Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because each thing is knowable insofar as it has of being.

Second conclusion: Just as the good bespeaks an order to the appetite, so also the true [bespeaks] the comparison to the intellect.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT in this article: what does the true add upon being, and whether that which it adds is something real, or only of reason?

To this doubt Durandus, in 1 Sentences, d. 19, qq. 5 and 6, answers that truth is nothing other than the conformity of the same thing to itself according to one and another to-be, namely, according to the to-be of the intellect and real to-be; and thus truth is a relation of reason, insofar as the thing itself, as it is understood, is conformed to itself as it is in itself on the side of reality. For which Durandus notes that things have a twofold to-be: one which belongs to them on the side of reality, the operation of our intellect being excluded, as to be a man, to be white; another which belongs to them through the operation of the intellect, as to be a genus, to be a species. He notes second that the real thing itself, insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, not by means of a simple concept alone, but by means of a judicative proposition, becomes conformed to itself according to the real to-be which it has on the side of reality; and since this conformity belongs to things only through the operation of the intellect, hence it is that it is only a being of reason. Whence he infers that truth is nowhere subjectively, but only objectively in the intellect. This too seems to have been the opinion of Hervaeus, Quodlibet, book 3, question 1. And it is proved first. Truth is only objectively in the intellect, and not subjectively: therefore it is a being of reason. The antecedent is proved: for if truth is subjectively in the intellect, it is necessary that there be in it a certain conformity to the thing, either in being or in representing: but neither of these is in the intellect. I prove: not in being, for the intellect, and whatever is subjectively in it, is a spiritual accident, but the thing known is sometimes a material substance: therefore between them there is no conformity in being. Nor even in representing. It is proved: because by nature the thing is represented to the intellect through the impressed likeness before it is actually known by the intellect: therefore the actual cognition of the intellect is not [one] of conformity to the thing. Second it is proved from Aristotle, 6 Metaphysics, text 8, where he says that it does not pertain to the metaphysician to treat of truth: therefore truth is not a real being, otherwise it would be incumbent on the metaphysician to deal with it. And we confirm this argument from St. Thomas, saying here to the third, that the account of the true follows upon the apprehension of the mind; therefore it is a being of reason. And Cajetan says here that the good formally is the object of the will, but the true is not the formal object of the intellect, but is a condition of the object, not however a condition which follows upon the operation of the intellect, but one which accompanies it and assists it. Third it is proved. The true is the object to which the intellect ultimately tends; but the intellect ultimately tends to the things themselves: therefore truth consists in the conformity of things in their order to themselves, and not in the conformity of the intellect to the thing. It is confirmed: for the true is a passion of being: therefore it follows upon real beings themselves, and is founded rather in them than in the operation of the intellect. Fourth it is argued: for if truth is the conformity of a proposition existing in the intellect to the thing, it follows that it denominates only the intellect itself, or the mental proposition, and not the things themselves existing on the side of reality; but this is impossible, for then the true would not be a passion of being: therefore etc. Into this opinion of Durandus Soncinas seems to fall, 6 Metaphysics, question 16.

For the explication of truth let this be the first conclusion: Truth, whether it be taken transcendentally, or formally according as it is principally in the intellect, is a real entity. It is proved first: Truth in God is a divine perfection, for God is his truth, as he is his to-be: therefore also in all other things truth is something real. The consequence is proved: because just as we know the divine Wisdom through the wisdom of creatures, so we attribute truth to God from created truth, as was explained in the preceding article: therefore truth, in its whole community, is a perfection simply, like being. And it is confirmed: The truth of God is the measure and per se cause of every other truth; therefore the truth of created things is a real entity. The consequence is proved: because of a being of reason there is no per se cause, but it follows upon the operation of the intellect. Second it is proved: the perfection of our intellect does not consist in an entity of reason, since it is itself a certain real power: but truth is its perfection: therefore it is a real entity. Third it is proved: the passions of real being are something real; but truth is a proper passion of real being: therefore it is something real.

