Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, and is clear from art. 3. The ground is: because God wills things other than Himself, and not from necessity; therefore, with respect to them, He has free will.

COMMENTARY.

THE principal doubt in this article is concerning the conclusion of St. Thomas, whether according to faith, and according to natural reason, it must necessarily be asserted that free will, properly and without metaphor, is in God. So entirely that God Himself is the master of His own actions, and can not have an action which He has, and have one which He does not have. It is argued first, for the negative side. In God there is not, properly speaking, counsel: therefore neither free will. The consequence is clear: because the deliberation by which one deliberates some means to be determined to an end proceeds from a comparison of the means which can be chosen for the end. But the antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, 1. 2., q. 14, art. 1, and from St. Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 5, cap. 5, who assert that counsel presupposes an inquiry into the means, and ignorance of the certain means for the attainment of the end. And St. Thomas says that the inquiry of reason in doubtful and uncertain matters is called counsel; but such an imperfection cannot be in God; therefore neither counsel. Secondly. Everyone who has free will is, from his nature, indifferent to deliberating something or not deliberating, to exercising some act or not exercising it: but this indifference is repugnant to God, whose property it is always to have Himself in the same way, nor to be able to have Himself otherwise than He has Himself: therefore free will is repugnant to God. But if someone answers that the indifference of free will is not in God with respect to any divine act, but extrinsically, through the respect to the being or non-being of the creature; it is rejoined, on the contrary: if in this way there were indifference in God according to the respect to creatures, either it is with respect to those which are not, nor were, nor will be, or it is with respect to those which coexist with eternity in some difference of their time; but neither of these can be: therefore neither is that indifference possible. I prove the minor, because with respect to the creatures which coexist with eternity the divine will is not indifferent, but willed determinately that they be. Similarly with respect to those which do not coexist with eternity, there is no indifference: because from eternity God willed those things not to be; therefore there is no respect of the divine will that is indifferent with respect to creatures, and consequently free will is repugnant to God. Thirdly. If in God there is free will, it follows that God is not altogether immutable, but that He can, absolutely speaking, have Himself otherwise than He now has Himself in Himself: the consequent is against that of James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration: therefore. For the force of this argument, take note that man and the angel are said in their own way to be immutable, or not to be changed, as regards free will. Man indeed is not said to be viciously mutable when he changes counsel from new circumstances arising, but in truth the will of man can be changed, and is changed, when after he willed something to be done, without any wholly new circumstance, he now wills it not to be done, whether that change be vicious or studious. But the angel is not mutable in that way, on account of the perfection of his nature, but after he has chosen something he cannot choose the opposite. Nevertheless, in the angel mutability in free will is considered insofar as he could not have had the election which he has, and consequently could have had himself otherwise in himself than he now has himself. But in God, says James, there is no change, nor shadow of alteration, because the divine will could not not have every action which it has in itself from eternity, but as it now is in itself, so from necessity of nature it must have itself. Now the sequel is proved: for if in God there is free will, so that He can do things otherwise than He does, it is necessary that in the divine will, which is the cause of things, some difference be possible, and that it could have had itself otherwise in itself than it now has itself. The sequel is proved: since by natural reason it seems manifest that, a total cause having itself in a wholly same way and invariably, and not impedable or modifiable by anything extrinsic, it is necessary that the same effect always be produced by it, and that which is not produced cannot be produced: therefore it does not seem intelligible that, no change having been made in the divine will, the world be made from nothing; and that by the same will, having itself in the same way, the world not be made. Therefore that diversity of effects, namely, the world is made from nothing, and the world is not made from nothing, must be referred to some variety possible in the cause, which is the divine will; and consequently the divine will would have had itself otherwise, if it had not created, than it now has