Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: It is necessary that the will of God be always fulfilled. This conclusion is to be understood of the will of God simply and absolutely. The reason is: because every universal cause always attains each effect, so that there is no effect which departs from the order of the universal cause; but the divine will is a universal cause, as was said in art. 5: therefore the will of God is always fulfilled, that is, God always effects what He wills.

For the explanation of the major proposition St. Thomas notes that, since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the same account or proportion holds in agent causes as in formal causes; but in formal causes it so happens that, although something can fall short of some particular form, yet nothing can fall short of the universal form, e.g. something can fail to be a man, but nothing can be that is not a being: therefore, proportionally, in agent causes, a particular agent can indeed not have an effect that is assimilated to its particular form, but it cannot be that a universal agent be frustrated of the effect corresponding to its form.

Second Conclusion, to the first: what God wills with antecedent will does not always come about, yet what He wills with consequent will always comes about.

Third Conclusion, explanatory of the preceding: The antecedent will is the one that regards that which, although it is good in its first consideration, nevertheless, as it is considered together with some adjunct, is otherwise disposed. But the consequent will is the one that regards some good which, with all its circumstances, retains the account of good.

There is an example: A judge, by antecedent will, wills every man to live in the commonwealth, but by consequent will he wills to kill the murderer. Behold, in the first consideration, a man is considered with the circumstance of sin set aside; but in the second consideration, a man is considered as a murderer.

Fourth Conclusion, in the same place: what we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but in a certain respect; but what we will consequently, we will simply. The reason for this is: because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves; but in themselves they are in the particular, with all their circumstances: therefore we will simply according as we will something with all the particular circumstances considered: which is to will simply.

COMMENTARY.

IT must be noted in this article that the first conclusion, in the explained sense, is certain according to faith. It is proved from Ps. 113: «All whatsoever the Lord willed, He has done»; and Isa. 46: «My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done». It must be noted secondly that in the Sacred Scriptures there are found testimonies in which the will of God seems to be affirmed as not always fulfilled: e.g. Matt. 23: «How often would I have gathered together your children, as the hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and you would not». And 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved»; and yet it is certain that not all are saved, and therefore St. Thomas brings in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, by which these and similar testimonies are explained in a Catholic way.

IT IS DOUBTED, so that the doctrine of St. Thomas may become better known, whether the antecedent will is some act formally existing in God, as the consequent will is an act formally and properly existing in God? That is, to ask whether God has this act properly and without metaphor, I would that all men be saved. As a merchant compelled by a storm has this act, I would keep my goods, but lest I myself perish, I will absolutely to throw them into the sea.

It is argued first, for the negative part. Such an act, as St. Thomas says in the article, ad 1, can rather be called a velleity than an absolute will; but a velleity intrinsically bespeaks an imperfection: therefore such an act is not in God.

Secondly. If that velleity is posited in God expressly and formally, it follows that in God there is an idle and feigned will. The sequel is proved: if, in human affairs, some father had an absolute will of excluding his son from the inheritance, for no other reason than because he wills it, and otherwise said that he would wish to admit that son to the inheritance, such a velleity would seem idle and feigned, because if he truly willed it, he would certainly do it, since he could do so without any loss to himself. So therefore, since God wills to exclude certain ones absolutely from His kingdom, it does not seem credible that in God there is that affection of will, I would admit these.

Thirdly. If it is verified that God would will all men to be saved by an express and formal act of will, by parity of reason it would be verified that He would will all the angels to be saved: but with respect to the angels He did not have such a will: therefore neither with respect to men. The minor is proved: because with respect to the angels no sin can be assigned on account of which God withheld the help of grace by which they would have persevered, if those who fell had had it, whereas in men the cause can be assigned, namely original sin.

Fourthly. If this act is formally in God, I would that all men be saved, with respect to men created or to be created, by parity of reason it would be posited with respect to those who are neither created nor to be created. The consequence is clear: because such an antecedent will posits nothing in reality: therefore it can be with respect to non-existing things, at some difference of time.

Fifthly. Because by parity of reason it would also have to be granted that God wills all sinners to be punished forever. I prove the sequel: because for one who sins against God to be punished is good and just, absolutely considered: therefore by antecedent will God wills it; the consequent is false: for the contradictory is true, Ezek. 33: As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the wicked.

But for the affirmative part it is argued first, from St. Thomas in this article, ad 1, where he says that just as a judge who is a man has that antecedent will by which he would wish to preserve all men, so God wills every man to be saved. And in On Truth, q. 23, art. 2, he seems to think the same.

