Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: The divine will imposes necessity on certain things willed, but not on all. The reason for this conclusion is in the Summa: because the divine will is most efficacious, and the effect follows it in the mode in which God wills it to come about; but He wills, for this, that there be order in things for the completion of the universe, that certain things come about by necessity, certain things contingently: therefore. From this it follows, against the opinion of certain men, that effects willed by God do not come about contingently for this reason, that the proximate causes are contingent; but for this reason, that God willed them to come about contingently, and so prepared contingent causes. Second Conclusion, to the first: The divine will imposes conditional necessity on things willed, insofar as this conditional is necessary: If God wills this, it is necessary that this be.

COMMENTARY.

The doctrine of this question of the article is the completion of the doctrine of St. Thomas above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 1, where he says that although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect can nevertheless be contingent on account of a proximate contingent cause. Here, however, he proceeds further, assigning an earlier cause of the contingency of things, in such a way that this contingency is not only referred to second causes, but is chiefly reduced to the efficacy of the divine will.

IT IS DOUBTED principally in this article whether the first conclusion is true, and its argument, and whether the arguments by which St. Thomas rejects the contrary opinion are good. It is argued first for the negative part. The divine will imposes necessity on all things: therefore the second part of the conclusion is false. I prove the antecedent: because this is a necessary consequence, God from eternity willed things to be in time; therefore they are. The antecedent is necessary: therefore also the consequent. The minor is proved in two ways. First, because it is a proposition about the past and true, therefore necessary, inasmuch as there is no potency with respect to the past; then secondly, since the will of God is immutable: therefore at least the antecedent is necessary, by a necessity of infallibility, therefore the consequent is not contingent. And it is confirmed: because St. Thomas, above, ad 2, says that this is necessary absolutely, God knew the Antichrist would be; but the account is the same for this, God willed the Antichrist to be, therefore it is necessary absolutely. Likewise, in the same place, in the solution to the first he says that the knowledge of God is a first necessary cause: therefore the will too is a first necessary cause. The consequence is clear: because, in our way of understanding, the account of causing belongs to the divine knowledge from the divine will itself, which applies knowledge to the work.

It is argued, secondly, against the former part of the conclusion. The divine will, whatever it wills outside God, wills freely and not by necessity, as we said in art. 3: therefore it imposes necessity on no thing. The consequence is clear: because there is no thing which cannot not be, with respect to the divine liberty, which is the first cause of all things: therefore the former part of the conclusion is false. The antecedent is proved: because heaven can be annihilated by God, and the angels: therefore they do not have a necessity of being simply and absolutely, but only from supposition, supposing that God wills them to be. Thirdly, against the argument of the conclusion. The divine will is not a more efficacious cause with respect to one thing than another: therefore, with respect to the divine will and its efficacy, no account of a difference can be gathered as to why certain things come about contingently, others by necessity. It is confirmed first: because with respect to the efficacy of the divine will, all things come about infallibly: therefore nothing comes about contingently with respect to it. The consequence is clear: because contingent and infallible are opposed, at least with respect to the same cause. It is confirmed secondly, and I prove that contingent and infallible or necessary are simply repugnant, both from Aristotle, 6 Metaphysics, asserting that necessary and contingent are differences of being; and also because if some effect is contingent, then, simply speaking, it can not be: therefore its contradictory, namely 'it comes about necessarily,' is simply false: therefore neither will it be verified with respect to the divine will. I prove the consequence: because what is verified with respect to the divine knowledge and will is verified simply, and consequently there would be two contradictories simultaneously true. Fourthly, against the former argument, by which St. Thomas rejects that opinion which reduces the contingency of things to second contingent causes, the argument is this. The effect of the first cause can be contingent on account of a second cause that does not impede but modifies the influx of the first cause itself: therefore it is false what St. Thomas says, that the effect of the first cause is contingent for this reason, because it is impeded by a second cause. The antecedent is clear in the first movable, whose influx is indeed never impeded by a second cause, and yet through the sole modification of the planets contingent effects arise. Fifthly, against the second argument, by which he rejects the same opinion. For that consequence seems to be none at all, namely, if the distinction of contingent things from necessary things is referred only to second causes, it follows that such a distinction is beside the intention and will of God. For it can be answered that nevertheless the second causes themselves are willed by God, on account of the perfection of the universe; and consequently that defect of contingency is permitted by God. Sixthly: for granted that there is some higher cause of the contingency of things, nevertheless the nature of the defectible second causes will be the proper root of contingency: therefore that opinion is blamed undeservedly, especially since St. Thomas himself, above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 1, says that, although the first cause is necessary, the effect can nevertheless be contingent on account of a proximate contingent cause. Seventhly. Sin is a contingent effect of a defectible rational nature, and yet the will of God is not the cause of sin; therefore the divine will is not the universal cause and root of the contingency of things. Lastly. Even if, per impossibile, God Himself operated ad extra from necessity of nature, there would nevertheless be contingent effects: therefore the will of God is not the first root of the contingency of things. The antecedent is clear from the opinion of Aristotle, 8 Physics and 12 Metaphysics, who, although he thought the world flowed from God by necessity of nature, nevertheless posited contingent effects, referring them to second causes as regards contingency.