itself, when it willed to create. Fourthly. In the demons there is no liberty in the act of the will with respect to the object of pride, because the angels immutably adhere to the object which they once willed, and this on account of the perfection of the angelic nature: therefore neither is there liberty in God with respect to those things which He willed from eternity. The consequence is clear: because God is much more immutable than the angel. But the antecedent is proved: because if the angel now operated freely, his fault would always grow, and consequently the punishment due would grow forever, without any term. Fifthly and lastly. For Aristotle, who is said to be a monster of nature, denied that the first cause operates freely, and asserted that it moves from necessity of nature, just as it moves all things. Therefore according to natural reason it is repugnant, or at least cannot be gathered, that free will is in God. The antecedent is clear from 8. Physic., tex. 7 and 8, where he says that if the first mover did not move before, it was necessary for it to move afterwards, that the impediment by which it was prevented be removed. There he seems to suppose that God acts from necessity of nature, otherwise that reason of his would be frivolous. For it could be answered that the first mover is free, and therefore could have not moved, not on account of an impediment, but because it did not will to move. And in the same place, text 15, he says it is absurd that God did not make the world from eternity. Moreover, lib. 1 De Caelo, cap. 10 and following, he says that the heaven is unbegotten and incorruptible. But if Aristotle had understood that God is a free efficient cause with respect to the heaven, he would assert that the heaven can be corrupted and the world too: therefore. And it is confirmed especially because Aristotle was ignorant of production from nothing: therefore according to his doctrine it was necessary that something besides God be eternal, namely, prime matter, from which corruptible species are made, and the intelligences themselves, which are not made from matter: and finally, 9. Metaphy., tex. 17, and lib. 12, tex. 30, he says that the heaven cannot not be moved, and that God and the intelligences do not have the power not to move, but are always actually moving.

For the decision of this difficulty we must suppose, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in 1. 2., q. 14, art. 1, to the second, that those things which are said of God are to be taken without every defect which is found in us. Which indeed is to be understood not only of those things which are said of God eminently, but also formally. As, for example, knowledge in us is of conclusions through discourse from causes into effects; but knowledge, said of God, signifies certitude about all effects in the first cause, without any discourse. There is also an example in the angels, in whom knowledge is a quality superadded to the angelic intellect: but in God it is substance. Take note secondly, with Cajetan, in that place, that counsel in us signifies a completed inquiry, that is, up to judgment inclusively, because the inquiry itself without judgment is not counsel, except inchoatively. Thus in counsel, as its proper specific account, the very term of the inquiry is to be considered. But the inquiry itself and the practical discourse are required on account of our imperfection.

These things supposed, let the first conclusion be: Counsel formally and properly, without metaphor, is in God. It is proved first: because in God there is posited properly and formally knowledge without metaphor, and similarly there is posited in God prudence properly and formally: therefore also counsel. The antecedent is admitted by all, both Metaphysicians and Theologians. The consequence is proved: because just as knowledge, although it is defined by us as an acquired habit through demonstration, nevertheless according to the proper and specific account of knowledge, inasmuch as it is knowledge, is understood by us to be a certain power of knowing effects in their cause: so also counsel, although in us it prerequires inquiry, nevertheless according to its proper account is a practical judgment about some means which in itself does not have a necessary connection with the end; but such a judgment is no more repugnant to God than the judgment of knowledge, which is found properly and formally in God, because its specific account does not necessarily require discourse, or the account of a habit, or of a quality accidental to substance. It is proved secondly: because according to the common doctrine of St. Augustine, those things which are said in the Sacred Letters, which can be understood without metaphor, ought to be understood according to the propriety of speech: but counsel is often found in the Sacred Letters said of God, as for example to the Ephesians, 1: Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will: therefore just as will is posited in God properly and formally, so also counsel must properly be asserted to be in God, all imperfections being removed which belong to counsel according to the mode of existing in a rational creature.

