Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is: It is necessary that in every work of God justice and mercy be found.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS TO BE NOTED in this article how elegantly St. Thomas shows that in every work of God mercy and justice are found, and that the work of justice is always founded on mercy. Especially, let attention be paid to the teaching of St. Thomas in the solution to the first argument, where he says that in the damnation of the reprobate mercy also appears, in that he punishes short of what is condign. For if he punished more, it would still be just. Nevertheless the equality of proportionality is preserved, namely that as the quantity of the demerits of one damned man stands to the quantity of the demerits of another damned man, so precisely stands the punishment of one to the punishment of the other; but the punishment of anyone whatsoever could most justly have been greater. In like manner we can also philosophize about the reward of beatitude, which is also given beyond what is condign, according to absolute quantity, yet the equality of proportionality is preserved, so that as the merits of one blessed man stand to the quantity of the merits of another, so the reward of one stands to the reward of the other. None the less God could have sufficiently rewarded the merits of anyone whatsoever with a lesser glory. Further, in the justification of the impious St. Thomas says that justice appears, in that he remits sins on account of love. St. Thomas could have said, on account of contrition: but he touched the root of contrition, namely charity, according to whose measure contrition follows and the remission of sins is granted, according to that of Luke 7: many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much. See here in this place how there is a certain account of justice between the remission of sin and the disposition which God works in the sinner. For it is due to that disposition which God works in man that the remission of sin, or the infusion of grace, answer to it. This they observe who so think the sinner to be justified freely that no account of justice appears in his justification. And let them acknowledge that this opinion is against St. Thomas. They are deceived, however, when they at once infer: therefore man merits in some way, at least imperfectly, the remission of sin. But assuredly that consequence is nothing. Because the debt of justice and equality which St. Thomas asserts to be found in the justification of the impious is between one work of God and another work of God, insofar as they are from God and commensurated by his wisdom, and not as they are from the man who is justified. And the reason is: because as sorrow and love proceed from man, they do not have the proportion of a disposition to grace; but only as they proceed from operating grace according to the order of divine wisdom, from which grace contrition itself also has it that it is a certain satisfaction, of the justice of a special virtue, for an offense committed against God, and not only for the pains of Purgatory.

Thus far I had remarked in the earlier edition. But since I see some, even among our Thomists, paralogizing about the aforesaid teaching, not judging it to be sufficiently safe, whereas it is nevertheless the express opinion of St. Thomas, it has seemed good, in this place, to resolve this difficulty entirely.

IT IS DOUBTED therefore: Whether in the justification of the impious there is found some account of justice? It is argued, first, for the negative side, from that in Rom. 3: Justified freely by his grace. Where the Apostle seems to exclude every account of justice on our part: but on God's part he establishes pure grace, through which we are justified freely. Secondly. Contrition can in no way be called meritorious of the remission of guilt: therefore neither can it be satisfactory for an offense committed against God. The antecedent no theologian will dare to deny; the consequence is proved. Since a work satisfactory before God is also meritorious, for every good work is meritorious, and it is clear that satisfaction is a good work. Thirdly. God is in no way, even imperfectly, bound by justice to remit an offense: therefore when a man is justified from sin, he satisfies God by no action of his own for the offense committed against him. The antecedent is clear, also from the teaching of St. Thomas, in this question, art. 1, ad 3; the consequence is proved, because a reward is due to good works if they be done, although the grace of God precedes that they be done, as is said in the Arausican Council, Canon 18. Fourthly. Every satisfaction of ours with respect to God presupposes that guilt has already been remitted; otherwise our operation toward satisfying God will be judged of no moment: therefore it seems to be an implication of contradiction that there be any satisfaction for an offense which has already been remitted through divine mercy and operating grace. And it is confirmed from what is said in the Council of Trent, chapter 8: We are said to be justified freely because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace itself of justification; for if it is grace, it is no longer from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace, as the Apostle says, Rom. 10. But if some subtle theologian wishes to answer that the Council does not speak of the works, or actions of ours, which are at the same time as justification itself, but of those which truly precede justification: but if the argument proceeds concerning those actions which are in the same instant of justification, it is not unfitting that in some genus of cause some operation of ours precede the infusion of grace, as a disposition to it; and so it is no wonder if contrition in that instant is satisfactory for the offense committed against God, which is then at the same time remitted through the infusion of grace. Then it is argued fifthly. Contrition considered as it precedes the infusion of grace can only have the account of a disposition which God effects in us in order to infuse grace, the causality of which disposition is only the account of a material cause: therefore, as such, it cannot have the account of satisfaction. The consequence is proved: because satisfaction names an action as it is from the one satisfying and rendering what he owes, which consideration is already of an efficient cause, at least morally; for it is a work of cooperating grace. But if you again say that contrition has the account of satisfaction according as it already presupposes grace: then it is argued sixthly: it follows that such satisfaction for the offense is now condign. The consequence is proved, because contrition is said by theologians, according to the common and more approved and safer opinion, to be meritorious of glory condignly, because it is considered as already informed by grace and charity, and so much glory will be given to a man as corresponds to so much merit, although it is founded in grace; therefore, by a similar account, if contrition is called a satisfaction of the offense, insofar as it is considered in that instant as informed by grace, it follows that the moral effect, answering to the satisfaction, is due to it condignly, just as the remission of the pain of Purgatory answers condignly to the intensity of contrition, in that proportion in which the perfection of contrition is found.

