Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Truth is more principally in the intellect than in things.

Second conclusion: Truth is secondarily in things, insofar as they are compared to the intellect as to a principle on which they depend.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED: Whether creatures are formally true? And it seems that they are not. First, from that common distinction which the Logicians and Metaphysicians use, that truth is found in three ways: in the intellect formally, in a proposition as in a sign, in things truly fundamentally and as in a cause: therefore in created things it is not found formally.

Secondly. Truth belongs to things through comparison to the intellect, as St. Thomas says in the article. But if they be compared to the divine intellect, on which they depend of themselves, truth is found in them as in a sign, because they have been made to the likeness of the divine idea; but if they be compared to the human intellect, truth is in them as in a cause: therefore in no way formally. It is confirmed: because St. Thomas says in the article, as is clear in the second conclusion, that truth is in things secondarily: therefore not formally, for if formally, why more secondarily than in the intellect.

Thirdly. For St. Augustine, book 2 of the Soliloquies, ch. 4 and 5, rejects a certain definition of the true, by which some said the true to be that which is as it seems; and another similar one, namely, the true is that which is as it seems to cognition; but the to-be which is in created things is known by the intellect: therefore through that to-be they do not have it, that they be formally true.

On the contrary, however, is that creatures are formally beings: therefore also true.

For the resolution, note first that, as far as is gathered from the definitions adduced by St. Thomas in the article, truth formally is nothing other than a certain adequation or passive conformity of a thing to some measure, principle or cause; and so is understood the definition of St. Augustine adduced here, namely, truth is the supreme likeness of a principle without any dissimilitude, that is, it is the assimilation or adequation of a thing to its measure.

Note secondly that just as healthy is said in three ways: first formally, according as it is said of the animal in which health is formally present; in the second way causatively, as it is said of food, because it is the effective cause of health; in the third way as in a sign, as it is said of urine and of color: so too true can denominate in three ways: first formally, and in this way it is said of the intellect and of its operation, insofar as it has a passive conformity to its object, whether it be the divine or a created intellect. Secondly true is said of created things in two ways, both causatively and formally, but in respect of diverse things: for if they be compared to the divine intellect they are formally true, but secondarily, because in themselves they have that passive conformity to the divine intellect as to a measure and exemplar, through this that they have the forms due to their nature, by which they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind. And in this way is understood the second conclusion of St. Thomas, when he says that truth is in things secondarily: not that truth is not formally in them in its own way, but because it is dependently on the truth which is in the divine intellect.

Creatures are also said to be truly causatively, through order to the human intellect, insofar as they are the cause and measure of the truth which is in the human intellect.

But if you say that a creature is rather denominated true through order to the divine intellect, insofar as it is a sign of the truth which is in the divine mind, because it has been made to the likeness of the divine idea; it is answered that it is no inconvenience that creatures be true in both ways, namely both formally and as a sign, just as the dawn is bright formally and at the same time also a sign of the bright sun.

And creatures are formally good, and also are signs of the divine goodness. See St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 1, art. 2, and book 1 of the Perihermeneias, lect. 3.

We can also give an example of a house, which through the form it has in itself is formally a true house, and is also a sign of the art which is in the mind of the craftsman.

All creatures stand similarly in respect of God.

Note thirdly that even in God, in our manner of understanding, we can distinguish a twofold denomination of the true, namely formally and fundamentally. For if we consider the divine Essence as it is intellect and intellection, it is formally true, because it is adequated to its own essence as to an object and measure; but the divine Essence itself, as it is the object of its own intellection, can be denominated true fundamentally, as the measure of the truth itself which is formally in the divine intellect. Nor is this against St. Thomas, art. 5 following, to the second, where he says that in the essential truth of the divine intellect there is not found, as in us, a conformation to its principle, unless perhaps, he says, truth be taken according as it is appropriated to the Son, who has a principle. For St. Thomas there takes principle for that from which something is produced, and not only for that which has the character of object and measure, as we take it in the present. But if principle be taken in the character of measure and object, it is most truly said that the divine intellection is commensurated to the divine Essence as to the principle and object of the intellection; just as also the duration of the Divine Essence is commensurated with eternity itself, which is not distinguished from the Essence itself. From these things it follows that answer is to be made to the proposed doubt, namely that truth is formally found in creatures, which is sufficiently clear from the second observation set out above. And furthermore, for the true is convertible with being, but creatures are formally beings: therefore they are formally true through comparison to the divine intellect, as has been said.