Second conclusion: In God there is truly and properly and formally free will, as wisdom and knowledge. This conclusion is certain, both from the Sacred Letters and also from natural reason. It is proved, then, first from the preceding conclusion. In God there is counsel properly: therefore also free will. The consequence is proved: because counsel is about a means which in itself does not have a necessary connection with the end, and nevertheless is judged to be ordainable and to be ordained to the end; but free will is nothing other than, as it is defined by Theologians, the faculty of reason and will toward either: therefore about the means, about which counsel is, there is freedom of choice to choose it or not to choose it. For otherwise, if it is necessarily willed, neither will there be counsel about it. It is proved secondly by the reason of St. Thomas, in this article: God wills things other than Himself, and not from necessity of nature: therefore, with respect to them, He has free will. The major is manifest, because since God is the ultimate end, and naturally wills the ultimate end, it necessarily follows that if there are any other things in the nature of things besides God, they are for the sake of the ultimate end. But the minor is proved. Because the goodness of God, which is the ultimate end, is by itself alone most perfect, since it is to-be itself through essence: therefore the divine will wills no other good from necessity of its nature. The consequence is plain: because the necessity of the will, with respect to means, arises from nowhere else than from the fact that the attainment of the end depends on those means, in some genus of cause: therefore since the attainment of that divine end depends in no way on any means, it follows manifestly that the divine will does not will anything other than Himself from necessity. It is proved thirdly: in us there is free will, as must be held according to faith, and natural reason dictates, and experience testifies. therefore also in God there is free will. This consequence is proved: because when man is moved freely by his own action, he is moved either by himself, as by a first mover, or by God; if by himself, therefore there is given some motion in the creature which is not reduced to God, as to the first mover and mover, on whose motion the creature which operates, moving itself, depends; and consequently God will not be master of the free will of man, which would be blasphemous. But if you say that he is moved by God, as by a first mover, not however as by a free mover but by one moving from necessity of nature: on the contrary, it follows that man is not moved freely. The sequel is proved: because it follows well, God moves my will, therefore my will is moved by God. Again: therefore if the antecedent is necessary from necessity of nature, my will will not be moved freely; since it is impossible that God move me, and that my will not be moved. Where then will the liberty of action be? since the consequence from the nature of the thing is necessary. The antecedent also is granted to be absolutely necessary: therefore my liberty is altogether destroyed. But perhaps some clever fellow will answer that an equal argument can be made even if God is a free mover through His free will. For such an argument will be made: God by His will, although free, yet efficacious, moves me: therefore I am moved. The consequence indeed is necessary, but the antecedent is necessary by supposition: therefore my will, the truth of the antecedent standing, cannot not be moved, therefore is not moved freely; since God moves the will no less efficaciously by His free will than if He moved from necessity of nature. To this objection the last consequence must be denied. And the reason is. Because although that antecedent, God moves my will, has the necessity of supposition in the composite sense, that is, the supposition that He freely wills to move, it is necessary that it be verified at the same time that He moves. Nevertheless, He moves freely, because simply He can not move; for He can will not to move: yet my liberty is not thereby destroyed, but rather perfected: because from the divine act, freely, efficaciously and sweetly moving, my will itself participates in liberty and is moved freely. But enough has been said of these things in article eight. Fourthly the conclusion is proved: that something is in act and something in potency, it is necessary that, as often as it has been in act, it be moved by another; but if God operated from necessity of nature, our will could not sometimes be in act and sometimes in potency: therefore God operates from free will. The minor is proved: since our free will cannot be efficaciously moved by any other than by God: but if God moves from necessity of nature, no reason can be assigned why the will now goes forth into act and now remains in potency. But now at last the conclusion is proved by a theological and necessary reason. And I lay as a foundation the excellent testimony of the Apostle to the Romans 1: The invisible things (he says) of himself from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen, his eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable; because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. In which apostolic testimony two things are to be weighed by us, from which we shall construct a double reason. The one is, how the Apostle testifies that from the perfections of creatures the divine perfections can be investigated and demonstrated. There is therefore the argument: in ourselves we experience free will, which is the greatest perfection: therefore in God there is free will. Nor does it avail to answer that free will is not a perfection simply: because, as we have already shown, the faculty and power of operating freely includes formally no imperfection according to its proper account, any more than knowledge or wisdom. But it is further confirmed: because man through the faculty of free will has the power of mastering other things, and of ordering them, as it shall have pleased him, to the end intended by him. Since therefore God is most of all the Master of those things which exist outside Himself, and has disposed and ordered all things for the sake of Himself, as for the ultimate end, as is had in Proverbs 16, it is necessary that God be most free. And it is confirmed from what we read in Gen. 1: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may preside over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the whole