Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Truth is more principally in the intellect than in things.

Second conclusion: Truth is secondarily in things, insofar as they are compared to the intellect as to a principle on which they depend.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED: Whether creatures are formally true? And it seems that they are not. First, from that common distinction which the Logicians and Metaphysicians use, that truth is found in three ways: in the intellect formally, in a proposition as in a sign, in things truly fundamentally and as in a cause: therefore in created things it is not found formally.

Secondly. Truth belongs to things through comparison to the intellect, as St. Thomas says in the article. But if they be compared to the divine intellect, on which they depend of themselves, truth is found in them as in a sign, because they have been made to the likeness of the divine idea; but if they be compared to the human intellect, truth is in them as in a cause: therefore in no way formally. It is confirmed: because St. Thomas says in the article, as is clear in the second conclusion, that truth is in things secondarily: therefore not formally, for if formally, why more secondarily than in the intellect.

Thirdly. For St. Augustine, book 2 of the Soliloquies, ch. 4 and 5, rejects a certain definition of the true, by which some said the true to be that which is as it seems; and another similar one, namely, the true is that which is as it seems to cognition; but the to-be which is in created things is known by the intellect: therefore through that to-be they do not have it, that they be formally true.

On the contrary, however, is that creatures are formally beings: therefore also true.

For the resolution, note first that, as far as is gathered from the definitions adduced by St. Thomas in the article, truth formally is nothing other than a certain adequation or passive conformity of a thing to some measure, principle or cause; and so is understood the definition of St. Augustine adduced here, namely, truth is the supreme likeness of a principle without any dissimilitude, that is, it is the assimilation or adequation of a thing to its measure.

Note secondly that just as healthy is said in three ways: first formally, according as it is said of the animal in which health is formally present; in the second way causatively, as it is said of food, because it is the effective cause of health; in the third way as in a sign, as it is said of urine and of color: so too true can denominate in three ways: first formally, and in this way it is said of the intellect and of its operation, insofar as it has a passive conformity to its object, whether it be the divine or a created intellect. Secondly true is said of created things in two ways, both causatively and formally, but in respect of diverse things: for if they be compared to the divine intellect they are formally true, but secondarily, because in themselves they have that passive conformity to the divine intellect as to a measure and exemplar, through this that they have the forms due to their nature, by which they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind. And in this way is understood the second conclusion of St. Thomas, when he says that truth is in things secondarily: not that truth is not formally in them in its own way, but because it is dependently on the truth which is in the divine intellect.

Creatures are also said to be truly causatively, through order to the human intellect, insofar as they are the cause and measure of the truth which is in the human intellect.

But if you say that a creature is rather denominated true through order to the divine intellect, insofar as it is a sign of the truth which is in the divine mind, because it has been made to the likeness of the divine idea; it is answered that it is no inconvenience that creatures be true in both ways, namely both formally and as a sign, just as the dawn is bright formally and at the same time also a sign of the bright sun.

And creatures are formally good, and also are signs of the divine goodness. See St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 1, art. 2, and book 1 of the Perihermeneias, lect. 3.

We can also give an example of a house, which through the form it has in itself is formally a true house, and is also a sign of the art which is in the mind of the craftsman.

All creatures stand similarly in respect of God.

Note thirdly that even in God, in our manner of understanding, we can distinguish a twofold denomination of the true, namely formally and fundamentally. For if we consider the divine Essence as it is intellect and intellection, it is formally true, because it is adequated to its own essence as to an object and measure; but the divine Essence itself, as it is the object of its own intellection, can be denominated true fundamentally, as the measure of the truth itself which is formally in the divine intellect. Nor is this against St. Thomas, art. 5 following, to the second, where he says that in the essential truth of the divine intellect there is not found, as in us, a conformation to its principle, unless perhaps, he says, truth be taken according as it is appropriated to the Son, who has a principle. For St. Thomas there takes principle for that from which something is produced, and not only for that which has the character of object and measure, as we take it in the present. But if principle be taken in the character of measure and object, it is most truly said that the divine intellection is commensurated to the divine Essence as to the principle and object of the intellection; just as also the duration of the Divine Essence is commensurated with eternity itself, which is not distinguished from the Essence itself. From these things it follows that answer is to be made to the proposed doubt, namely that truth is formally found in creatures, which is sufficiently clear from the second observation set out above. And furthermore, for the true is convertible with being, but creatures are formally beings: therefore they are formally true through comparison to the divine intellect, as has been said.

To the arguments on the contrary it is answered. To the first, I grant that the distinction is good: but yet the two members can belong to the same thing in respect of diverse things. Hence if creatures be compared to the human intellect, they are true causatively; but through comparison to the divine intellect they have truth formally, and also as a sign, as was explained in the second observation. In the same way it is answered to the second with its confirmation, for that saying of St. Thomas was explained in the second observation. To the third it is likewise answered as St. Thomas answers in the solution to the first, that Augustine speaks of the truth of things which of themselves do not depend on the human intellect; whence, since those definitions included such a dependence, which is accidental, and those things which are accidental are to be excluded from definitions, therefore those definitions are rejected by St. Augustine.