To the arguments on the contrary it is answered. To the first, I grant that the distinction is good: but yet the two members can belong to the same thing in respect of diverse things. Hence if creatures be compared to the human intellect, they are true causatively; but through comparison to the divine intellect they have truth formally, and also as a sign, as was explained in the second observation. In the same way it is answered to the second with its confirmation, for that saying of St. Thomas was explained in the second observation. To the third it is likewise answered as St. Thomas answers in the solution to the first, that Augustine speaks of the truth of things which of themselves do not depend on the human intellect; whence, since those definitions included such a dependence, which is accidental, and those things which are accidental are to be excluded from definitions, therefore those definitions are rejected by St. Augustine.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

CONCLUSION: Truth, properly speaking, is only in the intellect composing and dividing, and not in the sense nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. The reason is: because every thing is true insofar as it has the proper form of its nature; therefore, since the proper account of the intellect as it is knowing is the true, which is its form, it is necessary that its truth and conformity to the thing be in it as in the knowing subject: which does not come about except by composing and dividing.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT concerning the truth of St. Thomas's conclusion, and an argument is first made against it. Truth is found in the angelic intellect, and yet there is no composition or division there: therefore truth is not only in the intellect composing and dividing. And it is confirmed. For in the divine intellect, in which there is in no way composition, truth is most properly present.

Second. Every thing which properly is a being is a true being, therefore truth is in it, therefore truth is not only found in the intellect composing and dividing. It is confirmed: the intellect knowing the quiddity of a thing by a simple concept is conformed to it: therefore it is formally true. The consequence is proved: for truth formally is the conformity of the intellect to the thing.

Third. When the intellect forms an apprehensive proposition before it judges anything, it properly composes; and yet it is then neither formally true nor false: therefore truth is not always in the intellect composing. The major seems clear, for that apprehension does not pertain to the first operation of the intellect, since it is not an apprehension of simples. The minor is proved: because by the mere apprehension of this proposition, the earth is round, the intellect is said to be neither true nor false, because it neither conforms nor dissonates or is difform to the thing until judgment. And this is proved manifestly, because as for the Theologians apprehending propositions against the faith, before they judge concerning them, the intellect is not said to be false, otherwise it would also be called erroneous: therefore etc.

Fourth, an argument is made against the reasoning of St. Thomas, and I prove that it is not necessary for the intellect to know the conformity of itself to the thing in order to be formally true, as St. Thomas says in the article. As soon as the intellect judges that man is risible, it is formally true: and yet it does not then know its conformity to the thing known: therefore etc. The minor is proved, because it cannot know such conformity unless it reflects upon itself: therefore, when it directly knows risibility together with the likeness, it does not yet know the conformity of itself to the thing. It is confirmed. When the intellect reflects upon its own understanding, which is of a simple object, e.g. when it reflects upon the simple concept by which it knows man, it then knows its own conformity to the thing; and yet it is not then formally true, because it does not yet say anything of the thing: therefore truth properly is not in the intellect knowing its conformity to the thing. The major is proved and explained. For we suppose that that reflection is made upon the concept, not as a certain quality that it is, but as the likeness of the thing. Then it is argued thus. A proper concept of an image cannot be had unless the conformity of it to the thing of which it is the image is known: therefore the intellect knows through that reflex act the conformity of its direct concept to the thing.

Lastly. The intellect knowing a thing incomplexly and in the universal is distinguished from things and from the sense, which is of singulars: therefore truth properly is in the intellect knowing what a thing is. I prove the consequence, for in that way truth is in the intellect according to what is proper to it as it is intellect; but it is proper to it to know a thing in the universal: therefore etc.

