Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: in God there is intellect, therefore will. The antecedent is clear from q. 14, art. 1. The consequence is proved: because will follows intellect. He demonstrates this by a comparison of the intelligible form to the natural form, and the argument is as follows: any thing whatsoever has this relation to its own natural form or perfection, that when it does not have it, it tends toward it; and when it has it, it rests in it; but an intellectual nature has such a relation to the intelligible form, that it tends toward it, or rests in it: therefore every intellectual nature has a will. The consequence is clear, because the will is nothing other than the inclination proper to an intellectual nature. And so it is called rational or intellectual appetite, just as the animal appetite is the inclination proper to the sensitive nature; and the natural appetite is the inclination proper to a nature lacking cognition.

Second Conclusion: God's willing is His to-be. The reason for this conclusion is not assigned here by St. Thomas; but the same reason is presupposed, which is assigned concerning the divine intellect, which is the divine to-be, inasmuch as God is pure and most simple act, as was shown in q. 3.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article it must be noted that the first conclusion is so certain that the opposite is against the faith. It is proved from Rom. 12: Be reformed in the newness of your mind, that you may prove what is the good, and well-pleasing, and perfect will of God; and John 3: God so loved the world; therefore, if in God there is properly love, it is necessary that there be properly will. Likewise Wis. 11: How could anything have remained, had you not willed it; and finally, the Catholic faith teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son through the will. Moreover, whoever desires more natural arguments for this conclusion, let him see St. Thomas, book 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 72, where he demonstrates this truth by eight arguments. But the weightiest of all is the one explained in this article. It must be noted secondly that there is a manifold difference among the threefold appetite, namely the natural, common to all things, or even proper to those lacking reason; and the sensitive, proper to animals; and the intellective, which is immaterial and proper to a spiritual nature. The first difference is: for the natural appetite immediately follows the natural form; the others, however, follow the form apprehended by a cognitive power. The second difference is: for the natural appetite does not need to be an elicited and vital act, but it suffices that it be a certain tacit propensity of nature; and such an appetite is in the stone toward the center; the others, however, are elicited and vital acts. The third difference is that the natural appetite is determined to one thing; the others, however, can have a difference according to the variety of forms which the sense or the intellect apprehends. And finally, the natural appetite appetizes in a limited way the good befitting it, e.g. the natural appetite of a stone toward the center is only toward the good befitting a stone according to heaviness. But the sensitive and intellectual appetite appetize any good whatsoever of the composite itself, even of the other powers; e.g. the sensitive appetite, and much more the intellectual, appetizes the operations befitting the supposit, according to sight, hearing, and even according to intellect. For every man naturally desires to know, in such a way that the true is the object of the will according as it is the good of the intellect. Cajetan here gives seven differences, but they are reduced to the aforesaid four.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion is affirmative. The reason for it is: because every thing, according as it is good and perfect, has an inclination to diffuse its own good into other things: therefore much more does this pertain to the divine will, from which every perfection is derived.

Second Conclusion: God wills Himself as end, but other things as toward the end.

Third Conclusion, to the second: just as God understands things other than Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things other than Himself by willing His own goodness.

COMMENTARY.

The FIRST Conclusion is manifest according to faith, as is clear from the testimony cited in the argument On the contrary, 1 Thess. 4: This is the will of God, your sanctification, and from what was cited in the preceding article.

About the argument of the first conclusion there occurs a twofold doubt: The one: whether it is a perfection of God to communicate Himself to others? For the affirmative part seems true from the discourse of the article. But on the other hand it seems to follow as unfitting that some perfection was lacking to God before He communicated Himself. Cajetan says that to communicate Himself to others in God is a voluntary and free perfection. And that it does not follow from this that some perfection was lacking to God from eternity, absolutely speaking, but that some voluntary perfection was lacking. For he says that to be voluntary diminishes the account of perfection. Yet this way of speaking of Cajetan does not please us, nor does it sound well to posit in God a diminished perfection. Let us therefore say briefly three things: The first is that to be communicative of itself is a natural perfection of God, because this is of the account of the good. The second is that to communicate itself in act and naturally ad intra is also a maximal perfection and from eternity in God. For He generates the Son, and produces the Holy Spirit. The third is: to communicate itself in act ad extra to creatures themselves is not a new perfection coming to God, but only posits anew a real perfection in creatures; in God, however, it bespeaks anew a relation of reason. And in this way it pertains to the divine will to communicate itself in act, not as a necessary consequent, but as befitting the divine goodness, as St. Thomas says at the end of the article.

The other doubt is: what does it signify that he says it pertains to the divine will that it communicate its good to others through a likeness, according as it is possible? To this it is answered, first, that as a matter of fact the matter stands thus, that God communicated Himself to a creature in the highest possible way, when He communicated to human nature in Christ His own personal to-be. Nevertheless, other ways of communicating Himself lie hidden in the divine omnipotence, many indeed in the species of creatable things, but not greater. For it can produce new species of creatures. It is answered secondly that the most plain sense is, when he says that it pertains to the divine goodness to communicate its good to others through a likeness according as it is possible, that is, not by communicating to things its essence through a likeness of the same account, as He communicates it to the Son; but through a certain imperfect and analogous likeness, according as it is possible, in that the creature, which is from nothing, imitates God.

Against the second conclusion an argument of this kind can be made. If God loves us for His own sake as for the ultimate end: therefore His love toward us cannot be a love of friendship, but will always be one of concupiscence. To this it is answered by denying the consequence. For God truly loves us also with a true love of friendship. Nor is it repugnant to this that God wills good to it for His own sake as for the ultimate end: because by this very fact He orders the rational creature to the supreme good, and to its ultimate end. But this can be explained if we imagine what is impossible, namely that there be two Gods, the one the supreme good and ultimate end of the rational creature, the other a friend and benefactor, leading the rational creature to the supreme good. Then surely this latter God would truly be a friend. Since therefore these two perfections concur in one true God, so that the same one is our ultimate end, and at the same time Savior and helper leading us into that ultimate end, nothing prevents Him from being supremely a friend, even if He wills and loves us for His own sake, as for the supreme good, in which our beatitude consists.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: God wills by necessity that His goodness be. The reason is: because the divine will has a necessary relation to its proper object, which is the divine goodness as it really exists.

Second Conclusion: God does not will things other than Himself by necessity, absolutely speaking. The reason is: because nothing other than God has a necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the object of the divine will.

Third Conclusion: God wills things other than Himself by a necessity of supposition. The reason is: because the divine will cannot be changed; therefore, supposing that God willed me to speak, He necessarily wills that I have a tongue, and the things which are necessary for speaking.

COMMENTARY.

The FIRST Conclusion is most certain, and according to faith. For God is necessarily blessed, and enjoys Himself, and by His will produces the Holy Spirit. And the argument of St. Thomas is evident by natural light. For its explanation an argument is brought against it: our will has a necessary relation to its object, and to beatitude; yet it is not gathered from this that our will necessarily wills beatitude as regards the exercise of the act; therefore the aforesaid argument does not efficaciously conclude that the divine will necessarily, as regards the exercise of the act, wills its object.

It is answered from Cajetan that the argument of St. Thomas, per se speaking, concludes only that the divine will necessarily, as regards specification, wills its own goodness. Moreover, because it was proved elsewhere above that God is pure act, and that the divine will is the divine essence, it is well gathered that it cannot be in potency with respect to the object by which the will itself is specified. But it happens in creatures that the will is not always in act with respect to its proper object, on account of its own imperfection.

About the second conclusion it is doubted whether it is true. It is argued first, for the negative part: God necessarily loves Himself as end, therefore He necessarily wills the means to the end. I prove the consequence: because end and means are said correlatively; therefore if the one is necessary, the other too must be necessary. Secondly. Just as God understands His essence most perfectly in all the ways in which it is intelligible, so He loves His goodness most perfectly in all the ways in which it is lovable: but one of these is that He love as the ultimate end to which all things are ordered: therefore just as God necessarily understands all intelligible things in His Essence, so He necessarily wills and loves all lovable things on account of His goodness.

Thirdly. God necessarily loves His liberality and mercy; but He cannot be liberal and merciful unless He communicate Himself: therefore He necessarily wills things other than Himself.

Fourthly. If God does not necessarily will things other than Himself, it follows that something is God which could have not been God. The sequel is clear: because the will to create man is God; and it could have not been the will to create man: therefore something now is God, which could have not been God.

To this it is answered that the second conclusion of the author is certain according to faith, as is efficaciously proved from Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of His will; but what we do from the counsel of the will, we do not will by necessity. Moreover, it is proved by argument: because when God wills things other than Himself, He wills them as they participate in the goodness of God, and under the account of His goodness: therefore if from the fact that He necessarily wills His own goodness He necessarily willed things other than Himself, it would follow that He willed there to be infinite creatures. The sequel is clear: because the infinite goodness of God is participable in infinite ways. It is confirmed: because then there would be no reason why He willed these creatures, rather than other possible ones, to exist by necessity. And finally, in art. 10 St. Thomas shows that free choice belongs to God; which we shall show to be certain according to faith: therefore God does not will things other than Himself by necessity.

It is answered to the argument. To the first, that the end can be considered in two ways. In one way according to its perfection and dignity, according to which it is possible and fitting that something be done on account of it. In another way according as something is actually done on account of it. If it be considered in the first way, God necessarily loves Himself as end; but not in the second way does He necessarily love Himself by ordering other things to Himself. Hence it does not follow that there is a mutual real relation between the means and the ultimate end: both because they are not of the same order, and also because it is not of the account of that end that it finalize, but it suffices that it be able to finalize the means. Hence it suffices that the means be in potency ordinable to it.

It is answered secondly that the divine goodness can perhaps be called an end with respect to the divine will, in our way of understanding: because we understand the divine goodness as the object and term of God's will, and so there is a mutual relation of reason between the end and that which is toward the end.

To the second it is answered that it is not a necessary or new perfection of the end that other things be actually loved on account of it, but that they be actually lovable on account of the perfection. Moreover, it belongs to the infinite intelligible perfection that all possibles be actually and distinctly understood in it, whence the account is not the same.

To the third it is answered by denying the minor: indeed, God would be merciful and liberal all the more, because the power of showing mercy is His goodness and essence. Moreover, when He actually shows mercy, He manifests His mercy to us; yet He is not Himself more perfectly merciful, as a merciful man is perfected by showing mercy.

To the fourth the sequel is denied. To the proof, I deny the consequence: just as this does not hold, God could have not been creator; and creator is God: therefore something is God which could have not been God. For the appellation is varied, or the argument proceeds from the formal to the identical negatively.

The same argument can also be solved by distinguishing that minor: the volition of creating could have not been, either as regards its own essence, or as regards its relation to the creature's existing in act; in the first way, the minor is denied; in the second way it is granted: and then the consequence is null on account of the defect assigned.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. St. Thomas proves it in three ways, as is clear in the article. And it is certain according to faith, as is clear from the testimony of Wis. 11: «How could anything remain, had you not willed it?»

COMMENTARY.

FOR the understanding of the conclusion it must be noted that something can be understood to act from necessity of nature in two ways. In one way, with the intellect and will not concurring, or concurring only per accidens: as fire generates fire, and man generates man. In the second way, an agent is said to act from necessity of nature because, although it operates by intellect and will, it nevertheless operates insofar as these powers are certain natures, not as they are indifferent to either alternative. And thus the divine intellect and the divine will concur as nature for the production of the Divine Persons. And also our intellect and will operate as certain natures, and are determined to one thing, as regards the specification of the act, with respect to the first principles and to beatitude in general. Since therefore St. Thomas says that God operates through the will, and not from necessity of nature, he understands this of operation ad extra: but if he understood it of operation ad intra, then God would not operate in the first way ad intra from necessity of nature, but He operates in the second way, by intellect and will concurring per se, as an infinitely perfect nature. It must be noted, secondly, about the second argument — for the first is manifest — that the saying that it belongs to a natural agent to produce one effect is to be understood of immediate action, as far as it is on the part of the natural agent, just as the sun is determined to one thing, namely through the action of illuminating: moreover, it causes different effects on account of the difference of the secondary efficient or material causes. It must be noted, thirdly, about the third argument, that St. Thomas speaks on the presupposition of the doctrine of the preceding article, where it was shown that no creature proceeds by necessity from the divine will of God Himself. Hence that consequence is good: if something proceeds in an intelligible mode, it is necessary that it proceed in the mode of will: because he speaks of what proceeds through the intellect, and not from necessity of nature. For this must be determined by the will. Hence the solution to the objection is clear, which could be made against the consequence by adducing the instance of the Son of God, who proceeds in an intelligible mode, and not in the mode of will.

