Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, and is certain according to faith, as is clear from very many testimonies of Scripture. But the ground is evident, because in God there is will, therefore also love. St. Thomas proves this consequence in the article, with an elegant discourse. See the text of the article.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS TO BE NOTED in this article that the name love, or to love, is said properly of God. For although at the outset such terms were imposed to signify a passion of the sensitive appetite, nevertheless, now by the usage of the wise, these terms have been transferred to signify the first and immediate act of the will, by which it is adapted to its object, and thus they are properly found in the angels and in God. See St. Dionysius, 4th chapter, De Divin. Nomin. and St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 25. 26. and 27. and Plato in the Dialogue whose title is Symposium, or Convivium.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first conclusion is affirmative and certain from the Sacred Letters, Wis. 11: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. And the ground is: because the will of God is the cause of all existing things: therefore He communicates to all some good, which is to love them.

Second conclusion: Nothing forbids one and the same thing to be loved in one respect, and held in hatred in another respect; and thus God loves the sinner according to nature, and holds his sin in hatred, as is said in Wis. 14: The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: on the part of the act of the divine will, He does not love one more, that is, more intensely, than another. The ground is: because He loves all things by one most simple act.

Second conclusion: on the part of the good which one wills for the beloved, God loves certain things more than others, insofar as He wills a greater good for one than for another.

COMMENTARY.

BOTH conclusions are most certain according to faith. As it is certain that God is pure act, and that creatures are not equally good, especially in the being of grace, according to which not all are equally just, as that worst Luther asserted, nor are they predestined to equal glory.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion of the article is affirmative.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING the solution to the first, it is to be noted that although God loved Christ the Lord more than the whole universe, and would love the life of Christ more than the whole universe, on account of the union of the humanity to the Word, nevertheless He gave Him death for the salvation of the human race. Because from this very fact He acquired for Christ greater glory and honor than if He had not — indeed not before God, with whom He was always equally blessed, and held in equal honor, but before intellectual creatures — insofar as He merited that His name be known, which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow. From which it follows that the predestination of Christ regards not only the means by which man was to be elevated to this, that he be a son of God, and to the most excellent fruition of God; but also His predestination was the preparation of all the means by which He was to be the glorious victor and Redeemer of the human race through the sacrifice of His Body, most acceptable to God. From which again it follows that if Adam had not sinned, there would not be such a predestination of Christ; rather the permission of his sin was an effect of the predestination of Christ. And so is understood that saying of St. Gregory, in the blessing of the Paschal candle: O truly necessary sin of Adam, which was destroyed by the death of Christ; that is, the permission of the sin was necessary and good, so that Christ the Lord be the Redeemer. To which office He was predestined by certain means destined from eternity, one of which was the permission of Adam's sin. The solution to the 3rd is to be noted; where St. Thomas solves most modestly the doubt whether Peter was holier than John the Evangelist, and finally concludes that to wish to judge this seems presumptuous. Because, as is said in Prov. 16, the Lord is the weigher of spirits.

It is to be noted, concerning the solution to the 4th, that the doctrine of St. Thomas is excellent, whether God loves the innocent more than the penitent. And he answers that whether they be innocent or penitent, those are better and more beloved who have more of grace and charity. But, other things equal, innocence is more worthy and more beloved than penitence. On which matter see more fully St. Thomas, in 3., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 5.

CONCERNING the solution to the fifth it is doubted whether God loves a just man who is foreknown more than a predestined sinner. It is argued first, and proved, that God loves a predestined sinner more than a just man who is foreknown. God loves every predestined person more than a non-predestined or foreknown one; but this sinner is predestined: therefore God loves this predestined sinner more than a just man who is foreknown. Secondly. God wills a greater good for this predestined sinner than for a foreknown just man: therefore He loves him more. The consequence is clear from article 3; the antecedent is proved, because He wills beatitude for him, which is the greatest good.