Seventhly it is argued: The eternal punishment is remitted at the same time as the guilt; therefore in no way is contrition a satisfaction for eternal punishment; therefore it remains that contrition can have the account of satisfaction only with respect to the punishment of Purgatory.

Eighthly and lastly it is argued: If in the justification of the impious contrition itself is a satisfaction and recompense for the offense committed against God, it is either a satisfaction for an offense which is not, or for an offense which is, at least in guilt. If the first be said, it seems vain to say that a man satisfies for an offense which in no way is, since it has already been remitted through grace; but if it be said that it is a satisfaction for an offense which still is, it follows that then man is not made reconciled to God, since God has not yet forgiven the offense done to him: therefore in no way can it be affirmed that in the justification of the impious there is any action of man which has the account of justice or of satisfaction.

In the resolution of this difficulty it is a wonder how varied the opinions are, even among the Thomists themselves, whereas nevertheless what St. Thomas thought, both in this place and in the 3rd part, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2; and in q. 35, art. 5, is manifest. From his teaching I lay down the following conclusions. Then, in the solutions of the arguments, I shall report and refute the variety of opinions.

First conclusion: In the justification of the impious there is an account of distributive justice on the part of God distributing and, so to speak, equating one effect with another, according to the order of divine wisdom imposed on things themselves. This conclusion is so certain that it ought to be doubted by no one worthy of the name of theologian. St. Thomas demonstrated it in art. 1 of this question; for he shows that this account of justice is found in the order of the universe, both in natural things and in voluntary things. And it is confirmed by the testimony of St. Dionysius, ch. 8 of On the Divine Names, asserting: «One must see in this that God's justice is true, that he assigns to all their own according to the dignity of each existing thing, and preserves the nature of each in its own order and power». According to this manner, then, we understand that in the justification of the impious there is an account of justice, namely because God infuses such and so great grace as such a disposition of the man to be justified demands; for to this disposition, as it is from God disposing, such grace is due, through which sins are remitted, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in art. 4, ad 1, when he says: «In the justification of the impious justice appeared, in that God remits sins on account of love, which nevertheless he himself mercifully infuses, as is read of Magdalene in Luke 7: Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much». Observe nevertheless that I said on purpose that grace is due to such a disposition as that disposition is from God disposing; for as it is from the powers of free choice, grace is not due to it; for thus it is a certain remote disposition, to which a form of such dignity is not due. But if our consent and our love be considered as it is a gift of God, proceeding from supernatural help, it has the account of a disposition of the same order as the form of grace; and accordingly, just as the ultimate disposition which a natural agent effects is due the substantial form according to the order of nature, so the supernatural disposition which God effects proportionally to the end intended is due grace, which is a supernatural form, through which we are made partakers of the divine nature, and sins are remitted. And so, by this account of justice it is rather a certain equality and proportion of things among themselves than the merit of the rational creature operating. Concerning this conclusion, then, let what has been said suffice.