It is asked, however, briefly, since the divine knowledge is a cause of things, as was said in q. 14, art. 8, and the divine will is also a cause, which of the two is prior to the other, or more immediate? It is answered that there can be no difference, except in our way of understanding, according to which the knowledge or art of making is prior to the will of exercising the art. Hence we can say that knowledge has the account of cause in act only as the will determines and applies knowledge to operating. Likewise, a difference can be assigned in another way, that the will indeed, as regards the specification of the effect, is not the immediate cause to which it is assimilated, but rather it is the idea which the effect imitates. But as regards the exercise, the will determines the immediate effect to be made. Moreover, the executive power is more properly called the intellect, according to that word, He spoke, and they were made. Whoever desires more arguments for the conclusion, let him see St. Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 23 and 24; let him also see M. Soto, book 8 of the Physics, where he disputes at length against Aristotle, who erred vehemently in this part.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is negative. Its reason, in its force, is this: if there were given some cause of the divine will, it would be either outside God, or in God Himself. But it cannot be outside, because every cause, in that it is a cause, is superior, and that whose cause it is depends on it; which it is impossible for the divine will to have. Again, neither can the cause be in God Himself: because God by a single act wills all things in His goodness; but the same thing cannot be the cause of itself: therefore there is given no cause of the divine will ad intra. And this is the discourse of St. Thomas in the Summa. Which he explains from a comparison to the act of the divine intellect, of which no cause is assigned. Let the theologian observe that in no genus of cause can a cause of the divine will be given, e.g. neither final, nor efficient, nor formal, nor material. And this is to be observed for the matter On Grace. For the will of God presupposes nothing of which it is not itself the cause.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article Cajetan notes four propositions, for the way of speaking in this matter. The first is, that in the nature of things some things are for the sake of others. This is most evident: for the fruits of the earth are for the sake of animals, the world for the sake of man, and man for the sake of God. For this is the order which the author of nature disposed. The second proposition: God wills one thing willed for the sake of another. This too is true: because it does not signify a final cause of the divine will, but only of one thing willed, which God wills to be for the sake of another. The third proposition: this is willed by God for the sake of another thing willed. This seems to have an ambiguity: because the sense seems to be that the reason for willing one thing is the willing of another. But Cajetan says it is true, because the causality signified in it is posited only on the part of the things willed. And so St. Thomas speaks, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 87 and 88, where he says that one thing willed by God is the cause for another to fall under the order of the divine will. It must be noted, however, with the same Cajetan, that the act of the divine will lacks a cause, not only as it is such a being, but also as it is a willing, or a volition attaining the things willed. And so the active attainment of the divine will with respect to one thing willed is not the cause of the active attainment with respect to another thing willed. Yet with this there stands that the same act of the divine will has a cause on the part of one thing willed with respect to another; in such a way, surely, that the passive attainment of one thing willed is the cause of the passive attainment of another. As if we were to say that the being willed of one thing is caused by the being willed of another; and not only is the natural being of one caused on account of the perfect being of another: e.g. man has a being willed by God, and brute animals have a being willed by God, and because man has a being willed, brute animals have a being willed. The fourth proposition: God wills this because He wills another: this in rigor is false, because it imports a cause of the act of the divine will, and that its attainment of one thing willed is caused by its attainment of another. Hence St. Thomas in the article denies this, God wills this on account of this, because it makes the same sense; he grants, however, this, God wills this to be on account of this. Cajetan says, however, that sometimes locutions of this kind are to be interpreted piously, even if in scholastic rigor they seem false, as if, e.g., a preacher were to say: Because God wills the sinner to be converted, He wills him to be punished temporally; surely the causality is to be referred piously to the things willed themselves among themselves, not to the divine will.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: It is necessary that the will of God be always fulfilled. This conclusion is to be understood of the will of God simply and absolutely. The reason is: because every universal cause always attains each effect, so that there is no effect which departs from the order of the universal cause; but the divine will is a universal cause, as was said in art. 5: therefore the will of God is always fulfilled, that is, God always effects what He wills.

For the explanation of the major proposition St. Thomas notes that, since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the same account or proportion holds in agent causes as in formal causes; but in formal causes it so happens that, although something can fall short of some particular form, yet nothing can fall short of the universal form, e.g. something can fail to be a man, but nothing can be that is not a being: therefore, proportionally, in agent causes, a particular agent can indeed not have an effect that is assimilated to its particular form, but it cannot be that a universal agent be frustrated of the effect corresponding to its form.

Second Conclusion, to the first: what God wills with antecedent will does not always come about, yet what He wills with consequent will always comes about.

Third Conclusion, explanatory of the preceding: The antecedent will is the one that regards that which, although it is good in its first consideration, nevertheless, as it is considered together with some adjunct, is otherwise disposed. But the consequent will is the one that regards some good which, with all its circumstances, retains the account of good.

There is an example: A judge, by antecedent will, wills every man to live in the commonwealth, but by consequent will he wills to kill the murderer. Behold, in the first consideration, a man is considered with the circumstance of sin set aside; but in the second consideration, a man is considered as a murderer.

Fourth Conclusion, in the same place: what we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but in a certain respect; but what we will consequently, we will simply. The reason for this is: because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves; but in themselves they are in the particular, with all their circumstances: therefore we will simply according as we will something with all the particular circumstances considered: which is to will simply.

COMMENTARY.

IT must be noted in this article that the first conclusion, in the explained sense, is certain according to faith. It is proved from Ps. 113: «All whatsoever the Lord willed, He has done»; and Isa. 46: «My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done». It must be noted secondly that in the Sacred Scriptures there are found testimonies in which the will of God seems to be affirmed as not always fulfilled: e.g. Matt. 23: «How often would I have gathered together your children, as the hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and you would not». And 1 Tim. 2: «Who wills all men to be saved»; and yet it is certain that not all are saved, and therefore St. Thomas brings in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, by which these and similar testimonies are explained in a Catholic way.

IT IS DOUBTED, so that the doctrine of St. Thomas may become better known, whether the antecedent will is some act formally existing in God, as the consequent will is an act formally and properly existing in God? That is, to ask whether God has this act properly and without metaphor, I would that all men be saved. As a merchant compelled by a storm has this act, I would keep my goods, but lest I myself perish, I will absolutely to throw them into the sea.

It is argued first, for the negative part. Such an act, as St. Thomas says in the article, ad 1, can rather be called a velleity than an absolute will; but a velleity intrinsically bespeaks an imperfection: therefore such an act is not in God.

Secondly. If that velleity is posited in God expressly and formally, it follows that in God there is an idle and feigned will. The sequel is proved: if, in human affairs, some father had an absolute will of excluding his son from the inheritance, for no other reason than because he wills it, and otherwise said that he would wish to admit that son to the inheritance, such a velleity would seem idle and feigned, because if he truly willed it, he would certainly do it, since he could do so without any loss to himself. So therefore, since God wills to exclude certain ones absolutely from His kingdom, it does not seem credible that in God there is that affection of will, I would admit these.

Thirdly. If it is verified that God would will all men to be saved by an express and formal act of will, by parity of reason it would be verified that He would will all the angels to be saved: but with respect to the angels He did not have such a will: therefore neither with respect to men. The minor is proved: because with respect to the angels no sin can be assigned on account of which God withheld the help of grace by which they would have persevered, if those who fell had had it, whereas in men the cause can be assigned, namely original sin.

Fourthly. If this act is formally in God, I would that all men be saved, with respect to men created or to be created, by parity of reason it would be posited with respect to those who are neither created nor to be created. The consequence is clear: because such an antecedent will posits nothing in reality: therefore it can be with respect to non-existing things, at some difference of time.

Fifthly. Because by parity of reason it would also have to be granted that God wills all sinners to be punished forever. I prove the sequel: because for one who sins against God to be punished is good and just, absolutely considered: therefore by antecedent will God wills it; the consequent is false: for the contradictory is true, Ezek. 33: As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the wicked.

But for the affirmative part it is argued first, from St. Thomas in this article, ad 1, where he says that just as a judge who is a man has that antecedent will by which he would wish to preserve all men, so God wills every man to be saved. And in On Truth, q. 23, art. 2, he seems to think the same.

Secondly. Because if God does not really have formally in Himself some affection or will, at least antecedent, those things which are said in the Sacred Scriptures about the divine benevolence toward men can hardly be explained: e.g. Rom. 2: «Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to repentance?»; and 2 Pet. 3: «The Lord does not delay His promises, as some imagine, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to repentance». But if in God there is absolutely no formal will with respect to objects of this kind, which do not actually come about, these locutions will seem rather to be fictions than affections of God toward the salvation of men: therefore. It is confirmed by the example of a father in human affairs, who wills his son to lead a studious life, and certainly such an affection is good, and a testimony of the goodness of nature: therefore such an affection can be posited in God.

Thirdly. In Christ the Lord there was such a velleity: for Christ would wish all men to be saved: therefore it is not repugnant to God that He will all men to be saved. Indeed, it seems to follow by a good consequence: for whatever Christ willed with His human will, God also willed Him to will such things; and consequently, He willed the object of Christ's will, and it was pleasing to God. For Christ always willed the things that were pleasing to God. Nor is it of any avail to answer that velleities of this kind import an imperfection in the one willing, and therefore are not in God. For although this imperfection is found in a creature, yet in God that velleity can properly be, in such a way that the imperfection signified is referred to the effect, not to God Himself.

FOR the decision of this difficulty let the first conclusion be: It is probable, and can be defended without prejudice to the faith, that in the divine will there is a formal and express act with respect to certain goods which indeed do not come about, but are commanded by God to come about, or fall under counsel, or are possible to come about according to the common law and the common means which have been proposed by God. The conclusion is explained: for we do not wish to assert that there is a distinct act of the divine will by which it would will these goods to come about, apart from the act by which God wills His own goodness: for in God there is no more than a single act of will. But we wish to say that, just as the very act of will by which God necessarily wills His own goodness is the act by which He freely wills things other than Himself, and nevertheless we formally posit in God a free act of will with respect to creatures; so proportionally, the very same act by which God wills absolutely that certain goods come about is also the act by which He would will other goods to come about, which nevertheless do not come about. This conclusion is proved by the arguments made for the affirmative part. And it is confirmed: for just as we posit formally in God an act of free choice, which is with respect to things ad extra, whose formal object nevertheless is not any thing ad extra (for no formal account of the divine will can be anything but the divine goodness); so too it will not be unfitting that the same act, with respect to certain creatures, be a velleity and a desire, with the imperfection removed.

Second Conclusion: It seems much more probable that in God there is not formally a will which is signified by this name, velleity, but it suffices that such an antecedent will be posited in God eminently. The conclusion is explained by an example: for just as that maxim is also verified of God, every agent acts insofar as it is in act, although the creatures of which God is the author are not in Him formally, but eminently; so the good affections which are found in men, of which God is the cause, are also in God formally or eminently: e.g. the affection of a Christian man, by which he wills all men to be saved, of which God is the cause, must be in God formally or eminently. The conclusion, therefore, is proved as to its former part by the arguments made for the negative part: from which the second part is immediately gathered: because if such a will is not formally in God, it must be in Him eminently, since God is the cause of it in the saints. Moreover, the arguments made for the first conclusion suffice to prove that that will is to be posited in God, at least eminently. From what has been said it follows that, proportionally, it must be said that with respect to the sins which are committed, which God would not have come about, a nolleity is to be posited in God formally or eminently.

BUT to the arguments of both parts an answer must be given. To the first argument, then, made for the negative part, it is answered in favor of the first conclusion, by denying that such an act, which is a velleity, intrinsically imports an imperfection, as hatred of sin does.

To the second it is answered that, even if that act is formally in God, it is not idle, but is a testimony of the divine mercy. Nor again is it a feigned will: for God does not without cause permit some to fall short of the ultimate end, and to exclude them from His kingdom: but the cause is, that the vindictive justice of God be shown in those who have fallen; and a greater abundance of mercy in those who are saved, as St. Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, ch. 5, and the Apostle, Rom. 9: «But if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory».

To the third it is answered that an antecedent will can also be posited in God with respect to the created angels, by which He willed all the angels to be saved, because He gave to all the grace by which they were ordered to glory, and He enlightened all, that they might be subject to the divine mercy. Nor yet is it necessary that they should have sinned beforehand for God to have willed by consequent will to permit some of them to fall short of the ultimate end; but the good of the universe suffices, and that the justice of God be shown. On which see St. Augustine, book 11 of The City, ch. 18.

To the fourth it is answered that the account is not the same for positing a will in God with respect to possible men, as with respect to those whom God wills to create: because the antecedent will presupposes the will simply taken, concerning things in their natural being, in order that it be verified that God wills to lead the creature to a supernatural end.

To the fifth it is answered that the consideration of a man insofar as he is a sinner does not pertain to the antecedent will, but to the consequent, according to which God wills to punish certain ones. Hence it does not follow that God would will all sinners to be punished. Nor again does He will by consequent will to punish all, otherwise all would be punished; but He wills to punish some, and not others, but to save them.

But to the arguments of the affirmative part it must be said in favor of the negative part. To the first it is answered that the example of St. Thomas concerning a human judge is not apt as regards everything, but it suffices that it be fitting as to this, that an antecedent will be posited in God, at least eminently, but not formally: since that velleity intrinsically imports an imperfection, if it be considered formally. For it bespeaks the inefficacy of a will unable to effect what it desires: as if a merchant would wish to keep his goods, which he nevertheless throws into the sea, because he cannot keep them. And therefore, such a will is not posited in God formally; it is posited, however, eminently, and this suffices.

To the second it is answered that those testimonies of Sacred Scripture are sufficiently explained, in which the benignity of God is commended to us concerning the salvation of all men, if we posit in God an eminent antecedent will.

To the third it is answered that it concludes this very thing, namely that God willed what Christ willed, insofar as He is man, with antecedent will; but this will was in Christ formally, in God however eminently.

