Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative. The reason is taken from the definition of Providence. See the text.

Second conclusion: In God there is no Providence concerning himself, nor concerning his own acts. The reason is: because God is not ordainable to an end.

Third conclusion, to the third: Providence is in the intellect, but it presupposes the will of the end. The reason is: because the act concerned with the means to be ordered to the end presupposes the act concerned with the end. This conclusion is understood according to the mode of our cognition: for in God the act of will and of intellect is the same, both concerning the means and concerning the end.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question see St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentes, from ch. 71, and De Veritate, q. 5; St. Ambrose, book 1 of the Offices, ch. 13, 14 and 15; St. Chrysostom, Homilies 9 and 10 to the people, and in the books On Providence. Before all things, about the name providence it is to be noted, from Durandus, in 1 Sent., dist. 39, q. 3, that in God these acts are distinguished by us, knowledge, disposition, providence, predestination, governance, differing according to our mode of understanding: for by the name knowledge we understand the cognition of things, and nothing else. But disposition adds the account of a future order in things, with respect to them and among themselves. For example, that the earth be in the lowest place, and the heaven above. Providence adds above disposition a respect to the ultimate end. But predestination a respect to the end of supernatural beatitude. But governance is the execution of disposition and providence and predestination. Whence governance is not eternal, but began at the beginning of time.

THERE IS A DOUBT in this article, whether it pertains to the account of providence that it be not only the account of the order of means to the end, but also of the attainment of the end itself. It is argued first, and it is proved, that providence does not include the account of the attainment of the end, or of the event intended: for St. Thomas in q. 6 of De Veritate expressly holds so, in the first article. Secondly. If a man perfectly has the account of the order of means suitable for the attainment of the end, he is not called improvident if, those means being applied, the event does not follow: therefore. Thirdly. Providence is the most powerful part of prudence; but prudence is only concerned with the means to the end, and gives precepts only concerning them: therefore providence too. Fourthly. God has providence with respect to the reprobate in order to the ultimate end, and yet they do not attain the end: therefore providence is not the account of the attainment of the end. The consequence is clear: because otherwise God's providence concerning the reprobate would be imperfect. But the minor is proved. Because God bestows on them all the means necessary for the end. On account of these arguments some follow this opinion. But Cajetan, in this place, whom all the grave doctors of our time follow, follows the opposite opinion.

Let this be our first conclusion. If providence be considered according to the simply perfect account of providence, it intrinsically includes not only the account of means suitable for the end, but also the account of the certain efficacy of the means for attaining the end. It is proved first; because otherwise providence is imperfect and ineffective, and all the means have been applied in vain. From which it follows that, since divine providence is most perfect, it pertains to it intrinsically to be the account of the attainment of the end. And so the Church prays: «O God, whose providence is not deceived in its disposition, we suppliants beseech thee, that thou remove all things harmful, and grant us all things profitable». Secondly it is proved: for providence, simply speaking, is the account of the means to be ordered to the ultimate end; but the attainment of the end itself is also ordered to the ultimate end, namely to the divine goodness. For example, the vision is ordered to God: therefore divine providence also includes the account of the attainment of the ultimate end.

Second conclusion: If providence be considered as it is in man, with a certain imperfection, it is not necessary that it be the account of the attainment of the end and of the event which really follows, but it suffices that in the estimation of a prudent man those means be suitable and sufficient for the end. But that they can be impeded beyond the intention of the one operating does not take away the account of human providence. And so it is said in Wis. 9: For the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our providences uncertain.