Second conclusion: When an adult is justified from original sin alone, no account of justice is found on the part of the one operating, not even an imperfect one. It is proved: since the adult who is justified from original sin alone has no act which pertains to justice, as is clear inductively: for an act of faith, hope, or charity, or of contrition, could not necessarily pertain to such a justification in any account of justice. I said on the part of the one operating, because on the part of the object of faith there is found the account of the justice of Christ: for no one is justified except through faith in his Blood, according to that in Rom. 3: «Justified freely by his grace, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom he has set forth as a propitiation through faith in his Blood». In which place it is given us to understand how God justifies us altogether mercifully, and at the same time through the redemption and satisfaction made on the part of Christ, which we offer to God through faith, infuses grace into us; and so is verified what the Apostle says in the same place: «That he may be himself just and justifying him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ». What is it that he be himself just? Namely that he be shown just, in that he does a work of justice, because to Christ is due as a just reward of his humility even to the death of the Cross that everyone who is of his faith be justified through charity working. With which nevertheless it stands in truth that the justification of the impious itself is altogether gratuitous and proceeding from divine mercy, if it be considered as conferred on this wretched sinner. In this conclusion too there is the greatest concord among theologians who think well and catholically.

Third conclusion: When a man is justified through penance from actual sin, contrition itself is an act of justice, of a certain special virtue which is contained under justice as a potential part, and not as a perfect species. Which conclusion is St. Thomas's, in the 3rd part, q. 85, art. 3; and among the Thomists it ought to be the common opinion, about which matter a more prolix disputation ought to be held in the place cited. But now it is only my intention to show how they depart from the opinion of St. Thomas, who in the justification of a sinner from actual sin deny that contrition is a satisfaction for an offense committed against God, although in truth there is not here simply a just thing in this satisfaction, but in a qualified sense. This conclusion, as to both parts, St. Thomas proves in the article cited. For he supposes that penance does not have it that it is a special virtue from this alone, that it grieves over evil perpetrated (for this alone charity would suffice); but from this, that the penitent grieves over sin committed insofar as it is an offense of God, with the purpose of amendment. But the amendment of an offense committed against someone is not made through the mere cessation of the offense, but there is required further a certain recompense, which has place in offenses committed against another; as also retribution. Although there is a difference, that the recompense is on the part of him who offends, as happens with satisfaction; but the retribution is on the part of him against whom the offense has been committed. But both pertain to the matter of justice: because both are a certain exchange. So St. Thomas. From this he gathers the first part of the conclusion, namely that penance, according as it is a special virtue, is a part of justice. But the second part of the conclusion he proves: because the just simply must be between equals; but between God offended and the creature offending there is no equality: therefore it cannot be simply just, but just in a qualified sense. It is clear therefore from the express teaching of St. Thomas that the act of penance, which is contrition, is a certain recompense, though imperfect, which immediately regards the offense of God, or God offended, to whom some imperfect satisfaction is made for the offense committed against him. From which it follows how ridiculous is the understanding of St. Thomas's teaching on the part of those who say that penance is a special virtue of justice for this reason, that it regards the pains of Purgatory, by which man, grieving in time over his sins, satisfies God. For this cannot stand with the teaching of St. Thomas: first, because contrition is not sorrow over sins on account of the pains of Purgatory; but formally regards the offense of God, not only by grieving, but by intending to recompense it: therefore the account of commutative justice which is found in penance consists in this, that contrition is immediately a recompense and satisfaction for the offense of God. Then, because the recompense for the pains of Purgatory, if it be considered according to the equality of thing to thing, can well be according to condign merit, just as also the retribution of glory for our works: but St. Thomas, not only in the place cited but also in the 3rd part, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, firmly asserts that no satisfaction of a mere man, howsoever pleasing to God, can be made condignly for sin. The reason for this is: because the offense is graver the greater he is against whom the offense is committed: whence for condign satisfaction it was required that the act of the one satisfying have infinite efficacy. Nevertheless he grants in the same place that the satisfaction of a mere man can be sufficient imperfectly: namely, according to the acceptance of him who is content with it, although it is not condign: and because every imperfect thing presupposes something perfect by which it is sustained, hence it is that every satisfaction of a mere man has efficacy from the satisfaction of Christ. So St. Thomas. Where it is clear that he speaks of satisfaction for an offense committed against God, and not of the satisfaction which is made for the pains due in Purgatory, for which, grace being supposed, he satisfies condignly in that place; although in a certain opuscule On Faith and Works he seems to assert that one who is justified in no way satisfies for guilt, but he speaks according to the common opinion of others, or he speaks of guilt insofar as it is the evil and stain of the sinner, in which he says well, as will appear below in the solution to the second.