On this difficulty the opinion of Cajetan is as follows. He notes first that the title of the article is understood of absolute necessity, by which certain parts of the universe are necessary, such as the heavenly bodies and the angels; certain others, on the contrary, are contingent, such as singular corruptible things, and fortuitous things, and free things. He notes secondly that it is one thing to ask whether all things are necessary, and another to ask whether necessity is imposed on all things willed by God by the divine will itself. The first is not formally a matter of the present consideration, but materially: because here it is a question of the divine will, and of its effects as they are from it: and therefore the sense is whether, from the fact that something is willed by God, it follows that it is per se necessary in itself, absolutely speaking. He notes thirdly that in this article nothing else is sought than what is the first and proper root of contingency, and this in the genus of efficient cause. Nor does the question descend to such contingency in particular; but the question is about contingency absolutely, whether the proper and first root of contingency is some condition of second causes, or rather some condition of the divine will. He notes fourthly that an instrument can concur to a work in two ways: in one way when the defect of the instrument does not fall under the choice of the craftsman, but follows from elsewhere, from the necessity of the matter; in the other way, when the defect itself is chosen by the craftsman, who on purpose wills to effect an imperfect work. When, therefore, the craftsman operates in the former way, then the concurrence of the craftsman is not only modified, but even impeded by the defective instrument, so that the work not be so perfect. Hence the imperfection of the work is not attributed to the craftsman, but only to the instrument. But when the craftsman operates in the second way, then the concurrence of the craftsman is not impeded but modified, since he intends to make such an imperfect work through such an instrument. These things presupposed, Cajetan says, explaining the opinion of St. Thomas, it is necessary that the cause of contingency be reduced, as to its first and proper root, to the divine will as antecedent and efficient cause, and not, as the opinion refuted in the article said, to the defectibility found in second causes. And the reason is: because when the defect is reduced only to the second cause, then the defectibility of the second cause is not from the choice of the first agent; but God chose such contingent causes: otherwise such a contingent effect would be beside the intention and will of God, which is unfitting. Likewise, when the power of the first cause is only modified by the second cause, it is not impeded from its effect, but rather the effect of the second cause is more principally attributed to the first cause. But when the defect of the work is reduced only to the condition of the second cause, as to its first root, it must be that the condition of the second cause is impeding, and not only modifying, the efficacy of the first cause: but it is a great unfittingness to say that there is some second cause which can impede the will of God from producing its effect: which nevertheless follows from the opinion refuted in the text. Rightly, therefore, it is gathered that the first root of the contingency of things is the divine will, most efficacious for making things, not only as regards substance, but also as regards every mode of them, as regards their coming to be and as regards their being. Hence it wills certain things to come about by necessity, certain things contingently. But its will strongly attains all things, fitting necessary causes to certain effects, contingent and defectible causes to others, from which contingent effects come about. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, as it is understood and explained by Cajetan. But before we bring forward our own opinion, we must first, concerning the fourth notable of Cajetan, advert to something. For it seems worthy of animadversion that he compares the second mode of concurrence of a defective instrument, namely from the choice of the craftsman, with the concurrence of the defectible second causes with respect to the divine will, which, from choice, operates through such defectible causes. And as to this, Cajetan's explanation is true. But it is displeasing that he says the power of the first cause is modified by the second cause, yet not impeded: which indeed I reckon false, if it is understood of the most universal first cause, such as the divine will is. Indeed, the divine will modifies all things, while it is the most universal and most efficacious cause of each thing, both as regards coming to be and as regards being and as regards mode. Nor, with respect to the active attainment of the divine will, can there be given any cause, as Cajetan says, which in some genus modifies it; well, however, with respect to the passive attainment, concerning one thing willed, is there given a modifying cause, namely another passive attainment of another thing willed, as e.g. the passive attainment of the divine will, with respect to the motion of the heavens, is modified by the concurrence of second causes, which the divine will also attains. Moreover, the more immediate concurrence of the divine will, considered as it stands on the part of the agent and as it is an action, cannot be modified by anything lower, and the reason seems evident: because every cause that is modifiable by another does not determine itself to a special effect; but the divine will determines itself to any effect whatsoever, however special and singular, to be produced: therefore the active concurrence of the divine will is not modifiable by a lower cause. And it is confirmed: because it would be to posit the greatest imperfection in God, to assert that, just as the altogether same concurrence of the sun produces distinct effects because it is modified by distinct lower causes, so the concurrence of the divine will, as far as it is on its own part, remains indifferent, but is modified and determined to distinct effects by distinct lower causes. Moreover, just as the free choice of man is related to those things which are wholly subjected to it, so, indeed much more efficaciously, the divine will is related to those things which are subjected to it, which are in fact all things; but the concurrence of our free choice to do something, through subordinate means, is not modified by the means themselves, but rather free choice modifies the motion and concurrence of the means which are subjected to it: as e.g. when a craftsman wills to paint an image, he himself exactly adapts the brush, prepares the colors, moves his hand, determines the idea in his mind which he wills to imitate. Then surely, the craftsman's free choice is not modified by those means, insofar as they are subjected to it, except perhaps by impeding the perfection of the effect, insofar as they are not subjected to it in some respect: but rather the craftsman himself, through his free choice and art, determines such means for himself, insofar as they are subjected to it. Therefore much less can something created be found which determines the active concurrence or active attainment of the divine will. Finally it is argued: for every cause whose action is modified by another depends on that other in its operation in some genus of cause: but God's will in its operation does not depend on any cause: therefore its action is not modified by anything. I prove the major inductively: for even the first movable, insofar as its concurrence to the special effect of the generation of a horse is modifiable, depends in the genus of material cause on a particular cause, and on its dispositions, inasmuch as the first movable itself is not the cause of the whole being, but operates with something presupposed; and consonant with this is what the philosophers say, that causes are causes to one another, because they depend on one another and are modified by one another. There is another example in artificial things. The musician depends on the musical instrument itself, inasmuch as through music he cannot produce the instrument itself. Again, the craftsman who makes the instrument depends on the matter from which the instrument must be made, in the genus of material cause. And this doctrine is greatly to be noted for the matter of grace and predestination, in which many are deceived, thinking that the free choice of man modifies the equal concurrence and help of God, determining it to effect more or less. And so some are wont ignorantly to say that, with an equal help of God's grace, one is converted and another is not. By which path one easily falls into the error of the Pelagians. But of this elsewhere, and below, q. 23.