From what has been said a fuller understanding can be gathered of that testimony, 1 Tim. 2, Who wills all men to be saved. St. Thomas gives three explanations in the solution to the first. The first is that the distribution be accommodated, that is, as many as are saved, are saved by the will of God. This is St. Augustine's in the Enchiridion, ch. 105, and in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8. The second explanation is of the same author, in the same place, namely that the distribution be taken for all the states of men, and the sense be: God wills that some from all the states of men be saved. As that text of Luke 11 is taken, You tithe... every herb, so that the distribution is made for the kinds of individuals, not for the individuals of kinds. And this explanation is sufficiently germane to the text: because there the Apostle had said beforehand that prayers be made for all, for kings, for rulers, and for those who are established in high station, for this is good before God, and the Savior, who wills all men to be saved; as if he were to say, even soldiers, and rulers, and kings. The third explanation of the article is not only Damascene's, book 2 of the Orthodox Faith, ch. 29, near the end, but also Augustine's, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 33, which we explained in the preceding doubt. Let there be, moreover, a fourth explanation from Augustine, Epist. 59, namely that it is the custom of Sacred Scripture sometimes to speak of the part as of the whole. There is an example in 1 Cor., where at the beginning he praises the Corinthians, but afterwards vehemently reproves them: because some were worthy of praise, but some of reproof. Likewise John 1: «No man receives his testimony: because not all received it». The fifth explanation is Ambrose's, on that passage of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2, where he says: «He wills all men to be saved, if they themselves will it». But it must be noted that, although this conditional is true, yet in the antecedent there is not denoted a cause of the divine will, but rather the divine will works in us the very willing and the perfecting, as is had in Phil. 2. Hence that condition, if they themselves will it, is an explanation of free choice, that is, God does not save the resistant, but the willing; but that they will, the grace of God and His will effects that they will. The sixth explanation can be about the will of sign, of which we shall speak in art. 11. But there is a will of sign in the present matter, because God does many things concerning the salvation of all men which are wont to be signs of will in men, namely because God commands and exhorts that all things pertaining to salvation be pursued: hence God is disposed in the manner of one willing something to come about. The seventh explanation is most elegant and very literal, namely: God wills all men to be saved, that is, God wills and effects that the just will and desire all men to be saved. Paul desired the salvation of all men, and he demands this very thing of the faithful, that they will it. Indeed, most especially Christ the Lord Himself, insofar as He is man, had that velleity and desire, which indeed was effected by the Holy Spirit. This explanation is St. Augustine's, book 22 of The City, ch. 2, where he says: When the saints will and pray according to God that each one be saved, we can say by that manner of speaking, God wills and does not do, so that we say that He wills, who makes them will. But Augustine speaks of a manner of speaking customary in the Sacred Scriptures, that an action which He effects in us by His gift be attributed to God, as Augustine says in book 4 of On Genesis, ch. 9; and so he explains that text, Gen. 22: Now I know that you fear God, that is, I have made you know; and Rom. 8: The Spirit asks for us with unspeakable groanings, that is, He makes us ask; and on Ps. 52, on that verse: The Lord has looked down from heaven upon the sons of men, to see, he teaches this very thing and so explains the aforesaid verse, He has looked down from heaven, that is, He has made the men whose conversation is in heaven to look down. And 1 Cor. 2: The Spirit searches all things; that is, He makes us search. And Deut. 13: The Lord your God tests you, that He may know whether you love Him, namely, that by His gift He may make you know. And by this rule is understood that in Acts 1, where it is said of Judas the traitor, This man possessed the field of the reward of iniquity, namely, because from the money which he received the chief priests bought the potter's field, and so Judas possessed the field, that is, he made it to be possessed. The eighth explanation is that he speaks of Christ. For he says: Before our Savior Jesus Christ, who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, etc.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: The will of God is altogether immutable. The reason is: His substance and knowledge are altogether immutable: therefore also His will. The antecedent is clear from what was said above, in q. 9 and q. 14. The consequence is proved: because the will is changed not indeed when someone wills contrary things to come about at different times; for this can happen while the will remains immutably: but then the will changes, when someone begins to will what he previously did not will, or to not-will what he previously willed; but this cannot happen unless a change be presupposed, either on the part of cognition, because he begins to know what he previously did not know; or with a change made concerning the disposition of the substance, insofar as something begins anew to be fitting to him. Therefore, since neither of these has a place in God, it follows well that His will is not mutable.

COMMENTARY.

The Conclusion of this article is certain according to faith, as is clear from James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration. But the argument of the article will be examined in art. 10. About the solution to the fourth it must be noted that the argument can thus be dissolved in dialectical form by distinguishing that maxim, everything that has a potency to opposites is mutable: if it be understood of passive potency, I grant it, but this is not in God. If, however, it be understood of active potency, I deny the maxim. Because the active potency of God is from eternity destined to every effect which comes about in time. Hence we can say that, by supposition, God necessarily wills all things that He wills: and so the divine will is not indifferent by supposition: because it is already destined to one part of the contradiction, with respect to each effect.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: The divine will imposes necessity on certain things willed, but not on all. The reason for this conclusion is in the Summa: because the divine will is most efficacious, and the effect follows it in the mode in which God wills it to come about; but He wills, for this, that there be order in things for the completion of the universe, that certain things come about by necessity, certain things contingently: therefore. From this it follows, against the opinion of certain men, that effects willed by God do not come about contingently for this reason, that the proximate causes are contingent; but for this reason, that God willed them to come about contingently, and so prepared contingent causes. Second Conclusion, to the first: The divine will imposes conditional necessity on things willed, insofar as this conditional is necessary: If God wills this, it is necessary that this be.

COMMENTARY.

The doctrine of this question of the article is the completion of the doctrine of St. Thomas above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 1, where he says that although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect can nevertheless be contingent on account of a proximate contingent cause. Here, however, he proceeds further, assigning an earlier cause of the contingency of things, in such a way that this contingency is not only referred to second causes, but is chiefly reduced to the efficacy of the divine will.

IT IS DOUBTED principally in this article whether the first conclusion is true, and its argument, and whether the arguments by which St. Thomas rejects the contrary opinion are good. It is argued first for the negative part. The divine will imposes necessity on all things: therefore the second part of the conclusion is false. I prove the antecedent: because this is a necessary consequence, God from eternity willed things to be in time; therefore they are. The antecedent is necessary: therefore also the consequent. The minor is proved in two ways. First, because it is a proposition about the past and true, therefore necessary, inasmuch as there is no potency with respect to the past; then secondly, since the will of God is immutable: therefore at least the antecedent is necessary, by a necessity of infallibility, therefore the consequent is not contingent. And it is confirmed: because St. Thomas, above, ad 2, says that this is necessary absolutely, God knew the Antichrist would be; but the account is the same for this, God willed the Antichrist to be, therefore it is necessary absolutely. Likewise, in the same place, in the solution to the first he says that the knowledge of God is a first necessary cause: therefore the will too is a first necessary cause. The consequence is clear: because, in our way of understanding, the account of causing belongs to the divine knowledge from the divine will itself, which applies knowledge to the work.

It is argued, secondly, against the former part of the conclusion. The divine will, whatever it wills outside God, wills freely and not by necessity, as we said in art. 3: therefore it imposes necessity on no thing. The consequence is clear: because there is no thing which cannot not be, with respect to the divine liberty, which is the first cause of all things: therefore the former part of the conclusion is false. The antecedent is proved: because heaven can be annihilated by God, and the angels: therefore they do not have a necessity of being simply and absolutely, but only from supposition, supposing that God wills them to be. Thirdly, against the argument of the conclusion. The divine will is not a more efficacious cause with respect to one thing than another: therefore, with respect to the divine will and its efficacy, no account of a difference can be gathered as to why certain things come about contingently, others by necessity. It is confirmed first: because with respect to the efficacy of the divine will, all things come about infallibly: therefore nothing comes about contingently with respect to it. The consequence is clear: because contingent and infallible are opposed, at least with respect to the same cause. It is confirmed secondly, and I prove that contingent and infallible or necessary are simply repugnant, both from Aristotle, 6 Metaphysics, asserting that necessary and contingent are differences of being; and also because if some effect is contingent, then, simply speaking, it can not be: therefore its contradictory, namely 'it comes about necessarily,' is simply false: therefore neither will it be verified with respect to the divine will. I prove the consequence: because what is verified with respect to the divine knowledge and will is verified simply, and consequently there would be two contradictories simultaneously true. Fourthly, against the former argument, by which St. Thomas rejects that opinion which reduces the contingency of things to second contingent causes, the argument is this. The effect of the first cause can be contingent on account of a second cause that does not impede but modifies the influx of the first cause itself: therefore it is false what St. Thomas says, that the effect of the first cause is contingent for this reason, because it is impeded by a second cause. The antecedent is clear in the first movable, whose influx is indeed never impeded by a second cause, and yet through the sole modification of the planets contingent effects arise. Fifthly, against the second argument, by which he rejects the same opinion. For that consequence seems to be none at all, namely, if the distinction of contingent things from necessary things is referred only to second causes, it follows that such a distinction is beside the intention and will of God. For it can be answered that nevertheless the second causes themselves are willed by God, on account of the perfection of the universe; and consequently that defect of contingency is permitted by God. Sixthly: for granted that there is some higher cause of the contingency of things, nevertheless the nature of the defectible second causes will be the proper root of contingency: therefore that opinion is blamed undeservedly, especially since St. Thomas himself, above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 1, says that, although the first cause is necessary, the effect can nevertheless be contingent on account of a proximate contingent cause. Seventhly. Sin is a contingent effect of a defectible rational nature, and yet the will of God is not the cause of sin; therefore the divine will is not the universal cause and root of the contingency of things. Lastly. Even if, per impossibile, God Himself operated ad extra from necessity of nature, there would nevertheless be contingent effects: therefore the will of God is not the first root of the contingency of things. The antecedent is clear from the opinion of Aristotle, 8 Physics and 12 Metaphysics, who, although he thought the world flowed from God by necessity of nature, nevertheless posited contingent effects, referring them to second causes as regards contingency.

On this difficulty the opinion of Cajetan is as follows. He notes first that the title of the article is understood of absolute necessity, by which certain parts of the universe are necessary, such as the heavenly bodies and the angels; certain others, on the contrary, are contingent, such as singular corruptible things, and fortuitous things, and free things. He notes secondly that it is one thing to ask whether all things are necessary, and another to ask whether necessity is imposed on all things willed by God by the divine will itself. The first is not formally a matter of the present consideration, but materially: because here it is a question of the divine will, and of its effects as they are from it: and therefore the sense is whether, from the fact that something is willed by God, it follows that it is per se necessary in itself, absolutely speaking. He notes thirdly that in this article nothing else is sought than what is the first and proper root of contingency, and this in the genus of efficient cause. Nor does the question descend to such contingency in particular; but the question is about contingency absolutely, whether the proper and first root of contingency is some condition of second causes, or rather some condition of the divine will. He notes fourthly that an instrument can concur to a work in two ways: in one way when the defect of the instrument does not fall under the choice of the craftsman, but follows from elsewhere, from the necessity of the matter; in the other way, when the defect itself is chosen by the craftsman, who on purpose wills to effect an imperfect work. When, therefore, the craftsman operates in the former way, then the concurrence of the craftsman is not only modified, but even impeded by the defective instrument, so that the work not be so perfect. Hence the imperfection of the work is not attributed to the craftsman, but only to the instrument. But when the craftsman operates in the second way, then the concurrence of the craftsman is not impeded but modified, since he intends to make such an imperfect work through such an instrument. These things presupposed, Cajetan says, explaining the opinion of St. Thomas, it is necessary that the cause of contingency be reduced, as to its first and proper root, to the divine will as antecedent and efficient cause, and not, as the opinion refuted in the article said, to the defectibility found in second causes. And the reason is: because when the defect is reduced only to the second cause, then the defectibility of the second cause is not from the choice of the first agent; but God chose such contingent causes: otherwise such a contingent effect would be beside the intention and will of God, which is unfitting. Likewise, when the power of the first cause is only modified by the second cause, it is not impeded from its effect, but rather the effect of the second cause is more principally attributed to the first cause. But when the defect of the work is reduced only to the condition of the second cause, as to its first root, it must be that the condition of the second cause is impeding, and not only modifying, the efficacy of the first cause: but it is a great unfittingness to say that there is some second cause which can impede the will of God from producing its effect: which nevertheless follows from the opinion refuted in the text. Rightly, therefore, it is gathered that the first root of the contingency of things is the divine will, most efficacious for making things, not only as regards substance, but also as regards every mode of them, as regards their coming to be and as regards their being. Hence it wills certain things to come about by necessity, certain things contingently. But its will strongly attains all things, fitting necessary causes to certain effects, contingent and defectible causes to others, from which contingent effects come about. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, as it is understood and explained by Cajetan. But before we bring forward our own opinion, we must first, concerning the fourth notable of Cajetan, advert to something. For it seems worthy of animadversion that he compares the second mode of concurrence of a defective instrument, namely from the choice of the craftsman, with the concurrence of the defectible second causes with respect to the divine will, which, from choice, operates through such defectible causes. And as to this, Cajetan's explanation is true. But it is displeasing that he says the power of the first cause is modified by the second cause, yet not impeded: which indeed I reckon false, if it is understood of the most universal first cause, such as the divine will is. Indeed, the divine will modifies all things, while it is the most universal and most efficacious cause of each thing, both as regards coming to be and as regards being and as regards mode. Nor, with respect to the active attainment of the divine will, can there be given any cause, as Cajetan says, which in some genus modifies it; well, however, with respect to the passive attainment, concerning one thing willed, is there given a modifying cause, namely another passive attainment of another thing willed, as e.g. the passive attainment of the divine will, with respect to the motion of the heavens, is modified by the concurrence of second causes, which the divine will also attains. Moreover, the more immediate concurrence of the divine will, considered as it stands on the part of the agent and as it is an action, cannot be modified by anything lower, and the reason seems evident: because every cause that is modifiable by another does not determine itself to a special effect; but the divine will determines itself to any effect whatsoever, however special and singular, to be produced: therefore the active concurrence of the divine will is not modifiable by a lower cause. And it is confirmed: because it would be to posit the greatest imperfection in God, to assert that, just as the altogether same concurrence of the sun produces distinct effects because it is modified by distinct lower causes, so the concurrence of the divine will, as far as it is on its own part, remains indifferent, but is modified and determined to distinct effects by distinct lower causes. Moreover, just as the free choice of man is related to those things which are wholly subjected to it, so, indeed much more efficaciously, the divine will is related to those things which are subjected to it, which are in fact all things; but the concurrence of our free choice to do something, through subordinate means, is not modified by the means themselves, but rather free choice modifies the motion and concurrence of the means which are subjected to it: as e.g. when a craftsman wills to paint an image, he himself exactly adapts the brush, prepares the colors, moves his hand, determines the idea in his mind which he wills to imitate. Then surely, the craftsman's free choice is not modified by those means, insofar as they are subjected to it, except perhaps by impeding the perfection of the effect, insofar as they are not subjected to it in some respect: but rather the craftsman himself, through his free choice and art, determines such means for himself, insofar as they are subjected to it. Therefore much less can something created be found which determines the active concurrence or active attainment of the divine will. Finally it is argued: for every cause whose action is modified by another depends on that other in its operation in some genus of cause: but God's will in its operation does not depend on any cause: therefore its action is not modified by anything. I prove the major inductively: for even the first movable, insofar as its concurrence to the special effect of the generation of a horse is modifiable, depends in the genus of material cause on a particular cause, and on its dispositions, inasmuch as the first movable itself is not the cause of the whole being, but operates with something presupposed; and consonant with this is what the philosophers say, that causes are causes to one another, because they depend on one another and are modified by one another. There is another example in artificial things. The musician depends on the musical instrument itself, inasmuch as through music he cannot produce the instrument itself. Again, the craftsman who makes the instrument depends on the matter from which the instrument must be made, in the genus of material cause. And this doctrine is greatly to be noted for the matter of grace and predestination, in which many are deceived, thinking that the free choice of man modifies the equal concurrence and help of God, determining it to effect more or less. And so some are wont ignorantly to say that, with an equal help of God's grace, one is converted and another is not. By which path one easily falls into the error of the Pelagians. But of this elsewhere, and below, q. 23.

