the nature of his own complexion can be more prone to lust than another, and also to bodily infirmities. But to add over and above these punishments a certain special and supernatural punishment which of itself corresponds to original sin, such as is the permission and abandonment in actual sin, which is not common to all the baptized but only to the reprobate: is to say that original sin is not equally remitted to all in Baptism, at least as to the punishment due of itself to original sin, which does not seem to me sufficiently safe: for the guilt being equally remitted and through an equal baptismal grace, it is necessary that the punishment due of itself to sin be equally remitted according to divine justice. There is an example. We understand that to two men who are sinners equally, but not equally disposed through contrition nor equally justified through grace, a fuller remission is granted to one as to the punishments due of itself in Purgatory; but to those equally disposed and equally justified through grace we neither understand nor believe that one remains more liable to the punishments of Purgatory than the other. So therefore and by like reason it cannot be believed that, to two baptized infants, the punishment due of itself to original sin is not equally remitted. Furthermore, even if this fourth mode of speaking be admitted, this proposition is not sufficiently verified in propriety of speech, original sin even when remitted is the cause of reprobation, because it is not verified in propriety of speech that on account of such a sin the reprobate is condemned, but only remotely and occasionally can original sin be called the cause of their condemnation, when it has been remitted. Because the punishment of that sin which remained was the occasion, God permitting, of the ruin into actual sin, to which is owed the eternal pain of loss and of sense.

The fifth mode of speaking is: for certain ones say that the whole human nature, insofar as it was infected with original sin in Adam, was reprobated and held in hatred by God thus in common, on account of original sin, out of which nevertheless God willed mercifully to snatch some and lead them to eternal life; but the rest, by not predestining them, he left in the mass of damnation and reprobation, and therefore they are said to be reprobated on account of original sin. But this mode of speaking has no firmness for the defense of the opinion of St. Augustine; for although the infection of the whole human nature in Adam could be a sufficient cause of the reprobation of all men, nevertheless it was not in fact the cause of the reprobation of those whom God decreed to cleanse from original sin, whether he predestined them or not: and thus this mode does not show how in fact these are reprobated on account of a sin to be remitted to them, but only teaches that on account of that sin the whole human nature was held in hatred by God in the first parent Adam, and each individual in particular was held in hatred by God in order to that time in which it was infected with original sin according to the divine foreknowledge. Likewise this opinion and mode of speaking also shows that on account of original sin all men were reprobable and worthy of reprobation, if God had willed to reprobate them.

Lastly, this is our judgment on this matter, if it is worth anything. For I would believe that St. Augustine was only solicitous to destroy the error of the Pelagians asserting that foreknown merits are the cause of divine predestination and election; and because, if it were conceded that the foreknowledge of the evil works of Esau was the cause of his reprobation, it seemed to St. Augustine immediately to follow that also the future good works of Jacob were the cause of his predestination; for that reason he always denied that the foreknowledge of the evil works of Esau was the cause of his reprobation. But since this consequence is not necessary, as we have already shown, in that good merits themselves are effects of predestination, but sins are not effects of reprobation, whence they can well be the reason and cause of reprobation, that is, of the whole effect of reprobation; but good merits cannot be the cause of predestination, that is, of the whole effect of predestination; because nothing can be the cause of itself: therefore it is manifest that there is not the same account of predestination and reprobation, such that if a cause of reprobation be given on our part, a cause of predestination be given also. If therefore St. Augustine had willed to attend to the malice of this consequence, he would never have posited that universally original sin alone is the cause of the reprobation of all reprobated men, but would have excepted those to whom it was to be remitted, in whom the actual sin itself was foreseen as a cause of reprobation no less than in others original sin, in which they were to die. For God foreknew both as so to be future, and permitted both. But the testimony of the Apostle, Romans 9: Not of works, but of him that calls, etc., by which Augustine is convinced that he denies even that the future evil works of Esau foreknown by God are the cause of his reprobation, has an easy solution for the defense of the second opinion, because there the Apostle only seems to deny the cause and reason why Jacob is chosen by God rather than Esau, and he denies that the reason is the good works of Jacob, even foreknown by God, which he signifies when he says, Not of works, that is, that difference did not take its origin from merits, but only from the mercy of him who calls, since both were of themselves worthy of eternal damnation. And this is what the Apostle immediately says in the following: I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy, etc.: therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy; as if he were to say, of that difference the will or the good running of Jacob cannot be the reason or cause. And thus the second opinion can easily be sustained, and I do not think it differs from the opinion of St. Thomas except in name alone. For if the permission of sin, whether original or actual, in which someone is abandoned, is not numbered among the effects of reprobation, because those holding the second opinion do not understand by the name of reprobation the divine providence of permitting sin, then the second opinion is necessary, because to the merit of sin the abandonment and eternal punishment is justly owed. But according to the opinion of St. Thomas the permission of sin, in which someone is abandoned, is an effect of his reprobation. Because by the name of reprobation St. Thomas understands a part of divine providence, according to which God permits sin for the showing forth of his justice, and of greater mercy in the predestined. And therefore it is also necessary to say that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate, since of all the effects of reprobation collectively no cause is given on the part of the reprobate, since no demeritorious cause is given of that permission of sin. This opinion of St. Thomas is most safe and speaks most properly; wherefore let it be embraced by Theologians.