Now, however, let it suffice for us to assert that not only can a second cause not impede the concurrence of the most universal cause, as St. Thomas said, art. 6, ad 3: but neither can it modify the concurrence of the most universal cause, which works all things, and in all things what it wills and as it wills. And therefore it effectively modifies one second cause by means of another; or one effect by means of another. And so is fulfilled what the Apostle says, Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of His will.

Now, for a fuller understanding of this doctrine, and the solution of the arguments which we made above, it is necessary before all things to distinguish the modes of the necessary and the contingent. It must be noted, then, first, that the necessary is opposed, per se first, to the possible-not-to-be, as to its contradictory. Hence these are contradictories: 'It is necessary that it run' and 'It is possible that the heaven not be.' It is then opposed to the possible contrarily: hence these are contraries, 'It is necessary that Peter run,' 'It is impossible that Peter run.' Moreover, the necessary is opposed to the contingent according to the part virtually included in the contingent, namely: because the contingent says 'it is possible to be' and 'it is possible not to be,' and by reason of this second part it is opposed to the necessary of the contingent. Since therefore in as many ways as one of opposites is said, the other is also said, it must be noted secondly that the necessary, as far as the present consideration goes, can be taken in four ways. In the first way it is said principally of God Himself, whose To-be is His Essence above every genus of being. Hence God's to-be is necessary by the most absolute necessity, which in no way depends on anything. In this way nothing is necessary besides God; but analogically something created can be said to be necessary. And the reason is: because the necessity of being of the heavens does not arise from their essence, but from the free will of God, who could will not to communicate that being, and has the power of annihilating all creatures. And this is what is said in Ps. 101: In the beginning, O Lord, you founded the earth, and the works of your hands are the heavens: They shall perish, but you remain, etc. But you are the same, and your years shall not fail. Where the Holy Spirit teaches that the being of God alone is necessary, wholly, absolutely, and independently of anything. Wherefore, just as being is said analogically of God and creatures, so also necessary. In the second way it is called necessary logically or metaphysically, and so it is verified of certain propositions, or of their significates, in which a definition is affirmed of the defined, or a part of the definition, or a proper passion of its proper subject: as, e.g., 'man is a rational animal,' 'man is capable of laughter,' is something necessary and of eternal truth. But it must be observed here that no truth is eternal in itself formally, except in the divine intellect. For the truth which is formally in a created mind is not eternal, just as the mind itself is not; but the truth in the divine mind is eternal and the same as God Himself. And so it is verified that 'man is an animal' is of eternal truth, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 16, art. 7, ad 4; and q. 10, art. 3, ad 3: not because the truth which is formally in the enuntiable is eternal, but because the root and foundation of that truth is eternal in the divine mind. In the third way certain things are said to be necessary physically or naturally, e.g. that the heavens are, that the angels are, that the world is. But it must be observed that the necessity of these things does not arise from their intrinsic account per se first and positively, as 'capable of laughter' arises from the rational essence itself: otherwise 'the heaven is' would be of perpetual and eternal truth. But they are called necessary beings because, after they have once received being, there is not in the whole nature of things, nor can there be, any intrinsic or extrinsic cause of the things themselves through which they can be corrupted or cease to be. Moreover, with respect to God Himself, who is a being outside every universe, they do not have being by necessity, because they do not flow from Him, nor are they conserved by necessity simply, but freely. In which matter Aristotle was slippery, as we shall say in art. 10; for sometimes he seems to hold that God produces the world by necessity of nature, sometimes that He freely governs human affairs. Yet with this there stands that the heavens are simply said to be incorruptible, so that these propositions are of eternal truth, 'the heaven is incorruptible,' 'an angel is incorruptible': because incorruptibility imports the negation of an intrinsic principle of corruptibility. But with respect to being itself, as it depends on God, things are necessary from supposition, namely, supposing that God freely willed to give them being, and His will is immutable, by which God determined to conserve that being forever. In the fourth way the necessary from supposition is so called, which necessity is rather of the consequence, insofar as something necessarily follows from another presupposed, by a good consequence; e.g. supposing an absolute volition of the end, the will necessarily wills the means which are judged necessary to the end, that is, this consequence is necessary, 'Peter wills health absolutely, and judges that the means, a bitter drink, is necessary, therefore he wills that drink'; yet the consequent is not necessary, 'he wills the drink,' absolutely speaking. For just as he can not will health, so he can not will the drink. On which matter St. Thomas is to be seen, 1-2, q. 13, art. 6. It must also be noted here that suppositions of this kind are various. For sometimes the knowledge of God, or His infallible will and providence with respect to some effect, is presupposed. Sometimes a contingent cause is presupposed, yet placed in act and not impeded; and then the effect necessarily follows by a consequential necessity, which nevertheless is contingent simply. And so Aristotle said in book 1 of the Perihermeneias, at the end: Everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. The foundation of this is: because two contradictories cannot be simultaneously true, although either, simply speaking, can be true, e.g. 'Peter sits,' 'Peter does not sit,' if we attend to the potency for them to be true, each has the potency to be true at the same time. But if a conjunction and simultaneity be made concerning the act of sitting and not sitting, then they cannot be simultaneously true; but by a necessity of the consequence, from the truth of one follows the falsity of the other, not by a necessity of the consequent. And this is what is commonly said, that in the composite or in the divided sense something is necessary or impossible, as e.g. while Peter sits, 'it is necessary to sit' is necessary in the composite sense, but is not necessary in the divided sense: because even while he sits, he sits freely. Finally it must be noted that the naturally contingent and the morally contingent differ from the merely dialectically contingent. For the dialectically contingent only says it is possible for something to be, and possible not to be, nor does it posit any imperfection in the cause; and so God contingently created the world, and the heaven contingently is, inasmuch as in God there is a simple power to create and to annihilate the heaven. But the physically contingent intrinsically and formally adds a respect to a defectible and impedible cause. Finally the morally contingent intrinsically and formally adds that the effect produced, being contingent, is beside the intention of the one operating; e.g. someone intends to kill a man, and kills him; that killing of the man is a physically contingent effect, because it could be impeded; but if, intending to kill a man, he kills a wild beast, then the killing of the beast was morally and naturally contingent.

