Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

CONCLUSION: Truth, properly speaking, is only in the intellect composing and dividing, and not in the sense nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. The reason is: because every thing is true insofar as it has the proper form of its nature; therefore, since the proper account of the intellect as it is knowing is the true, which is its form, it is necessary that its truth and conformity to the thing be in it as in the knowing subject: which does not come about except by composing and dividing.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT concerning the truth of St. Thomas's conclusion, and an argument is first made against it. Truth is found in the angelic intellect, and yet there is no composition or division there: therefore truth is not only in the intellect composing and dividing. And it is confirmed. For in the divine intellect, in which there is in no way composition, truth is most properly present.

Second. Every thing which properly is a being is a true being, therefore truth is in it, therefore truth is not only found in the intellect composing and dividing. It is confirmed: the intellect knowing the quiddity of a thing by a simple concept is conformed to it: therefore it is formally true. The consequence is proved: for truth formally is the conformity of the intellect to the thing.

Third. When the intellect forms an apprehensive proposition before it judges anything, it properly composes; and yet it is then neither formally true nor false: therefore truth is not always in the intellect composing. The major seems clear, for that apprehension does not pertain to the first operation of the intellect, since it is not an apprehension of simples. The minor is proved: because by the mere apprehension of this proposition, the earth is round, the intellect is said to be neither true nor false, because it neither conforms nor dissonates or is difform to the thing until judgment. And this is proved manifestly, because as for the Theologians apprehending propositions against the faith, before they judge concerning them, the intellect is not said to be false, otherwise it would also be called erroneous: therefore etc.

Fourth, an argument is made against the reasoning of St. Thomas, and I prove that it is not necessary for the intellect to know the conformity of itself to the thing in order to be formally true, as St. Thomas says in the article. As soon as the intellect judges that man is risible, it is formally true: and yet it does not then know its conformity to the thing known: therefore etc. The minor is proved, because it cannot know such conformity unless it reflects upon itself: therefore, when it directly knows risibility together with the likeness, it does not yet know the conformity of itself to the thing. It is confirmed. When the intellect reflects upon its own understanding, which is of a simple object, e.g. when it reflects upon the simple concept by which it knows man, it then knows its own conformity to the thing; and yet it is not then formally true, because it does not yet say anything of the thing: therefore truth properly is not in the intellect knowing its conformity to the thing. The major is proved and explained. For we suppose that that reflection is made upon the concept, not as a certain quality that it is, but as the likeness of the thing. Then it is argued thus. A proper concept of an image cannot be had unless the conformity of it to the thing of which it is the image is known: therefore the intellect knows through that reflex act the conformity of its direct concept to the thing.

Lastly. The intellect knowing a thing incomplexly and in the universal is distinguished from things and from the sense, which is of singulars: therefore truth properly is in the intellect knowing what a thing is. I prove the consequence, for in that way truth is in the intellect according to what is proper to it as it is intellect; but it is proper to it to know a thing in the universal: therefore etc.

For the understanding of the truth and of the conclusion of St. Thomas, note first that the conclusion of St. Thomas must necessarily be understood of the human intellect, for the divine intellect has every kind of simplicity, as is clear above, q. 3, art. 7: and the angelic intellect does not know by composing and dividing, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 58, art. 4. The human intellect alone, therefore, since it is in the lowest grade of intelligible things, attains truth by composing one thing with another; and from this the solution to the first argument with its confirmation is clear. And that St. Thomas wished to hold this is clear from what he says in the body of the article, namely, that in every proposition the intellect either applies to some thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate, or removes it from it, which certainly does not happen except in the human intellect. Note second that if the conclusion of St. Thomas were set under these words, truth, properly speaking, is in the intellect knowing and saying or judging the truth, it would be more universal and more per se. More universal indeed, because it would comprehend every intellect; but more per se, because according to the teaching of Aristotle, 1 Posterior Analytics, text 9, that belongs to something more per se which belongs according to the adequate account, and not according to a particular account. But that the intellect composes and divides is not the adequate account on account of which truth is found in it; indeed this belongs to a certain intellect on account of its imperfection, because it cannot come from potency to the act of judging except by proceeding gradually, because it needs many things. But the adequate account of the truth of the intellect is judgment. Nevertheless I think that St. Thomas deliberately set the conclusion under that form, both because at the same time it had to be proved universally that truth is in the intellect knowing and judging, and especially because from the perfection which we find in our intellect, joined nevertheless to many imperfections of composition and division, we more easily rise to knowing the perfection of the truth of a higher intellect, the imperfection of composition and division being removed. Lastly note that since here, and especially in the preceding article, it has been defined by St. Thomas that truth is principally in the intellect rather than in things, it is necessary in such a locution to take the intellect as distinct from things, according to the proper account by which it is intellect, and not as it is a certain thing. Wherefore it must be taken as knowing the truth by which it is conformed to the thing known. And the reason for this is: because if the intellect is taken as it is a certain thing having conformity in itself, and not as knowing it, it has this in common with the other things which in that way are true, as we said in the preceding article: therefore, in order that truth be attributed to the intellect in a special way and not commonly as to any thing whatever, it is necessary to take the intellect according to those things which are proper to it, namely, as it is knowing the truth, and in this way truth is said to be in the intellect as in the one knowing the truth.