For the understanding of the truth and of the conclusion of St. Thomas, note first that the conclusion of St. Thomas must necessarily be understood of the human intellect, for the divine intellect has every kind of simplicity, as is clear above, q. 3, art. 7: and the angelic intellect does not know by composing and dividing, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 58, art. 4. The human intellect alone, therefore, since it is in the lowest grade of intelligible things, attains truth by composing one thing with another; and from this the solution to the first argument with its confirmation is clear. And that St. Thomas wished to hold this is clear from what he says in the body of the article, namely, that in every proposition the intellect either applies to some thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate, or removes it from it, which certainly does not happen except in the human intellect. Note second that if the conclusion of St. Thomas were set under these words, truth, properly speaking, is in the intellect knowing and saying or judging the truth, it would be more universal and more per se. More universal indeed, because it would comprehend every intellect; but more per se, because according to the teaching of Aristotle, 1 Posterior Analytics, text 9, that belongs to something more per se which belongs according to the adequate account, and not according to a particular account. But that the intellect composes and divides is not the adequate account on account of which truth is found in it; indeed this belongs to a certain intellect on account of its imperfection, because it cannot come from potency to the act of judging except by proceeding gradually, because it needs many things. But the adequate account of the truth of the intellect is judgment. Nevertheless I think that St. Thomas deliberately set the conclusion under that form, both because at the same time it had to be proved universally that truth is in the intellect knowing and judging, and especially because from the perfection which we find in our intellect, joined nevertheless to many imperfections of composition and division, we more easily rise to knowing the perfection of the truth of a higher intellect, the imperfection of composition and division being removed. Lastly note that since here, and especially in the preceding article, it has been defined by St. Thomas that truth is principally in the intellect rather than in things, it is necessary in such a locution to take the intellect as distinct from things, according to the proper account by which it is intellect, and not as it is a certain thing. Wherefore it must be taken as knowing the truth by which it is conformed to the thing known. And the reason for this is: because if the intellect is taken as it is a certain thing having conformity in itself, and not as knowing it, it has this in common with the other things which in that way are true, as we said in the preceding article: therefore, in order that truth be attributed to the intellect in a special way and not commonly as to any thing whatever, it is necessary to take the intellect according to those things which are proper to it, namely, as it is knowing the truth, and in this way truth is said to be in the intellect as in the one knowing the truth.

To the arguments made it is answered. To the first, it has already been answered in the first note.

To the second it is answered by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent: in any thing whatever truth is found commonly or transcendentally, I grant; but as in the knowing and judging subject, it is only in the intellect, and this is the proper mode by which truth is in the intellect. To the confirmation it is answered similarly: let the antecedent pass, and I distinguish the consequent: as in the knowing and judging subject, I deny that truth is in the intellect itself by the very fact that it knows some simple quiddity; but commonly or transcendentally I grant, which will be further explained in the solution to the fifth.

To the third it is to be noted that Cajetan, in his Commentary on this article, seems to say that the intellect is then formally true, in the way in which truth is attributed to the intellect, when it apprehends a true proposition. For then, he says, the intellect is true in this way, when it knows the conformity of itself to the thing. But to know the conformity of itself to the thing is nothing other than to know something in itself as conformed to the thing: but this is nothing other than to apprehend some complex; for by apprehending ly homo est, I apprehend something as conformed. These are the words of Cajetan, by which I confess that beginners can be deceived, thinking that in the apprehensive proposition alone, before judgment supervenes, the intellect is constituted formally true or false. But the truth is the opposite: for the intellect is not conformed or difform to the thing before it judges. Wherefore, for the full understanding of this, note that since the true bespeaks an order to the intellect as perfective of it, the intellect can be perfected and conformed to the things themselves in four ways. First, through an intelligible likeness. Second, through a simple concept, by which it knows the simple quiddity of the thing. Third, through an apprehensive proposition, which the intellect forms without asserting or judging, as happens in those who doubt. Fourth, through a judicative proposition, which the intellect forms by asserting and saying or judging, as when the intellect assertively says, homo est risibilis. And then first is the intellect formally true, because then it is conformed to the thing signified by the proposition, and this comes about when the intellect judges the thing to be as is signified by that proposition. But that this is the mind of the Holy Doctor is manifestly clear from the words of this article, where he says that when the intellect judges a thing to be so as is the form which it apprehends of the thing, then first it knows and says the true. He says the same in On Truth, q. 1, art. 3. And it is proved: for the true is the perfection of our intellect, and for this reason it bespeaks an order to the intellect as perfective of it; but the intellect is not reckoned altogether and absolutely perfect through the apprehensive proposition alone, but through judgment; for through it, it is conformed to the thing itself, by knowing the thing to be as it is: therefore then first is truth formally in the intellect, as in the one knowing the truth. Second this is proved. Every other operation of our intellect, and every discourse of it, is ordered to this, that it judge of things such as they are, attributing some things to some and removing some: therefore then first does it attain its perfection, and then first does it know and say the true, when through such judgment it is conformed to the things themselves. Nor does Cajetan hold the opposite of this opinion in the article, if it be read attentively; indeed he openly teaches the same, for he says that the intellect then first knows the truth, or the conformity of itself to the thing, when it says, homo est, or homo currit, etc. But it is certain that the intellect says none of these things except when it asserts; and it does not assert until it judges. But what he says, that this is nothing other than to apprehend, is not so to be taken as if he took apprehension as an operation distinct from judgment; but by to apprehend he understands the same as to form or know, yet by judging. But if against this you object, first, that which Aristotle teaches, 1 Perihermeneias, chap. 1, lect. 3, and 5 On the Soul, text 21, that truth is in composition and division, or in the intellect composing and dividing, but when the intellect first apprehends a proposition, it composes before it judges, therefore it is then formally true. For Aristotle was speaking of this kind of truth in those places, as is clear from St. Thomas, 1 Perihermeneias, lect. 3. It is confirmed: in the second operation of our intellect there is truth formally, as the Logicians and Metaphysicians teach from those places of Aristotle; and that apprehensive proposition pertains to the second operation of our intellect, as is evident: therefore etc. It is confirmed second: for then that proposition is true; how then is truth in it? It certainly does not seem otherwise than formally, since it is a mental proposition. It is answered that those places of Aristotle and the like are thus to be understood: in the composition and division of the judging intellect the truth is formally. For in our judgment there certainly is a certain composition, in contrast to angelic judgment, whether our judicative cognition be one or multiple. Similarly it is answered to the first confirmation that in the second operation of the judging intellect there is truth formally, and until the intellect judges it is not formally true or false. To the second confirmation it is answered easily that just as in the vocal and written proposition there is truth as in a sign, so also in the mental one: in the former indeed as in an instrumental sign at will, as the dialecticians say; in the latter, however, as in a formal sign. And from these things the answer to the third main argument is clear. For when St. Thomas says that truth formally is in the intellect composing, composing is understood as composing and judging, as he himself explains in the article.