THESE foundations having been laid down, let the first conclusion be: from the fact that God from eternity knew or willed or provided all future things, it does not follow that they necessarily come about absolutely, or are so; e.g. contingent natural effects or free actions do not come about, absolutely speaking, from necessity.

This conclusion is defined in the Council of Constance, Session 8, where among the errors of Wyclif, the 27th is that all things come about from absolute necessity. Likewise, because otherwise it would follow that there is no free choice, and consequently that there are no laws and counsels, rewards and punishments, by which men are deterred from evil and stirred to good. On which matter Augustine is to be seen, book 5 of The City, ch. 9 and 10, against Cicero and other Stoics, who, in order to attribute free choice to men, denied the foreknowledge and providence of God concerning human affairs. See also Gratian, 23, q. 4, ch. Nabuchodonosor, where he recites many testimonies for the conclusion. Note, however, concerning the conclusion, that if someone asserted that natural universals, apart from the acts of free choice, come about from absolute necessity and nothing contingently, insofar as all things are efficaciously subjected to the motions of the heavens, he would indeed err in physical science, but not in faith. For to that extent the error of Wyclif is condemned, who asserted that all things come about from necessity, insofar as he includes in this universal also free choice. Moreover, the contingency of natural effects is found in two ways. In one way, not because the effect is impeded here and now, but because it was impedible, as far as it is on the part of the proximate cause from which it proceeds; and thus this fire contingently generates this fire here and now. In the other way, because the effect intended by a particular cause was in fact impeded on account of the concurrence of another particular cause; and thus Peter contingently generates a monster. The conclusion, then, as posited, as far as pertains to the contingency of natural things, is proved. For if, with God operating from necessity of nature, as perhaps Aristotle thought, he nevertheless taught that the contingency of natural things must be posited, much more does contingency seem to be posited, while the first cause operates freely. Likewise, if the proper cause of an impedible effect is such, or is even impeded: therefore it does not operate by absolute necessity, and consequently the effect is contingent. Second Conclusion: Contingent or free effects, if compared to the knowledge or providence or will of God, are necessary in a certain respect, namely from supposition, which necessity is conditional or rather of the consequence, not of the consequent. This conclusion is proved: because these consequences are good and necessary. God knows that something will be, therefore it comes about in the mode and when He wills it to come about. Moreover, God provides this future thing, therefore it is; likewise God foresaw a future sin, therefore that sin will be; inasmuch as in these consequences the antecedent cannot be given true and the consequent false: therefore the conclusions are necessary from supposition, that is, supposing that the antecedents are true, it is necessary that what follows be simultaneously verified by a necessary consequentiality; and this is what is commonly said, that in the composite sense the consequent is necessary, namely because it is impossible for the falsity of the consequent to stand with the truth of the antecedent. But if someone objects that by this position the use of free choice is also destroyed, and that laws and counsels are in vain, etc., because in the end that will infallibly come about which God provided, or willed, or foreknew to be future, I deny the sequel: because God so foreknew, so willed, and provided, that the effect come forth from second causes according to their own mode. Nor does free choice have the capacity for this, that it can simultaneously operate two contradictories; but supposing that it wills one, it is impossible that it simultaneously will the opposite, even if it were not moved by God, but were itself the first cause of its operation. But in this consists the capacity of free choice, as far as the intrinsic judgment of the one operating goes, not to choose that which it judged not to have a necessary connection with the end, or because it did not will the end necessarily here and now, as we shall say at once in art. 10. Third Conclusion: No effect is or is said to be formally contingent through a respect to the will or providence of God, but through a formal respect to proximate or particular defective causes. The first part is proved: every effect in its order to God comes about infallibly, nor is it impedible; therefore formally through such an order it is not contingent, otherwise it would be impedible and not impedible with respect to the same cause. But the second part is proved: because the definition of a naturally contingent effect is given formally through a respect to a defective and impedible cause; but particular causes are of this kind; therefore etc. From this it follows that it is false what certain men say, that God concurs so sweetly with second causes that with a necessary cause He concurs as a necessary cause, with a contingent one as a contingent cause. But they are in fact mistaken: because He is never a contingent cause in the way in which we speak of contingency, namely not logically or metaphysically, but naturally or morally. For God, even operating freely, cannot be impeded. Strongly, therefore, and sweetly He attains all things, inasmuch as He most efficaciously operates what He wills, not destroying the condition of second causes, but having made their effects contingent, which either in themselves, or in their causes, are necessary, absolutely and naturally, insofar as they are not impedible by others. Fourth Conclusion, greatly to be noted: Human free actions, as formally free, are referred not only to the immediate cause, namely to the faculty of created free choice, but also to the first free cause. It is proved: because for an action to be free, as such, is a perfection simply, as will be said in art. 10: therefore it is formally in God; therefore, just as every created wisdom formally includes an order of dependence on the supreme wisdom, so free choice, as such, formally includes such an order to the first free cause. Likewise, in analogates in which the form signified is found formally in both extremes, the matter stands thus, that the less principal form has an intrinsic order to the principal one; but free choice is such an analogate: therefore etc. Hence it follows that, while free choice is moved efficaciously by the free choice of God, whether naturally or supernaturally, so far is it from losing liberty from this, that it rather operates freely from it, but only it follows that it is not the first free cause, but intrinsically depends on another free choice.