To the arguments on the opposite side an answer is given. To the first it is said that St. Thomas changed his opinion here, as is also clear in book 3 Contra Gentes, c. 94, where he says that providence is the account of the order to the end as to both. It is answered secondly that he speaks of human providence. To the second and third it is answered that they prove the second conclusion. To the fourth it is answered that just as God, simply speaking, does not have the will that the reprobate be saved, so neither, simply speaking, does he have providence with respect to them concerning the ultimate end of beatitude, that they attain it. For divine providence is not less efficacious than the divine will. But he has providence concerning those who are not saved, ordering the permission of their sins to the showing forth of his justice: and this end comes about infallibly, which is moreover ordered to the showing forth of a greater mercy toward the predestined. Concerning St. Thomas's second conclusion it must be noted that although God does not have providence concerning himself, or concerning his own goodness, he can nevertheless be said to have providence concerning the manifestation of his goodness and glory, insofar as in him there is the account of means suitable for the attainment of such a manifestation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is: All things are subject to divine providence, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. He proves this by a twofold reason: see the text, and note the solutions of the arguments.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article it must be remarked that its conclusion is certain according to the catholic faith, as is clear from Wis. 14: But thy providence, O Father, governs all things from the beginning: and in Wis. 8 it is said of the divine Wisdom: She reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly. The same conclusion Augustine proves, book 5 of On Genesis Literally, ch. 21, and he proves it from that of Ps. 148: Fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of storms, which do his word. Where those things which seem to us fortuitous and casual are asserted to be subject to divine providence. And Ps. 146: Who gives to beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. Likewise Matt. 6: Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor reap, nor gather into barns: and your heavenly Father feeds them. And a similar passage is had in Luke 12. In which place Christ asserts that these most minute things are subject to divine providence. From which consideration, as Augustine reports, book 10 of The City of God, ch. 14, Plotinus the Platonist, who wrote four books on providence, proves that divine providence extends even to each of the most minute things, in the four books on the providence of God. Which opinion Proculus the Platonist followed, and as many say, Plato himself in the Epinomis, although St. Thomas in art. 3 does not think that Plato so held, but rather that he opined that these lowest things are governed by the providence of demons, and not of God. Which Plato seems to suggest in book 10 of the Laws. And lastly this opinion is that of all the holy Doctors against the Philosophers, who erred in various ways about divine providence. See St. Ambrose, in the place above, and St. Augustine, book 5 of The City of God, from ch. 9, and book 7, ch. 29 and 30, and book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 2, and Origen, homily 3 on Genesis, and St. Jerome on ch. 32 of Jeremiah, on those words, God of all flesh. From which it follows that St. Jerome, on ch. 1 of Habakkuk, where he seems to deny God's providence concerning these lower things, did not speak from his own opinion, but according to the opinion of others, whose opinions he customarily reports in his Commentaries, not defining whether they are true or false. So Jerome himself answers Ruffinus, book 1 Against Ruffinus, and this is to be noted especially in order to excuse St. Jerome, in whose writings many sayings that are not sufficiently safe are often found.

IT IS DOUBTED, moreover, principally in this article, whether sins are subject to divine providence? It is argued first, for the affirmative side. God has foreknowledge of sins: therefore he has providence. The consequence is proved: because otherwise God would know something casual and fortuitous to himself. Secondly. God from eternity provided and ordained to exercise vindictive justice by punishing sins: but this cannot be exercised unless there be sins: therefore God provided future sins, that he might show forth his justice. It is confirmed: because just as God provided the merits of the just, that they be crowned, so he seems to have provided the demerits of others, that they be justly punished. It is confirmed secondly from that which the Apostle says in Rom. 9: For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, that for this very purpose I have raised thee up, that I may show in thee my power, and that my name may be announced in all the earth. Therefore he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Therefore God has providence of the hardening, which is the greatest sin.

But on the opposite side it is held that providence is concerned with things which fall under the choice of the will, or are willed by the intention of the will: but the divine will is not of sins, therefore neither is providence. Secondly, this same negative part is gathered from the reasoning of St. Thomas: for, if from the divine causality with respect to all things the providence of God with respect to all things is gathered, it follows that God does not provide sins, since he does not cause sins. Thirdly. Providence is an account existing in the divine mind, through which things are ordered to the ultimate end: but sins, of themselves, are a withdrawal from the order of the ultimate end: therefore of themselves they do not fall under divine providence.

For the decision of this difficulty let this be the first conclusion: If sin be considered of itself, it involves a contradiction that it fall under divine providence, as the arguments made for the negative side well demonstrate.

Second conclusion: If sin be considered insofar as it is a certain being and a certain real act, it falls under divine providence, as under divine causality. For God is the cause of the act which is sin, although he is not the cause of the sin.

Third conclusion: If sin be considered insofar as it is permitted by God for a greater good, it falls under divine providence, as under the divine will, which wills to permit sin, ordering that permission directly to a greater good, as St. Thomas excellently explains in the solution to the second. Concerning which solution, see Cajetan, in this place excellently explaining how many goods would have been lacking in the universe unless God had permitted sin. Of which the greatest seems to be that Victim of the Divine Supposit which was accomplished on the Cross, through which God has been most honored. But concerning this conclusion we shall say more in q. 23, art. 3. St. Thomas's teaching in the solution to the fourth is greatly to be noted. Where the providence of man is placed under the providence of God, as a particular cause is placed under a universal one. Whence not only is human providence not derogated from, but it itself thence participates in the account of providence. Concerning which matter St. Augustine is to be consulted, book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 2. Concerning the solution to the fifth, see the same author on Ps. 145, tome 8.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: As to the account of the things provided for the end, God immediately provides for all things. The reason is: because he alone, in his intellect, has the account of all things.