To the fourth main argument it is answered: I grant the major, and I deny the minor. To its proof the antecedent is denied. And it is to be noted with Cajetan that the intellect can know the conformity of itself to the thing known in two ways. First, in the signified act, as when it knows truth through the simple concept of the true or of conformity, as is signified by this name true or conformity. Second, in the exercised act, and this happens whenever the intellect judges of things, saying that matters stand as it itself forms judgment about things: for which it is not required that it reflect; but it suffices that by a direct act it exercises judgment about the thing, and then it is said to know its conformity in the exercised act. To the confirmation it is answered that the intellect can reflect upon its concept in two ways. In one way through another concept or simple cognition: and thus it knows no conformity of itself in the exercised act. In another way it can reflect through a certain cognition, by which it says I am conformed, or I am not conformed, to the things themselves: and then there is also truth or falsity in this reflection, properly speaking, just as when the intellect directly judges, because then too the intellect composes and divides.

To the fifth it is answered that universality is not the proper account of the object of the intellect, but is a condition of the object consequent upon the action of the intellect itself. But truth is a perfect form existing within the intellect itself. Hence its proper operation, as it is intellect, is not to know the universal, but the true in the exercised act. Wherefore the intellect will not be perfect according to its proper form until it knows the truth by exercising judgment about things.

There is a DOUBT: whether the true bespeaks an intrinsic order to the intellect? And it seems not. For the true is converted with being; but being does not bespeak an intrinsic order to the intellect: therefore neither does the true. Second. For otherwise it would follow that the nature of the true were relative, which nevertheless will be impugned below. The sequel is proved: for that which bespeaks an intrinsic order to another is relative. Third. If by any account the true bespoke an intrinsic order to the intellect, it would be because it is the object of the intellect; but this account is null: therefore etc. The minor is proved: for the object precedes the power itself; therefore it does not bespeak an intrinsic order to it. It is proved second: because being is the object of the intellect, and yet does not bespeak an intrinsic order to the intellect: therefore neither does the true.