earth, and every creeping thing that moves on the earth. And God created man to his own image, to the image of God he created him. In which testimony all the doctors, especially the scholastics, say that man was made to the image of God most of all in this, that through free will he acts freely, as judge and master of his own actions. Whence he can also govern the rest, referring them to himself, and himself to God, as to the prototype, to whose likeness he was formed. For it must be considered that the Divine Essence itself is the most excellent prototype, which all created things imitate according to their measure. For all things have their being from the Divine Essence, which is through itself, and those which live receive life from it, which is through itself life. But no creature, except the rational and intellectual, is said to be made to the image and likeness of God, because the best that is understood to be of honor in God is intellect and will, and the providence and judgment of all things, which is signified to us by the very name of God, which among the Greeks is taken from providence. But this is much more insinuated in the cited place of Genesis. Where in the Hebrew tongue, in which the text was originally written, it is said: And Elohim created, that is, judge or judges, Adam in his image. In the image of Elohim he created him. As if he said, in the image of a judge. For man was created to be a certain judge, as it were God's vicar on earth, that concerning his own actions according to the natural and divine law implanted in him he might dispose by his own judgment, and refer himself with all other things to the supreme judge. We have therefore that from the free will of man the free will in God is gathered, and that the free will of God influences and conserves liberty in our will, and moves efficaciously and sweetly to free actions. Now the other, which we promised was to be weighed in the Apostle's testimony, presses more. For the Apostle says, because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. From which words it is gathered by necessary consequence that the Apostle speaks of the knowledge which men had of God from the power of natural light. For he says, because when they knew God, that is, the author and governor of the world, and he accuses them of having sinned, because they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. But if God does not freely move and govern all things, and does not look after and provide for human affairs, no thanks are due to him. For thanks are given to one who confers a benefit freely and gratis. For we do not give thanks to the celestial bodies, although we have very much convenience from their influxes. Nor again do we give thanks to God Himself on account of those things which He operates from necessity of nature; for example, we do not give thanks because He begets a Son equal to Himself, but we give thanks because He deigned freely to reveal to us the eternal generation, and sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that he who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life. See in what way, from the Sacred Letters, we have efficaciously concluded that by natural reason it can be known that free will is in God: since, as the Apostle testifies, natural reason dictates that God is to be glorified by us and great thanks given to Him for benefits received. But now I think I will do a great service in the interest of Theologians, while from the solutions of the arguments which I have objected to the contrary, I shall show in what the proper account of a free action consists.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that St. Thomas and Gregory speak of counsel according to the conditions which it has in us: yet the proper account of counsel consists in the elective judgment of some means, in order to the end. Which means, according to its proper nature, does not have a necessary connection with the end, but rather without it the attainment of the end could stand. But it sometimes happens, on account of men's ignorance, to inquire into means and compare them among themselves, by which they may absolutely attain the end they will; whereas nevertheless it often happens that the means necessary from its nature for attaining the intended end is unique, which if they had known beforehand, they would in no way consult. But God knows best that for the attainment of His end, which is the object of the divine goodness, no means is necessary, or that any contributes to a better attainment of the end; but He works all things according to the counsel of His will, that is, according to a voluntary and free counsel. For it is a Hebrew phrase, that the genitive supplies the place of a denominative and superlative, according to that: He hath translated us into the kingdom of the son of his love, that is, of his most beloved son. So it is said, the counsel of his will, that is, a most voluntary and free counsel. To the second, that we may answer, it is to be noted that 'indifferent', or indifference, can be understood in two ways. In one way negatively, that is, not differing, not determined, not a difference and not a determination. In the other way privatively, so that that is called indifferent which is apt to be determined, and is not yet determined, but still remains in potency to either. Like a man who has not yet resolved to take a wife, nor indeed resolved not to take one. It must be said therefore to the argument that indifference, understood in the former way, is not repugnant to God in this sense, that from His nature and from His own substance He does not have a determination to will something outside Himself. But if indifference be understood in the second way, it is repugnant to God, because God was never suspended concerning things possible and producible by Himself, but whatever He made in time, from eternity He willed and deliberated that it be in time, and whatever He did not make nor is going to make in time, from eternity He resolved not to make. And so it is verified that in God there is no indifference understood privatively. But now let us begin to gather some necessary property of free will. For indifference to either is not required privatively, namely, that there be an aptitude to either, and there not be a determination to one. For this happens in us, on account of the imperfection of free will. But the operation of free will is more perfect when such indifference is in the faculty of free will negatively, in this sense, that as far as it is