Now, however, let it suffice for us to assert that not only can a second cause not impede the concurrence of the most universal cause, as St. Thomas said, art. 6, ad 3: but neither can it modify the concurrence of the most universal cause, which works all things, and in all things what it wills and as it wills. And therefore it effectively modifies one second cause by means of another; or one effect by means of another. And so is fulfilled what the Apostle says, Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of His will.

Now, for a fuller understanding of this doctrine, and the solution of the arguments which we made above, it is necessary before all things to distinguish the modes of the necessary and the contingent. It must be noted, then, first, that the necessary is opposed, per se first, to the possible-not-to-be, as to its contradictory. Hence these are contradictories: 'It is necessary that it run' and 'It is possible that the heaven not be.' It is then opposed to the possible contrarily: hence these are contraries, 'It is necessary that Peter run,' 'It is impossible that Peter run.' Moreover, the necessary is opposed to the contingent according to the part virtually included in the contingent, namely: because the contingent says 'it is possible to be' and 'it is possible not to be,' and by reason of this second part it is opposed to the necessary of the contingent. Since therefore in as many ways as one of opposites is said, the other is also said, it must be noted secondly that the necessary, as far as the present consideration goes, can be taken in four ways. In the first way it is said principally of God Himself, whose To-be is His Essence above every genus of being. Hence God's to-be is necessary by the most absolute necessity, which in no way depends on anything. In this way nothing is necessary besides God; but analogically something created can be said to be necessary. And the reason is: because the necessity of being of the heavens does not arise from their essence, but from the free will of God, who could will not to communicate that being, and has the power of annihilating all creatures. And this is what is said in Ps. 101: In the beginning, O Lord, you founded the earth, and the works of your hands are the heavens: They shall perish, but you remain, etc. But you are the same, and your years shall not fail. Where the Holy Spirit teaches that the being of God alone is necessary, wholly, absolutely, and independently of anything. Wherefore, just as being is said analogically of God and creatures, so also necessary. In the second way it is called necessary logically or metaphysically, and so it is verified of certain propositions, or of their significates, in which a definition is affirmed of the defined, or a part of the definition, or a proper passion of its proper subject: as, e.g., 'man is a rational animal,' 'man is capable of laughter,' is something necessary and of eternal truth. But it must be observed here that no truth is eternal in itself formally, except in the divine intellect. For the truth which is formally in a created mind is not eternal, just as the mind itself is not; but the truth in the divine mind is eternal and the same as God Himself. And so it is verified that 'man is an animal' is of eternal truth, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 16, art. 7, ad 4; and q. 10, art. 3, ad 3: not because the truth which is formally in the enuntiable is eternal, but because the root and foundation of that truth is eternal in the divine mind. In the third way certain things are said to be necessary physically or naturally, e.g. that the heavens are, that the angels are, that the world is. But it must be observed that the necessity of these things does not arise from their intrinsic account per se first and positively, as 'capable of laughter' arises from the rational essence itself: otherwise 'the heaven is' would be of perpetual and eternal truth. But they are called necessary beings because, after they have once received being, there is not in the whole nature of things, nor can there be, any intrinsic or extrinsic cause of the things themselves through which they can be corrupted or cease to be. Moreover, with respect to God Himself, who is a being outside every universe, they do not have being by necessity, because they do not flow from Him, nor are they conserved by necessity simply, but freely. In which matter Aristotle was slippery, as we shall say in art. 10; for sometimes he seems to hold that God produces the world by necessity of nature, sometimes that He freely governs human affairs. Yet with this there stands that the heavens are simply said to be incorruptible, so that these propositions are of eternal truth, 'the heaven is incorruptible,' 'an angel is incorruptible': because incorruptibility imports the negation of an intrinsic principle of corruptibility. But with respect to being itself, as it depends on God, things are necessary from supposition, namely, supposing that God freely willed to give them being, and His will is immutable, by which God determined to conserve that being forever. In the fourth way the necessary from supposition is so called, which necessity is rather of the consequence, insofar as something necessarily follows from another presupposed, by a good consequence; e.g. supposing an absolute volition of the end, the will necessarily wills the means which are judged necessary to the end, that is, this consequence is necessary, 'Peter wills health absolutely, and judges that the means, a bitter drink, is necessary, therefore he wills that drink'; yet the consequent is not necessary, 'he wills the drink,' absolutely speaking. For just as he can not will health, so he can not will the drink. On which matter St. Thomas is to be seen, 1-2, q. 13, art. 6. It must also be noted here that suppositions of this kind are various. For sometimes the knowledge of God, or His infallible will and providence with respect to some effect, is presupposed. Sometimes a contingent cause is presupposed, yet placed in act and not impeded; and then the effect necessarily follows by a consequential necessity, which nevertheless is contingent simply. And so Aristotle said in book 1 of the Perihermeneias, at the end: Everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. The foundation of this is: because two contradictories cannot be simultaneously true, although either, simply speaking, can be true, e.g. 'Peter sits,' 'Peter does not sit,' if we attend to the potency for them to be true, each has the potency to be true at the same time. But if a conjunction and simultaneity be made concerning the act of sitting and not sitting, then they cannot be simultaneously true; but by a necessity of the consequence, from the truth of one follows the falsity of the other, not by a necessity of the consequent. And this is what is commonly said, that in the composite or in the divided sense something is necessary or impossible, as e.g. while Peter sits, 'it is necessary to sit' is necessary in the composite sense, but is not necessary in the divided sense: because even while he sits, he sits freely. Finally it must be noted that the naturally contingent and the morally contingent differ from the merely dialectically contingent. For the dialectically contingent only says it is possible for something to be, and possible not to be, nor does it posit any imperfection in the cause; and so God contingently created the world, and the heaven contingently is, inasmuch as in God there is a simple power to create and to annihilate the heaven. But the physically contingent intrinsically and formally adds a respect to a defectible and impedible cause. Finally the morally contingent intrinsically and formally adds that the effect produced, being contingent, is beside the intention of the one operating; e.g. someone intends to kill a man, and kills him; that killing of the man is a physically contingent effect, because it could be impeded; but if, intending to kill a man, he kills a wild beast, then the killing of the beast was morally and naturally contingent.

THESE foundations having been laid down, let the first conclusion be: from the fact that God from eternity knew or willed or provided all future things, it does not follow that they necessarily come about absolutely, or are so; e.g. contingent natural effects or free actions do not come about, absolutely speaking, from necessity.

This conclusion is defined in the Council of Constance, Session 8, where among the errors of Wyclif, the 27th is that all things come about from absolute necessity. Likewise, because otherwise it would follow that there is no free choice, and consequently that there are no laws and counsels, rewards and punishments, by which men are deterred from evil and stirred to good. On which matter Augustine is to be seen, book 5 of The City, ch. 9 and 10, against Cicero and other Stoics, who, in order to attribute free choice to men, denied the foreknowledge and providence of God concerning human affairs. See also Gratian, 23, q. 4, ch. Nabuchodonosor, where he recites many testimonies for the conclusion. Note, however, concerning the conclusion, that if someone asserted that natural universals, apart from the acts of free choice, come about from absolute necessity and nothing contingently, insofar as all things are efficaciously subjected to the motions of the heavens, he would indeed err in physical science, but not in faith. For to that extent the error of Wyclif is condemned, who asserted that all things come about from necessity, insofar as he includes in this universal also free choice. Moreover, the contingency of natural effects is found in two ways. In one way, not because the effect is impeded here and now, but because it was impedible, as far as it is on the part of the proximate cause from which it proceeds; and thus this fire contingently generates this fire here and now. In the other way, because the effect intended by a particular cause was in fact impeded on account of the concurrence of another particular cause; and thus Peter contingently generates a monster. The conclusion, then, as posited, as far as pertains to the contingency of natural things, is proved. For if, with God operating from necessity of nature, as perhaps Aristotle thought, he nevertheless taught that the contingency of natural things must be posited, much more does contingency seem to be posited, while the first cause operates freely. Likewise, if the proper cause of an impedible effect is such, or is even impeded: therefore it does not operate by absolute necessity, and consequently the effect is contingent. Second Conclusion: Contingent or free effects, if compared to the knowledge or providence or will of God, are necessary in a certain respect, namely from supposition, which necessity is conditional or rather of the consequence, not of the consequent. This conclusion is proved: because these consequences are good and necessary. God knows that something will be, therefore it comes about in the mode and when He wills it to come about. Moreover, God provides this future thing, therefore it is; likewise God foresaw a future sin, therefore that sin will be; inasmuch as in these consequences the antecedent cannot be given true and the consequent false: therefore the conclusions are necessary from supposition, that is, supposing that the antecedents are true, it is necessary that what follows be simultaneously verified by a necessary consequentiality; and this is what is commonly said, that in the composite sense the consequent is necessary, namely because it is impossible for the falsity of the consequent to stand with the truth of the antecedent. But if someone objects that by this position the use of free choice is also destroyed, and that laws and counsels are in vain, etc., because in the end that will infallibly come about which God provided, or willed, or foreknew to be future, I deny the sequel: because God so foreknew, so willed, and provided, that the effect come forth from second causes according to their own mode. Nor does free choice have the capacity for this, that it can simultaneously operate two contradictories; but supposing that it wills one, it is impossible that it simultaneously will the opposite, even if it were not moved by God, but were itself the first cause of its operation. But in this consists the capacity of free choice, as far as the intrinsic judgment of the one operating goes, not to choose that which it judged not to have a necessary connection with the end, or because it did not will the end necessarily here and now, as we shall say at once in art. 10. Third Conclusion: No effect is or is said to be formally contingent through a respect to the will or providence of God, but through a formal respect to proximate or particular defective causes. The first part is proved: every effect in its order to God comes about infallibly, nor is it impedible; therefore formally through such an order it is not contingent, otherwise it would be impedible and not impedible with respect to the same cause. But the second part is proved: because the definition of a naturally contingent effect is given formally through a respect to a defective and impedible cause; but particular causes are of this kind; therefore etc. From this it follows that it is false what certain men say, that God concurs so sweetly with second causes that with a necessary cause He concurs as a necessary cause, with a contingent one as a contingent cause. But they are in fact mistaken: because He is never a contingent cause in the way in which we speak of contingency, namely not logically or metaphysically, but naturally or morally. For God, even operating freely, cannot be impeded. Strongly, therefore, and sweetly He attains all things, inasmuch as He most efficaciously operates what He wills, not destroying the condition of second causes, but having made their effects contingent, which either in themselves, or in their causes, are necessary, absolutely and naturally, insofar as they are not impedible by others. Fourth Conclusion, greatly to be noted: Human free actions, as formally free, are referred not only to the immediate cause, namely to the faculty of created free choice, but also to the first free cause. It is proved: because for an action to be free, as such, is a perfection simply, as will be said in art. 10: therefore it is formally in God; therefore, just as every created wisdom formally includes an order of dependence on the supreme wisdom, so free choice, as such, formally includes such an order to the first free cause. Likewise, in analogates in which the form signified is found formally in both extremes, the matter stands thus, that the less principal form has an intrinsic order to the principal one; but free choice is such an analogate: therefore etc. Hence it follows that, while free choice is moved efficaciously by the free choice of God, whether naturally or supernaturally, so far is it from losing liberty from this, that it rather operates freely from it, but only it follows that it is not the first free cause, but intrinsically depends on another free choice.