To this it is briefly answered that the true imports an intrinsic order to the intellect; thus St. Thomas teaches, artic. seq., where he says that just as the good adds upon being the account of the appetible, so also the true [adds] the comparison to the intellect. The same St. Thomas teaches more openly, On Truth, q. 1, art. 2, where he says that, any intellect whatever being removed, the account of truth would in no way remain. And it is proved: Truth, intrinsically, is the adequation of the intellect to the thing or of the thing to the intellect, as we explained, art. 1: therefore etc. Moreover. The true, from its own and intrinsic account, adds something upon being; but it is not understood what that is which it adds, unless it be the order to the intellect; therefore it includes this order intrinsically. Hence just as the good is the object of the will, and bespeaks an intrinsic order to the will, so also the true bespeaks an intrinsic order, at least in the mode of saying and as it were obliquely, to the intellect. And by these, to the objections.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because each thing is knowable insofar as it has of being.

Second conclusion: Just as the good bespeaks an order to the appetite, so also the true [bespeaks] the comparison to the intellect.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT in this article: what does the true add upon being, and whether that which it adds is something real, or only of reason?

To this doubt Durandus, in 1 Sentences, d. 19, qq. 5 and 6, answers that truth is nothing other than the conformity of the same thing to itself according to one and another to-be, namely, according to the to-be of the intellect and real to-be; and thus truth is a relation of reason, insofar as the thing itself, as it is understood, is conformed to itself as it is in itself on the side of reality. For which Durandus notes that things have a twofold to-be: one which belongs to them on the side of reality, the operation of our intellect being excluded, as to be a man, to be white; another which belongs to them through the operation of the intellect, as to be a genus, to be a species. He notes second that the real thing itself, insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, not by means of a simple concept alone, but by means of a judicative proposition, becomes conformed to itself according to the real to-be which it has on the side of reality; and since this conformity belongs to things only through the operation of the intellect, hence it is that it is only a being of reason. Whence he infers that truth is nowhere subjectively, but only objectively in the intellect. This too seems to have been the opinion of Hervaeus, Quodlibet, book 3, question 1. And it is proved first. Truth is only objectively in the intellect, and not subjectively: therefore it is a being of reason. The antecedent is proved: for if truth is subjectively in the intellect, it is necessary that there be in it a certain conformity to the thing, either in being or in representing: but neither of these is in the intellect. I prove: not in being, for the intellect, and whatever is subjectively in it, is a spiritual accident, but the thing known is sometimes a material substance: therefore between them there is no conformity in being. Nor even in representing. It is proved: because by nature the thing is represented to the intellect through the impressed likeness before it is actually known by the intellect: therefore the actual cognition of the intellect is not [one] of conformity to the thing. Second it is proved from Aristotle, 6 Metaphysics, text 8, where he says that it does not pertain to the metaphysician to treat of truth: therefore truth is not a real being, otherwise it would be incumbent on the metaphysician to deal with it. And we confirm this argument from St. Thomas, saying here to the third, that the account of the true follows upon the apprehension of the mind; therefore it is a being of reason. And Cajetan says here that the good formally is the object of the will, but the true is not the formal object of the intellect, but is a condition of the object, not however a condition which follows upon the operation of the intellect, but one which accompanies it and assists it. Third it is proved. The true is the object to which the intellect ultimately tends; but the intellect ultimately tends to the things themselves: therefore truth consists in the conformity of things in their order to themselves, and not in the conformity of the intellect to the thing. It is confirmed: for the true is a passion of being: therefore it follows upon real beings themselves, and is founded rather in them than in the operation of the intellect. Fourth it is argued: for if truth is the conformity of a proposition existing in the intellect to the thing, it follows that it denominates only the intellect itself, or the mental proposition, and not the things themselves existing on the side of reality; but this is impossible, for then the true would not be a passion of being: therefore etc. Into this opinion of Durandus Soncinas seems to fall, 6 Metaphysics, question 16.

For the explication of truth let this be the first conclusion: Truth, whether it be taken transcendentally, or formally according as it is principally in the intellect, is a real entity. It is proved first: Truth in God is a divine perfection, for God is his truth, as he is his to-be: therefore also in all other things truth is something real. The consequence is proved: because just as we know the divine Wisdom through the wisdom of creatures, so we attribute truth to God from created truth, as was explained in the preceding article: therefore truth, in its whole community, is a perfection simply, like being. And it is confirmed: The truth of God is the measure and per se cause of every other truth; therefore the truth of created things is a real entity. The consequence is proved: because of a being of reason there is no per se cause, but it follows upon the operation of the intellect. Second it is proved: the perfection of our intellect does not consist in an entity of reason, since it is itself a certain real power: but truth is its perfection: therefore it is a real entity. Third it is proved: the passions of real being are something real; but truth is a proper passion of real being: therefore it is something real.