Fourth conclusion: It is most certainly to be held, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, that contrition is an act of commutative justice, imperfect nevertheless, which is called a recompense and imperfect satisfaction for sin, insofar as it is an offense of God. This conclusion is clear from what has been said; and although it is not certain according to faith, it is nevertheless the most probable of all opinions, and most consonant with Sacred Scripture, and such as greatly extols the grace of God: so far is it from derogating from it, as certain of the modern theologians, looking at few things, boldly affirm. Then, the conclusion is proved from that in Ezek. 18: «But if the impious man do penance, and do judgment and justice, he shall live in life»; and in Ps. 118: I have done judgment and justice: and Ps. 31: «I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord». And in Rom. 6: «As you have exhibited your members to serve iniquity unto iniquity, so now exhibit them to serve justice unto sanctification». In which places, not unfittingly, by the name of justice penance is understood, just as by the name of injustice and iniquity sin is understood, which constitutes a certain inequality between God offended and the sinner offending; which inequality must be taken away through the opposite form and virtue, which may be in its own way justice and imperfect equality. But that this opinion magnifies the grace of God is proved: because contrition itself, through which we in some way satisfy God offended, is an effect of the grace of God, which so elevates us that we can in some way recompense the offense which we have done to God through sin; and so it is called a sufficient satisfaction from the acceptance of God, who is content with it. It is true nevertheless, as we have suggested from the teaching of St. Thomas above, and as Cajetan observes, q. 1 of the 3rd part, that our satisfaction, as united together with the satisfaction of Christ, and insofar as we are with him one mystical person, is perfect and condign. But now we do not speak of satisfaction under this mystical unity with Christ, but as it is an action exhibited by us, who are in a finite manner pleasing to God, through grace infused by him, according to the measure of the Holy Spirit, who divides to each as he wills. This opinion and understanding of St. Thomas have been followed by the most learned Masters of our Order, who have been most diligent in understanding St. Thomas: in particular, after Cajetan in the place commemorated, the most learned Master brother John de la Peña, greatly deserving of Scholastic Theology in this renowned university of Salamanca, and formerly appointed to the evening chair of Sacred Theology, of whom the opinion was no less, but perhaps greater, and not undeservedly, than of those who from our Order preceded him. He, in his Commentaries on the cited place of the Third Part, constantly affirmed this opinion and understanding of St. Thomas, and confirmed it with many most firm arguments. Then, it has been followed not by one or another but by many Masters of our Order of no mean name, all of whom I would gladly name if the envy of the age permitted; but, whether the envious man will or not, I gladly refer in support of this opinion the most learned Master brother John de Orellana, who, had he not been oppressed by bodily infirmities, would doubtless long since have been a teacher in the most eminent place among theologians: he also, in his Commentaries on q. 1 of the 3rd part, most copiously explains and confirms this opinion. But lest we seem to bring testimonies only from our own men, I bring forward the most learned man Roard Taper, formerly Dean of Louvain: who, in art. 6 On Satisfaction, in the response to the argument of the adversaries against satisfaction, a little before the end, fol. 257, says thus: «It is the probable opinion of many Catholics that for mortal guilt and eternal punishment we can satisfy through the same indwelling Spirit: which would seem more likely, and would be more apparent, if, grace being infused later in time, eternal punishment and guilt were remitted, as Hugh of St. Victor holds; just as according to blessed Thomas their remission comes about later in nature and at the same time in time. But about this we are unwilling to contend here, since it is among the questions about which it is permitted to dispute on either side, and, with faith safe, to opine and even to defend either part». So Roard. And after a few words: «But the gratuitous remission of sins is adverse to neither opinion; on the contrary, it is more gratuitous if we ourselves too can satisfy, for the grace is greater, a greater benefit is conferred: and greater is the glory of Christ and of us, if he makes us rich, so that we may satisfy from our own for even mortal guilt». And a little below he has this: «Nor can the satisfaction which is from grace be adverse to gratuitous remission: since gratuitousness is adverse only to the works of free choice, and not to the works of grace, which the Apostle Paul does not distinguish against grace, in the epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians; on the contrary, in that he includes those works as its fruits: but only the works of nature or of free choice. And in this way blessed Augustine, ch. 45 On Nature and Free Choice, teaches that eternal life is grace, and nevertheless is due to merits which are grace and freely given». All this is Roard. All which things have been reported by me, not that I follow his opinion in all things (since he posits that the penitent renders an equivalent for the offense, in which he displeases me), but that it may appear how rashly certain modern theologians condemn what they do not understand. But the whole difficulty is, among true Thomists, in explaining in what way satisfaction for a sin committed against God has some account of commutative justice, whereas nevertheless satisfaction itself presupposes that the sin has already been remitted through the infusion of grace, which, unless it has preceded, at least in priority of nature, such satisfaction will be judged to be of no moment: about which matter I find several catholic opinions, among the most learned men and the sharpest in wit. But what I think about this matter, and what seems to me more conformable to the teaching of St. Thomas, will be more conveniently explained in the solutions of the arguments proposed by me.