TO the arguments proposed at the beginning, warring against the opinion of St. Thomas, it is answered. To the first, I deny the antecedent; on the contrary, before the foreknowledge of sin the permission of sin, whether actual or original, is understood. And to the proof of the antecedent it is said that, even if sin be seen together with the very nature that is defectible and deficient, nevertheless the permission of sin, an effect of divine providence, is prior to the fact that the defectible nature fails. And this providence is not only concerning the means to a natural end, but also, and most especially, to a supernatural end. Hence, simply speaking, in the genus of final cause, in our mode of understanding, that supernatural end is prior to the permission of sin. But this priority does not stand in the way of the permission itself, in the genus of quasi-material cause and of the terminus from which, being prior, in our mode of understanding, to that supernatural end; and thus the same thing with respect to the same thing can have the account of cause and effect in a different genus of cause. Since therefore the permission itself is not a cause on the part of the reprobate on account of which he merits to be reprobated, the consequence made is worth nothing. To the confirmation it is answered, as we have already said above, in the first doubt of art. 3, that we do not use the name reprobation insofar as it signifies to reject something as evil: for in this signification the second opinion uses the name reprobation, and so it is verified. But we, with St. Thomas, use this name as it imports the divine providence concerning the non-predestined, which includes an act of the will of God willing not only to punish foreknown sin, but also to permit the sin itself, in which someone is justly abandoned: and all these God wills, in order to show his justice in the punishment of sin; and accordingly reprobation does not immediately regard the sin to be punished, but the permission of sin.

To the second, I deny the minor; on the contrary, the permission of sin in certain ones is an effect of reprobation. To the proof of the minor it is answered that it is the first effect and the first means ordained by God for the showing forth of his justice, which is manifested in the punishment of sins; and thus the punishment itself is not intended of itself in the first place, but rather the order of divine justice itself. Hence it does not stand in the way that it is said in Wisdom 1: «God did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the perdition of the living»; because that testimony is understood insofar as God inflicted temporal death on no one, nor eternal, absolutely speaking, but sin being presupposed, which the first man committed by his own will, according to that of Romans 5: «Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death». And Genesis 2: «On whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death»; which is understood of both death, temporal and eternal. Nor does that stand in the way which is asserted by the Theologians, that God by antecedent will wills all men to be saved. For it is not asserted by St. Thomas that before the foreknowledge of sin we understand God to will to deprive any man of eternal life and to punish him eternally: and thus it is verified that absolutely, no supposition of sin being made, God wills all men to be saved. But in what way it is understood that this antecedent will is in God, whether formally or eminently, properly or metaphorically, has been sufficiently said in q. 19, in the last articles. To the confirmation it is said, from the teaching of St. Thomas in art. 3 of this question, in the solution to the first, where he says that God is therefore said to hate the reprobate, insofar as he does not will for them the good of eternal life simply. And so, the hatred of God can be spoken of and considered in two ways: in the first way negatively, that is, insofar as God did not love some unto eternal life. And in this way, before foreknown sin God can be understood to hate certain ones, that is, not to love them unto eternal life. In the second way hatred is understood positively as an act of God rejecting and refuting some evil; and in this way God is not understood to hate anyone before foreknown sin; rather that very hatred tends to and immediately regards the sinner himself, as such.

To the third it is answered that the end of God permitting sins is not to punish men: for he does not rejoice in the evil of their punishment, but the punishment itself is willed by God for this end, which is the order of divine justice and its representation. And to the proof of the antecedent it is said that it also belongs to a human governor sometimes to permit certain evils, even if he could prevent them: not only for this end, that greater evils be avoided, but also that greater goods of the commonwealth not be impeded. So also, and much more, God, to whom belongs the governance of the whole universe, permitted the sin of the angel and of man, on account of the greater good of the whole universe, which would be impeded if God did not permit sin, as St. Thomas excellently asserts, here in the solution to the third; and likewise Cajetan in q. 22, art. 2, ad 2. For if there were no sin, there would be lacking in the universe the patience and excellence of the martyrs, and, what most adorned the universe, there would be lacking that good which is the Host of Christ the Lord on the Cross, where a supposit of infinite dignity was offered to God himself, for the honor of God and a condign satisfaction for sins: which indeed was so great as to exceed infinitely every evil of guilt, even of those crucifying Christ; for where sin abounded, grace also superabounded.