Second conclusion: truth is not distinguished really from being, but only in reason, not indeed by reason reasoning alone, but also by reasoned reason, which has a foundation in the thing itself. It is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas in the article. Each thing is knowable insofar as it has of being: where St. Thomas takes knowable or intelligible for the object of the intellect, which is the true, as if he said, each thing participates the account of the intelligible and of the true insofar as it participates the account of being: therefore truth is not distinguished really from being. This conclusion all metaphysicians acknowledge. But there is a difference, for some of them say that being and the true are distinguished in reason as a being of reason from real being; we however say that truth formally is something real, because it is a certain real passive conformity.

For the greater explication of which let there be the third conclusion, by which the question is answered: the true does not add upon being something real really distinct, but adds expressly a certain real perfection of being, which we do not conceive by this name being. This conclusion is explained: for just as we know the Divine Essence by one and another concept, e.g. of wisdom, of goodness, etc., and by one concept something real is signified which is not formally signified by the other, although it is not really distinct; so we say that being itself, and whatever is enclosed in it, we do not know distinctly by one concept, but by one concept we know the unity of being, and by another the truth, and by another the very account of being, abstracting from this and from that, etc., although these are not really distinguished among themselves. And just as, although the one imports a certain negation of division, nevertheless unity itself is not a negation, but a real entity, which is explained through the negation of division. As also immortality and incorruptibility are real perfections, which are nevertheless explained through the negation of death and corruption. In this manner, the true imports truth, which is a certain real entity and perfection; but which must nevertheless be explained through the relation to the intellect, although it is not itself a relation, as we shall say below. For the understanding of which it is to be noted that the perfection of each created thing is to participate something of the perfection of being; but since an intellective being is more perfect than that which lacks intellect, because it is more immaterial, and again a being intellective by essence is more perfect than one knowing by participation, hence it is that it is the greatest perfection of every created being that it be reduced to the intellect of God as to a measure, from which it receives its to-be and all its perfection. Every creature, therefore, insofar as it imitates the to-be of God, is called a being; insofar, however, as it imitates the intellect of God, as it is his work, it is called true. But insofar as it understands by imitating the operation of God, it is the most perfect of all creatures, and is said to be made to the image of God; and again among rational creatures themselves, that one is more perfect which more imitates the divine intellect.

To the arguments. To the first of Durandus it is answered by denying the antecedent. And to the proof the minor is denied. For there is in the intellect a conformity to the thing, not indeed in being, for of this we are not now speaking, but there is a conformity in representing. Since the intellect through judgment is formally conformed to the things themselves, in a certain representative to-be: and such a form of judgment takes the place of the things, which cannot per se immediately be united and present to the intellect so that it judge concerning them. He grants nevertheless that, since things are denominated true through an order to our intellect, such denomination is extrinsic and through a relation of reason. But what Durandus asserts, that the thing is present to the intellect through the impressed likeness, is in a certain way true, but nevertheless the thing is not formally represented as true until the judgment of the intellect supervenes, as St. Thomas expressly taught in the preceding article. To the second it is answered first that truth as it is in the intellect is not a passion of being, but as it is in things, as St. Thomas teaches here, to the first, and therefore its consideration does not pertain to the metaphysician. It is answered second that, although the formal truth which is in the intellect is a real being, nevertheless the consideration of it in particular does not belong to the metaphysician: for it is not for the metaphysician to deal with every real being in particular, but under the account of being in common. To the confirmation it is answered that by those words St. Thomas wished to signify nothing other than that the account of the true is together with the apprehension of being, when the intellect judges that something is or is not; and Cajetan holds the same. From which it does not follow that formal truth is a being of reason. To the third it is answered that the intellect tends to the mental proposition itself as to an intrinsic term; and to the things themselves, which it principally intends to know, as to an extrinsic term. That first is the proper and per se perfection of the intellect; the second, however, is not so. Wherefore although the intellect tends to both, the account of the true consists rather in the first than in the second. To the confirmation it is answered that there is one account of the true, which is a passion of being, and another of formal truth, which is in the intellect. To the fourth it is answered that the truth which is in our intellect denominates the intellect formally true; and by the same truth things are said to be true by extrinsic denomination, insofar as they are the cause of the truth which is in the intellect.