Fifth Conclusion: Every contingent effect is principally referred to the divine will, as to the proper and first efficient cause of its contingency. This has been sufficiently confirmed by Cajetan, above.

Sixth Conclusion, which follows from the foregoing: No effect of which God alone is the cause can be contingent. It is proved: because a contingent effect, as we speak in the present matter, intrinsically and formally bespeaks an order to an impedible cause; but God cannot be a cause of this kind; therefore by Himself alone He cannot produce a contingent effect. But if someone objects with the common argument: whatever God can do with a second cause, He can do by Himself alone; but God effects a contingent effect through a contingent cause: therefore by Himself alone He can make a contingent effect. It is answered that, if the argument has any force, it would prove also that God by Himself alone could produce a sensation without a sentient power: since, through a sentient power in the genus of efficient cause, He produces sensation. It is answered, therefore, to the argument that that maxim is understood when the effect does not intrinsically and formally include an order to a secondary efficient cause, as sensation intrinsically does, since it is an immanent and vital action, and bespeaks an order to a sensitive efficient cause. Similarly, also, a contingent effect formally bespeaks contingency in its order to a defectible cause. Moreover, the same effect as regards substance, which a contingent cause produces as contingent, God by Himself alone could produce as not contingent, but altogether infallibly: as, e.g., He could produce this singular fire, which He now produces through a contingent cause. It must be noted, however, that in this conclusion we do not deny that God by Himself alone could

produce a contingent thing, that is, a thing not necessary in such a way as to be necessarily, but corruptible. For thus in fact He created many things and contingent causes. But we deny that, in the account of the effect, that which is produced by God alone is called contingent, for the reason assigned: because the contingency of an effect, as such, is formally reduced to a defectible cause as impedible.

Seventh Conclusion: If God operated all things from necessity of nature, there would nevertheless be contingency in the nature of things. This conclusion is against Scotus, in 1, dist. 2, q. 2, and dist. 8, q. 2, who holds that Aristotle, with the other philosophers, asserted contradictorily, when they said that something comes about contingently, and yet thought God acts by necessity. And Scotus's reason is: because, although he agrees with us in this, that the first root of contingency is a condition of the divine will, yet he differs in this, that we say that the condition itself is the supreme efficacy of the Divine Will; he, however, says that that condition is the contingency of the Divine Will: but by the name 'contingency of the Divine Will' he understands not some imperfection, but its liberty. Cajetan, however, deservedly rejects this opinion of Scotus, and proves our conclusion: because if the Divine Will willed and caused the universe by necessity, there would nevertheless be causes defectible and mutually impedible, as they now are: therefore effects would contingently proceed from them. It is confirmed: because there would be free agents, namely men, among whom there could be fortune and a contingent event; beside their intention, something would befall them, or they would operate defectibly. But this second argument of Cajetan does not please us.