Secondly. Because if God does not really have formally in Himself some affection or will, at least antecedent, those things which are said in the Sacred Scriptures about the divine benevolence toward men can hardly be explained: e.g. Rom. 2: «Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to repentance?»; and 2 Pet. 3: «The Lord does not delay His promises, as some imagine, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to repentance». But if in God there is absolutely no formal will with respect to objects of this kind, which do not actually come about, these locutions will seem rather to be fictions than affections of God toward the salvation of men: therefore. It is confirmed by the example of a father in human affairs, who wills his son to lead a studious life, and certainly such an affection is good, and a testimony of the goodness of nature: therefore such an affection can be posited in God.

Thirdly. In Christ the Lord there was such a velleity: for Christ would wish all men to be saved: therefore it is not repugnant to God that He will all men to be saved. Indeed, it seems to follow by a good consequence: for whatever Christ willed with His human will, God also willed Him to will such things; and consequently, He willed the object of Christ's will, and it was pleasing to God. For Christ always willed the things that were pleasing to God. Nor is it of any avail to answer that velleities of this kind import an imperfection in the one willing, and therefore are not in God. For although this imperfection is found in a creature, yet in God that velleity can properly be, in such a way that the imperfection signified is referred to the effect, not to God Himself.

FOR the decision of this difficulty let the first conclusion be: It is probable, and can be defended without prejudice to the faith, that in the divine will there is a formal and express act with respect to certain goods which indeed do not come about, but are commanded by God to come about, or fall under counsel, or are possible to come about according to the common law and the common means which have been proposed by God. The conclusion is explained: for we do not wish to assert that there is a distinct act of the divine will by which it would will these goods to come about, apart from the act by which God wills His own goodness: for in God there is no more than a single act of will. But we wish to say that, just as the very act of will by which God necessarily wills His own goodness is the act by which He freely wills things other than Himself, and nevertheless we formally posit in God a free act of will with respect to creatures; so proportionally, the very same act by which God wills absolutely that certain goods come about is also the act by which He would will other goods to come about, which nevertheless do not come about. This conclusion is proved by the arguments made for the affirmative part. And it is confirmed: for just as we posit formally in God an act of free choice, which is with respect to things ad extra, whose formal object nevertheless is not any thing ad extra (for no formal account of the divine will can be anything but the divine goodness); so too it will not be unfitting that the same act, with respect to certain creatures, be a velleity and a desire, with the imperfection removed.

Second Conclusion: It seems much more probable that in God there is not formally a will which is signified by this name, velleity, but it suffices that such an antecedent will be posited in God eminently. The conclusion is explained by an example: for just as that maxim is also verified of God, every agent acts insofar as it is in act, although the creatures of which God is the author are not in Him formally, but eminently; so the good affections which are found in men, of which God is the cause, are also in God formally or eminently: e.g. the affection of a Christian man, by which he wills all men to be saved, of which God is the cause, must be in God formally or eminently. The conclusion, therefore, is proved as to its former part by the arguments made for the negative part: from which the second part is immediately gathered: because if such a will is not formally in God, it must be in Him eminently, since God is the cause of it in the saints. Moreover, the arguments made for the first conclusion suffice to prove that that will is to be posited in God, at least eminently. From what has been said it follows that, proportionally, it must be said that with respect to the sins which are committed, which God would not have come about, a nolleity is to be posited in God formally or eminently.

BUT to the arguments of both parts an answer must be given. To the first argument, then, made for the negative part, it is answered in favor of the first conclusion, by denying that such an act, which is a velleity, intrinsically imports an imperfection, as hatred of sin does.

To the second it is answered that, even if that act is formally in God, it is not idle, but is a testimony of the divine mercy. Nor again is it a feigned will: for God does not without cause permit some to fall short of the ultimate end, and to exclude them from His kingdom: but the cause is, that the vindictive justice of God be shown in those who have fallen; and a greater abundance of mercy in those who are saved, as St. Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, ch. 5, and the Apostle, Rom. 9: «But if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory».

To the third it is answered that an antecedent will can also be posited in God with respect to the created angels, by which He willed all the angels to be saved, because He gave to all the grace by which they were ordered to glory, and He enlightened all, that they might be subject to the divine mercy. Nor yet is it necessary that they should have sinned beforehand for God to have willed by consequent will to permit some of them to fall short of the ultimate end; but the good of the universe suffices, and that the justice of God be shown. On which see St. Augustine, book 11 of The City, ch. 18.

To the fourth it is answered that the account is not the same for positing a will in God with respect to possible men, as with respect to those whom God wills to create: because the antecedent will presupposes the will simply taken, concerning things in their natural being, in order that it be verified that God wills to lead the creature to a supernatural end.

To the fifth it is answered that the consideration of a man insofar as he is a sinner does not pertain to the antecedent will, but to the consequent, according to which God wills to punish certain ones. Hence it does not follow that God would will all sinners to be punished. Nor again does He will by consequent will to punish all, otherwise all would be punished; but He wills to punish some, and not others, but to save them.