To the confirmation, first it is said that, although God does not of himself intend punishment in the first place, nevertheless of himself in the second place he intends to punish the sinful man, insofar as the punishment itself orders man to God the just judge, that his justice may be shown in the universe, and greater mercy in the predestined. And this end is of himself intended in the first place. To the second confirmation Cajetan answers here that, although God could have shown his justice in the condemnation of the demons alone, nevertheless, because it is certain according to the Catholic faith that some men are reprobated and some predestined, therefore St. Thomas considered the whole human race as a certain universe, consisting of differing grades, in which it was fitting that the divine goodness be represented by way of justice and mercy. Then we can also answer that from the permission of human sin greater goods have followed, God providing, than would follow from the permission of the sin of the Angels: namely that the Son of God became man, that he might offer to God a sacrifice infinitely pleasing and might satisfy to the equality of justice for the sins of the whole human race. In which matter the rigor of the divine justice and majesty is more shown than in the punishment of the demons.

To the fourth, the consequence made from the first to the last is denied: the reason is, because there is no proceeding in the same genus of cause. For reprobation presupposes the predestination of Christ in the genus of final cause, that is, the whole effect of reprobation presupposes the effect of the predestination of Christ in the genus of final cause: and again the effect of the predestination of Christ presupposes some effect of reprobation in the genus of material cause, concerning which the effect of the predestination of Christ was to be exercised: for he was predestined to be the Savior and Redeemer of sinful men, and therefore sinful men are presupposed, God permitting; and therefore that consequence does not hold, because it does not proceed in the same genus of cause. Hence reprobation does not presuppose the foreknowledge of sin according to the opinion of St. Thomas, because the first effect of reprobation is the permission of sin, which is ordained by God to the showing forth of his justice, and of the glory of Christ the Redeemer; and this the reasons made in the argument prove for the major and the minor.

To the fifth it is answered that, formally speaking, reprobation, as it is taken by St. Thomas, is an action of providence, just as predestination. Which reprobation nevertheless presupposes the will of permitting sins for the showing forth of divine justice in the punishment of sins, and thus reprobation itself is reduced to justice in its effects: for the permission is ordained to this end, namely the showing forth of justice, but the abandonment is already, as it were, a just punishment of sins of vindictive justice: for man merits on account of sin to be abandoned by God. But eternal punishment is manifest to be an effect of vindictive justice. But in what way it must be understood that in every work of God there is justice and mercy has been sufficiently explained by St. Thomas, q. 21, art. 4; for it is not necessary that every work of God, or action of God, be formally of justice or of mercy, but it is enough that it be some effect of divine providence, ordained to the showing forth of justice or of mercy or to both, just as the permission of sin is ordained to the showing forth of justice in the damned, and in the predestined to the showing forth of greater mercy.

It remains to answer the other arguments made for the opinion of Augustine and of Scotus. It is answered therefore to the most important argument of Augustine, from that of Romans 9, Not of works, etc., that that testimony favors the opinion of St. Thomas and does not prove the opinion of Augustine. First it is proved, because St. Thomas denies a cause of reprobation on the part of the reprobate, just as a cause of predestination on the part of the predestined; and this the Apostle seems to signify when he says: Not of works, as if he were to say, from no works, good or evil, did it take its origin that Jacob should be loved and Esau held in hatred. But that it does not favor the opinion of Augustine, as to those men who, although they are reprobated, nevertheless obtain the true remission of original sin, has appeared above in the arguments made against the opinion of Augustine, which are with the greatest difficulty solved.

To the arguments of the second opinion it is answered that M. Soto in the end of the fourth of the Sentences retracted the opinion. But to the passage of St. Thomas, from lecture 2 on Romans 9, it is said that he himself sufficiently explains himself in the same place when he says that the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the part of the punishment, insofar as God proposes to punish the wicked on account of the sins which they have from themselves and not from God. So St. Thomas. To the testimony from book 3 of Against the Gentiles, it is said that St. Thomas nowhere said that men are reprobated on account of that impediment which is sin, nor is it gathered from those words, but well that they are condemned on account of that impediment which they object to the grace of God calling. But we have already said that that second opinion, if it be considered attentively, does not differ from the opinion of St. Thomas except in name: because it understands different things by the name reprobation. Thus far, concerning this most celebrated article.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: Predestination most certainly and infallibly attains its effect; yet it does not impose necessity. The reason of this conclusion is the same as that which was assigned concerning the certitude of divine providence, and concerning the contingency of things which fall under divine providence, in q. 22, art. 4, concerning which matter we have said more in q. 19, art. 8, where concerning the infallibility of the divine will and the contingency of things we have said many things which make for the present matter. But now it must be said proportionally here that the order of predestination is most certain, and yet the freedom of choice is not taken away by this; on the contrary it is most of all perfected in the predestined through divine grace, which does not destroy but most of all perfects nature. And this doctrine is as certain according to the Catholic faith as it is certain that the divine will is immutable and is always fulfilled, and nevertheless does not impose necessity on all the things willed, nor destroy the use of free choice.