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the true, formally speaking, imports something absolute, or something respective? And it seems that it imports a relation formally. The true is said from truth as from a denominating form, as white from whiteness; but truth is defined through the conformity of one to another, as was said in article 1; but conformity formally is a relation: therefore also truth. Second. For St. Thomas said in the preceding article that for the intellect to know truth is to know the conformity of itself to the thing: therefore truth consists in this conformity, or adequation, or likeness, which is a certain relation. Third. The true adds something upon being: but it is not understood what it adds unless this relation of conformity: therefore the true formally imports a relation.

To this doubt Durandus, in the place cited above, says that truth is principally and formally something respective. Cajetan seems to say the same in the preceding article, at the end. Let this nevertheless be the conclusion: The true, simply speaking, imports something absolute, which nevertheless cannot be explained without a respect. Thus St. Thomas teaches, On Truth, q. 1, art. 8, and Capreolus in 1, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 5; Soncinas, 6 Metaphysics, q. 17. The conclusion is explained, and at the same time proved both of the truth which is in things and of the truth of the intellect. For just as knowledge is something absolute, yet bespeaking an order to the knowable, so also the true which is in things is an absolute perfection, which nevertheless is not explained without a respect to the intellect. Similarly also the true which is in the intellect signifies the judgment by which the intellect judges of the thing with a bearing and conformity to the thing itself. The conclusion is therefore proved: the truth which is in the divine intellect is a certain greatest perfection; therefore it is that eternal judgment which God has of himself: therefore it is not the conformity of that judgment to the thing signified, for this is a relation of reason, like the relation of the same to itself: therefore similarly, the truth which is in the created intellect is the conformed judgment itself; but the relation of conformity itself is not truth, but something consequent upon truth, just as the relation of conformity in knowledge is something consequent upon knowledge, and just as conformity or difformity to a rule is not moral goodness and malice, but consequent upon it. But if you argue: for truth is commonly defined as the adequation of the intellect to the thing, or of the thing to the intellect, therefore the relation of adequation and conformity itself is truth; it is answered that there the word adequation is not taken formally for the relation of adequation, but for the foundation, namely for the judgment which is adequated. Moreover, for when we say that God is the first truth, we explain a certain great perfection which is in God, and completes the divine judgment: therefore it imports something absolute. Moreover, he who says this to be true gold, a true man, signifies the nature of man, and of gold; but those natures are something absolute: therefore the true also imports something absolute. Further, the true is the greatest perfection of our intellect: therefore it is not a relation. The consequence is proved: for a relation is the least entity.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered that they prove that the true imports something absolute which cannot be explained without a respect, as knowledge and power, etc. But in particular to the third it is answered that what the true adds upon being is not distinguished from being really, but only by reasoned reason, yet is something absolute, as we explained in the preceding doubt. But you ask whether that respect of conformity, through which the account of the true is explained, is a real respect or one of reason. About this see Soncinas, 6 Metaphysics, q. 17, and Javelli, in his treatise On the Transcendentals, chap. 5. But nevertheless it is answered that, speaking of the relation of conformity which divine truth has to its essence, it is a relation of reason on the part of both extremes. But if we speak of the relation of conformity which the judgment of our intellect bespeaks to the things judged, it abstracts from real and of reason, for sometimes it is real, namely when the things of which it judges exist on the side of reality; sometimes it is a relation of reason, namely when things do not exist, for a real relation requires real extremes. But if we speak of the truth which is in things, in order to the divine intellect, that relation of conformity which the creature bespeaks to the divine idea, for the whole time in which the creature exists, is a real relation. But the conformity which a thing bespeaks to our speculative intellect is a respect of reason, for the things themselves are the measure of the truth which is in the intellect; but the relation of the measure to the measured, although on the part of the measured it is a real relation, nevertheless on the part of the measure it is a relation of reason. But if the thing be compared to the practical intellect, it is a real relation, such as is between the thing made and its cause. For the house outside is the effect of the art which is in the mind of the craftsman. And let these suffice on this whole question. See the following articles, especially article 7, in which St. Thomas determines that no created truth is eternal. Where a question could be formed: whether propositions in which the predicate is said of the subject, in the first and second mode of saying per se, are of perpetual truth? But nevertheless on this matter see Cajetan, 1 Posterior Analytics, chap. 9, doubts 1, 2 and 3, and Soncinas, 9 Metaphysics, qq. 4 and 5, and what we said above, q. 10, art. 3; and below, q. 19, art. 8, doubt 2, note 2, certain things are to be found.