To the first argument therefore, which is taken from the Apostle in Rom. 3, asserting that we are justified freely through the grace of God, some easily answer from the teaching of Roard, in the place above, that the justice and satisfaction which is posited in contrition does not detract in any way from the grace of God, through which we are justified freely; on the contrary, contrition itself is the greatest gift of the grace of God. The Apostle therefore excludes there, and wherever he sets grace against works, the works which precede justification, as is said in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8; but he does not exclude the works which are gifts of God and flow from grace itself. It stands therefore with sound and catholic teaching that contrition itself is a recompense of the offense, while God remits sins on account of penance.

To the second argument, I indeed most gladly grant the antecedent, and I think it is a catholic dogma, since otherwise I do not understand in what way the remission of sins is gratuitous, if contrition were meritorious of the remission of guilt, whether contrition itself be considered as in the account of a disposition it precedes grace, by priority of nature and causality, not of time; or be considered as it is later in nature than grace itself in another genus of cause, namely the formal and quasi-efficient: for in this way grace is the principle of contrition, and of every account of merit which can be considered in contrition itself with respect to glory, or with respect to the punishments of Hell, from which one is delivered not only through the remission of guilt, which is made formally through grace, but also through the merit of contrition, insofar as it flows from grace, which will be explained more fully in the solution to the seventh. I know that there are some who assert that, from the absolute power of God, it could come about that contrition, even that which proceeds from grace, would be meritorious of that same grace; indeed some of them grant that in fact through such contrition a man merits, not indeed grace or the remission of sin, but that grace be so intense that through it sins are more abundantly remitted: the reason for which is that a more intense contrition and a more intense act of charity already presuppose grace, and accordingly it is not unfitting that a man merit that intensity of grace, which they rather improperly call the increase of grace, through a greater intensity of contrition. If opinions of theologians of this sort were to be exactly refuted by us, it would be necessary to compose an entire book. Let us return therefore to the solution of the second argument; we have granted therefore the antecedent, namely that contrition can in no way be meritorious of the remission of guilt, or of the infusion of grace, which two stand as formal effect and form; but we deny the consequence, when it is inferred: therefore contrition is not satisfactory for an offense committed against God. But to the proof of the consequence, I cannot but wonder how men who are theologians, who ought to have learned dialectic, do not see the open cavil of a sophism: for although the same act of contrition is satisfactory and meritorious, nevertheless the account of merit and the account of satisfaction differ formally, and have a different term. For contrition is meritorious of glory, or even of the remission of punishment; but satisfaction regards the offense of another, to whom satisfaction is to be made, and accordingly I merit a reward for myself, and I satisfy another, by compensating the offense which I have done to him. Although therefore every good work proceeding from grace is meritorious, and contrition itself is at the same time satisfactory, it does not follow that with respect to the same term it is meritorious and satisfactory.