Second conclusion, in the solution to the third: It is not necessary to say that God can fail to predestine one whom he has predestined, taking this in the composite sense; although, simply speaking, this man of whom we say that he is predestined, God can fail to predestine.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE the solution to the first, where there is excellently explained what is said in Apoc. 3, Hold fast what you have, lest another receive your crown, etc.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

IT IS DOUBTED in this article whether the number of the predestined is so certain formally and materially that it can in no way be increased or diminished. For if it can be increased or diminished, it is well gathered that it is not certain or determined.

Argument is made for the negative side. Speaking without qualification, one who is predestined can be condemned, and one who is reprobate can be saved: therefore, speaking without qualification, the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished. The consequence is proved: for if one who is predestined can be damned, it is possible that one who is predestined fall short, and consequently that that number be diminished. Similarly, if one who is reprobate can be saved, he can therefore be added to the number of those to be saved, and consequently of the predestined: therefore that number can be increased.

Second. Speaking without qualification, God can fail to confer grace on those on whom He confers it, and if He does not confer it, they will be damned: therefore, speaking without qualification, these predestined can be condemned, and consequently the number of the predestined can be diminished.

Third. When Peter is justified through contrition, he is freely disposed to grace, and cooperates with God operating: therefore, however much efficacious aid of God he receives, he can fail to consent, indeed even resist God calling and arousing him. Let it be supposed, then, that it is the case that he always resists God calling; then it follows well: therefore Peter will be condemned; therefore it is possible that the number of the predestined be smaller than it is. But if someone replies that all these arguments proceed in the divided sense, and not in the composite, that is, that they do not prove these two to be compossible at once — namely, that someone be predestined and be damned, and that someone be reprobate and be saved — although they prove that this man, of whom we say that he is predestined, absolutely speaking, no supposition being made, can be damned; and similarly that this one, who is reprobate, speaking without qualification, can do penance and be saved: the rejoinder stands against that solution which the Master of the Sentences makes, bk. 1, dist. 40, § 3. Both of these cannot be at once, namely that someone be predestined and be damned; but the one of these cannot not be, namely that this one be predestined; therefore the other is impossible, namely that he be damned. The consequence is clear; the minor is proved: for this one has been predestined from eternity, therefore now he cannot not be predestined; therefore the same account holds of possibility or impossibility in the composite and divided sense, as regards the present question. For we ask whether, speaking without qualification, it is now possible that Antichrist be saved, or that John, predestined, be condemned. The Master says that he would rather be taught the solution of this argument by another than teach it.

Fourth, from the teaching of St. Thomas in this article: the number of the reprobate is not certain nor predefined by God: therefore neither is that of the predestined. The consequence is proved: for every man is either reprobate or predestined: therefore if the number of the reprobate is not certain formally and materially, nor defined by God, it will be able to be increased and diminished, and accordingly the other number, of the predestined, will not be able to be predefined; for whoever is not of the number of the reprobate will pass over to the number of the predestined. The antecedent is proved from the difference which St. Thomas assigns in the article between the number of the predestined and the number of the reprobate: that the former is chosen and certain with God by way of a certain predefinition, but not so with the number of the reprobate. Just as a craftsman does not of himself choose some number of stones for constructing the building which he has principally predefined. On account of this argument, some of the moderns hold that, speaking without qualification, the number of the reprobate is neither foreseen nor predefined by God.

Fifth, argument is made with the argument of Ambrosius Catharinus, who published three little books On Predestination, in which there is nothing of learning, but very much of error. God does not will the death of the sinner and wills all men to be saved, therefore He has predefined no one to reprobate.

Sixth, argument is made with the argument of the same author. For if the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is predetermined by God, many absurdities follow. The first, that the force of preaching, of exhortation, of fraternal correction would be taken away, all of which would indeed be done in vain if it has already been predefined from eternity what is to be. The second absurdity is that God would exhort men in vain by good inspirations and promptings. The third, that if the number of the predestined is certain, it follows that the preaching of this matter would cause a certain despair in the faithful, and human effort in the attainment of eternal life would be undermined: which inconvenience is amplified in the Epistle of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, which is set out in the book On Predestination and Grace.

On account of these two arguments and others like them, Catharinus, in the passage cited, first asserts that it is against the Sacred Scriptures to affirm that only the predestined are saved, and that only the reprobate are condemned. Then he adds that the opinion asserted in this matter by Augustine and by St. Thomas is cruel and savage, and drives men into despair, and that the authority of these doctors is not to be held in such esteem that, oppressed by it, we embrace a manifest lie with closed eyes. Finally he distributes men into three classes. In the first he places the Saints who are confirmed in grace, of the sort the Apostles were, and these he calls predestined; and he thinks that what is said in Scripture about the predestination of the Saints is to be understood of these. In the second he places men who were notable in crimes and sins, such as the Pharisees and Judas; and these he calls reprobate, saying that what is contained in Scripture about the reprobation of man is to be taken and interpreted of them. In the third class, however, he establishes the remaining multitude of the rest of men; and these, with a certain audacious boldness, he affirms to be neither predestined nor reprobate, but that they will be saved or damned according to the capacity of their free will. Wherefore, the number of the predestined or of the reprobate is not certain, as the common opinion of the Theologians asserts.