Hence let there be an eighth conclusion: On the hypothesis that God operated from necessity of nature, the contingency of things would not be reduced to God as to the first efficient root. It is proved: because the defectibility of second causes would not be from the choice of God: therefore a contingent effect would be beside the intention of the first cause. The consequence is clear from Cajetan's fourth notable.

Last Conclusion: If God operated ad extra from necessity of nature, there would be no free choice in things. It is proved first: for if there is free choice, it is moved either by itself, as by the first mover, or by God; if by itself, then God is not the first mover; if by God, who moves by necessity: therefore it is not free. The consequence is proved: God moves from necessity of nature; therefore the will is not moved freely: because this consequence is good, 'God moves the will, therefore the will is moved by God,' the antecedent is altogether necessary, therefore also the consequent. Therefore there is no capacity in the will to be moved otherwise. Moreover, secondly: what is sometimes in act, sometimes in potency, must be moved by another; but God by hypothesis would always operate in one way from necessity of nature: therefore the will would always necessarily be in act, or never. For no cause of this indifference of the will to either alternative would be given, any more than in a brute. Nor is it strange that from such a supposition impossible and so absurd things follow. Finally, this last conclusion is proved from the fourth conclusion: for, just as, the first wisdom being removed, all wisdom is removed, so, the first free choice being removed, all free choice is removed. For as dependence is intrinsic in coming to be and also in being conserved for those things which are not their own to-be, which they have from the being that has being through essence: so in perfections of this kind, which do not belong to things through their essence, there is a formal and intrinsic dependence on that which is such through essence.

It is answered to the arguments. To the first, in which the celebrated difficulty is touched, there are many modes of answering, but this seems to me the best; for in form I deny the antecedent. To the proof, let the major pass, but I deny the minor: namely 'God willed things to be in time' is necessary if we speak of the simply and absolutely necessary, but is only necessary from supposition. For supposing that God willed freely, He now cannot not-will in the composite sense, because the will of God is immutable, whence the consequent will be necessary also from supposition, as also the antecedent. But, nevertheless, such necessity does not destroy the contingency of natural things, nor free actions, as was said in the first conclusion. Hence to the first proof of the minor, where it was said, that is about the past and true: therefore necessary; I distinguish the consequent: if it is understood of absolute necessity, I deny the consequence: but if it is understood of necessity from supposition, namely, supposing that it was true, then because this supposition was not simply necessary, I grant the consequence. To the second proof, I grant the consequence: for it is true that every effect, with respect to the divine will from which it proceeds, is infallible. Yet with this it stands in truth that some effect is contingent simply, speaking according to the formal respect to a defective cause from which it proceeds, as we have now said, whence contingency is formally to be received. To the confirmation from St. Thomas it would be answered, whatever other Thomists say, that when St. Thomas said that antecedent, God knew

the Antichrist would be, is absolutely necessary, he understood by 'absolutely necessary,' that is, not depending on the future, as a certain opinion said which he impugns there. Moreover, since God could have not had such a will, nor such knowledge of the future, that antecedent cannot be called necessary simply speaking, namely, 'God knew the Antichrist would be'; 'He willed the Antichrist to be,' since it is not necessary in the first mode, nor the second, nor the third: it will therefore be necessary from supposition.