from the nature of the one deliberating, there is not found in him a determination to one. Whence it was best answered when the argument was proposed. For surely all that indifference, if it be considered privatively, must be referred to the being or non-being of the creature. Indeed even if indifference be considered negatively, it is not to be posited in God with respect to any divine act, as it is in God, but is posited only in order to the extrinsic respect to the being or non-being of the creature. And to the rejoinder of the argument it is answered that that indifference, as it is posited in God by us, can be compared to all creatures even possible ones, whether they coexist or do not coexist with eternity. For to the production of no creature is the divine will determined from its nature, because no creature has a necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the proper object of the divine will. But the divine will was never, nor can be, as it were suspended concerning any creature, but from eternity immutably willed and wills whatever it wills to be done; and immutably does not will whatever it does not will to be done. Whence it is gathered that mutability does not pertain to the proper account of free will. To the third, I deny the sequel. To the proof it is answered that that maxim, celebrated among philosophers, 'a total cause having itself in the same way etc.', is verified in created causes, which have a limited and finite mode of being and operating, but not in the first cause of all things, which, since it is unlimited and infinite to-be itself, contains in itself the power of operating or not operating, without the possibility of having itself otherwise in itself, but operates otherwise than it operated before through the sole mutability of the effect. It must be granted therefore that the divine will would not have had itself otherwise in itself, if it had not willed to create the world, than it has itself now when it willed to create. But the world itself has itself much otherwise now when it actually receives being from Him and is really referred to Him as to the first efficient cause. But if it had not been created, it would not be referred to God, except by a relation of reason. I freely confess that it is difficult for us to understand the free efficiency of the divine will with such great and ineffable immutability. Nevertheless from those things which we know naturally, we can in some way be led by the hand to some understanding of such majesty. For we see that two contraries cannot convene in the same material subject, and nevertheless the single power of sight receives the likeness of white and of black, without its own variety. Then the distinct objects of the five senses, proper to each and mutually incommunicable, one sense, which is called common, knows their differences under one simple likeness. And finally, the intellect perceives the difference of many things in a simpler and more immutable way, in a more simple likeness. Which discourse Theologians are accustomed to make concerning the angels themselves: therefore, speaking consequently, it is no wonder if the divine purity and majesty, whose intellect and will are a simple substance, and whose substance is simple and infinite being, could, without any shadow of mutability, not create the world which it created; having itself in the same way creating the world, as it would have itself not creating. To the fourth it is answered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, in 1. p., q. 64, art. 2, to the third, that there still remains in the devil the sin with which he first sinned as regards the appetite; although it does not remain as regards this, that he believes he can obtain what he desires. As if someone believes he can commit homicide, and wills to do it, and afterwards the power is taken from him, nevertheless the will of homicide can remain in him, so that he wills to have done it, or wills to do it if he could. So he (says). And in the solution to the first he had said that the good and the bad angels have free will, but according to the mode and condition of their nature. We have therefore from the doctrine of St. Thomas that it is not repugnant for an act to be free and to be immutable, on account of the perfection of the angelic nature. I said immutable as regards this, that the angel can choose the opposite, not however as regards this, that he can suspend a free action: for this is possible to the angel, and to that extent he is mutable and measurable by time. To the argument therefore it is answered that the angel still sins the sin of pride which he sinned from the beginning, and whether he meanwhile suspends the act of pride or does not suspend it, which to me is more probable, and will be explained below, in q. 64; yet there is still in that act of sin a liberty, although he adheres immutably, and immutably chooses what he once chose. But to what was inferred in the argument as unfitting, that, the devil's fault growing, the punishment too would grow forever, St. Thomas answers in 2. Senten., dist. 7, q. 1, art. 2, to the fifth, that certain say that the fault and punishment of the demons can grow up to the day of judgment. But this does not seem to be so: because since afterwards they are not in the state of the way, as we now speak of the state of the way, so neither can they be changed for the worse. Whence it must be said that their fault or pride is said to grow not as regards the intensification of malice, but as regards the multiplicity of the act. So also the essential punishment does not grow, but the accidental, which is from the multitude of the damned, as is also the case with the reward of the good angels. To the fifth, from the opinion of Aristotle, it is answered that Aristotle is not to be esteemed so highly that we assert him to have been in all things an infallible rule of natural reason; indeed he himself is slippery enough in his doctrine concerning the immortality of souls, and then concerning the assertion of free will in God. In other places, besides those cited, he seems to think the opposite. As, for example, 4. Topic., cap. 5 he says: Much more do God and men do the things they do not do; and lib. 1 Ethic., cap. 5 he asserts that those are most dear to God who are truly wise, and that he confers very many benefits on them; and 8. Ethic., cap. 7 he teaches that God has friendship toward men, not indeed as between equals, but from supereminence. All of which cannot be true unless God has free will.