Let the first conclusion be, for the resolution of this question: It must most certainly be asserted, according to the faith, that the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is certain to God from eternity, and both formally and materially. And so God certainly knows and has predefined from eternity that these persons in this number are to be saved, and that such persons are to be damned eternally. The conclusion is proved from the judgment of all the Saints and scholastic Doctors. For before Catharinus introduced this fabricated opinion, it never occurred to anyone to hold the opposite of our conclusion. And the conclusion is proved. If the number of the predestined and of the reprobate is not certain, it follows that the divine foreknowledge is deceived; the consequent is against the faith, therefore. The sequel is proved. Some will be saved whom God did not foreknow as to be saved, and some will be damned whom God did not foreknow as to be damned; therefore either God does not have foreknowledge of future things, or He is deceived in it.

Second, it follows from that opinion that the will of God is mutable; the consequent is against the faith, as was clear above, q. 19, artic. 7: therefore. The sequel is manifestly proved: those who are to be saved or condemned attain eternal salvation, or the punishment of hell, on account of the will of God; but this will was not in God from eternity, since these are neither predestined nor reprobate: therefore there is a change in the divine will. Third, it follows from the opposite opinion that two contradictories are true, namely, this number is certain, this number is not certain. The negative is asserted by this author. The affirmative is proved: The knowledge of God is neither fallible nor mutable; but this number of those to be saved and damned is certain to God in time, since they are really saved and condemned; therefore it was also certain from eternity, otherwise the knowledge of God would be caused by things, and would not be immutable.

Second conclusion: The number of the reprobate is not as certain as that of the predestined. This conclusion is explained by St. Thomas here: although the number of the reprobate is certain, even materially, infallibly, according to the divine cognition, it is not predefined through itself first, according to the principal predefinition. St. Thomas means to say that God through Himself first wills that there be predestined in so great a number; yet He orders that there be as many reprobate as are necessary for the good of the predestined and for their glory, according to that text of Rom. 9: He endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory. See how the Apostle says that the reprobate are ordered to the predestined; and accordingly the number of the reprobate themselves is not intended through itself first, but for the sake of another, and hence is not predefined by the principal predefinition.

Third conclusion: It is most certain according to the faith that whoever attain eternal life are without qualification predestined. And so it is a manifest heresy that only men of outstanding holiness, and confirmed in grace, are predestined. This conclusion is proved first from that text of Matth. 25: Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For that preparation is nothing other than predestination, according to that text of Rom. 9: upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, that is, predestined. And so the Doctors are accustomed to say that predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God: therefore whoever attain eternal life, since they receive the kingdom prepared for them, are without qualification predestined. Second, I argue thus from that text of Rom. 8: «Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son»; but whoever are saved are made conformed to Christ in justifying grace, and in the attainment of eternal life: therefore they are predestined. Third, it is most effectively proved from that text of Rom. 9: That he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, whom he called not only from among the Jews, but also from among the Gentiles: therefore whoever from the whole multitude of men, whether they be Jews or Gentiles, are called to grace and at length attain glory, are without qualification predestined; and accordingly it is a manifestly heretical fabrication to say that what is said in Scripture about the predestination of the Saints is to be understood precisely of men of outstanding holiness and confirmed in grace. Fourth, St. Paul, Ephes. 1, when at the beginning of the Epistle he had said that God is blessed, that is, to be praised, because He has blessed men with every spiritual blessing in Christ — and by the name of blessing are understood the spiritual benefits of grace and glory — afterwards affirms that the same men, whom Paul calls blessed in the present, are predestined in Christ, and predestined by a certain happy and most great lot: therefore whoever are saved are without qualification predestined. Fifth, St. Paul in this ch. 1 of the Epistle to the Ephesians says further on that God works all things in these blessed ones according to the counsel of his will: but the counsel of the divine will is nothing other than divine predestination: therefore those in whom God works grace and glory are predestined.

But Catharinus says that these testimonies are to be understood of the predestination of the Saints who are of outstanding holiness. Against this there is an irrefragable argument: that the testimonies cited, if they are inspected according to the plain context of the letter, and are not twisted by violence, must be understood of whatever Saints are saved. And it is confirmed, since in these places this understanding is applied by all the Saints and Doctors, with Catharinus alone excepted; and that common consensus in this kind of explanation is a testimony of tradition and of the faith. And in mysteries of this kind, revealed by supernatural testimonies, we must act according to that saying of Augustine, 1st vol., book On the Morals of the Church, ch. 7: Let us hear the oracles, and submit our little reasonings to the divine utterances. And Hilary, bk. 1 On the Trinity: when the discourse has been about divine things, let us concede to God what befits the knowledge of Himself, and let us serve His words with pious veneration: for He is a fit witness to Himself, who is known to Himself through Himself.