For its greater understanding it is to be noted, first, with Durandus, in 4, dist. 15, q. 1, that satisfaction differs from restitution properly so called, for restitution is made of those things which, even without injury to the person and without derogation of honor, have been taken away or are retained; and in this way a man restores what he has received on loan, or what he has stolen. But satisfaction, properly speaking, is a certain recompense for an injury and offense committed against the honor or the standing of someone. It is true nevertheless that sometimes theologians use the name of satisfaction indifferently for restitution, and conversely. But now we use the name of satisfaction as it is a recompense which has place in offenses committed against another, as St. Thomas uses it in the 3rd part, q. 85, art. 3.

It is to be noted secondly that merit and satisfaction agree in this, that each indeed is an action of justice, and hence directed to another; they differ, however, in that satisfaction directly looks to the honor of him to whom satisfaction is made, who is also the one offended, so that the intrinsic and total term of satisfaction itself is understood without the advantage of the one satisfying being understood, indeed sometimes it is even done with the detriment and disadvantage of the one satisfying. But merit stands on the contrary, for the proper term of merit, insofar as it is merit, is the advantage of the one meriting, which is exhibited to him by another, to whom the merit must be ordered. These two things are most manifest, but they are not considered by those to whom the opinion of St. Thomas does not please, or by whom it is not understood. From what has been said there plainly follows the reason for the saying of this sort: We satisfy another and we merit for ourselves. There follows also what we intended explicitly, that if any action is at the same time satisfactory and meritorious, it is necessary that these two belong to it by different accounts, namely with respect to different terms.

It is to be noted thirdly that sin can be considered in two ways: in one way as it has the account of an offense and injury against God himself, in which consideration man stands as the doer, and God as it were as suffering the injury; for although while man sins he harms God in nothing, according to that of Job 35: «If you have sinned, what will you harm him? and if your iniquities are multiplied, what will you do against him?»; nevertheless, as regards the gravity of mortal sin, it is all the same that man attempts, as far as in him lies, to make another God for himself, by turning himself away from the true God. In the other way sin can be considered as the proper evil of the one sinning, insofar as it deprives him of the life of grace, and turns him away forever from the highest good, and is a stain and mortal disease of the sinner himself, whence it is also called mortal sin: for the sinner truly harms himself alone while he acts against the law of God, according to that of Ps. 7: «His sorrow shall be turned on his head, and his iniquity shall descend on his crown». From this teaching it is clear that satisfaction for the divine offense, although it stands concomitantly with respect to the good of the one to be justified, and is as it were a condition required that sins be remitted through the infusion of grace, nevertheless, formally speaking, regards only the sin as it is a divine evil, attempted by the sinner himself and to be recompensed by him, although this he cannot do, not even imperfectly, without the grace of God, healing every infirmity of sin and washing away every stain; the infusion of which grace, although it formally causes the remission of sin, yet does not do so alone, but with charity and penance infused by God presupposed. And this is the greatest mercy of God, that whereas he himself is the one offended, he exercises the office of physician, and heals all our infirmities; and in this way accepts our contrition as a certain, though imperfect, satisfaction for the offense committed against himself. And this is what St. Thomas said in the 3rd part, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, that this satisfaction is reckoned sufficient from the acceptance of him who is content with it, not because it is simply sufficient, howsoever it proceed from grace, since it always proceeds from a man finitely pleasing to God: therefore the satisfaction of Christ the Lord alone was to equality, and simply sufficient, because the one satisfying was of equal dignity with the one offended. From this same teaching an answer is easily given to the remaining argument of the consequence: because although God can be obliged to no one out of commutative justice, yet he is faithful in all his words, and he will remit the sins of those who do penance; just as he will also confer rewards on those who by his grace act well. To the proof of the consequence it is answered that the reward does not answer to contrition insofar as it is satisfactory, but insofar as it is meritorious of glory; but the remission of the offense itself is not due to the satisfaction, because it does not answer to it as a wage to merit.