But now at last, from the aforesaid assertion of the divine free will, let the novice Theologian gather for himself excellent documents, by which he can dissolve very many theological difficulties which in public disputations are wont to torment some men vehemently. The first document is well enough received, that the liberty of will does not consist in this, that it is able to sin. For although from the fact that someone sins, or can sin, we rightly gather that he has the faculty of free will: yet conversely it does not follow, this will is free, therefore it can sin. For behold, God Himself is most free, and yet He is far from the possibility of sinning. Similarly Christ the Lord, as man, is impeccable, if the particle as be taken not reduplicatively, as the dialecticians say, for thus the proposition Christ, as man, is impeccable would be false: because this is false, which is included in it, every man is impeccable. But if the term as be taken specifically, so that the sense be that Christ through humanity, or the human will, cannot sin, the proposition is true, because such a sin would be attributed to the divine Supposit: and nevertheless, through the human will, He is free, and can merit. The ground of this document is very frequent in the doctrine of Augustine. For to be able to sin is not a power, but an infirmity of free will. Wherefore if through the grace of God a man is made sound from this infirmity, his liberty is in no way destroyed, but perfected. As happened in the Blessed Virgin through the fullness of sanctifying grace, so that she could not even sin venially, and it is the case in all confirmed in grace, that they can no longer sin mortally: and nevertheless they remain free and can merit in the observance of the precepts, as we shall explain more fully later.

Let the second document be: It is not repugnant to the liberty of will concerning means, indeed it is a greater perfection of it, that the will itself be naturally and necessarily inclined to the ultimate end, or also through the grace of God and supernatural gifts be determined as it were naturally to the ultimate end: indeed the liberty concerning means, which do not have a necessary connection with the end, will be so much more perfect, the more the will itself has been determined concerning the end. Behold an example in the divine Will, which necessarily and naturally loves the supreme good; and nevertheless is most perfectly free with respect to all creatures which are ordered to the ultimate end, since they do not have a necessary connection with it. Similarly the will of man is naturally determined to the good in common, as regards the specification of the act; and nevertheless is free as regards the specification of the act, with respect to certain means which do not have a necessary connection with the good in common, which is the object of the will. Indeed even if the will, as regards the exercise of the act, were naturally determined to willing the good in common, it would nevertheless remain free with respect to such means, but not with respect to those which have a necessary and intrinsic connection, from their nature, with the object of the will, as to-be and to live have a necessary connection with the good which is desired. The third document, and most of all to be observed, is that the liberty, the act of the will, which formally exists in it, arises from the root of an act of the intellect, namely from such an act and judgment of the intellect. For the intellect proposes to the will an object which is of itself indifferent to the attainment of the object of the will, nor has a necessary connection with it; and nevertheless judges that it is ordainable to the end of the will, either to the attainment of it, or to participating some goodness from the end; and then judges that it be ordained to the end, and immediately the will chooses, and in such a choice it is formally free. Which liberty arises, as from a root, from the aforesaid judgment of the intellect. And it is to be observed, by the way, that we place indifference in the very object judged, but it is not necessary that we understand indifference to be in the intellect itself or in its act: as we have already said that it is not found in the divine intellect. We have therefore that it is necessary for the liberty of the act of the will that the indifference of the means to be chosen be judged by the intellect, and that at the same time such a means be judged to be determinable to the end. Which indeed is a practical judgment, and necessarily conjoined with the choice of the will as the efficacious root from which the actual liberty of the one operating through the will originates. Let those observe this document vehemently who do not wish to err in dissolving the questions concerning merit and the ground of meriting: which I show in no other way than from the aforesaid. For God is most free, as has already been defined, and nevertheless in Him no other account of liberty is found with respect to those things which He wills outside Himself, except that He judges them not to have a necessary connection with the end, but to be in themselves indifferent; yet He judges them to be ordainable to the end, and judges that they are to be ordained. And this is the reason why to will to ordain is free. See therefore, Theologian, whether we do an injury to our free will, when we gather that the rational and intellectual creature will be so much more free in its operation, the more its operation is freely assimilated to the divine operation, to whose image and likeness, according to intellect and will, it was made? But you say: so the matter stands. Now therefore attend to the corollaries, which we gather by evident consequence from the aforesaid.

