Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative. The reason is taken from the definition of Providence. See the text.

Second conclusion: In God there is no Providence concerning himself, nor concerning his own acts. The reason is: because God is not ordainable to an end.

Third conclusion, to the third: Providence is in the intellect, but it presupposes the will of the end. The reason is: because the act concerned with the means to be ordered to the end presupposes the act concerned with the end. This conclusion is understood according to the mode of our cognition: for in God the act of will and of intellect is the same, both concerning the means and concerning the end.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question see St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentes, from ch. 71, and De Veritate, q. 5; St. Ambrose, book 1 of the Offices, ch. 13, 14 and 15; St. Chrysostom, Homilies 9 and 10 to the people, and in the books On Providence. Before all things, about the name providence it is to be noted, from Durandus, in 1 Sent., dist. 39, q. 3, that in God these acts are distinguished by us, knowledge, disposition, providence, predestination, governance, differing according to our mode of understanding: for by the name knowledge we understand the cognition of things, and nothing else. But disposition adds the account of a future order in things, with respect to them and among themselves. For example, that the earth be in the lowest place, and the heaven above. Providence adds above disposition a respect to the ultimate end. But predestination a respect to the end of supernatural beatitude. But governance is the execution of disposition and providence and predestination. Whence governance is not eternal, but began at the beginning of time.

THERE IS A DOUBT in this article, whether it pertains to the account of providence that it be not only the account of the order of means to the end, but also of the attainment of the end itself. It is argued first, and it is proved, that providence does not include the account of the attainment of the end, or of the event intended: for St. Thomas in q. 6 of De Veritate expressly holds so, in the first article. Secondly. If a man perfectly has the account of the order of means suitable for the attainment of the end, he is not called improvident if, those means being applied, the event does not follow: therefore. Thirdly. Providence is the most powerful part of prudence; but prudence is only concerned with the means to the end, and gives precepts only concerning them: therefore providence too. Fourthly. God has providence with respect to the reprobate in order to the ultimate end, and yet they do not attain the end: therefore providence is not the account of the attainment of the end. The consequence is clear: because otherwise God's providence concerning the reprobate would be imperfect. But the minor is proved. Because God bestows on them all the means necessary for the end. On account of these arguments some follow this opinion. But Cajetan, in this place, whom all the grave doctors of our time follow, follows the opposite opinion.

Let this be our first conclusion. If providence be considered according to the simply perfect account of providence, it intrinsically includes not only the account of means suitable for the end, but also the account of the certain efficacy of the means for attaining the end. It is proved first; because otherwise providence is imperfect and ineffective, and all the means have been applied in vain. From which it follows that, since divine providence is most perfect, it pertains to it intrinsically to be the account of the attainment of the end. And so the Church prays: «O God, whose providence is not deceived in its disposition, we suppliants beseech thee, that thou remove all things harmful, and grant us all things profitable». Secondly it is proved: for providence, simply speaking, is the account of the means to be ordered to the ultimate end; but the attainment of the end itself is also ordered to the ultimate end, namely to the divine goodness. For example, the vision is ordered to God: therefore divine providence also includes the account of the attainment of the ultimate end.

Second conclusion: If providence be considered as it is in man, with a certain imperfection, it is not necessary that it be the account of the attainment of the end and of the event which really follows, but it suffices that in the estimation of a prudent man those means be suitable and sufficient for the end. But that they can be impeded beyond the intention of the one operating does not take away the account of human providence. And so it is said in Wis. 9: For the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our providences uncertain.

To the arguments on the opposite side an answer is given. To the first it is said that St. Thomas changed his opinion here, as is also clear in book 3 Contra Gentes, c. 94, where he says that providence is the account of the order to the end as to both. It is answered secondly that he speaks of human providence. To the second and third it is answered that they prove the second conclusion. To the fourth it is answered that just as God, simply speaking, does not have the will that the reprobate be saved, so neither, simply speaking, does he have providence with respect to them concerning the ultimate end of beatitude, that they attain it. For divine providence is not less efficacious than the divine will. But he has providence concerning those who are not saved, ordering the permission of their sins to the showing forth of his justice: and this end comes about infallibly, which is moreover ordered to the showing forth of a greater mercy toward the predestined. Concerning St. Thomas's second conclusion it must be noted that although God does not have providence concerning himself, or concerning his own goodness, he can nevertheless be said to have providence concerning the manifestation of his goodness and glory, insofar as in him there is the account of means suitable for the attainment of such a manifestation.