To the fourth argument it is answered that satisfaction presupposes that guilt has been remitted prior in nature to satisfaction itself having any value for satisfying God in some measure; but that consequence is denied, when it is inferred: therefore it seems an implication of contradiction that there be some satisfaction for an offense which has already been remitted through divine mercy and operating grace; and the reason is, because before the recompense of the offense is understood, the sin can be understood to have been remitted as it is the evil of the sinner himself; but as it is a divine evil, as we have said, it is not understood to have been recompensed by us until contrition itself is understood to have been accepted by God in the account of satisfaction. But since all these things are exercised in the same instant, all these priorities are considered by us according to different accounts and formalities, by which the divine grace is greatly extolled. And by this the confirmation is clear; for the Council speaks of our actions which precede justification earlier in time; but our actions which accompany justification itself can be in a certain genus of cause prior to justification itself, and in another genus can be posterior. But whether contrition, in the account of satisfaction for an offense, can be considered as prior or as posterior, there are various opinions among our men; to me, however, it has always seemed right that contrition, as satisfaction, is posterior to the remission of sins, insofar as the remission is considered as the salvation and vivification of the soul through the infusion of grace, which renders man pleasing to God: and this the fifth argument proves. But if sin be considered as it is a divine evil, then in some way contrition itself, as satisfaction, is understood to precede the non-imputation of the offense. Since before satisfaction is understood, God is not understood to be satisfied for the offense; nor does not imputing it to eternal punishment mean a gratuitous retribution on the part of God offended, unless the injuries done to him have been supposed for vengeance. And this assertion, because our satisfaction is said by St. Thomas to be sufficient from the acceptance of God, who is content with it: therefore our satisfaction presupposes grace, through which we are accepted by God. For he accepts the satisfaction of a friend and of one who is pleasing. And this way of speaking has less difficulty, and through it the objections which are made against the opinion of St. Thomas are more easily answered. To the fifth argument therefore, the answer is clear from what has been said: for it proves our opinion.

To the sixth argument, I deny the consequence. And to the proof it is answered that there is a great difference between contrition itself, as it is a meritorious act informed by grace and charity, and as it has the account of satisfaction of the divine offense: for, in the former way, it is of itself proportioned to the reward of glory, so indeed that, just as the merit is finite, so the corresponding reward is finite, and the more perfect contrition itself has been, commanded by a more perfect charity, the greater will be the reward of glory itself; and accordingly we grant that the reward will be given condignly to our merits. But contrition, howsoever informed by grace and charity, if it be considered as satisfaction of the divine offense, has no proportion with its immediate and formal term, which is the divine good, to be recompensed to God himself. For it must be recalled, as we said above, that the offense is graver the more dignified the one offended is. Therefore, that there be an equality of satisfaction for the offense, it is necessary that the one satisfying be able to render an equivalent. But this is impossible for a pure creature, howsoever endowed with divine grace, because it is always finitely pleasing; and therefore St. Thomas taught that it was necessary that God be incarnate, so that satisfaction might be made to God for sins condignly, because it was required that the one satisfying be of infinite dignity as the one offended: where this is very much to be observed. On account of the inconsideration of this many are deceived; for they think that, just as the offense is called infinite on account of the infinity of the one offended, so the recompense which is made through an act of the virtue contrary to the sin is reckoned infinite: for example, just as hatred is an infinite offense in that it is against God, so an act of charity has infinite dignity, because it is toward God, who is the highest and infinite good; and so they say that a man renders by love as much as he took away by sin. But those who so opine are subtly deceived. For it is to be noted that satisfaction and the recompense of injuries is not greater for this reason, that he to whom satisfaction is made is more dignified, but because he who recompenses and satisfies is more dignified. On the contrary, the more dignified he is to whom satisfaction is to be made, the lesser the satisfaction is, other things being equal: for example, if someone offends a fellow citizen, it will perhaps be a sufficient satisfaction that he kneel before him and ask pardon, that he do or say something similar. But if he offends a Prince or a King, it will not be judged to be a sufficient satisfaction, unless perhaps the one who offends is also a Prince and a King. And so the value of satisfaction is measured from the dignity of the one satisfying, and not from the greater dignity of him to whom satisfaction is owed; on the contrary, on this side the satisfaction will be more difficult, because the offense is graver. But if our works be considered in the account of merit, the dignity of the object contributes much to a greater merit; and accordingly the reward will be greater, and just as all our merit is finite, so every reward will be finite, which is proportioned to it according to the order of divine wisdom. We have therefore that in satisfaction, formally speaking, what is at issue is not our good, but the divine good, which man by sin attempted to destroy; and therefore all our satisfaction will be very imperfect, nor proportionable to its term; but our merit has its equality and condignity with the reward of glory.