Fifth Conclusion: Every contingent effect is principally referred to the divine will, as to the proper and first efficient cause of its contingency. This has been sufficiently confirmed by Cajetan, above.

Sixth Conclusion, which follows from the foregoing: No effect of which God alone is the cause can be contingent. It is proved: because a contingent effect, as we speak in the present matter, intrinsically and formally bespeaks an order to an impedible cause; but God cannot be a cause of this kind; therefore by Himself alone He cannot produce a contingent effect. But if someone objects with the common argument: whatever God can do with a second cause, He can do by Himself alone; but God effects a contingent effect through a contingent cause: therefore by Himself alone He can make a contingent effect. It is answered that, if the argument has any force, it would prove also that God by Himself alone could produce a sensation without a sentient power: since, through a sentient power in the genus of efficient cause, He produces sensation. It is answered, therefore, to the argument that that maxim is understood when the effect does not intrinsically and formally include an order to a secondary efficient cause, as sensation intrinsically does, since it is an immanent and vital action, and bespeaks an order to a sensitive efficient cause. Similarly, also, a contingent effect formally bespeaks contingency in its order to a defectible cause. Moreover, the same effect as regards substance, which a contingent cause produces as contingent, God by Himself alone could produce as not contingent, but altogether infallibly: as, e.g., He could produce this singular fire, which He now produces through a contingent cause. It must be noted, however, that in this conclusion we do not deny that God by Himself alone could

produce a contingent thing, that is, a thing not necessary in such a way as to be necessarily, but corruptible. For thus in fact He created many things and contingent causes. But we deny that, in the account of the effect, that which is produced by God alone is called contingent, for the reason assigned: because the contingency of an effect, as such, is formally reduced to a defectible cause as impedible.

Seventh Conclusion: If God operated all things from necessity of nature, there would nevertheless be contingency in the nature of things. This conclusion is against Scotus, in 1, dist. 2, q. 2, and dist. 8, q. 2, who holds that Aristotle, with the other philosophers, asserted contradictorily, when they said that something comes about contingently, and yet thought God acts by necessity. And Scotus's reason is: because, although he agrees with us in this, that the first root of contingency is a condition of the divine will, yet he differs in this, that we say that the condition itself is the supreme efficacy of the Divine Will; he, however, says that that condition is the contingency of the Divine Will: but by the name 'contingency of the Divine Will' he understands not some imperfection, but its liberty. Cajetan, however, deservedly rejects this opinion of Scotus, and proves our conclusion: because if the Divine Will willed and caused the universe by necessity, there would nevertheless be causes defectible and mutually impedible, as they now are: therefore effects would contingently proceed from them. It is confirmed: because there would be free agents, namely men, among whom there could be fortune and a contingent event; beside their intention, something would befall them, or they would operate defectibly. But this second argument of Cajetan does not please us.

Hence let there be an eighth conclusion: On the hypothesis that God operated from necessity of nature, the contingency of things would not be reduced to God as to the first efficient root. It is proved: because the defectibility of second causes would not be from the choice of God: therefore a contingent effect would be beside the intention of the first cause. The consequence is clear from Cajetan's fourth notable.

Last Conclusion: If God operated ad extra from necessity of nature, there would be no free choice in things. It is proved first: for if there is free choice, it is moved either by itself, as by the first mover, or by God; if by itself, then God is not the first mover; if by God, who moves by necessity: therefore it is not free. The consequence is proved: God moves from necessity of nature; therefore the will is not moved freely: because this consequence is good, 'God moves the will, therefore the will is moved by God,' the antecedent is altogether necessary, therefore also the consequent. Therefore there is no capacity in the will to be moved otherwise. Moreover, secondly: what is sometimes in act, sometimes in potency, must be moved by another; but God by hypothesis would always operate in one way from necessity of nature: therefore the will would always necessarily be in act, or never. For no cause of this indifference of the will to either alternative would be given, any more than in a brute. Nor is it strange that from such a supposition impossible and so absurd things follow. Finally, this last conclusion is proved from the fourth conclusion: for, just as, the first wisdom being removed, all wisdom is removed, so, the first free choice being removed, all free choice is removed. For as dependence is intrinsic in coming to be and also in being conserved for those things which are not their own to-be, which they have from the being that has being through essence: so in perfections of this kind, which do not belong to things through their essence, there is a formal and intrinsic dependence on that which is such through essence.

It is answered to the arguments. To the first, in which the celebrated difficulty is touched, there are many modes of answering, but this seems to me the best; for in form I deny the antecedent. To the proof, let the major pass, but I deny the minor: namely 'God willed things to be in time' is necessary if we speak of the simply and absolutely necessary, but is only necessary from supposition. For supposing that God willed freely, He now cannot not-will in the composite sense, because the will of God is immutable, whence the consequent will be necessary also from supposition, as also the antecedent. But, nevertheless, such necessity does not destroy the contingency of natural things, nor free actions, as was said in the first conclusion. Hence to the first proof of the minor, where it was said, that is about the past and true: therefore necessary; I distinguish the consequent: if it is understood of absolute necessity, I deny the consequence: but if it is understood of necessity from supposition, namely, supposing that it was true, then because this supposition was not simply necessary, I grant the consequence. To the second proof, I grant the consequence: for it is true that every effect, with respect to the divine will from which it proceeds, is infallible. Yet with this it stands in truth that some effect is contingent simply, speaking according to the formal respect to a defective cause from which it proceeds, as we have now said, whence contingency is formally to be received. To the confirmation from St. Thomas it would be answered, whatever other Thomists say, that when St. Thomas said that antecedent, God knew

the Antichrist would be, is absolutely necessary, he understood by 'absolutely necessary,' that is, not depending on the future, as a certain opinion said which he impugns there. Moreover, since God could have not had such a will, nor such knowledge of the future, that antecedent cannot be called necessary simply speaking, namely, 'God knew the Antichrist would be'; 'He willed the Antichrist to be,' since it is not necessary in the first mode, nor the second, nor the third: it will therefore be necessary from supposition.

But it is worth the effort briefly to review, concerning this difficulty, the various modes of answering, to that argument, God knew, or willed, or said that something is future, therefore it will be, where the antecedent is necessary, the consequence is good: therefore the consequent is necessary. For some say that the consequence is not formal. For there can be given a true antecedent and a false consequent, as e.g. God said the Antichrist is future, therefore the Antichrist will be, the antecedent is true, once the Antichrist is born, and the consequent false, the Antichrist will be born. But a consequence good formally must always be good: a material consequence, however, concerning its subject matter, suffices that it be good from supposition. This solution sophistically strives to evade the force of the argument. For it is certain that the difficulty of the argument does not depend on this, that the consequent be taken as future, otherwise the Antichrist is going to be would never be verified, if that the Antichrist is going to be is always verified, inasmuch as for a proposition about the future to be true, it is necessary that that future time at some point be present, and cease to be future. The consequent is therefore taken for that determinate time, of which God said or foreknew that something would be future in it, which will afterwards be present. And so a formal consequence can be made. Nor is an instance brought, if we say, everything that God said is true; but God said that something is future at time B: therefore that is true, therefore it is true that it will be present at that time. Then such an argument will be made. The major is evident, the minor is necessary, since it is about the past; therefore the consequent is necessary, because the consequence is good. Wherefore the first solution is better, that those propositions about the past are not necessary simply, but from supposition, and so the consequent is necessary from supposition. Others say that, although those propositions God willed, God knew that something is future seem, according to their mode of signifying, to be about the past, yet they are about the present as regards the thing signified: because in God 'willed' and 'wills' are the same, 'knew' and 'knows,' inasmuch as the divine act is measured by eternity, which is always present indivisibly. Hence they say that those propositions God willed, God knew do not have greater necessity because they signify in the mode of the past, than these, God wills, God knows, which propositions nevertheless are not simply necessary: because God freely wills whatever He wills outside Himself, and simply speaking has the power to not-will them. The whole necessity will therefore be of the consequence as of the antecedent, namely from supposition. This solution rather confirms and explains our solution. But Cajetan, above, q. 14, art. 13, ad 2, says that there is as much difference between these propositions, God willed the Antichrist to be future, and God wills, as there is between the necessity of a proposition about the past and of a proposition about the present in contingent matter; as if we say Peter sat and Peter sits. For that proposition about the past is necessary absolutely, but this one about the present is not necessary absolutely, except from the supposition that Peter sits. But this opinion does not seem intelligible to us, how this proposition God willed is more necessary than this, God wills, although there would be a difference between those, Peter sat and Peter sits, as regards necessity. And the reason is: for although this proposition God willed signifies in the mode of the past, as regards our way of understanding, yet that mode of preterition does not pass into the thing signified; otherwise the proposition God willed would be false, since in fact the act of the divine will is not past, but always present indivisibly and immutably. Since therefore, from the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false, it follows that with respect to God a proposition about the past is not more necessary than one about the present. Then this is a good consequence, against Cajetan, God willed, therefore He wills; the antecedent is necessary absolutely, therefore also the consequent. And it is confirmed: because these are equipollent, God wills and God willed; therefore if one is necessary, so is the other. Others answer the argument following the words of St. Thomas, above. For they grant that the consequence is good, and that the antecedent is necessary absolutely, but when it is inferred, 'therefore the consequent is necessary,' they distinguish 'necessary simply,' and deny the consequence; but as it is under the antecedent, they grant the consequence. This solution is St. Thomas's, above, but he explains himself sufficiently in the same place. For he posits the foundation that when something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is to be taken not according as it is in itself, but according as it is in the soul: e.g. if we say Peter understands something, therefore it is immaterial; the consequent is not taken according as the thing understood is in itself, for thus a thing which is understood could be material, as if a man is understood; but the consequent is to be taken according as it is in the intellect. For thus it is immaterial insofar as it is understood, through its immaterial form which is in the intellect. Thus, therefore, in the proposed matter, if we say, God knew that something is future, therefore it will be, the consequent is to be taken as it is under the divine knowledge, namely, as it is in its presentiality, and thus it is necessary as also the antecedent: because everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. This is St. Thomas. But this solution suffers a calumny; because it relies on that foundation, which seems false: for from it would follow that this is a good consequence: I think Peter runs, therefore Peter runs. I prove the sequel: because the consequent is to be taken not according to itself, but according as it is in my estimate. Similarly, this would be a good consequence, Peter wills to swear, therefore to swear is good; for if the consequent is taken as it is under the will, to swear is good, nor could an instance be brought against the consequence. Likewise, God wills me to speak now, therefore I speak now, is a good consequence, and yet the consequent is taken even according as it is in itself: therefore it is false what is said in the foundation, that when something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is not to be taken according as it is in itself, but according to the being that it has in the soul. On account of these arguments I reckon that that foundation is not to be understood universally, but its sense is that, when something pertaining to an act of the intellect or will is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is not necessarily taken according to the being that it has in itself, but can sometimes be taken only according to the being that it has in the intellect or will. And so it is allowed in common usage of speaking that sometimes the consequent be taken according to the being that it has in the soul; but it is not excluded that sometimes the consequent can be taken in both ways, namely both according to the being that it has in itself and according to the being that it has in the soul. And by this what has been objected is clear. It can be answered secondly, that St. Thomas in his foundation presupposes the consequence to be otherwise good: and then he gives us a rule for verifying the consequent, which cannot be verified according to itself, that it be verified according to the being that it has in the soul. It must be observed, however, that in fact this solution of St. Thomas does not differ from the first which we assigned. This is proved from what he says, that the consequent is necessary as also the antecedent. Which comparison consists in this, that just as the antecedent is necessary, that is, infallible, immutable and independent of the future, because all things are present to the knowledge of God, inasmuch as it is measured by eternity: so the consequent, as it is under that knowledge, is necessary and infallible, nor dependent on the future. For it already is as it is under the knowledge of God, and to this contributes what follows from Aristotle, 1 Perihermeneias, Everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. Behold how the antecedent is not necessary simply and altogether absolutely, otherwise the consequent would be necessary as the antecedent is simply and absolutely, but is only necessary, that is, infallible and immutable, that is, supposing that God willed something to be future, or permitted it to be future, as sin, it is necessary that He know it to be future, and that it already be present to His knowledge; and so future contingents are necessary in a certain respect, not absolutely, but with an addition, namely with respect to the divine knowledge, inasmuch as by a necessity of the consequence it follows that what is seen by God to be cannot be otherwise: because everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be. To the other testimony of St. Thomas, in the question, art. 13, ad 1, it is answered that St. Thomas does not there affirm that the knowledge of God of all future things is a first necessary cause. For this is false: because neither is God the cause of all things which He knows to be future, otherwise He would be the cause of sin, nor of those of which He is the cause is He the simply necessary cause, but only from supposition, that God freely wills them to be. But St. Thomas there denies the consequence of the argument. For it does not follow that if the first cause is necessary, no effect is contingent: because the contingency of that effect is formally taken with respect to the proximate contingent cause. Just as the sprouting of a plant is contingent on account of its proximate cause, although the motion of the heaven, which is the first cause, is necessary. But if someone still presses the point, and asks why, since every effect with respect to God comes about infallibly, every effect is not said to be simply infallible, and yet is said to be simply contingent because with respect to a lower cause it is contingent. It is answered that, just as a man is said to be simply curly-haired, although curliness belongs to him according to one part, namely according to the head, because according to that part alone he is apt to have curliness; so every effect is said to be formally and simply contingent with respect to the cause with respect to which it is apt to have contingency formally. For it must be noted that with respect to the divine will there is no difference among created things as regards the necessity of being or the possibility of not being. For all agree in this, that they were freely produced and are freely conserved in being,

and are equally annihilable, and all are contingent, logically speaking. Because nothing is necessarily in the second mode explained by us. Likewise with respect to the same divine will, all things are necessary in the fourth mode, namely from supposition. What remains, therefore, is that the whole account of the difference of things, according to natural necessity and contingency, be taken formally from the proximate and natural causes, insofar as certain causes are naturally not impedible, certain are impedible. And in relation to certain ones effects are naturally and simply necessary, in relation to certain ones contingent, simply and naturally speaking. And in this way the divine knowledge, will, and providence do not destroy the contingency of things; indeed the first efficient cause of contingency and necessity is the will itself. And this on this difficulty.

