Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion is affirmative. The reason for it is: because every thing, according as it is good and perfect, has an inclination to diffuse its own good into other things: therefore much more does this pertain to the divine will, from which every perfection is derived.

Second Conclusion: God wills Himself as end, but other things as toward the end.

Third Conclusion, to the second: just as God understands things other than Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things other than Himself by willing His own goodness.

COMMENTARY.

The FIRST Conclusion is manifest according to faith, as is clear from the testimony cited in the argument On the contrary, 1 Thess. 4: This is the will of God, your sanctification, and from what was cited in the preceding article.

About the argument of the first conclusion there occurs a twofold doubt: The one: whether it is a perfection of God to communicate Himself to others? For the affirmative part seems true from the discourse of the article. But on the other hand it seems to follow as unfitting that some perfection was lacking to God before He communicated Himself. Cajetan says that to communicate Himself to others in God is a voluntary and free perfection. And that it does not follow from this that some perfection was lacking to God from eternity, absolutely speaking, but that some voluntary perfection was lacking. For he says that to be voluntary diminishes the account of perfection. Yet this way of speaking of Cajetan does not please us, nor does it sound well to posit in God a diminished perfection. Let us therefore say briefly three things: The first is that to be communicative of itself is a natural perfection of God, because this is of the account of the good. The second is that to communicate itself in act and naturally ad intra is also a maximal perfection and from eternity in God. For He generates the Son, and produces the Holy Spirit. The third is: to communicate itself in act ad extra to creatures themselves is not a new perfection coming to God, but only posits anew a real perfection in creatures; in God, however, it bespeaks anew a relation of reason. And in this way it pertains to the divine will to communicate itself in act, not as a necessary consequent, but as befitting the divine goodness, as St. Thomas says at the end of the article.

The other doubt is: what does it signify that he says it pertains to the divine will that it communicate its good to others through a likeness, according as it is possible? To this it is answered, first, that as a matter of fact the matter stands thus, that God communicated Himself to a creature in the highest possible way, when He communicated to human nature in Christ His own personal to-be. Nevertheless, other ways of communicating Himself lie hidden in the divine omnipotence, many indeed in the species of creatable things, but not greater. For it can produce new species of creatures. It is answered secondly that the most plain sense is, when he says that it pertains to the divine goodness to communicate its good to others through a likeness according as it is possible, that is, not by communicating to things its essence through a likeness of the same account, as He communicates it to the Son; but through a certain imperfect and analogous likeness, according as it is possible, in that the creature, which is from nothing, imitates God.

Against the second conclusion an argument of this kind can be made. If God loves us for His own sake as for the ultimate end: therefore His love toward us cannot be a love of friendship, but will always be one of concupiscence. To this it is answered by denying the consequence. For God truly loves us also with a true love of friendship. Nor is it repugnant to this that God wills good to it for His own sake as for the ultimate end: because by this very fact He orders the rational creature to the supreme good, and to its ultimate end. But this can be explained if we imagine what is impossible, namely that there be two Gods, the one the supreme good and ultimate end of the rational creature, the other a friend and benefactor, leading the rational creature to the supreme good. Then surely this latter God would truly be a friend. Since therefore these two perfections concur in one true God, so that the same one is our ultimate end, and at the same time Savior and helper leading us into that ultimate end, nothing prevents Him from being supremely a friend, even if He wills and loves us for His own sake, as for the supreme good, in which our beatitude consists.