Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is: All things are subject to divine providence, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. He proves this by a twofold reason: see the text, and note the solutions of the arguments.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article it must be remarked that its conclusion is certain according to the catholic faith, as is clear from Wis. 14: But thy providence, O Father, governs all things from the beginning: and in Wis. 8 it is said of the divine Wisdom: She reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly. The same conclusion Augustine proves, book 5 of On Genesis Literally, ch. 21, and he proves it from that of Ps. 148: Fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of storms, which do his word. Where those things which seem to us fortuitous and casual are asserted to be subject to divine providence. And Ps. 146: Who gives to beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. Likewise Matt. 6: Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor reap, nor gather into barns: and your heavenly Father feeds them. And a similar passage is had in Luke 12. In which place Christ asserts that these most minute things are subject to divine providence. From which consideration, as Augustine reports, book 10 of The City of God, ch. 14, Plotinus the Platonist, who wrote four books on providence, proves that divine providence extends even to each of the most minute things, in the four books on the providence of God. Which opinion Proculus the Platonist followed, and as many say, Plato himself in the Epinomis, although St. Thomas in art. 3 does not think that Plato so held, but rather that he opined that these lowest things are governed by the providence of demons, and not of God. Which Plato seems to suggest in book 10 of the Laws. And lastly this opinion is that of all the holy Doctors against the Philosophers, who erred in various ways about divine providence. See St. Ambrose, in the place above, and St. Augustine, book 5 of The City of God, from ch. 9, and book 7, ch. 29 and 30, and book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 2, and Origen, homily 3 on Genesis, and St. Jerome on ch. 32 of Jeremiah, on those words, God of all flesh. From which it follows that St. Jerome, on ch. 1 of Habakkuk, where he seems to deny God's providence concerning these lower things, did not speak from his own opinion, but according to the opinion of others, whose opinions he customarily reports in his Commentaries, not defining whether they are true or false. So Jerome himself answers Ruffinus, book 1 Against Ruffinus, and this is to be noted especially in order to excuse St. Jerome, in whose writings many sayings that are not sufficiently safe are often found.

IT IS DOUBTED, moreover, principally in this article, whether sins are subject to divine providence? It is argued first, for the affirmative side. God has foreknowledge of sins: therefore he has providence. The consequence is proved: because otherwise God would know something casual and fortuitous to himself. Secondly. God from eternity provided and ordained to exercise vindictive justice by punishing sins: but this cannot be exercised unless there be sins: therefore God provided future sins, that he might show forth his justice. It is confirmed: because just as God provided the merits of the just, that they be crowned, so he seems to have provided the demerits of others, that they be justly punished. It is confirmed secondly from that which the Apostle says in Rom. 9: For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, that for this very purpose I have raised thee up, that I may show in thee my power, and that my name may be announced in all the earth. Therefore he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Therefore God has providence of the hardening, which is the greatest sin.

But on the opposite side it is held that providence is concerned with things which fall under the choice of the will, or are willed by the intention of the will: but the divine will is not of sins, therefore neither is providence. Secondly, this same negative part is gathered from the reasoning of St. Thomas: for, if from the divine causality with respect to all things the providence of God with respect to all things is gathered, it follows that God does not provide sins, since he does not cause sins. Thirdly. Providence is an account existing in the divine mind, through which things are ordered to the ultimate end: but sins, of themselves, are a withdrawal from the order of the ultimate end: therefore of themselves they do not fall under divine providence.

For the decision of this difficulty let this be the first conclusion: If sin be considered of itself, it involves a contradiction that it fall under divine providence, as the arguments made for the negative side well demonstrate.

Second conclusion: If sin be considered insofar as it is a certain being and a certain real act, it falls under divine providence, as under divine causality. For God is the cause of the act which is sin, although he is not the cause of the sin.

Third conclusion: If sin be considered insofar as it is permitted by God for a greater good, it falls under divine providence, as under the divine will, which wills to permit sin, ordering that permission directly to a greater good, as St. Thomas excellently explains in the solution to the second. Concerning which solution, see Cajetan, in this place excellently explaining how many goods would have been lacking in the universe unless God had permitted sin. Of which the greatest seems to be that Victim of the Divine Supposit which was accomplished on the Cross, through which God has been most honored. But concerning this conclusion we shall say more in q. 23, art. 3. St. Thomas's teaching in the solution to the fourth is greatly to be noted. Where the providence of man is placed under the providence of God, as a particular cause is placed under a universal one. Whence not only is human providence not derogated from, but it itself thence participates in the account of providence. Concerning which matter St. Augustine is to be consulted, book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 2. Concerning the solution to the fifth, see the same author on Ps. 145, tome 8.