To the second it is answered, I deny the consequence. Because God, freely willing things to be, effects some causes necessary naturally in being and in causing, with respect to which effects are said to be and are formally necessary. Yet the argument proves that no absolute necessity formally is in things, formally regarding the necessity of the one causing in the first cause, which is the divine will.

To the third it is answered, I grant the whole, if the antecedent is understood of the formal respect to the divine will as to the formal cause of the difference. For we have already sufficiently shown that the difference of things according to necessary and contingent is not considered formally except with respect to second causes, and this the first confirmation of the same argument proves. To the second confirmation it is answered, I grant that necessary and contingent are simply repugnant, if both are taken naturally. Of which difference the divine will is the efficient cause, as regards being. Yet with this it stands that with respect to the divine will there is no effect which is formally from it by absolute necessity, nor even contingently, except perhaps logically, but every effect proceeds infallibly and necessarily from supposition from the divine will. Hence something can be verified with respect to the divine will, or the divine intellect, according to some denomination, which nevertheless is not necessarily verified, absolutely speaking, but from supposition and by a necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent.

To the fourth, we have already sufficiently shown that the divine will cannot be modified by anything.

To the fifth it is answered that St. Thomas follows out the argument excellently when he infers that if the distinction of contingent things from necessary things is referred only to second causes, as to efficient causes, it would follow that such a distinction would be beside the intention and will of God. Nor does what is objected stand in the way; indeed it helps. For if second causes are willed by God on account of the perfection of the universe, it is well gathered that their contingent effects are willed, because, as such, they also pertain to the perfection of the universe.

To the sixth it is answered that St. Thomas does not blame that opinion in this, that it asserts contingent effects to be reduced to contingent causes, but in this, that it denies the divine will to be the first root and effective cause of contingency.

To the seventh it is answered, I grant the major and the minor, and I deny the consequence; indeed, God is the cause of every contingency of being, although that being be a sin, inasmuch as there is there no other contingency except in the account of being, whose passions are necessary or contingent. And just as God is the cause of the act of sin, as the theologians say, and yet is not the cause of sin, so God is the cause of the contingency of that act of sin, and is not the cause of sin. Nor need one seek another first root of sin, except the created defectible free choice, with respect to which sin formally is and is called sin, and is referred as to its efficient cause, or rather to its deficient cause, namely to free choice. But on the contrary, it follows that sin is beside the intention of God. I prove the sequel. Just as St. Thomas argues against the opinion of those who said that the first root of contingency is the second cause, that from this it would follow that the contingency of things is beside the intention of God, so it follows that something happens by fortune and by chance, with respect to the divine will. It is answered first, I grant the sequel. For it does not appear unfitting that sin be beside the intention of God, since it is beside every divine rule. Nor does what is objected stand in the way, objected to prove the falsity of the consequent: because although sin is beside the intention of the divine will, yet it is not by chance and fortune, because it has already been foreseen by God and permitted. It is answered secondly, by distinguishing the consequent. For if beside the intention imports only the negation of intention, the aforesaid solution is good; but if beside the intention imports that something happens by chance, which was not foreseen, I deny the sequel. For sin is neither from the intention of God, nor beside the intention in that second way, but it is permitted and foreseen, so that on its occasion God might do another greater good. Consonant with this is what St. Thomas says, art. 9, ad 3, that God neither wills evils to be done, nor wills evils not to be done, but wills to permit evils. So we say that sin is neither from the intention of God, nor beside the intention in that second way; but from the intention of a greater good, it is permitted the sin, and therefore foreseen.

To the last argument it is answered from the doctrine of the seventh and eighth conclusions, in which it was explained what would follow concerning the contingency of things, if God operated from necessity of nature. Thus far on this most difficult question.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: God in no way wills the evil of fault. The ground is: because God loves no good more than His own goodness; therefore the evil which deprives of order to the divine good, such as is the evil of fault, God cannot in any way will. This consequence is founded on this, that it is impossible for evil, under the account of evil, to be desired, because the account of good is the account of the desirable. But evil can sometimes be desired per accidens, insofar as it is conjoined to a good which is loved more than the good of which the evil deprives. Therefore the consequence drawn is sound; otherwise God would will another good more than His own goodness.

Second conclusion: The evil of natural defect or the evil of punishment God wills by willing some good to which such an evil is conjoined: just as, by willing justice, He wills punishment; and by willing the ordering of nature to be preserved, He wills certain things to be corrupted naturally.

Third conclusion, to the third: God neither wills evils to be done, nor wills evils not to be done, but He permits certain evils to be done, and this is good.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

CONCERNING the first conclusion, which is Catholic, this is not the place to dispute; but it is the custom among Thomists to dispute this question below, q. 49, and, for the most part, in 1. 2., q. 79. But concerning the ground of the conclusion, an argument could be made. God can will, absolutely speaking, the annihilation of the world, and yet no good is annexed to this evil: therefore He can will the evil of punishment under the account of evil. It is answered that, properly speaking, annihilation is not evil from the term to which, because as such it is a pure negation. But if it be considered from the term from which, evil is conceived in annihilation, because it destroys a good already existing. And in this way God could also have willed the annihilation of some thing for the display of His power; indeed, according to Scotus, God in fact annihilated the substance of the bread in the consecration of the Eucharist.

Another question could be disputed, whether the will can will evil under the account of evil. But the place fixed for this question is in 1. 2., q. 8, art. 1.

CONCERNING the third conclusion, take note that it is one thing that God holds sins in hatred, and another that He does not will sins to be done. For the first is formally in God: because hatred formally imports the detestation of the deformity which is in the sin, and in the sinner himself. Whence punishment is the effect of God's hatred, just as divine benefits are the effect of the divine love toward men. Yet it stands with this in truth that sins are done, but not that God wills them to be done, nor that He wills them not to be done: since this volition would altogether impede all sins. Finally, it is to be noted here, concerning the permission of sin, first, that it is good and willed by God, who orders it to a greater good than is the good of which the sin deprives. Secondly, it is to be noted that, although God permits sin, He cannot however be called the cause of sin, directly, nor indirectly, nor per accidens. Directly indeed, it is manifest: because sin, inasmuch as it is sin, has no account of good, and so cannot be desired. Indirectly, however, He is not the cause of sin: because although He could impede it and does not impede it, He is not bound to do so, which is required for a cause to be said to effect or will something indirectly. Nor finally is He the cause per accidens: because the action of the divine will in permitting sin does not touch upon sin itself, as upon an effect effectively proceeding from it. Which indeed is required for a cause to be said to effect something per accidens: as, for example, if Peter, digging a grave, perhaps finds a treasure, he is called the cause per accidens of the finding of the treasure; because the action of his digging the earth truly touched upon the finding of the treasure, although this was not intended. But yet, if the treasure being found, a thief was present and seized it, then Peter will not be called the cause per accidens of the robbery.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, and is clear from art. 3. The ground is: because God wills things other than Himself, and not from necessity; therefore, with respect to them, He has free will.

COMMENTARY.

THE principal doubt in this article is concerning the conclusion of St. Thomas, whether according to faith, and according to natural reason, it must necessarily be asserted that free will, properly and without metaphor, is in God. So entirely that God Himself is the master of His own actions, and can not have an action which He has, and have one which He does not have. It is argued first, for the negative side. In God there is not, properly speaking, counsel: therefore neither free will. The consequence is clear: because the deliberation by which one deliberates some means to be determined to an end proceeds from a comparison of the means which can be chosen for the end. But the antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, 1. 2., q. 14, art. 1, and from St. Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 5, cap. 5, who assert that counsel presupposes an inquiry into the means, and ignorance of the certain means for the attainment of the end. And St. Thomas says that the inquiry of reason in doubtful and uncertain matters is called counsel; but such an imperfection cannot be in God; therefore neither counsel. Secondly. Everyone who has free will is, from his nature, indifferent to deliberating something or not deliberating, to exercising some act or not exercising it: but this indifference is repugnant to God, whose property it is always to have Himself in the same way, nor to be able to have Himself otherwise than He has Himself: therefore free will is repugnant to God. But if someone answers that the indifference of free will is not in God with respect to any divine act, but extrinsically, through the respect to the being or non-being of the creature; it is rejoined, on the contrary: if in this way there were indifference in God according to the respect to creatures, either it is with respect to those which are not, nor were, nor will be, or it is with respect to those which coexist with eternity in some difference of their time; but neither of these can be: therefore neither is that indifference possible. I prove the minor, because with respect to the creatures which coexist with eternity the divine will is not indifferent, but willed determinately that they be. Similarly with respect to those which do not coexist with eternity, there is no indifference: because from eternity God willed those things not to be; therefore there is no respect of the divine will that is indifferent with respect to creatures, and consequently free will is repugnant to God. Thirdly. If in God there is free will, it follows that God is not altogether immutable, but that He can, absolutely speaking, have Himself otherwise than He now has Himself in Himself: the consequent is against that of James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration: therefore. For the force of this argument, take note that man and the angel are said in their own way to be immutable, or not to be changed, as regards free will. Man indeed is not said to be viciously mutable when he changes counsel from new circumstances arising, but in truth the will of man can be changed, and is changed, when after he willed something to be done, without any wholly new circumstance, he now wills it not to be done, whether that change be vicious or studious. But the angel is not mutable in that way, on account of the perfection of his nature, but after he has chosen something he cannot choose the opposite. Nevertheless, in the angel mutability in free will is considered insofar as he could not have had the election which he has, and consequently could have had himself otherwise in himself than he now has himself. But in God, says James, there is no change, nor shadow of alteration, because the divine will could not not have every action which it has in itself from eternity, but as it now is in itself, so from necessity of nature it must have itself. Now the sequel is proved: for if in God there is free will, so that He can do things otherwise than He does, it is necessary that in the divine will, which is the cause of things, some difference be possible, and that it could have had itself otherwise in itself than it now has itself. The sequel is proved: since by natural reason it seems manifest that, a total cause having itself in a wholly same way and invariably, and not impedable or modifiable by anything extrinsic, it is necessary that the same effect always be produced by it, and that which is not produced cannot be produced: therefore it does not seem intelligible that, no change having been made in the divine will, the world be made from nothing; and that by the same will, having itself in the same way, the world not be made. Therefore that diversity of effects, namely, the world is made from nothing, and the world is not made from nothing, must be referred to some variety possible in the cause, which is the divine will; and consequently the divine will would have had itself otherwise, if it had not created, than it now has itself, when it willed to create. Fourthly. In the demons there is no liberty in the act of the will with respect to the object of pride, because the angels immutably adhere to the object which they once willed, and this on account of the perfection of the angelic nature: therefore neither is there liberty in God with respect to those things which He willed from eternity. The consequence is clear: because God is much more immutable than the angel. But the antecedent is proved: because if the angel now operated freely, his fault would always grow, and consequently the punishment due would grow forever, without any term. Fifthly and lastly. For Aristotle, who is said to be a monster of nature, denied that the first cause operates freely, and asserted that it moves from necessity of nature, just as it moves all things. Therefore according to natural reason it is repugnant, or at least cannot be gathered, that free will is in God. The antecedent is clear from 8. Physic., tex. 7 and 8, where he says that if the first mover did not move before, it was necessary for it to move afterwards, that the impediment by which it was prevented be removed. There he seems to suppose that God acts from necessity of nature, otherwise that reason of his would be frivolous. For it could be answered that the first mover is free, and therefore could have not moved, not on account of an impediment, but because it did not will to move. And in the same place, text 15, he says it is absurd that God did not make the world from eternity. Moreover, lib. 1 De Caelo, cap. 10 and following, he says that the heaven is unbegotten and incorruptible. But if Aristotle had understood that God is a free efficient cause with respect to the heaven, he would assert that the heaven can be corrupted and the world too: therefore. And it is confirmed especially because Aristotle was ignorant of production from nothing: therefore according to his doctrine it was necessary that something besides God be eternal, namely, prime matter, from which corruptible species are made, and the intelligences themselves, which are not made from matter: and finally, 9. Metaphy., tex. 17, and lib. 12, tex. 30, he says that the heaven cannot not be moved, and that God and the intelligences do not have the power not to move, but are always actually moving.

For the decision of this difficulty we must suppose, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in 1. 2., q. 14, art. 1, to the second, that those things which are said of God are to be taken without every defect which is found in us. Which indeed is to be understood not only of those things which are said of God eminently, but also formally. As, for example, knowledge in us is of conclusions through discourse from causes into effects; but knowledge, said of God, signifies certitude about all effects in the first cause, without any discourse. There is also an example in the angels, in whom knowledge is a quality superadded to the angelic intellect: but in God it is substance. Take note secondly, with Cajetan, in that place, that counsel in us signifies a completed inquiry, that is, up to judgment inclusively, because the inquiry itself without judgment is not counsel, except inchoatively. Thus in counsel, as its proper specific account, the very term of the inquiry is to be considered. But the inquiry itself and the practical discourse are required on account of our imperfection.