Second conclusion: truth is not distinguished really from being, but only in reason, not indeed by reason reasoning alone, but also by reasoned reason, which has a foundation in the thing itself. It is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas in the article. Each thing is knowable insofar as it has of being: where St. Thomas takes knowable or intelligible for the object of the intellect, which is the true, as if he said, each thing participates the account of the intelligible and of the true insofar as it participates the account of being: therefore truth is not distinguished really from being. This conclusion all metaphysicians acknowledge. But there is a difference, for some of them say that being and the true are distinguished in reason as a being of reason from real being; we however say that truth formally is something real, because it is a certain real passive conformity.

For the greater explication of which let there be the third conclusion, by which the question is answered: the true does not add upon being something real really distinct, but adds expressly a certain real perfection of being, which we do not conceive by this name being. This conclusion is explained: for just as we know the Divine Essence by one and another concept, e.g. of wisdom, of goodness, etc., and by one concept something real is signified which is not formally signified by the other, although it is not really distinct; so we say that being itself, and whatever is enclosed in it, we do not know distinctly by one concept, but by one concept we know the unity of being, and by another the truth, and by another the very account of being, abstracting from this and from that, etc., although these are not really distinguished among themselves. And just as, although the one imports a certain negation of division, nevertheless unity itself is not a negation, but a real entity, which is explained through the negation of division. As also immortality and incorruptibility are real perfections, which are nevertheless explained through the negation of death and corruption. In this manner, the true imports truth, which is a certain real entity and perfection; but which must nevertheless be explained through the relation to the intellect, although it is not itself a relation, as we shall say below. For the understanding of which it is to be noted that the perfection of each created thing is to participate something of the perfection of being; but since an intellective being is more perfect than that which lacks intellect, because it is more immaterial, and again a being intellective by essence is more perfect than one knowing by participation, hence it is that it is the greatest perfection of every created being that it be reduced to the intellect of God as to a measure, from which it receives its to-be and all its perfection. Every creature, therefore, insofar as it imitates the to-be of God, is called a being; insofar, however, as it imitates the intellect of God, as it is his work, it is called true. But insofar as it understands by imitating the operation of God, it is the most perfect of all creatures, and is said to be made to the image of God; and again among rational creatures themselves, that one is more perfect which more imitates the divine intellect.

To the arguments. To the first of Durandus it is answered by denying the antecedent. And to the proof the minor is denied. For there is in the intellect a conformity to the thing, not indeed in being, for of this we are not now speaking, but there is a conformity in representing. Since the intellect through judgment is formally conformed to the things themselves, in a certain representative to-be: and such a form of judgment takes the place of the things, which cannot per se immediately be united and present to the intellect so that it judge concerning them. He grants nevertheless that, since things are denominated true through an order to our intellect, such denomination is extrinsic and through a relation of reason. But what Durandus asserts, that the thing is present to the intellect through the impressed likeness, is in a certain way true, but nevertheless the thing is not formally represented as true until the judgment of the intellect supervenes, as St. Thomas expressly taught in the preceding article. To the second it is answered first that truth as it is in the intellect is not a passion of being, but as it is in things, as St. Thomas teaches here, to the first, and therefore its consideration does not pertain to the metaphysician. It is answered second that, although the formal truth which is in the intellect is a real being, nevertheless the consideration of it in particular does not belong to the metaphysician: for it is not for the metaphysician to deal with every real being in particular, but under the account of being in common. To the confirmation it is answered that by those words St. Thomas wished to signify nothing other than that the account of the true is together with the apprehension of being, when the intellect judges that something is or is not; and Cajetan holds the same. From which it does not follow that formal truth is a being of reason. To the third it is answered that the intellect tends to the mental proposition itself as to an intrinsic term; and to the things themselves, which it principally intends to know, as to an extrinsic term. That first is the proper and per se perfection of the intellect; the second, however, is not so. Wherefore although the intellect tends to both, the account of the true consists rather in the first than in the second. To the confirmation it is answered that there is one account of the true, which is a passion of being, and another of formal truth, which is in the intellect. To the fourth it is answered that the truth which is in our intellect denominates the intellect formally true; and by the same truth things are said to be true by extrinsic denomination, insofar as they are the cause of the truth which is in the intellect.