The first is: As often as an act of the will arises from the aforesaid root of judgment, it will always be free. Whence again I gather: Whatever has preceded or will accompany or will supervene upon an act of the will, if it does not take away that judgment concerning the means with respect to the end, will not destroy the liberty of the operation. This consequence is evident, because the definition of a free act standing, the act must be free. Now therefore approach gradually to the more difficult things. There precedes indeed our free operation the eternal and immutable counsel of the divine will, or the infallible predefinition of divine providence, which has predefined every good free operation, indeed even every operation, inasmuch as it is good and is exercised about good. But because God Himself, by His providence and immutable counsel, does not bind nor destroy our judgment, by which we judge the indifference of the means, and its ordainability, and that it is to be ordained to the end, He does not destroy the liberty of our operation either, but rather efficaciously effects, fosters and conserves it. See how with the infallible and efficacious divine Providence the liberty of our operation stands, indeed cannot stand without it.

Now indeed, concerning the graces of God and the efficacious divine aids, and the precepts, you will understand more plainly in what way they are not opposed to the liberty of our will, but rather favor it. The ground is evident, if you do not wish to deny the aforesaid document, which you have necessarily granted. For all these are so far from perturbing or binding the judgment of our reason that it cannot in the aforesaid way judge the indifference of the object, that they rather illuminate and perfect it, and transfer it to the likeness of God. Behold, says the Prophet, Psal. 18: The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. And when again he asks: Direct my steps in thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved, does he ask that liberty be taken away from him by the divine aid? Not indeed, but rather he implores that it be perfected in the observance of the commandments. Similarly, when the bride asks: Draw me, we will run after thee, does she pray for efficacious aid so that she may not walk with her own steps, that is, with free affections? Indeed she longs for this, that she may run more freely and swiftly. Far be it, therefore, from the catholic and pious Theologian, that, in defending the liberty of will, he diminish the efficacy of divine Providence and divine grace, and set apart the obligation of the divine precept, so as to assert the liberty of operating in those confirmed in grace.