These things supposed, let the first conclusion be: Counsel formally and properly, without metaphor, is in God. It is proved first: because in God there is posited properly and formally knowledge without metaphor, and similarly there is posited in God prudence properly and formally: therefore also counsel. The antecedent is admitted by all, both Metaphysicians and Theologians. The consequence is proved: because just as knowledge, although it is defined by us as an acquired habit through demonstration, nevertheless according to the proper and specific account of knowledge, inasmuch as it is knowledge, is understood by us to be a certain power of knowing effects in their cause: so also counsel, although in us it prerequires inquiry, nevertheless according to its proper account is a practical judgment about some means which in itself does not have a necessary connection with the end; but such a judgment is no more repugnant to God than the judgment of knowledge, which is found properly and formally in God, because its specific account does not necessarily require discourse, or the account of a habit, or of a quality accidental to substance. It is proved secondly: because according to the common doctrine of St. Augustine, those things which are said in the Sacred Letters, which can be understood without metaphor, ought to be understood according to the propriety of speech: but counsel is often found in the Sacred Letters said of God, as for example to the Ephesians, 1: Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will: therefore just as will is posited in God properly and formally, so also counsel must properly be asserted to be in God, all imperfections being removed which belong to counsel according to the mode of existing in a rational creature.

Second conclusion: In God there is truly and properly and formally free will, as wisdom and knowledge. This conclusion is certain, both from the Sacred Letters and also from natural reason. It is proved, then, first from the preceding conclusion. In God there is counsel properly: therefore also free will. The consequence is proved: because counsel is about a means which in itself does not have a necessary connection with the end, and nevertheless is judged to be ordainable and to be ordained to the end; but free will is nothing other than, as it is defined by Theologians, the faculty of reason and will toward either: therefore about the means, about which counsel is, there is freedom of choice to choose it or not to choose it. For otherwise, if it is necessarily willed, neither will there be counsel about it. It is proved secondly by the reason of St. Thomas, in this article: God wills things other than Himself, and not from necessity of nature: therefore, with respect to them, He has free will. The major is manifest, because since God is the ultimate end, and naturally wills the ultimate end, it necessarily follows that if there are any other things in the nature of things besides God, they are for the sake of the ultimate end. But the minor is proved. Because the goodness of God, which is the ultimate end, is by itself alone most perfect, since it is to-be itself through essence: therefore the divine will wills no other good from necessity of its nature. The consequence is plain: because the necessity of the will, with respect to means, arises from nowhere else than from the fact that the attainment of the end depends on those means, in some genus of cause: therefore since the attainment of that divine end depends in no way on any means, it follows manifestly that the divine will does not will anything other than Himself from necessity. It is proved thirdly: in us there is free will, as must be held according to faith, and natural reason dictates, and experience testifies. therefore also in God there is free will. This consequence is proved: because when man is moved freely by his own action, he is moved either by himself, as by a first mover, or by God; if by himself, therefore there is given some motion in the creature which is not reduced to God, as to the first mover and mover, on whose motion the creature which operates, moving itself, depends; and consequently God will not be master of the free will of man, which would be blasphemous. But if you say that he is moved by God, as by a first mover, not however as by a free mover but by one moving from necessity of nature: on the contrary, it follows that man is not moved freely. The sequel is proved: because it follows well, God moves my will, therefore my will is moved by God. Again: therefore if the antecedent is necessary from necessity of nature, my will will not be moved freely; since it is impossible that God move me, and that my will not be moved. Where then will the liberty of action be? since the consequence from the nature of the thing is necessary. The antecedent also is granted to be absolutely necessary: therefore my liberty is altogether destroyed. But perhaps some clever fellow will answer that an equal argument can be made even if God is a free mover through His free will. For such an argument will be made: God by His will, although free, yet efficacious, moves me: therefore I am moved. The consequence indeed is necessary, but the antecedent is necessary by supposition: therefore my will, the truth of the antecedent standing, cannot not be moved, therefore is not moved freely; since God moves the will no less efficaciously by His free will than if He moved from necessity of nature. To this objection the last consequence must be denied. And the reason is. Because although that antecedent, God moves my will, has the necessity of supposition in the composite sense, that is, the supposition that He freely wills to move, it is necessary that it be verified at the same time that He moves. Nevertheless, He moves freely, because simply He can not move; for He can will not to move: yet my liberty is not thereby destroyed, but rather perfected: because from the divine act, freely, efficaciously and sweetly moving, my will itself participates in liberty and is moved freely. But enough has been said of these things in article eight. Fourthly the conclusion is proved: that something is in act and something in potency, it is necessary that, as often as it has been in act, it be moved by another; but if God operated from necessity of nature, our will could not sometimes be in act and sometimes in potency: therefore God operates from free will. The minor is proved: since our free will cannot be efficaciously moved by any other than by God: but if God moves from necessity of nature, no reason can be assigned why the will now goes forth into act and now remains in potency. But now at last the conclusion is proved by a theological and necessary reason. And I lay as a foundation the excellent testimony of the Apostle to the Romans 1: The invisible things (he says) of himself from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen, his eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable; because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. In which apostolic testimony two things are to be weighed by us, from which we shall construct a double reason. The one is, how the Apostle testifies that from the perfections of creatures the divine perfections can be investigated and demonstrated. There is therefore the argument: in ourselves we experience free will, which is the greatest perfection: therefore in God there is free will. Nor does it avail to answer that free will is not a perfection simply: because, as we have already shown, the faculty and power of operating freely includes formally no imperfection according to its proper account, any more than knowledge or wisdom. But it is further confirmed: because man through the faculty of free will has the power of mastering other things, and of ordering them, as it shall have pleased him, to the end intended by him. Since therefore God is most of all the Master of those things which exist outside Himself, and has disposed and ordered all things for the sake of Himself, as for the ultimate end, as is had in Proverbs 16, it is necessary that God be most free. And it is confirmed from what we read in Gen. 1: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may preside over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the whole earth, and every creeping thing that moves on the earth. And God created man to his own image, to the image of God he created him. In which testimony all the doctors, especially the scholastics, say that man was made to the image of God most of all in this, that through free will he acts freely, as judge and master of his own actions. Whence he can also govern the rest, referring them to himself, and himself to God, as to the prototype, to whose likeness he was formed. For it must be considered that the Divine Essence itself is the most excellent prototype, which all created things imitate according to their measure. For all things have their being from the Divine Essence, which is through itself, and those which live receive life from it, which is through itself life. But no creature, except the rational and intellectual, is said to be made to the image and likeness of God, because the best that is understood to be of honor in God is intellect and will, and the providence and judgment of all things, which is signified to us by the very name of God, which among the Greeks is taken from providence. But this is much more insinuated in the cited place of Genesis. Where in the Hebrew tongue, in which the text was originally written, it is said: And Elohim created, that is, judge or judges, Adam in his image. In the image of Elohim he created him. As if he said, in the image of a judge. For man was created to be a certain judge, as it were God's vicar on earth, that concerning his own actions according to the natural and divine law implanted in him he might dispose by his own judgment, and refer himself with all other things to the supreme judge. We have therefore that from the free will of man the free will in God is gathered, and that the free will of God influences and conserves liberty in our will, and moves efficaciously and sweetly to free actions. Now the other, which we promised was to be weighed in the Apostle's testimony, presses more. For the Apostle says, because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. From which words it is gathered by necessary consequence that the Apostle speaks of the knowledge which men had of God from the power of natural light. For he says, because when they knew God, that is, the author and governor of the world, and he accuses them of having sinned, because they glorified him not as God, or gave thanks. But if God does not freely move and govern all things, and does not look after and provide for human affairs, no thanks are due to him. For thanks are given to one who confers a benefit freely and gratis. For we do not give thanks to the celestial bodies, although we have very much convenience from their influxes. Nor again do we give thanks to God Himself on account of those things which He operates from necessity of nature; for example, we do not give thanks because He begets a Son equal to Himself, but we give thanks because He deigned freely to reveal to us the eternal generation, and sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that he who believes in him may not perish, but may have eternal life. See in what way, from the Sacred Letters, we have efficaciously concluded that by natural reason it can be known that free will is in God: since, as the Apostle testifies, natural reason dictates that God is to be glorified by us and great thanks given to Him for benefits received. But now I think I will do a great service in the interest of Theologians, while from the solutions of the arguments which I have objected to the contrary, I shall show in what the proper account of a free action consists.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that St. Thomas and Gregory speak of counsel according to the conditions which it has in us: yet the proper account of counsel consists in the elective judgment of some means, in order to the end. Which means, according to its proper nature, does not have a necessary connection with the end, but rather without it the attainment of the end could stand. But it sometimes happens, on account of men's ignorance, to inquire into means and compare them among themselves, by which they may absolutely attain the end they will; whereas nevertheless it often happens that the means necessary from its nature for attaining the intended end is unique, which if they had known beforehand, they would in no way consult. But God knows best that for the attainment of His end, which is the object of the divine goodness, no means is necessary, or that any contributes to a better attainment of the end; but He works all things according to the counsel of His will, that is, according to a voluntary and free counsel. For it is a Hebrew phrase, that the genitive supplies the place of a denominative and superlative, according to that: He hath translated us into the kingdom of the son of his love, that is, of his most beloved son. So it is said, the counsel of his will, that is, a most voluntary and free counsel. To the second, that we may answer, it is to be noted that 'indifferent', or indifference, can be understood in two ways. In one way negatively, that is, not differing, not determined, not a difference and not a determination. In the other way privatively, so that that is called indifferent which is apt to be determined, and is not yet determined, but still remains in potency to either. Like a man who has not yet resolved to take a wife, nor indeed resolved not to take one. It must be said therefore to the argument that indifference, understood in the former way, is not repugnant to God in this sense, that from His nature and from His own substance He does not have a determination to will something outside Himself. But if indifference be understood in the second way, it is repugnant to God, because God was never suspended concerning things possible and producible by Himself, but whatever He made in time, from eternity He willed and deliberated that it be in time, and whatever He did not make nor is going to make in time, from eternity He resolved not to make. And so it is verified that in God there is no indifference understood privatively. But now let us begin to gather some necessary property of free will. For indifference to either is not required privatively, namely, that there be an aptitude to either, and there not be a determination to one. For this happens in us, on account of the imperfection of free will. But the operation of free will is more perfect when such indifference is in the faculty of free will negatively, in this sense, that as far as it is from the nature of the one deliberating, there is not found in him a determination to one. Whence it was best answered when the argument was proposed. For surely all that indifference, if it be considered privatively, must be referred to the being or non-being of the creature. Indeed even if indifference be considered negatively, it is not to be posited in God with respect to any divine act, as it is in God, but is posited only in order to the extrinsic respect to the being or non-being of the creature. And to the rejoinder of the argument it is answered that that indifference, as it is posited in God by us, can be compared to all creatures even possible ones, whether they coexist or do not coexist with eternity. For to the production of no creature is the divine will determined from its nature, because no creature has a necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the proper object of the divine will. But the divine will was never, nor can be, as it were suspended concerning any creature, but from eternity immutably willed and wills whatever it wills to be done; and immutably does not will whatever it does not will to be done. Whence it is gathered that mutability does not pertain to the proper account of free will. To the third, I deny the sequel. To the proof it is answered that that maxim, celebrated among philosophers, 'a total cause having itself in the same way etc.', is verified in created causes, which have a limited and finite mode of being and operating, but not in the first cause of all things, which, since it is unlimited and infinite to-be itself, contains in itself the power of operating or not operating, without the possibility of having itself otherwise in itself, but operates otherwise than it operated before through the sole mutability of the effect. It must be granted therefore that the divine will would not have had itself otherwise in itself, if it had not willed to create the world, than it has itself now when it willed to create. But the world itself has itself much otherwise now when it actually receives being from Him and is really referred to Him as to the first efficient cause. But if it had not been created, it would not be referred to God, except by a relation of reason. I freely confess that it is difficult for us to understand the free efficiency of the divine will with such great and ineffable immutability. Nevertheless from those things which we know naturally, we can in some way be led by the hand to some understanding of such majesty. For we see that two contraries cannot convene in the same material subject, and nevertheless the single power of sight receives the likeness of white and of black, without its own variety. Then the distinct objects of the five senses, proper to each and mutually incommunicable, one sense, which is called common, knows their differences under one simple likeness. And finally, the intellect perceives the difference of many things in a simpler and more immutable way, in a more simple likeness. Which discourse Theologians are accustomed to make concerning the angels themselves: therefore, speaking consequently, it is no wonder if the divine purity and majesty, whose intellect and will are a simple substance, and whose substance is simple and infinite being, could, without any shadow of mutability, not create the world which it created; having itself in the same way creating the world, as it would have itself not creating. To the fourth it is answered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, in 1. p., q. 64, art. 2, to the third, that there still remains in the devil the sin with which he first sinned as regards the appetite; although it does not remain as regards this, that he believes he can obtain what he desires. As if someone believes he can commit homicide, and wills to do it, and afterwards the power is taken from him, nevertheless the will of homicide can remain in him, so that he wills to have done it, or wills to do it if he could. So he (says). And in the solution to the first he had said that the good and the bad angels have free will, but according to the mode and condition of their nature. We have therefore from the doctrine of St. Thomas that it is not repugnant for an act to be free and to be immutable, on account of the perfection of the angelic nature. I said immutable as regards this, that the angel can choose the opposite, not however as regards this, that he can suspend a free action: for this is possible to the angel, and to that extent he is mutable and measurable by time. To the argument therefore it is answered that the angel still sins the sin of pride which he sinned from the beginning, and whether he meanwhile suspends the act of pride or does not suspend it, which to me is more probable, and will be explained below, in q. 64; yet there is still in that act of sin a liberty, although he adheres immutably, and immutably chooses what he once chose. But to what was inferred in the argument as unfitting, that, the devil's fault growing, the punishment too would grow forever, St. Thomas answers in 2. Senten., dist. 7, q. 1, art. 2, to the fifth, that certain say that the fault and punishment of the demons can grow up to the day of judgment. But this does not seem to be so: because since afterwards they are not in the state of the way, as we now speak of the state of the way, so neither can they be changed for the worse. Whence it must be said that their fault or pride is said to grow not as regards the intensification of malice, but as regards the multiplicity of the act. So also the essential punishment does not grow, but the accidental, which is from the multitude of the damned, as is also the case with the reward of the good angels. To the fifth, from the opinion of Aristotle, it is answered that Aristotle is not to be esteemed so highly that we assert him to have been in all things an infallible rule of natural reason; indeed he himself is slippery enough in his doctrine concerning the immortality of souls, and then concerning the assertion of free will in God. In other places, besides those cited, he seems to think the opposite. As, for example, 4. Topic., cap. 5 he says: Much more do God and men do the things they do not do; and lib. 1 Ethic., cap. 5 he asserts that those are most dear to God who are truly wise, and that he confers very many benefits on them; and 8. Ethic., cap. 7 he teaches that God has friendship toward men, not indeed as between equals, but from supereminence. All of which cannot be true unless God has free will.

