Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. St. Thomas proves it in three ways, as is clear in the article. And it is certain according to faith, as is clear from the testimony of Wis. 11: «How could anything remain, had you not willed it?»

COMMENTARY.

FOR the understanding of the conclusion it must be noted that something can be understood to act from necessity of nature in two ways. In one way, with the intellect and will not concurring, or concurring only per accidens: as fire generates fire, and man generates man. In the second way, an agent is said to act from necessity of nature because, although it operates by intellect and will, it nevertheless operates insofar as these powers are certain natures, not as they are indifferent to either alternative. And thus the divine intellect and the divine will concur as nature for the production of the Divine Persons. And also our intellect and will operate as certain natures, and are determined to one thing, as regards the specification of the act, with respect to the first principles and to beatitude in general. Since therefore St. Thomas says that God operates through the will, and not from necessity of nature, he understands this of operation ad extra: but if he understood it of operation ad intra, then God would not operate in the first way ad intra from necessity of nature, but He operates in the second way, by intellect and will concurring per se, as an infinitely perfect nature. It must be noted, secondly, about the second argument — for the first is manifest — that the saying that it belongs to a natural agent to produce one effect is to be understood of immediate action, as far as it is on the part of the natural agent, just as the sun is determined to one thing, namely through the action of illuminating: moreover, it causes different effects on account of the difference of the secondary efficient or material causes. It must be noted, thirdly, about the third argument, that St. Thomas speaks on the presupposition of the doctrine of the preceding article, where it was shown that no creature proceeds by necessity from the divine will of God Himself. Hence that consequence is good: if something proceeds in an intelligible mode, it is necessary that it proceed in the mode of will: because he speaks of what proceeds through the intellect, and not from necessity of nature. For this must be determined by the will. Hence the solution to the objection is clear, which could be made against the consequence by adducing the instance of the Son of God, who proceeds in an intelligible mode, and not in the mode of will.

It is asked, however, briefly, since the divine knowledge is a cause of things, as was said in q. 14, art. 8, and the divine will is also a cause, which of the two is prior to the other, or more immediate? It is answered that there can be no difference, except in our way of understanding, according to which the knowledge or art of making is prior to the will of exercising the art. Hence we can say that knowledge has the account of cause in act only as the will determines and applies knowledge to operating. Likewise, a difference can be assigned in another way, that the will indeed, as regards the specification of the effect, is not the immediate cause to which it is assimilated, but rather it is the idea which the effect imitates. But as regards the exercise, the will determines the immediate effect to be made. Moreover, the executive power is more properly called the intellect, according to that word, He spoke, and they were made. Whoever desires more arguments for the conclusion, let him see St. Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 23 and 24; let him also see M. Soto, book 8 of the Physics, where he disputes at length against Aristotle, who erred vehemently in this part.