Fourth conclusion. It is also certain according to the faith that whoever incur eternal damnation are without qualification reprobate.

It is proved from that text of Matth. 25: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels. This preparation is nothing other than the divine preordination, which is reprobation. Second, it is proved from that text of Romans 9: He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches, etc. But that fitting for destruction, or preparation, is nothing other than preordination to destruction, which is reprobation to condemnation: therefore. Last, the conclusion is proved from that text of Apoc. 20: Death and hell were sent into the pool of fire, which is the second death, and he who was not written in the book of life was sent into the pool of fire. For those who are not written in the book of life are reprobate: therefore those who are really condemned belong without qualification to that reprobation of which Scripture speaks.

TO the arguments. To the first it is answered that that consequence does not hold — one who is predestined can be damned, and one who is reprobate can be saved, therefore the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished — since in the antecedent there is a divided modal, and in the consequent the composite sense is implied. For in this that I say, that one predestined can be damned, I explain that this person can be predestined and can be damned. But in that assertion I do not conjoin or connect the damnation in fact with the predestination as existing; but when I infer, therefore the number of the predestined is diminished, I intimate that to a number already pre-existing, certain and determined, a diminution supervenes. And so a composite sense is involved there: that these cohere at once — that a certain number pre-existed, and that the same was diminished: which cannot happen unless we posit a change in divine providence. There is a similar fallacy in this argument: what is white is possibly black, therefore to a body existing under whiteness blackness can supervene together with the whiteness, which is false.

To the second it is answered that although God can, absolutely and without qualification, fail to give grace to a man: yet these two cannot stand, nor come about — that God in fact not give grace to one predestined in his own time, and that the number of the predestined be diminished — since that one who is predestined be justified and saved has a certain necessity of the consequence.

To the third it is said that however freely Peter acts while he is being disposed to grace, it nevertheless involves a contradiction that, with the same efficacious aid of God standing at once, he not consent to God calling and preparing him. And yet he freely consents: and speaking without qualification, in the divided sense, he can fail to consent to God calling and urging him. But it is impossible that God propose to prepare this man for grace here and now, and that this man is not here and now prepared. Otherwise the purpose of God would be uncertain and powerless and ineffective and dependent on the will of man. But to say that a man is indeed prepared, helped by divine aid, but not from the purpose of God willing and preparing that man himself — that would be a manifest error against the faith, as is clear from what was said in article 3. But if it is so, that the divine purpose effects that preparation, then this copulative proposition must be impossible: God purposed to prepare this man for grace, and this man is not prepared. But if you say: how is the use of free will not destroyed in that preparation for grace, since by necessity of the consequence it follows from that divine purpose that that man be prepared? — it is answered that so far is the use of free will from being destroyed by the divine purpose that rather that man is freely disposed and acts: namely, because God freely willed and purposed to bring it about that a man be freely disposed, that man is freely disposed. To the rejoinder against that solution which proceeds by the composite and divided sense, it is said that that argument could easily be dissolved by distinguishing the minor, namely: the one of these is necessary, therefore it cannot not be, namely that this man be predestined. This minor is true in the composite sense, and false in the divided. And to the proof, when it is said, this man has been predestined from eternity, therefore now he cannot not be predestined — I concede the whole, if the consequent be taken in the composite sense and with the supposition at once made that he be predestined: but, speaking absolutely, there is now and always in God a power to not predestine any man whatever. On which matter see what we said above, q. 19, art. 10, doubt 2.

But because the aforesaid rejoinder gave the Master of the Sentences great difficulty in the place cited, he therefore reports the solution of certain others, which itself also has great difficulty: namely, that just as God could from eternity not predestine this man, so it is conceded by some, says the Master, that even now God can not have predestined this man, and consequently that this man can not have been predestined. And they speak similarly about foreknowledge and about things foreknown, namely that God can now not foreknow what He foreknew from eternity: yet this they by no means concede in the operations or actions of God and of men. For from the moment something has been done or said, now it cannot not have been: indeed it is impossible that what has been done or said not be or not have been. And the reason for this difference is that in actions which are purely of God Himself — as foreknowledge and predestination, etc. — the possibility or impossibility is referred to the power of God, which is always the same and was the same; and therefore in actions of this kind He could do nothing that He cannot do now. But in actions to which God concurs, either together with the creature acting, or terminating an action of God — which action posits something real in the creature itself — the possibility or impossibility is referred to the nature of the thing existing. And this St. Thomas explains in his exposition of the Master's text: because, he says, on the part of the creature actions of this kind are measured by time, and therefore they pass into the past and acquire necessity, and so now it cannot not have been what has been done or said.