But now at last, from the aforesaid assertion of the divine free will, let the novice Theologian gather for himself excellent documents, by which he can dissolve very many theological difficulties which in public disputations are wont to torment some men vehemently. The first document is well enough received, that the liberty of will does not consist in this, that it is able to sin. For although from the fact that someone sins, or can sin, we rightly gather that he has the faculty of free will: yet conversely it does not follow, this will is free, therefore it can sin. For behold, God Himself is most free, and yet He is far from the possibility of sinning. Similarly Christ the Lord, as man, is impeccable, if the particle as be taken not reduplicatively, as the dialecticians say, for thus the proposition Christ, as man, is impeccable would be false: because this is false, which is included in it, every man is impeccable. But if the term as be taken specifically, so that the sense be that Christ through humanity, or the human will, cannot sin, the proposition is true, because such a sin would be attributed to the divine Supposit: and nevertheless, through the human will, He is free, and can merit. The ground of this document is very frequent in the doctrine of Augustine. For to be able to sin is not a power, but an infirmity of free will. Wherefore if through the grace of God a man is made sound from this infirmity, his liberty is in no way destroyed, but perfected. As happened in the Blessed Virgin through the fullness of sanctifying grace, so that she could not even sin venially, and it is the case in all confirmed in grace, that they can no longer sin mortally: and nevertheless they remain free and can merit in the observance of the precepts, as we shall explain more fully later.

Let the second document be: It is not repugnant to the liberty of will concerning means, indeed it is a greater perfection of it, that the will itself be naturally and necessarily inclined to the ultimate end, or also through the grace of God and supernatural gifts be determined as it were naturally to the ultimate end: indeed the liberty concerning means, which do not have a necessary connection with the end, will be so much more perfect, the more the will itself has been determined concerning the end. Behold an example in the divine Will, which necessarily and naturally loves the supreme good; and nevertheless is most perfectly free with respect to all creatures which are ordered to the ultimate end, since they do not have a necessary connection with it. Similarly the will of man is naturally determined to the good in common, as regards the specification of the act; and nevertheless is free as regards the specification of the act, with respect to certain means which do not have a necessary connection with the good in common, which is the object of the will. Indeed even if the will, as regards the exercise of the act, were naturally determined to willing the good in common, it would nevertheless remain free with respect to such means, but not with respect to those which have a necessary and intrinsic connection, from their nature, with the object of the will, as to-be and to live have a necessary connection with the good which is desired. The third document, and most of all to be observed, is that the liberty, the act of the will, which formally exists in it, arises from the root of an act of the intellect, namely from such an act and judgment of the intellect. For the intellect proposes to the will an object which is of itself indifferent to the attainment of the object of the will, nor has a necessary connection with it; and nevertheless judges that it is ordainable to the end of the will, either to the attainment of it, or to participating some goodness from the end; and then judges that it be ordained to the end, and immediately the will chooses, and in such a choice it is formally free. Which liberty arises, as from a root, from the aforesaid judgment of the intellect. And it is to be observed, by the way, that we place indifference in the very object judged, but it is not necessary that we understand indifference to be in the intellect itself or in its act: as we have already said that it is not found in the divine intellect. We have therefore that it is necessary for the liberty of the act of the will that the indifference of the means to be chosen be judged by the intellect, and that at the same time such a means be judged to be determinable to the end. Which indeed is a practical judgment, and necessarily conjoined with the choice of the will as the efficacious root from which the actual liberty of the one operating through the will originates. Let those observe this document vehemently who do not wish to err in dissolving the questions concerning merit and the ground of meriting: which I show in no other way than from the aforesaid. For God is most free, as has already been defined, and nevertheless in Him no other account of liberty is found with respect to those things which He wills outside Himself, except that He judges them not to have a necessary connection with the end, but to be in themselves indifferent; yet He judges them to be ordainable to the end, and judges that they are to be ordained. And this is the reason why to will to ordain is free. See therefore, Theologian, whether we do an injury to our free will, when we gather that the rational and intellectual creature will be so much more free in its operation, the more its operation is freely assimilated to the divine operation, to whose image and likeness, according to intellect and will, it was made? But you say: so the matter stands. Now therefore attend to the corollaries, which we gather by evident consequence from the aforesaid.

The first is: As often as an act of the will arises from the aforesaid root of judgment, it will always be free. Whence again I gather: Whatever has preceded or will accompany or will supervene upon an act of the will, if it does not take away that judgment concerning the means with respect to the end, will not destroy the liberty of the operation. This consequence is evident, because the definition of a free act standing, the act must be free. Now therefore approach gradually to the more difficult things. There precedes indeed our free operation the eternal and immutable counsel of the divine will, or the infallible predefinition of divine providence, which has predefined every good free operation, indeed even every operation, inasmuch as it is good and is exercised about good. But because God Himself, by His providence and immutable counsel, does not bind nor destroy our judgment, by which we judge the indifference of the means, and its ordainability, and that it is to be ordained to the end, He does not destroy the liberty of our operation either, but rather efficaciously effects, fosters and conserves it. See how with the infallible and efficacious divine Providence the liberty of our operation stands, indeed cannot stand without it.

Now indeed, concerning the graces of God and the efficacious divine aids, and the precepts, you will understand more plainly in what way they are not opposed to the liberty of our will, but rather favor it. The ground is evident, if you do not wish to deny the aforesaid document, which you have necessarily granted. For all these are so far from perturbing or binding the judgment of our reason that it cannot in the aforesaid way judge the indifference of the object, that they rather illuminate and perfect it, and transfer it to the likeness of God. Behold, says the Prophet, Psal. 18: The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. And when again he asks: Direct my steps in thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved, does he ask that liberty be taken away from him by the divine aid? Not indeed, but rather he implores that it be perfected in the observance of the commandments. Similarly, when the bride asks: Draw me, we will run after thee, does she pray for efficacious aid so that she may not walk with her own steps, that is, with free affections? Indeed she longs for this, that she may run more freely and swiftly. Far be it, therefore, from the catholic and pious Theologian, that, in defending the liberty of will, he diminish the efficacy of divine Providence and divine grace, and set apart the obligation of the divine precept, so as to assert the liberty of operating in those confirmed in grace.

Finally let us gather that, among all intellectual creatures, the most perfect liberty of operating was in the soul of Christ the Lord: since it is most of all assimilated to the divine liberty above all others. First indeed because through the hypostatic union it was made impeccable: since, since it existed in the nature of things with no other personality than the personality of the Word, if the soul of Christ should sin, the sin would be reflected upon the Word itself. Then, because Christ the Lord Himself, by the light of glory, beheld openly as a most excellent exemplar the predefinition of divine providence concerning Himself and His operations, and the precept of dying. As it was said to Moses: Look, and do according to the pattern which was shown to thee on the mount, Exodus 25. All of which perfected the liberty of His will, and illuminated the practical judgment of the intellect, by which Christ judged more certainly and evidently the indifference of the means to the end, and their ordainability together with the divine ordination or preordination. Whence even Christ the Lord Himself, subordinated to the same, ordained those same things to the ultimate end from the immense charity by which He was borne necessarily to that ultimate end. And in this also He was assimilated to God, who loves Himself necessarily, but us freely. So also the soul of Christ the Lord loves God Himself necessarily, and all the means which have a necessary and intrinsic connection with the attainment of that end, namely with the beatific vision of the soul of Christ, and thus it wills the light of glory, its own intellect, and its own being. But the rest, which do not have from within a necessary connection with the attainment of the end, although it had them from the supposition of a precept, it willed freely. With this doctrine is consonant what we read in Psalm 39, which is understood literally of Christ, as the Apostle testifies, at Heb. 10: in the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will. Behold, the divine predefinition preceded, and the immutability of the divine will, which was predefined and willed, what Christ should do. Then it follows, My God willed. Behold a free act of the soul of Christ subordinated to God, by which it willed to obey unto death, embracing with immense affection, but free, the law of dying the death of the cross, from the love of God. And this is what it says, And thy law in the midst of my heart. From these things finally it follows how vehemently and dangerously he would be deceived who should assert that Christ the Lord neither merited, nor could merit, in that He obeyed the precept of dying, unless He willed to obey more intensely than He was bound to from the obligation of the precept. Which some wished to confirm by such a reason, because they say it cannot be understood how, the precept of dying standing, the soul of Christ freely willed to die, which, the precept standing, could not not will to die: therefore in order to merit through the act of obedience, one must assert in the act itself an intensity which was not enjoined under the precept. This reason certainly is ridiculous, and proceeds freely enough from ignorance of the definition of a free act, and seems to us unworthy to be refuted in more words after the aforesaid documents, nor is it for this place and time to examine to a nicety, and to show, how much peril lies hidden in that assertion, or certainly, as I might better say, lies open. I indeed would not dare to affirm without danger to myself that that opinion is in any way probable. But of this matter we shall say more, more opportunely, with the Lord favoring us, without whom nothing was made. So much for this most grave doubt, under the correction of the Roman Church.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly concerning this article, whether now, in fact, there is in God a real power to will that Antichrist not be going to be? Cajetan, above, art. 7, to the 4th, holds that in God there is now no such real power. And he proves it first, because a power to opposites posits mutability in that in which it is, as Aristotle says, 9. Metaphysic.; but God is altogether immutable; therefore He does not have a power to opposites.

Secondly. If God can now will that Antichrist not be, therefore He can be changed. The consequence is proved: because He has already now willed that Antichrist be, therefore He would cease to will what He willed, and this is to be changed. And finally, St. Thomas himself, in the place above, and 1. Cont. Gent., cap. 82, seems to hold this opinion. Nevertheless Cajetan concedes that this proposition, God can will that Antichrist not be, if the word 'can' be taken absolutely, is true. But Scotus holds the opposite opinion in 1. dist. 39: which opinion many of the modern Theologians follow, even Thomists. And it is proved first, because God can make that Antichrist not be:

therefore He can will it. I prove the antecedent: because when God is about to create the soul of Antichrist, He will create it freely and not from necessity of nature: therefore He can make that it not be. Secondly. God is most perfectly free with respect to all other things outside Himself: therefore He has a true and real power to either. The consequence is clear from the definition of free will. Finally, before God produced the world, I ask, did He have the real power of not producing it, or did He not have it? If the former, therefore He simply now has the real power of not producing Antichrist; if the latter, therefore He produced the world from necessity and not freely. The consequence is clear: because from eternity He did not have the power of not producing it.

For the solution of this difficulty, which seems to us a question about a name, it must be distinguished, when it is asked whether there is now in God a real power of not producing Antichrist, and of willing the opposite of what He willed. For if that particle 'now' makes a composite sense with two opposites, that is, the supposition and truth of one opposite being made, the other opposite also be verified, the answer must be in the negative, that there is no such power in God, nor can there be. But if that particle 'now' makes a composition of one opposite with the power of doing the other, it would be blasphemous to deny that God now has the real power of making that Antichrist not be, and of willing that Antichrist not be. The former opinion of Cajetan, therefore, proceeds in the composite sense; but the latter opinion proceeds in the divided sense, and absolutely speaking. But absolutely speaking, the second view has the truth, both because the immutability of the divine will stands well, which, although it could do the opposite, will never do or will it. And in this consists being an immutable will. From these things it is clear what must be said to the arguments of each opinion.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: In God, the will of sign and the will of good pleasure are distinguished.

Second conclusion: The will of good pleasure is properly a will, but the will of sign is metaphorically a will.

Third conclusion, to the second: The signs of the will are called divine wills, not because they are signs that God wills, but because those things which in us are wont to be signs of willing are said metaphorically to be divine wills.