But to the arguments of the affirmative part it must be said in favor of the negative part. To the first it is answered that the example of St. Thomas concerning a human judge is not apt as regards everything, but it suffices that it be fitting as to this, that an antecedent will be posited in God, at least eminently, but not formally: since that velleity intrinsically imports an imperfection, if it be considered formally. For it bespeaks the inefficacy of a will unable to effect what it desires: as if a merchant would wish to keep his goods, which he nevertheless throws into the sea, because he cannot keep them. And therefore, such a will is not posited in God formally; it is posited, however, eminently, and this suffices.

To the second it is answered that those testimonies of Sacred Scripture are sufficiently explained, in which the benignity of God is commended to us concerning the salvation of all men, if we posit in God an eminent antecedent will.

To the third it is answered that it concludes this very thing, namely that God willed what Christ willed, insofar as He is man, with antecedent will; but this will was in Christ formally, in God however eminently.

From what has been said a fuller understanding can be gathered of that testimony, 1 Tim. 2, Who wills all men to be saved. St. Thomas gives three explanations in the solution to the first. The first is that the distribution be accommodated, that is, as many as are saved, are saved by the will of God. This is St. Augustine's in the Enchiridion, ch. 105, and in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8. The second explanation is of the same author, in the same place, namely that the distribution be taken for all the states of men, and the sense be: God wills that some from all the states of men be saved. As that text of Luke 11 is taken, You tithe... every herb, so that the distribution is made for the kinds of individuals, not for the individuals of kinds. And this explanation is sufficiently germane to the text: because there the Apostle had said beforehand that prayers be made for all, for kings, for rulers, and for those who are established in high station, for this is good before God, and the Savior, who wills all men to be saved; as if he were to say, even soldiers, and rulers, and kings. The third explanation of the article is not only Damascene's, book 2 of the Orthodox Faith, ch. 29, near the end, but also Augustine's, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 33, which we explained in the preceding doubt. Let there be, moreover, a fourth explanation from Augustine, Epist. 59, namely that it is the custom of Sacred Scripture sometimes to speak of the part as of the whole. There is an example in 1 Cor., where at the beginning he praises the Corinthians, but afterwards vehemently reproves them: because some were worthy of praise, but some of reproof. Likewise John 1: «No man receives his testimony: because not all received it». The fifth explanation is Ambrose's, on that passage of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2, where he says: «He wills all men to be saved, if they themselves will it». But it must be noted that, although this conditional is true, yet in the antecedent there is not denoted a cause of the divine will, but rather the divine will works in us the very willing and the perfecting, as is had in Phil. 2. Hence that condition, if they themselves will it, is an explanation of free choice, that is, God does not save the resistant, but the willing; but that they will, the grace of God and His will effects that they will. The sixth explanation can be about the will of sign, of which we shall speak in art. 11. But there is a will of sign in the present matter, because God does many things concerning the salvation of all men which are wont to be signs of will in men, namely because God commands and exhorts that all things pertaining to salvation be pursued: hence God is disposed in the manner of one willing something to come about. The seventh explanation is most elegant and very literal, namely: God wills all men to be saved, that is, God wills and effects that the just will and desire all men to be saved. Paul desired the salvation of all men, and he demands this very thing of the faithful, that they will it. Indeed, most especially Christ the Lord Himself, insofar as He is man, had that velleity and desire, which indeed was effected by the Holy Spirit. This explanation is St. Augustine's, book 22 of The City, ch. 2, where he says: When the saints will and pray according to God that each one be saved, we can say by that manner of speaking, God wills and does not do, so that we say that He wills, who makes them will. But Augustine speaks of a manner of speaking customary in the Sacred Scriptures, that an action which He effects in us by His gift be attributed to God, as Augustine says in book 4 of On Genesis, ch. 9; and so he explains that text, Gen. 22: Now I know that you fear God, that is, I have made you know; and Rom. 8: The Spirit asks for us with unspeakable groanings, that is, He makes us ask; and on Ps. 52, on that verse: The Lord has looked down from heaven upon the sons of men, to see, he teaches this very thing and so explains the aforesaid verse, He has looked down from heaven, that is, He has made the men whose conversation is in heaven to look down. And 1 Cor. 2: The Spirit searches all things; that is, He makes us search. And Deut. 13: The Lord your God tests you, that He may know whether you love Him, namely, that by His gift He may make you know. And by this rule is understood that in Acts 1, where it is said of Judas the traitor, This man possessed the field of the reward of iniquity, namely, because from the money which he received the chief priests bought the potter's field, and so Judas possessed the field, that is, he made it to be possessed. The eighth explanation is that he speaks of Christ. For he says: Before our Savior Jesus Christ, who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, etc.