But it is worth the effort briefly to review, concerning this difficulty, the various modes of answering, to that argument, God knew, or willed, or said that something is future, therefore it will be, where the antecedent is necessary, the consequence is good: therefore the consequent is necessary. For some say that the consequence is not formal. For there can be given a true antecedent and a false consequent, as e.g. God said the Antichrist is future, therefore the Antichrist will be, the antecedent is true, once the Antichrist is born, and the consequent false, the Antichrist will be born. But a consequence good formally must always be good: a material consequence, however, concerning its subject matter, suffices that it be good from supposition. This solution sophistically strives to evade the force of the argument. For it is certain that the difficulty of the argument does not depend on this, that the consequent be taken as future, otherwise the Antichrist is going to be would never be verified, if that the Antichrist is going to be is always verified, inasmuch as for a proposition about the future to be true, it is necessary that that future time at some point be present, and cease to be future. The consequent is therefore taken for that determinate time, of which God said or foreknew that something would be future in it, which will afterwards be present. And so a formal consequence can be made. Nor is an instance brought, if we say, everything that God said is true; but God said that something is future at time B: therefore that is true, therefore it is true that it will be present at that time. Then such an argument will be made. The major is evident, the minor is necessary, since it is about the past; therefore the consequent is necessary, because the consequence is good. Wherefore the first solution is better, that those propositions about the past are not necessary simply, but from supposition, and so the consequent is necessary from supposition. Others say that, although those propositions God willed, God knew that something is future seem, according to their mode of signifying, to be about the past, yet they are about the present as regards the thing signified: because in God 'willed' and 'wills' are the same, 'knew' and 'knows,' inasmuch as the divine act is measured by eternity, which is always present indivisibly. Hence they say that those propositions God willed, God knew do not have greater necessity because they signify in the mode of the past, than these, God wills, God knows, which propositions nevertheless are not simply necessary: because God freely wills whatever He wills outside Himself, and simply speaking has the power to not-will them. The whole necessity will therefore be of the consequence as of the antecedent, namely from supposition. This solution rather confirms and explains our solution. But Cajetan, above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 2, says that there is as much difference between these propositions, God willed the Antichrist to be future, and God wills, as there is between the necessity of a proposition about the past and of a proposition about the present in contingent matter; as if we say Peter sat and Peter sits. For that proposition about the past is necessary absolutely, but this one about the present is not necessary absolutely, except from the supposition that Peter sits. But this opinion does not seem intelligible to us, how this proposition God willed is more necessary than this, God wills, although there would be a difference between those, Peter sat and Peter sits, as regards necessity. And the reason is: for although this proposition God willed signifies in the mode of the past, as regards our way of understanding, yet that mode of preterition does not pass into the thing signified; otherwise the proposition God willed would be false, since in fact the act of the divine will is not past, but always present indivisibly and immutably. Since therefore, from the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false, it follows that with respect to God a proposition about the past is not more necessary than one about the present. Then this is a good consequence, against Cajetan, God willed, therefore He wills; the antecedent is necessary absolutely, therefore also the consequent. And it is confirmed: because these are equipollent, God wills and God willed; therefore if one is necessary, so is the other. Others answer the argument following the words of St. Thomas, above. For they grant that the consequence is good, and that the antecedent is necessary absolutely, but when it is inferred, 'therefore the consequent is necessary,' they distinguish 'necessary simply,' and deny the consequence; but as it is under the antecedent, they grant the consequence. This solution is St. Thomas's, above, but he explains himself sufficiently in the same place. For he posits the foundation that when something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is to be taken not according as it is in itself, but according as it is in the soul: e.g. if we say Peter understands something, therefore it is immaterial; the consequent is not taken according as the thing understood is in itself, for thus a thing which is understood could be material, as if a man is understood; but the consequent is to be taken according as it is in the intellect. For thus it is immaterial insofar as it is understood, through its immaterial form which is in the intellect. Thus, therefore, in the proposed matter, if we say, God knew that something is future, therefore it will be, the consequent is to be taken as it is under the divine knowledge, namely, as it is in its presentiality, and thus it is necessary as also the antecedent: because everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. This is St. Thomas. But this solution suffers a calumny; because it relies on that foundation, which seems false: for from it would follow that this is a good consequence: I think Peter runs, therefore Peter runs. I prove the sequel: because the consequent is to be taken not according to itself, but according as it is in my estimate. Similarly, this would be a good consequence, Peter wills to swear, therefore to swear is good; for if the consequent is taken as it is under the will, to swear is good, nor could an instance be brought against the consequence. Likewise, God wills me to speak now, therefore I speak now, is a good consequence, and yet the consequent is taken even according as it is in itself: therefore it is false what is said in the foundation, that when something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is not to be taken according as it is in itself, but according to the being that it has in the soul. On account of these arguments I reckon that that foundation is not to be understood universally, but its sense is that, when something pertaining to an act of the intellect or will is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is not necessarily taken according to the being that it has in itself, but can sometimes be taken only according to the being that it has in the intellect or will. And so it is allowed in common usage of speaking that sometimes the consequent be taken according to the being that it has in the soul; but it is not excluded that sometimes the consequent can be taken in both ways, namely both according to the being that it has in itself and according to the being that it has in the soul. And by this what has been objected is clear. It can be answered secondly, that St. Thomas in his foundation presupposes the consequence to be otherwise good: and then he gives us a rule for verifying the consequent, which cannot be verified according to itself, that it be verified according to the being that it has in the soul. It must be observed, however, that in fact this solution of St. Thomas does not differ from the first which we assigned. This is proved from what he says, that the consequent is necessary as also the antecedent. Which comparison consists in this, that just as the antecedent is necessary, that is, infallible, immutable and independent of the future, because all things are present to the knowledge of God, inasmuch as it is measured by eternity: so the consequent, as it is under that knowledge, is necessary and infallible, nor dependent on the future. For it already is as it is under the knowledge of God, and to this contributes what follows from Aristotle, 1 Perihermeneias, Everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. Behold how the antecedent is not necessary simply and altogether absolutely, otherwise the consequent would be necessary as the antecedent is simply and absolutely, but is only necessary, that is, infallible and immutable, that is, supposing that God willed something to be future, or permitted it to be future, as sin, it is necessary that He know it to be future, and that it already be present to His knowledge; and so future contingents are necessary in a certain respect, not absolutely, but with an addition, namely with respect to the divine knowledge, inasmuch as by a necessity of the consequence it follows that what is seen by God to be cannot be otherwise: because everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. To the other testimony of St. Thomas, in the question, art. 13, ad 1, it is answered that St. Thomas does not there affirm that the knowledge of God of all future things is a first necessary cause. For this is false: because neither is God the cause of all things which He knows to be future, otherwise He would be the cause of sin, nor of those of which He is the cause is He the simply necessary cause, but only from supposition, that God freely wills them to be. But St. Thomas there denies the consequence of the argument. For it does not follow that if the first cause is necessary, no effect is contingent: because the contingency of that effect is formally taken with respect to the proximate contingent cause. Just as the sprouting of a plant is contingent on account of its proximate cause, although the motion of the heaven, which is the first cause, is necessary. But if someone still presses the point, and asks why, since every effect with respect to God comes about infallibly, every effect is not said to be simply infallible, and yet is said to be simply contingent because with respect to a lower cause it is contingent. It is answered that, just as a man is said to be simply curly-haired, although curliness belongs to him according to one part, namely according to the head, because according to that part alone he is apt to have curliness; so every effect is said to be formally and simply contingent with respect to the cause with respect to which it is apt to have contingency formally. For it must be noted that with respect to the divine will there is no difference among created things as regards the necessity of being or the possibility of not being. For all agree in this, that they were freely produced and are freely conserved in being,