But against that solution I argue thus. For as regards the present dispute there seems to be no difference between the actions of God alone and the actions of God which are done through the mediation of a creature, or which are done in a creature: for if we speak in the composite sense or on supposition, it is not less impossible that He be able not to predestine whom He predestined, than that He be able not to have created the world which He created: for each involves a contradiction. But if we speak of both kinds of actions in the divided sense, with no supposition made, each is true: namely both that God can not have predestined this man, and that He can not have created the world. It is answered that the difference lies in this: that propositions which convey an action of God and of the creature in the creature through a verb of the past — such as God created the world, Adam was — convey in their signification something which is measured by past time, or by a past instant, and thus those propositions make a composite sense; whereas propositions which convey a pure action of God, even if they signify it in the manner of the past, nevertheless in reality that action is not measured by any past, but that action is always present and eternal, and measured by eternity. And therefore, just as God freely predestines a man, so He can freely not predestine. And so a proposition of this kind, God has predestined Peter, does not make a composite sense, any more than that one, God predestines Peter. Nevertheless, if someone wishes to conjoin this proposition, God predestines Peter, which is equivalent to that one, God has predestined Peter, with this one, God does not predestine Peter, the conjunction will be incompossible; and consequently the distinction will still have a place in this proposition, God can not predestine Peter, whom He has predestined: for in the composite sense it is false, but in the divided sense true. From which it follows that it is safer and clearer that propositions of this kind be distinguished than that they simply be denied or conceded. And so St. Thomas, in artic. 6, in the reply to the third, said: it is not necessary to say that God can not predestine whom He has predestined, taking it in the composite sense.

To the fourth argument it is answered that on the occasion of the teaching of St. Thomas in this artic. 7, some, not fully considering the words of St. Thomas, say that the number of the reprobate is not predefined by God, although it is foreknown and foreseen. And they use the example of St. Thomas here to prove this. For every agent intends to make something finite in its effect, and so it devises some finite number in the essential parts of that effect, which parts are required through themselves for the perfection of the whole. For it does not choose through itself some number in those things which are not principally required, but only for the sake of another. But in truth, St. Thomas does not deny that the number of the reprobate is predefined by God, just as he does not deny that the number of the drops of rain and of the sand of the sea is predefined by God. And it is proved: for the knowledge of God is practical with respect to all things, according as it has the will conjoined, as He himself teaches above, q. 14, artic. 8: therefore God predefined and purposed from eternity to make as many creatures as He makes in time. And it is confirmed by induction. For God made this ant, therefore He purposed from eternity to make it: for He works all things according to the counsel of his will, and so of each one: therefore God purposed from eternity to make all ants in this number in which they are and will be. The Evangelical teaching confirms this doctrine. For Christ the Lord taught us that even the hairs of our head are numbered, and that not one little sparrow falls to the earth without our Father, that is, without the providence of God the Father. But the teaching of St. Thomas here is manifest to those who consider it: namely, that the election of the predestined is by way of a certain principal definition, as he expressly says; and it is established that this principality of predefinition is not in the divine act itself according to itself. For by a single predefinition He predefined all things that He was going to do. But this is considered principally in the effects of the whole universe, according as certain things pertain through themselves to the perfection of the universe, while certain others, not through themselves but for the sake of another thing which through itself pertains to the perfection of the universe, are predefined. And so St. Thomas gave the example in the individuals of corruptible species, which individuals are ordered to the conservation of the species, which pertain through themselves to the conservation of the universe; and nevertheless he immediately said that individuals of this kind are produced by divine Providence in as many as suffice for the conservation of the species: therefore these corruptible individuals, although not through themselves first, are nevertheless in the second way chosen as means to the end, and are predefined by God.

Therefore according to the judgment of St. Thomas, the predefined number of the predestined is to be understood as by way of principality, insofar as these are ordered to the most powerful supernatural end. But the number of the reprobate is also predefined secondarily, for the sake of that ultimate end: namely, for the greater showing forth of the mercy of God in the predestined.

To the fifth argument of Catharinus it is sufficiently clear from what was said at q. 19, artic. 6, how it is to be understood that God wills all men to be saved, and that He does not will the death of the sinner. For these are verified of the antecedent will: for God does not will to punish the sinner before the sin foreknown. And similarly, according to the judgment of St. Thomas, that God wills to reprobate certain ones includes the will of permitting sin: but this will does not conflict with the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved. And the reason is that the will of permitting sin is considered before the foreknowledge of the sin, just as also the antecedent will itself by which God wills all men to be saved.

