Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: If an idea be taken as it is a principle of working, there are ideas in God of all things which have been produced, or at some time will be produced. Second conclusion: If an idea be taken as it is a principle of knowing, there are ideas in God of all possible creatures. These conclusions are clear from the first and second articles.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED: Whether the idea of a possible thing, which will never exist, is practical? And it seems that it is not. For St. Thomas in the body of the article says that of those things which will never be future we posit ideas in God according as an idea is a principle of knowing, but not according as it is a principle of working. And in the solution to the second he says that of things which are not future God does not have an idea as an idea is an imitable exemplar: therefore according to St. Thomas, the idea of possible things is not practical but speculative. To this doubt let this be the first conclusion: simply speaking, it must be granted that an idea of this kind is practical. It is proved first from St. Thomas, q. 3 On Truth, art. 3, in the solution to 1 and 2. It is proved secondly. God through an idea of this kind knows a creature as it is operable, and knows it in an operable manner: and so, if he wished to produce the thing, he would not need another idea, but through this idea which he now has he would produce the thing itself: therefore it is a practical idea. It is confirmed: for the account of practical science and of a practical idea, one must look not to the end of the one working, but to the intrinsic mode of the science and idea itself: therefore from the fact that God does not wish to produce some thing outwardly, it may not be gathered that he does not have a practical idea of that thing, if nevertheless the idea itself by its nature can be a principle of producing that thing. It is confirmed secondly: St. Thomas, in the solution to the second of this article, speaks in the same way of the idea of possible things and of the divine knowledge of those same things; but the knowledge of possible things is simply practical: therefore. The minor is gathered from St. Thomas, in the last article of the preceding question, where he says that the divine knowledge of possible things is not practical insofar as the practical is said from the end, where he insinuates that it is simply practical and in a qualified sense speculative, as the account of the speculative and the practical is taken from the end: but an exemplary form imports the character of a cause: therefore an idea essentially imports the character of a cause, and consequently is simply practical. From this it follows that the mental word and the idea differ, and the difference consists in this, that the word is a ground of knowing only, but the idea is a ground not only of knowing but also of working. Wherefore the word is a speculative ground, simply speaking, but the idea is a practical ground.

Second conclusion: The idea of possible things which have never been produced is in some way, in a qualified sense, not practical. It is proved: for every practical principle which is in the intellect, whether it be a habit or an idea, is consummated and completed in the character of an operative and practical principle through determination to the work, which determination it takes from the will; but the idea of these things does not have determination from the will to the work: nay rather, the divine will is determined not to work through a likeness of this kind: therefore this idea does not have all its completion in the character of a practical principle, and consequently is in some way and in a qualified sense not practical. This second assertion St. Thomas intends to teach in the words which we have cited for the negative part of this doubt. The solutions of the arguments of this article are to be noted, that we may know of which things God has ideas: and St. Thomas is to be read, q. 3 On Truth, where these things are explained one by one.

Concerning the solution to the first, it is to be noted that the imperfections which are found in creatures fall under a twofold difference: some are defects of nature, and are privations of some perfection due in to-be, such as blindness. But some are natural conditions of things, which do not import the privation of some perfection due, but the negation of a higher perfection not due, such as potential and material to-be, finite to-be and participated to-be.

Then let this be the first conclusion: in God there is no idea of the first kind, whether it be taken in the abstract or in the concrete. And so God does not have an idea of blindness, nor of the blind man, formally speaking. It is proved: for God does not have in himself an effective principle of blindness, or of the blind man, since these imperfections do not come from the active power of God, but from the defect of a particular nature: therefore.

Second conclusion: of an imperfection of the second kind God does not have an idea, if these imperfections be considered formally in the character of imperfection, that is, insofar as they are negations of a greater perfection. This is proved, since a negation, as such, does not have any principle: therefore neither an idea.

Let this be the third conclusion: God has an idea of these imperfections of the second kind, if they be taken in the concrete: that is, he has an idea of the things which intrinsically include these imperfections, e.g. he has an idea of matter, which is pure potency. It is proved. For these imperfections, taken materially and in the concrete, are certain positive entities: for the potentiality of matter, according to the thing, is the substantial entity of matter itself: therefore, as such, they have an idea, for of any producible entity whatever God has an idea.