To the seventh argument it is answered that it is not unfitting that we be delivered from eternal punishment by a double title, namely both by the infusion of grace, through which we are made adopted sons and heirs of eternal life, and also from the fact that God accepts our imperfect satisfaction of penance as a recompense of his offense, and consequently on account of it God does not impute our sin to us unto eternal punishment; although in the meantime he commutes it into the temporal punishment of Purgatory, unless the contrition be so perfect that on account of its intensity man remains free even from the punishment of Purgatory. But what we have said about the double title with respect to eternal punishment will not seem wonderful to a theologian who has considered that a justified man also acquires a right to eternal glory by a double title. The first title is infused grace itself, which makes the justified man worthy of eternal life, in as great a quantity as grace itself is. The other title is the act itself of charity and contrition and faith and hope, by which man merits that same eternal life in the same moment of his justification. What wonder, then, if proportionally he is delivered from eternal death by a double title. Take note, however, that we do not here posit the remission of eternal punishment to be the immediate term of satisfaction; but it is something consequent, from the fact that God himself is satisfied, so to speak, and content with that satisfaction. For hence it comes about that he does not impute the sin unto eternal punishment, which is a just retribution on the part of God offended, who is a just judge to avenge the injuries done to him. To the eighth, the solution is now easy. For it is a light sophism, for you would ask by a like account: If a man is justified, therefore he is either justified from a guilt which is, or from a guilt which is not. And just as to this argument it is answered that a man is justified from a guilt which was immediately before this, at least in guilt; so too he satisfies for an offense which was immediately before this, at least in guilt.

NAY, rather, from what has been said it follows that not only while a man is justified from sin does he satisfy God for the offense; but also afterwards through his whole life, as often as he is contrite, he satisfies God for the offense, howsoever already remitted through grace and a prior satisfaction. And the reason is manifest: because contrition is always an act of the same species: therefore it will always have the same object and the same immediate and formal term: therefore it is formally a satisfaction and recompense, according to a certain imperfect commutative justice. And if you object, how, since God has accepted a prior satisfaction, can a man again satisfy for the offense? It is answered that, because the prior satisfaction, indeed every satisfaction of ours, is always imperfect and greatly deficient of itself, a man can often repeat it and have a more intense contrition, not indeed by precept but by counsel, zealous for the divine honor, and striving to satisfy more and more on account of the infinite dignity of the one offended; although he, in his kindness, is already content with a lesser satisfaction. To this is consonant what Baruch says, ch. 2: «A soul that is sad over the greatness of evil, and walks bowed and weak, and failing eyes and a hungry soul, gives glory and justice to the Lord». Toward this David said: «I will wash my bed every night». Toward this also blessed Peter through his whole life always wept at the cockcrow, remembering the offense of God. Toward this lastly blessed Mary Magdalene, to whom many sins were forgiven by Christ because she loved much, nevertheless afterwards, for thirty years, did penance on a rock. Nor let anyone say to me that these excellent penitents did these things in order to escape the pains of Purgatory, since this end is infinite, nor is it fitting for such great perfection of the saints that they intend it directly. Then, because they had satisfied more than enough for the pains of Purgatory, but their chief end was to look to the divine good against which they had sinned, and to God whom they had offended: and lest they also seem ungrateful for the divine mercy and liberality, if, because God in his kindness accepts the smallest contrition as a satisfaction of his offense, they were not solicitous to render a greater and greater one, as much as they could, for the dignity of the one offended. And this is what the excellent penitent David said, and taught us, Ps. 50: «Wash me more from my iniquity, etc. For I know my iniquity, and my sin is always against me». He certainly had knowledge of the pardon granted to him: none the less the consideration of the highest good offended always pricked and spurred him, so that he grieved more and more and, though always imperfectly, more often made recompense for the greatness of the divine offense. Contrition therefore has place in perfect men, as St. Thomas teaches, 3rd part, q. 84, art. 8, ad primum. If the most learned Master F. Bartholomew de Medina had attentively considered all these things, in the 3rd part, q. 1, art. 2, and in 1. 2., q. 114, art. 6, perhaps he would not so quickly have departed from the opinion of St. Thomas, nor so rashly gone to excess in his censure against those who embrace it. But indulgence must be shown to a man otherwise most learned, and most diligent in collecting the writings of others for the common utility.