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the true, formally speaking, imports something absolute, or something respective? And it seems that it imports a relation formally. The true is said from truth as from a denominating form, as white from whiteness; but truth is defined through the conformity of one to another, as was said in article 1; but conformity formally is a relation: therefore also truth. Second. For St. Thomas said in the preceding article that for the intellect to know truth is to know the conformity of itself to the thing: therefore truth consists in this conformity, or adequation, or likeness, which is a certain relation. Third. The true adds something upon being: but it is not understood what it adds unless this relation of conformity: therefore the true formally imports a relation.

To this doubt Durandus, in the place cited above, says that truth is principally and formally something respective. Cajetan seems to say the same in the preceding article, at the end. Let this nevertheless be the conclusion: The true, simply speaking, imports something absolute, which nevertheless cannot be explained without a respect. Thus St. Thomas teaches, On Truth, q. 1, art. 8, and Capreolus in 1, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 5; Soncinas, 6 Metaphysics, q. 17. The conclusion is explained, and at the same time proved both of the truth which is in things and of the truth of the intellect. For just as knowledge is something absolute, yet bespeaking an order to the knowable, so also the true which is in things is an absolute perfection, which nevertheless is not explained without a respect to the intellect. Similarly also the true which is in the intellect signifies the judgment by which the intellect judges of the thing with a bearing and conformity to the thing itself. The conclusion is therefore proved: the truth which is in the divine intellect is a certain greatest perfection; therefore it is that eternal judgment which God has of himself: therefore it is not the conformity of that judgment to the thing signified, for this is a relation of reason, like the relation of the same to itself: therefore similarly, the truth which is in the created intellect is the conformed judgment itself; but the relation of conformity itself is not truth, but something consequent upon truth, just as the relation of conformity in knowledge is something consequent upon knowledge, and just as conformity or difformity to a rule is not moral goodness and malice, but consequent upon it. But if you argue: for truth is commonly defined as the adequation of the intellect to the thing, or of the thing to the intellect, therefore the relation of adequation and conformity itself is truth; it is answered that there the word adequation is not taken formally for the relation of adequation, but for the foundation, namely for the judgment which is adequated. Moreover, for when we say that God is the first truth, we explain a certain great perfection which is in God, and completes the divine judgment: therefore it imports something absolute. Moreover, he who says this to be true gold, a true man, signifies the nature of man, and of gold; but those natures are something absolute: therefore the true also imports something absolute. Further, the true is the greatest perfection of our intellect: therefore it is not a relation. The consequence is proved: for a relation is the least entity.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered that they prove that the true imports something absolute which cannot be explained without a respect, as knowledge and power, etc. But in particular to the third it is answered that what the true adds upon being is not distinguished from being really, but only by reasoned reason, yet is something absolute, as we explained in the preceding doubt. But you ask whether that respect of conformity, through which the account of the true is explained, is a real respect or one of reason. About this see Soncinas, 6 Metaphysics, q. 17, and Javelli, in his treatise On the Transcendentals, chap. 5. But nevertheless it is answered that, speaking of the relation of conformity which divine truth has to its essence, it is a relation of reason on the part of both extremes. But if we speak of the relation of conformity which the judgment of our intellect bespeaks to the things judged, it abstracts from real and of reason, for sometimes it is real, namely when the things of which it judges exist on the side of reality; sometimes it is a relation of reason, namely when things do not exist, for a real relation requires real extremes. But if we speak of the truth which is in things, in order to the divine intellect, that relation of conformity which the creature bespeaks to the divine idea, for the whole time in which the creature exists, is a real relation. But the conformity which a thing bespeaks to our speculative intellect is a respect of reason, for the things themselves are the measure of the truth which is in the intellect; but the relation of the measure to the measured, although on the part of the measured it is a real relation, nevertheless on the part of the measure it is a relation of reason. But if the thing be compared to the practical intellect, it is a real relation, such as is between the thing made and its cause. For the house outside is the effect of the art which is in the mind of the craftsman. And let these suffice on this whole question. See the following articles, especially article 7, in which St. Thomas determines that no created truth is eternal. Where a question could be formed: whether propositions in which the predicate is said of the subject, in the first and second mode of saying per se, are of perpetual truth? But nevertheless on this matter see Cajetan, 1 Posterior Analytics, chap. 9, doubts 1, 2 and 3, and Soncinas, 9 Metaphysics, qq. 4 and 5, and what we said above, q. 10, art. 3; and below, q. 19, art. 8, doubt 2, note 2, certain things are to be found.