To the arguments made it is answered. To the first, it has already been answered in the first note.

To the second it is answered by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent: in any thing whatever truth is found commonly or transcendentally, I grant; but as in the knowing and judging subject, it is only in the intellect, and this is the proper mode by which truth is in the intellect. To the confirmation it is answered similarly: let the antecedent pass, and I distinguish the consequent: as in the knowing and judging subject, I deny that truth is in the intellect itself by the very fact that it knows some simple quiddity; but commonly or transcendentally I grant, which will be further explained in the solution to the fifth.

To the third it is to be noted that Cajetan, in his Commentary on this article, seems to say that the intellect is then formally true, in the way in which truth is attributed to the intellect, when it apprehends a true proposition. For then, he says, the intellect is true in this way, when it knows the conformity of itself to the thing. But to know the conformity of itself to the thing is nothing other than to know something in itself as conformed to the thing: but this is nothing other than to apprehend some complex; for by apprehending ly homo est, I apprehend something as conformed. These are the words of Cajetan, by which I confess that beginners can be deceived, thinking that in the apprehensive proposition alone, before judgment supervenes, the intellect is constituted formally true or false. But the truth is the opposite: for the intellect is not conformed or difform to the thing before it judges. Wherefore, for the full understanding of this, note that since the true bespeaks an order to the intellect as perfective of it, the intellect can be perfected and conformed to the things themselves in four ways. First, through an intelligible likeness. Second, through a simple concept, by which it knows the simple quiddity of the thing. Third, through an apprehensive proposition, which the intellect forms without asserting or judging, as happens in those who doubt. Fourth, through a judicative proposition, which the intellect forms by asserting and saying or judging, as when the intellect assertively says, homo est risibilis. And then first is the intellect formally true, because then it is conformed to the thing signified by the proposition, and this comes about when the intellect judges the thing to be as is signified by that proposition. But that this is the mind of the Holy Doctor is manifestly clear from the words of this article, where he says that when the intellect judges a thing to be so as is the form which it apprehends of the thing, then first it knows and says the true. He says the same in On Truth, q. 1, art. 3. And it is proved: for the true is the perfection of our intellect, and for this reason it bespeaks an order to the intellect as perfective of it; but the intellect is not reckoned altogether and absolutely perfect through the apprehensive proposition alone, but through judgment; for through it, it is conformed to the thing itself, by knowing the thing to be as it is: therefore then first is truth formally in the intellect, as in the one knowing the truth. Second this is proved. Every other operation of our intellect, and every discourse of it, is ordered to this, that it judge of things such as they are, attributing some things to some and removing some: therefore then first does it attain its perfection, and then first does it know and say the true, when through such judgment it is conformed to the things themselves. Nor does Cajetan hold the opposite of this opinion in the article, if it be read attentively; indeed he openly teaches the same, for he says that the intellect then first knows the truth, or the conformity of itself to the thing, when it says, homo est, or homo currit, etc. But it is certain that the intellect says none of these things except when it asserts; and it does not assert until it judges. But what he says, that this is nothing other than to apprehend, is not so to be taken as if he took apprehension as an operation distinct from judgment; but by to apprehend he understands the same as to form or know, yet by judging. But if against this you object, first, that which Aristotle teaches, 1 Perihermeneias, chap. 1, lect. 3, and 5 On the Soul, text 21, that truth is in composition and division, or in the intellect composing and dividing, but when the intellect first apprehends a proposition, it composes before it judges, therefore it is then formally true. For Aristotle was speaking of this kind of truth in those places, as is clear from St. Thomas, 1 Perihermeneias, lect. 3. It is confirmed: in the second operation of our intellect there is truth formally, as the Logicians and Metaphysicians teach from those places of Aristotle; and that apprehensive proposition pertains to the second operation of our intellect, as is evident: therefore etc. It is confirmed second: for then that proposition is true; how then is truth in it? It certainly does not seem otherwise than formally, since it is a mental proposition. It is answered that those places of Aristotle and the like are thus to be understood: in the composition and division of the judging intellect the truth is formally. For in our judgment there certainly is a certain composition, in contrast to angelic judgment, whether our judicative cognition be one or multiple. Similarly it is answered to the first confirmation that in the second operation of the judging intellect there is truth formally, and until the intellect judges it is not formally true or false. To the second confirmation it is answered easily that just as in the vocal and written proposition there is truth as in a sign, so also in the mental one: in the former indeed as in an instrumental sign at will, as the dialecticians say; in the latter, however, as in a formal sign. And from these things the answer to the third main argument is clear. For when St. Thomas says that truth formally is in the intellect composing, composing is understood as composing and judging, as he himself explains in the article.

