Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: God wills by necessity that His goodness be. The reason is: because the divine will has a necessary relation to its proper object, which is the divine goodness as it really exists.

Second Conclusion: God does not will things other than Himself by necessity, absolutely speaking. The reason is: because nothing other than God has a necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the object of the divine will.

Third Conclusion: God wills things other than Himself by a necessity of supposition. The reason is: because the divine will cannot be changed; therefore, supposing that God willed me to speak, He necessarily wills that I have a tongue, and the things which are necessary for speaking.

COMMENTARY.

The FIRST Conclusion is most certain, and according to faith. For God is necessarily blessed, and enjoys Himself, and by His will produces the Holy Spirit. And the argument of St. Thomas is evident by natural light. For its explanation an argument is brought against it: our will has a necessary relation to its object, and to beatitude; yet it is not gathered from this that our will necessarily wills beatitude as regards the exercise of the act; therefore the aforesaid argument does not efficaciously conclude that the divine will necessarily, as regards the exercise of the act, wills its object.

It is answered from Cajetan that the argument of St. Thomas, per se speaking, concludes only that the divine will necessarily, as regards specification, wills its own goodness. Moreover, because it was proved elsewhere above that God is pure act, and that the divine will is the divine essence, it is well gathered that it cannot be in potency with respect to the object by which the will itself is specified. But it happens in creatures that the will is not always in act with respect to its proper object, on account of its own imperfection.

About the second conclusion it is doubted whether it is true. It is argued first, for the negative part: God necessarily loves Himself as end, therefore He necessarily wills the means to the end. I prove the consequence: because end and means are said correlatively; therefore if the one is necessary, the other too must be necessary. Secondly. Just as God understands His essence most perfectly in all the ways in which it is intelligible, so He loves His goodness most perfectly in all the ways in which it is lovable: but one of these is that He love as the ultimate end to which all things are ordered: therefore just as God necessarily understands all intelligible things in His Essence, so He necessarily wills and loves all lovable things on account of His goodness.

Thirdly. God necessarily loves His liberality and mercy; but He cannot be liberal and merciful unless He communicate Himself: therefore He necessarily wills things other than Himself.

Fourthly. If God does not necessarily will things other than Himself, it follows that something is God which could have not been God. The sequel is clear: because the will to create man is God; and it could have not been the will to create man: therefore something now is God, which could have not been God.

To this it is answered that the second conclusion of the author is certain according to faith, as is efficaciously proved from Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of His will; but what we do from the counsel of the will, we do not will by necessity. Moreover, it is proved by argument: because when God wills things other than Himself, He wills them as they participate in the goodness of God, and under the account of His goodness: therefore if from the fact that He necessarily wills His own goodness He necessarily willed things other than Himself, it would follow that He willed there to be infinite creatures. The sequel is clear: because the infinite goodness of God is participable in infinite ways. It is confirmed: because then there would be no reason why He willed these creatures, rather than other possible ones, to exist by necessity. And finally, in art. 10 St. Thomas shows that free choice belongs to God; which we shall show to be certain according to faith: therefore God does not will things other than Himself by necessity.

It is answered to the argument. To the first, that the end can be considered in two ways. In one way according to its perfection and dignity, according to which it is possible and fitting that something be done on account of it. In another way according as something is actually done on account of it. If it be considered in the first way, God necessarily loves Himself as end; but not in the second way does He necessarily love Himself by ordering other things to Himself. Hence it does not follow that there is a mutual real relation between the means and the ultimate end: both because they are not of the same order, and also because it is not of the account of that end that it finalize, but it suffices that it be able to finalize the means. Hence it suffices that the means be in potency ordinable to it.

It is answered secondly that the divine goodness can perhaps be called an end with respect to the divine will, in our way of understanding: because we understand the divine goodness as the object and term of God's will, and so there is a mutual relation of reason between the end and that which is toward the end.

To the second it is answered that it is not a necessary or new perfection of the end that other things be actually loved on account of it, but that they be actually lovable on account of the perfection. Moreover, it belongs to the infinite intelligible perfection that all possibles be actually and distinctly understood in it, whence the account is not the same.

To the third it is answered by denying the minor: indeed, God would be merciful and liberal all the more, because the power of showing mercy is His goodness and essence. Moreover, when He actually shows mercy, He manifests His mercy to us; yet He is not Himself more perfectly merciful, as a merciful man is perfected by showing mercy.

To the fourth the sequel is denied. To the proof, I deny the consequence: just as this does not hold, God could have not been creator; and creator is God: therefore something is God which could have not been God. For the appellation is varied, or the argument proceeds from the formal to the identical negatively.

The same argument can also be solved by distinguishing that minor: the volition of creating could have not been, either as regards its own essence, or as regards its relation to the creature's existing in act; in the first way, the minor is denied; in the second way it is granted: and then the consequence is null on account of the defect assigned.