and are equally annihilable, and all are contingent, logically speaking. Because nothing is necessarily in the second mode explained by us. Likewise with respect to the same divine will, all things are necessary in the fourth mode, namely from supposition. What remains, therefore, is that the whole account of the difference of things, according to natural necessity and contingency, be taken formally from the proximate and natural causes, insofar as certain causes are naturally not impedible, certain are impedible. And in relation to certain ones effects are naturally and simply necessary, in relation to certain ones contingent, simply and naturally speaking. And in this way the divine knowledge, will, and providence do not destroy the contingency of things; indeed the first efficient cause of contingency and necessity is the will itself. And this on this difficulty.

To the second it is answered, I deny the consequence. Because God, freely willing things to be, effects some causes necessary naturally in being and in causing, with respect to which effects are said to be and are formally necessary. Yet the argument proves that no absolute necessity formally is in things, formally regarding the necessity of the one causing in the first cause, which is the divine will.

To the third it is answered, I grant the whole, if the antecedent is understood of the formal respect to the divine will as to the formal cause of the difference. For we have already sufficiently shown that the difference of things according to necessary and contingent is not considered formally except with respect to second causes, and this the first confirmation of the same argument proves. To the second confirmation it is answered, I grant that necessary and contingent are simply repugnant, if both are taken naturally. Of which difference the divine will is the efficient cause, as regards being. Yet with this it stands that with respect to the divine will there is no effect which is formally from it by absolute necessity, nor even contingently, except perhaps logically, but every effect proceeds infallibly and necessarily from supposition from the divine will. Hence something can be verified with respect to the divine will, or the divine intellect, according to some denomination, which nevertheless is not necessarily verified, absolutely speaking, but from supposition and by a necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent.

To the fourth, we have already sufficiently shown that the divine will cannot be modified by anything.

To the fifth it is answered that St. Thomas follows out the argument excellently when he infers that if the distinction of contingent things from necessary things is referred only to second causes, as to efficient causes, it would follow that such a distinction would be beside the intention and will of God. Nor does what is objected stand in the way; indeed it helps. For if second causes are willed by God on account of the perfection of the universe, it is well gathered that their contingent effects are willed, because, as such, they also pertain to the perfection of the universe.

To the sixth it is answered that St. Thomas does not blame that opinion in this, that it asserts contingent effects to be reduced to contingent causes, but in this, that it denies the divine will to be the first root and effective cause of contingency.

To the seventh it is answered, I grant the major and the minor, and I deny the consequence; indeed, God is the cause of every contingency of being, although that being be a sin, inasmuch as there is there no other contingency except in the account of being, whose passions are necessary or contingent. And just as God is the cause of the act of sin, as the theologians say, and yet is not the cause of sin, so God is the cause of the contingency of that act of sin, and is not the cause of sin. Nor need one seek another first root of sin, except the created defectible free choice, with respect to which sin formally is and is called sin, and is referred as to its efficient cause, or rather to its deficient cause, namely to free choice. But on the contrary, it follows that sin is beside the intention of God. I prove the sequel. Just as St. Thomas argues against the opinion of those who said that the first root of contingency is the second cause, that from this it would follow that the contingency of things is beside the intention of God, so it follows that something happens by fortune and by chance, with respect to the divine will. It is answered first, I grant the sequel. For it does not appear unfitting that sin be beside the intention of God, since it is beside every divine rule. Nor does what is objected stand in the way, objected to prove the falsity of the consequent: because although sin is beside the intention of the divine will, yet it is not by chance and fortune, because it has already been foreseen by God and permitted. It is answered secondly, by distinguishing the consequent. For if beside the intention imports only the negation of intention, the aforesaid solution is good; but if beside the intention imports that something happens by chance, which was not foreseen, I deny the sequel. For sin is neither from the intention of God, nor beside the intention in that second way, but it is permitted and foreseen, so that on its occasion God might do another greater good. Consonant with this is what St. Thomas says, art. 9, ad 3, that God neither wills evils to be done, nor wills evils not to be done, but wills to permit evils. So we say that sin is neither from the intention of God, nor beside the intention in that second way; but from the intention of a greater good, it is permitted the sin, and therefore foreseen.

To the last argument it is answered from the doctrine of the seventh and eighth conclusions, in which it was explained what would follow concerning the contingency of things, if God operated from necessity of nature. Thus far on this most difficult question.