To the fourth main argument it is answered: I grant the major, and I deny the minor. To its proof the antecedent is denied. And it is to be noted with Cajetan that the intellect can know the conformity of itself to the thing known in two ways. First, in the signified act, as when it knows truth through the simple concept of the true or of conformity, as is signified by this name true or conformity. Second, in the exercised act, and this happens whenever the intellect judges of things, saying that matters stand as it itself forms judgment about things: for which it is not required that it reflect; but it suffices that by a direct act it exercises judgment about the thing, and then it is said to know its conformity in the exercised act. To the confirmation it is answered that the intellect can reflect upon its concept in two ways. In one way through another concept or simple cognition: and thus it knows no conformity of itself in the exercised act. In another way it can reflect through a certain cognition, by which it says I am conformed, or I am not conformed, to the things themselves: and then there is also truth or falsity in this reflection, properly speaking, just as when the intellect directly judges, because then too the intellect composes and divides.

To the fifth it is answered that universality is not the proper account of the object of the intellect, but is a condition of the object consequent upon the action of the intellect itself. But truth is a perfect form existing within the intellect itself. Hence its proper operation, as it is intellect, is not to know the universal, but the true in the exercised act. Wherefore the intellect will not be perfect according to its proper form until it knows the truth by exercising judgment about things.

There is a DOUBT: whether the true bespeaks an intrinsic order to the intellect? And it seems not. For the true is converted with being; but being does not bespeak an intrinsic order to the intellect: therefore neither does the true. Second. For otherwise it would follow that the nature of the true were relative, which nevertheless will be impugned below. The sequel is proved: for that which bespeaks an intrinsic order to another is relative. Third. If by any account the true bespoke an intrinsic order to the intellect, it would be because it is the object of the intellect; but this account is null: therefore etc. The minor is proved: for the object precedes the power itself; therefore it does not bespeak an intrinsic order to it. It is proved second: because being is the object of the intellect, and yet does not bespeak an intrinsic order to the intellect: therefore neither does the true.

To this it is briefly answered that the true imports an intrinsic order to the intellect; thus St. Thomas teaches, artic. seq., where he says that just as the good adds upon being the account of the appetible, so also the true [adds] the comparison to the intellect. The same St. Thomas teaches more openly, On Truth, q. 1, art. 2, where he says that, any intellect whatever being removed, the account of truth would in no way remain. And it is proved: Truth, intrinsically, is the adequation of the intellect to the thing or of the thing to the intellect, as we explained, art. 1: therefore etc. Moreover. The true, from its own and intrinsic account, adds something upon being; but it is not understood what that is which it adds, unless it be the order to the intellect; therefore it includes this order intrinsically. Hence just as the good is the object of the will, and bespeaks an intrinsic order to the will, so also the true bespeaks an intrinsic order, at least in the mode of saying and as it were obliquely, to the intellect. And by these, to the objections.