To the sixth it is answered that it is the greatest ignorance to infer those absurdities from the fact that the number of the predestined and of those to be saved is predefined by God. Therefore to the first absurdity Augustine replies, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, from ch. 14 to ch. 20. And Catharinus could have been convinced by the example which Augustine brings: that Christ the Lord exhorted the Apostles to do good, and to prepare themselves for temptation, and to love one another: and yet Christ knew that they were predestined; indeed He had already said to them, Luke 10: But rejoice that your names are written in heaven. See the argument ad hominem: those disciples were in the first class, namely of the predestined, and yet Christ preached to them: therefore the certitude of predestination does not destroy the force of preaching. It must therefore be said to the first absurdity that these means of exhortation and preaching and prayer, and the works of any virtue whatever, are so applied by men that they are nevertheless effects of the divine predefinition: for God provides that these very things be done for the end of the predestination of certain ones; and also with respect to others they are sometimes done for the greater showing forth of the divine justice, in that those men, on account of their malice, turn these very things into wrath, God permitting it; and this is what the Apostle says, 2 Corinth. 2: We are the good odour of Christ to God, to some indeed the odour of death unto death, but to others the odour of life unto life. And similarly Actorum 15, as the Apostle preaches, it is said: They believed, as many as were foreordained to eternal life. See, that preaching was a means and an effect of their predestination, and a means unto salvation.

To the second absurdity it is said that it is astonishing how great is the ignorance of this author in this matter, that he does not see that the same absurdity would follow if only the divine foreknowledge of future things were posited, which no one, unless he be openly a heretic, will dare to deny. And what we say is proved: for we shall make an argument altogether similar about foreknowledge to the one he makes about predestination: namely, if God most certainly foreknew for whom His inspirations will be profitable and for whom not, He would seem to exhort in vain those whom He foreknew would resist God calling. Hence to arguments of this kind it must be said that nevertheless God works in these men wisely, justly and mercifully. For in some, the divine mercy, on account of their hardness, is turned into wrath, God permitting it, so that His justice may afterwards be shown; in others, however, it comes about from a more abundant mercy that they will to make good use of the divine inspirations.

To the third absurdity it is answered from St. Augustine, in the place cited, ch. 20 and following, where he says two things: the first is that this truth about predestination and its certitude is not to be preached in bare words to the rude populace, lest perhaps the populace, incapable of so great a doctrine, despair. Nevertheless sometimes it will be necessary, when necessity presses — for instance, to cut away some heresy which is already held by the common people — to teach the people the truth of this doctrine in open words. But if the people, having heard this doctrine, feel a difficulty in believing how the free use of will remains, if it has already been predestined what we are going to do, it must be said to them that they should believe, just as they believe that God is Three and One, because this is the doctrine of the Church. Second, he says that it is rather to be preached to the people that all good things are from God, that without His grace we can do nothing unto eternal life, that it is good, and that one must always pray and not faint, and ask of God abundance in grace and perseverance in good; and that those who do these things can have confidence that they are of the number of the predestined, and nevertheless always persist in good works. Therefore, to that third absurdity of Catharinus it must be said that the truth of predestination does not lead prudent and humble men into despair, but rather into greater humility. Nor is it a cause or occasion of sloth, but rather of solicitude, according to that text of 2 Pet. 1: Give diligence that by good works you may make your calling and election certain, that is, that by the testimony of a good conscience, which arises from good works, you may have confidence that you are elect. It must be noted, however, that no one, as long as he lives in this mortality, can have that certitude absolutely, unless he be made certain by a special revelation, as has been defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 12.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: Predestination, as regards the divine preordination itself which is in God Himself, is not helped by the prayers of the saints.

SECOND conclusion: Predestination, as regards its effect, is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints and by other good works. The reason is that divine providence does not withdraw secondary causes, but rather the order of secondary causes lies beneath divine providence.

THIRD conclusion, in reply to the third: Predestination, as regards its effect, cannot be impeded by creatures. The reason is that secondary causes cannot overstep the order of the first universal cause.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE concerning the second conclusion, that it can be understood either of the whole effect of predestination, or of a particular effect. If it be understood in the second way, it is most plain; for the saints obtain from God that He confer on us certain spiritual goods. But if we speak of the whole effect of predestination, so that we consider not only the effects which are intrinsically received in us and which we ourselves work, but also the extrinsic means which God orders to our spiritual profit, predestination cannot thus be helped by the prayers of the saints as regards the whole effect, since the prayers themselves are effects of predestination. But if the whole effect of predestination be considered as it is intrinsically received in us, then it can be helped by the prayers of the saints. For St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. last, that the just man can merit congruously for some sinner not only grace but also the disposition to it.

Finally, in order to meditate on this whole matter of predestination, let us be mindful of that Apostolic saying, 2 Tim. 2: The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his, and let every one that nameth the name of the Lord depart from iniquity. In which testimony the Theologian should consider two things: the one is the certitude and infallibility of divine predestination, in that it says, The foundation of God standeth sure. The other is the movement of free will into sin, by departing from it, so that through penance the sinner departs from iniquity by invoking the name of the Lord. Thus far concerning this matter of predestination.