Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Falsity is not in the intellect knowing what a thing is. It is proved: because the intellect does not fall short of the cognition of that thing by whose likeness it is informed: therefore concerning what a thing is it is not deceived, because it is informed by the likeness of the quiddity.

Second conclusion: falsity is in the intellect composing and dividing. It is proved: because truth is there too; whence just as in the intellect composing and dividing truth is twofold, namely formally and objectively, so also falsity.

Third conclusion: Per accidens there can be falsity in the operation by which the intellect knows what a thing is, insofar as a composition of the intellect is mixed in there, as if, e.g., it attributes the definition of one thing to another, or joins together parts of a definition which cannot be associated together.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE concerning these articles how dissimilar the manner in which truth and falsity are found in the sense and in the intellect. For in the intellect, just as truth is found because the intellect knows the conformity of itself to the thing, so also falsity is found in it because it knows the difformity of itself to the thing, not indeed through a reflex act by which it knows itself to be unlike things, for thus it would not be deceived: but through a direct act by judging the thing otherwise than it is. But the sense is said to be true, not because it knows the truth, but because it is informed by the likeness of its object. But concerning this a doubt arises: for from this it follows that falsity can be in the sense neither per se nor per accidens, the contrary of which St. Thomas teaches in the second conclusion of the second article. The sequel is proved: for the sense always receives the likeness and form of the thing to be known. To this it is customarily answered in various ways, different authors explaining in different ways how the sense is deceived concerning the proper sensible, as, e.g., when something white, viewed through red glass, is judged to be of a red color. Some therefore say that then the likeness of whiteness is not received in the sense, but only that of redness; otherwise it would produce the cognition of white; and thus they save that there is falsity in the sense: since the likenesses of red do not agree with white. Others however say that from those two likenesses a certain third likeness is produced, through which the thing is known as white, as though red. But this explanation seems fabricated. For either that likeness is of red, or of white, or of some third thing. If the first, then the third is posited in vain, distinct from the likeness of red and of white. If the second, I ask, by what is it produced? Certainly it does not appear by what it can be produced, for red can only produce the likeness of red, and white the likeness of white, because each thing acts such as it itself is. Moreover, because in the sick man who judges sweet to be bitter, it is not easily explained how that third likeness is produced. It must therefore be said in one of two ways. The first is that which pleases learned men, namely, that in the sense, in that case, there is only the likeness of red and the likeness of white, for the object always transmits the likeness of itself through a diaphanous medium as far as the power: but nevertheless those two likenesses received in the sense mutually impede one another, and thus the true cognition of the sense is impeded. And they say the same of the likeness of bile which is in the tongue of the sick man, and of the likeness which honey produces in the taste, for both are received in the sense, but mutually impede one another; and thus the sense is deceived on account of the mutual impediment of the likenesses, in that it moves to a false judgment. And so they answer the argument made at the beginning, by denying the sequel: for although the proper likeness of the object is always received in the sense, yet because it is sometimes impeded, either on account of the refraction of the likenesses, or on account of contrary likenesses received in the same sense, therefore the sense is not always true. I, however, explain otherwise how the sense is deceived in that case concerning the proper sensible, not indeed because those likenesses received in the sense mutually impede one another: for otherwise, just as the sensation of white is impeded by the likeness of red, so also conversely: and consequently red would not be perceived by the visual power, the contrary of which we experience. And a similar argument holds of the sick man sensing bitterness and not sweetness. The sense is therefore deceived in that case because it does not receive the likeness in the manner in which it is emitted by the object, on account of the indisposition of the medium. For from the fact that the medium is affected by another color, it is necessary that the likenesses transmitted through that medium arrive at the power preoccupied by that color of the medium; and because what exists within prohibits what is foreign, 3 On the Soul, text 4, hence it happens that the visual power, affected by the likeness of the color red, cannot perceive another color except red. Which appears still more clearly in the sick man whose tongue is infected with bile, for the bile existing within, and not determinable by the likenesses of other savors, prohibits the sensation of other savors. See Cajetan, below, q. 36, art. 2, and the expositors of Aristotle, 5 On the Soul, in the place cited, and especially 2 On the Soul, text 65, where it is customarily disputed ex professo how the sense is not deceived concerning the proper sensible.

There is a doubt concerning what St. Thomas says in article 2, first conclusion, namely that the sense is deceived, from the fact that it sometimes judges things otherwise than they are. For it seems that in the sense there is no judgment. First, for St. Thomas so asserts, here to the third. And moreover, because both in the preceding question, art. 2, and in this place, St. Thomas taught that truth is in the intellect composing and dividing as in the knowing subject for this reason, that it is the intellect which judges the conformity of itself to the thing: therefore in the sense there is no judgment. To this it is answered first that when St. Thomas says the sense judges of its object, it is not to be understood that judgment is subjectively in the sense, but it is a causal locution, because the sense causes in the intellect a judgment about its object, insofar as the mind uses the apprehension of the senses for contemplating phantasms. It is said, second, that perhaps according to the teaching of St. Thomas it is to be asserted absolutely that in the interior sense there is judgment. For according to his mind, in the imagination there are certain singular and prudential propositions: therefore similarly, in the interior sense of the brute, a certain proportional judgment is to be asserted. But there is a great difference between the judgment of our intellect and that which is found in the brute. For our intellect takes first the subject, then the predicate, and joins one to the other: but brutes, by a certain natural instinct, produce their judgments similar to ours. Likewise, we perceive the conformity of one to the other, brutes by no means.