Finally let us gather that, among all intellectual creatures, the most perfect liberty of operating was in the soul of Christ the Lord: since it is most of all assimilated to the divine liberty above all others. First indeed because through the hypostatic union it was made impeccable: since, since it existed in the nature of things with no other personality than the personality of the Word, if the soul of Christ should sin, the sin would be reflected upon the Word itself. Then, because Christ the Lord Himself, by the light of glory, beheld openly as a most excellent exemplar the predefinition of divine providence concerning Himself and His operations, and the precept of dying. As it was said to Moses: Look, and do according to the pattern which was shown to thee on the mount, Exodus 25. All of which perfected the liberty of His will, and illuminated the practical judgment of the intellect, by which Christ judged more certainly and evidently the indifference of the means to the end, and their ordainability together with the divine ordination or preordination. Whence even Christ the Lord Himself, subordinated to the same, ordained those same things to the ultimate end from the immense charity by which He was borne necessarily to that ultimate end. And in this also He was assimilated to God, who loves Himself necessarily, but us freely. So also the soul of Christ the Lord loves God Himself necessarily, and all the means which have a necessary and intrinsic connection with the attainment of that end, namely with the beatific vision of the soul of Christ, and thus it wills the light of glory, its own intellect, and its own being. But the rest, which do not have from within a necessary connection with the attainment of the end, although it had them from the supposition of a precept, it willed freely. With this doctrine is consonant what we read in Psalm 39, which is understood literally of Christ, as the Apostle testifies, at Heb. 10: in the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will. Behold, the divine predefinition preceded, and the immutability of the divine will, which was predefined and willed, what Christ should do. Then it follows, My God willed. Behold a free act of the soul of Christ subordinated to God, by which it willed to obey unto death, embracing with immense affection, but free, the law of dying the death of the cross, from the love of God. And this is what it says, And thy law in the midst of my heart. From these things finally it follows how vehemently and dangerously he would be deceived who should assert that Christ the Lord neither merited, nor could merit, in that He obeyed the precept of dying, unless He willed to obey more intensely than He was bound to from the obligation of the precept. Which some wished to confirm by such a reason, because they say it cannot be understood how, the precept of dying standing, the soul of Christ freely willed to die, which, the precept standing, could not not will to die: therefore in order to merit through the act of obedience, one must assert in the act itself an intensity which was not enjoined under the precept. This reason certainly is ridiculous, and proceeds freely enough from ignorance of the definition of a free act, and seems to us unworthy to be refuted in more words after the aforesaid documents, nor is it for this place and time to examine to a nicety, and to show, how much peril lies hidden in that assertion, or certainly, as I might better say, lies open. I indeed would not dare to affirm without danger to myself that that opinion is in any way probable. But of this matter we shall say more, more opportunely, with the Lord favoring us, without whom nothing was made. So much for this most grave doubt, under the correction of the Roman Church.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly concerning this article, whether now, in fact, there is in God a real power to will that Antichrist not be going to be? Cajetan, above, art. 7, to the 4th, holds that in God there is now no such real power. And he proves it first, because a power to opposites posits mutability in that in which it is, as Aristotle says, 9. Metaphysic.; but God is altogether immutable; therefore He does not have a power to opposites.

Secondly. If God can now will that Antichrist not be, therefore He can be changed. The consequence is proved: because He has already now willed that Antichrist be, therefore He would cease to will what He willed, and this is to be changed. And finally, St. Thomas himself, in the place above, and 1. Cont. Gent., cap. 82, seems to hold this opinion. Nevertheless Cajetan concedes that this proposition, God can will that Antichrist not be, if the word 'can' be taken absolutely, is true. But Scotus holds the opposite opinion in 1. dist. 39: which opinion many of the modern Theologians follow, even Thomists. And it is proved first, because God can make that Antichrist not be:

therefore He can will it. I prove the antecedent: because when God is about to create the soul of Antichrist, He will create it freely and not from necessity of nature: therefore He can make that it not be. Secondly. God is most perfectly free with respect to all other things outside Himself: therefore He has a true and real power to either. The consequence is clear from the definition of free will. Finally, before God produced the world, I ask, did He have the real power of not producing it, or did He not have it? If the former, therefore He simply now has the real power of not producing Antichrist; if the latter, therefore He produced the world from necessity and not freely. The consequence is clear: because from eternity He did not have the power of not producing it.

For the solution of this difficulty, which seems to us a question about a name, it must be distinguished, when it is asked whether there is now in God a real power of not producing Antichrist, and of willing the opposite of what He willed. For if that particle 'now' makes a composite sense with two opposites, that is, the supposition and truth of one opposite being made, the other opposite also be verified, the answer must be in the negative, that there is no such power in God, nor can there be. But if that particle 'now' makes a composition of one opposite with the power of doing the other, it would be blasphemous to deny that God now has the real power of making that Antichrist not be, and of willing that Antichrist not be. The former opinion of Cajetan, therefore, proceeds in the composite sense; but the latter opinion proceeds in the divided sense, and absolutely speaking. But absolutely speaking, the second view has the truth, both because the immutability of the divine will stands well, which, although it could do the opposite, will never do or will it. And in this consists being an immutable will. From these things it is clear what must be said to the arguments of each opinion.