Second conclusion: As to the execution of this order, God does not immediately, that is, by himself alone, provide for all things. The reason is: because certain lower things he governs through higher ones, not on account of a defect of his power, but on account of the abundance of his goodness, that he might communicate the dignity of causality even to creatures.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING the first conclusion it is to be noted first that in Christ the Lord there is indeed knowledge of all things which God knows by intuitive cognition; yet there is not in him the practical account of all those things: because he neither created the heavens, nor does he provide for their motions. But nevertheless he has providence of the effects pertaining of themselves to the order of grace with respect to men, and he is the moral cause of all of them, insofar as he merited that they so come about, and that all these effects be ordered, although he is not the principal efficient cause of all those effects, just as he is not the principal efficient cause of grace, but an instrumental one. It is to be noted secondly that that particle immediately can be taken in two ways. In one way exclusively, namely so that it excludes all means. In the other way, so that it is the same as intimately, and without dependence on mediate causes, even if mediate causes concur. St. Thomas's conclusions therefore are most manifest, if the particle immediately be taken exclusively.

But with the truth of the second conclusion it truly stands that God operates in all things immediately, by the immediation of power and supposit, if immediately be taken in the second way, and not exclusively, as we showed above, in q. 8, on the existence of God in things. Because, just as he is immediately present to all things, so he operates intimately in all, namely without dependence on mediate causes.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is single: Divine providence imposes necessity on certain things, but not on all.

COMMENTARY.

THIS conclusion and its reason and the whole teaching of the article is nothing other than a confirmation of all that has been said in q. 19, art. 8. And although Cajetan, in this place, seems to propose to himself a difficult doubt, and perhaps one insoluble by the human intellect, nevertheless it is not a new question, nor different from that which we discussed and defined in the place cited. But nevertheless, three things seem to us worthy of admiration in this commentary of Cajetan. The first is his modesty, piety and religion, in that he teaches by his own example that we captivate the intellect into the obedience of faith, when it is not convinced by reason to understand how the avoidability of contingent effects and the freedom of human acts stand together with the immutability of those same acts and the inevitability of divine Providence. The second thing he asserts is that he cannot by certain reason understand how an effect is simply avoidable of itself, and inevitable according as it is provided by God; on the contrary, it seems to him that reason convinces that the effect is simply inevitable, and avoidable in a qualified sense. Because, he says, all things well considered, it is inevitable, in that to have been provided by God overcomes the conditions of the effect itself of itself: just as the throwing of wares overboard, in time of shipwreck, is simply willed, because, all circumstances considered, it is simply willed, and in a qualified sense it is not willed, insofar as of itself the throwing displeased. To us, however, who have shown above that from the efficacy of the divine Will and Providence the conditions of effects of themselves are not destroyed, but rather are effectively perfected by the divine will, it is not unintelligible how contingent and free effects are said to be simply avoidable, although, divine Providence being supposed, they will not be avoided. Nor is the example of the throwing of wares into the sea of any avail: because the throwing names a determinate act, with all its circumstances, and determinately willed: but to be an avoidable effect names a power of itself suitable to it. If the example is of any avail, it only concludes that contingent effects will not be simply avoided, nor free acts, insofar as they fall under divine Providence. The third, which seems altogether unintelligible and worthy of admiration, is: for he says that God so provides for things and events that, upon some effect being provided by God, there follows something higher than avoidability or inevitability; so altogether that, from the passive provision of the event, one of the two members of neither combination must follow. And so, says Cajetan, the intellect has sought it, hidden not by the evidence of the truth inspected, but by the height of inaccessible truth. But to us it seems more unintelligible how Cajetan finds a middle between avoidable and not avoidable, which is the same as inevitable, supposing that we speak of real effects. Lastly this excessive humility of Cajetan gives occasion of erring to the fainthearted, just as many philosophers have erred by denying either divine providence or free choice. For the way which Cajetan uses to compose these two seems to imply a contradiction, namely that there be some effect provided by God neither avoidable nor inevitable. And this, concerning this q. 22.