But, for the other side, it is argued first from that of Prov. 8: I love them that love me. But this sinner does not love God: therefore he is not loved by God. Secondly. To the sinner in fact no good of grace is communicated, but only the gift of nature; for let us suppose that he is an unbelieving sinner, whereas in the just man there is in fact both the good of nature and the good of grace: therefore a greater good is communicated to him by God, and consequently he is loved more by God. Thirdly. The just man, simply speaking, loves God more than the sinner, however much the latter be predestined: therefore God loves the just man more than any sinner. And it is confirmed: because the just man through the grace which he has is an adoptive son of God, and a partaker of the divine nature; but the sinner is a son of the devil by imitation, simply speaking: therefore God loves the just man more, notwithstanding that he be foreknown, than the sinner, notwithstanding that he be predestined.

For the solution of this difficulty, it is to be noted from St. Augustine, tract. 110 On John, on that verse: And thou hast loved them, as thou hast also loved me; where he says that the love with which God loves is incomprehensible, nor is it mutable. For it is not from the time when we were reconciled to him through the Blood of his Son that he began to love us, but he loved us before the foundation of the world, that we might also be his sons with his Only-begotten. It is to be noted secondly that, although that love of God is eternal and immutable, nevertheless the good which through it is communicated to the creature is communicated in time, and is mutable, according to being and non-being, more and less. From which it follows that, since a greater or lesser love of God regards a greater or lesser good which is communicated to the creature, it is necessary that it also regard the time when that good is to be communicated: since it is not from eternity, nor is it always immutably communicated, and this is what St. Thomas teaches expressly in this article, in the solution to the 5th.

These things posited, the first conclusion is: absolutely and simply speaking this is true, God loves any predestined person more than any non-predestined person. The reason is: because in this proposition it is signified that God by His love regards the good which in time is communicated to the predestined person, namely perseverance in grace unto the end; and this good, in comparison with the good which is communicated to others not predestined, is always greater. Whence, absolutely speaking, He loves the predestined more than the non-predestined.

Second conclusion: absolutely also and simply this is true, God loves any just man more than any sinner. And it is proved: for absolutely speaking it is signified in that proposition that God by His love regards the just man for the time in which he is just, and the sinner for the time in which he is a sinner; and for that time He rather holds the sinner in hatred than loves him. Whence it is an abusive locution to say, God loves the just man more than the sinner, just as we say, God is better than the devil. And the arguments made for the other side prove this conclusion: and the opposite of this conclusion seems to savor of the error condemned in the Council of Constance, Session 15, that a predestined person is never a member of the devil. Since therefore he is truly an enemy and hateful to God while he is in mortal sin, it follows that for that time he is not loved more than the just man, who otherwise is foreknown.

Third conclusion. This proposition, God loves a predestined sinner more than a foreknown just man, is not to be conceded without a distinction. For if in it be signified that the love of God is referred to the time in which someone is just, even if otherwise he be foreknown; and to the time in which another is a sinner, even if otherwise he be predestined, that proposition is false and erroneous, because, for that time, he who is just is a living member of Christ, and the other is a member of the devil. But if the divine love be referred to the last term of the life of the predestined person himself, even if he be now a sinner, the proposition is true. Because the divine will does a greater good for that time for the predestined sinner than for the foreknown just man. But because according to the form of that proposition it seems that the word loves more is carried over the sinner, as though for that time he were loved more, therefore that proposition seems to be absolutely denied. Nor do I reckon it safe to utter such a proposition before the people, because they are immediately scandalized, thinking that a predestined person, whatever he does, never falls from grace. Especially if inept examples be brought forward, as some are wont to adduce such an example: that just as a mother loves her own son clothed in dirty garments more than the son of a maidservant, elegantly and beautifully dressed and clothed: so God always loves the predestined more, however foul and unclean with sins, than the foreknown, however just. Which example certainly savors much of the heresy condemned in the Council of Constance, in the place above. To the arguments for the former side it is answered that they prove only the first conclusion.